CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN “ISLAMIC DEMOCRACIES”: MILITARY INTERVENTION & WITHDRAWAL IN ALGERIA, PAKISTAN, & TURKEY

By

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To the Faculty of Washington State University:

The members of the Committee appointed to examine the dissertation of PAUL ERNEST LENZE, JR. find it satisfactory and recommend that it be accepted.

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CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN “ISLAMIC DEMOCRACIES”: MILITARY INTERVENTION & WITHDRAWAL IN ALGERIA, PAKISTAN, & TURKEY

Abstract

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This dissertation examines civil-military relations in Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey, specifically how military interventions and withdrawals have occurred in these three states. The major questions this project seeks to answer are: why do militaries intervene in politics and why do militaries return to the barracks? These states’ militaries use nationalism to justify their interventions in politics while ensuring that withdrawal only occurs if national identity is protected. Nationalism, for the Algerian, Pakistani and Turkish militaries, is used to paper over the ethnic and linguistic differences of regional groups within the state. The use of nationalism by the military is not used to strengthen the Algerian, Pakistani and Turkish nation-state; instead, it strengthens the Algerian, Pakistani and Turkish praetorian state.

Using Preston and ‘t Hart’s (1999) bureau-political framework, this study builds upon Schiff’s (1996; 2009) concordance theory to measure the level of conflict in the civil-military relationships of Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey. Through a comparison of politicians, the military and society in these states, this dissertation seeks to build mid-range theory to improve our understanding of the persistence of military involvement in politics and enduring authoritarianism in the Middle East and South Asia.
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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

*The same causes which produce military intervention in politics...lie not in the nature of the group but in the structure of society. In particular, they lie in the absence or weakness of effective political institutions in the society.—Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968, 195-6)*

*Huntington’s view that the political systems of a society best account for military intervention appears to hold water. But that may not present the full picture. Many countries stumble on their way to nationhood and stable polities without fully developed political systems. So, it may well be the interaction of military and political leaders and their respective ambitions and inclinations that account for some of these interventions.—Shuja Nawaz, Crossed Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within (2008, 139 [emphasis mine])*

The clock strikes 4 AM. Over the radio a codeword is transmitted. Upon hearing this signal, 2 armored brigades and 1 infantry brigade move out from their barracks just outside the city limits. Within minutes troops have cordoned off the capital and the state’s two other major cities, surrounding the state television, radio station, airport and major roads. Troops then moved toward the offices of the two main political parties and the residences of the party leaders and prime minister. The junta—consisting of the Chief of the General Staff, various generals, and a handful of field-rank officers fanned out to key government offices, the television and radio stations.

At this point, the junta announces over the air that they have overthrown the government for excessive corruption and conduct threatening the “security” of the state. Over the next few weeks, the junta establishes connections with bureaucrats within the massive state bureaucracy, as well as with compliant politicians from one, or possibly both, political parties. In fact, one of the ultra-conservative members of the junta reaches out to a friend in a far right (read: Islamist) party to curry favor essentially to allow this party the opportunity to oppose the operation. This
does two things: 1. The junta will be able to gain support of those political forces which fear the other parties more than the military junta; and 2. The junta will be able to step forward and fight other groups after associating them as extremists or terrorists. Finally, the junta and their allies in government declare martial law to ensure that control can be maintained as “reforms” are implemented throughout government and society.¹

The scenario described above has been common for many years, but the “feasibility of the coup derives from a comparatively recent development: the rise of the modern state with its professional bureaucracy and standing armed forces” (Luttwak 1968 [1979], 19). Thus, according to Kees Koonings and Dirk Kruijt (2002), “The military have played an important, if not a central role in the process of nation building and state formation over the past hundred years. In the majority of nation-states that have emerged and…consolidated during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, military politics was the rule rather than the exception” (1).

Essentially, the militaries of these states have a few common features identifiable across cases: “strong identification of the military with the fate of the nation and its core values, emphasis on the theme of order and especially the protection of the integrity of the state, national strength and development, and a military doctrine that links the destiny of the nation and the interests of the people to the historic mission of the military. Often,…national values derived from prevailing religious or ideological paradigms (Christianity, Islam, nationalism, socialism) are invoked to lend ‘higher support’ to the intervention” (Koonings and Kruijt 2002, 10). As Cottam and Cottam (2001) note, “Although nationalism can produce acts of grotesque violence, it is not a pathology; it is a natural form of group identity. It can be manipulated by demagogues, but it can also be channeled” (278). Therefore, this dissertation will systematically test how the

¹ For a more complete description of a coup d’etat, see Edward Luttwak’s (1968 [1979]) excellent primer, Coup d’Etat: A Practical Handbook.
militaries of Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey have channeled nationalism for their own purposes in an attempt to define what it means to be Algerian, Pakistani, or Turkish.

Civil-Military Relations in the Developing World

Why would the militaries of Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey intervene in politics and what factors are necessary for their withdrawal? These questions are not new to the scholarly literature; in fact, these cases have been selected because they represent the most recent instances of military interventions and withdrawals in the world. After World War II, decolonization and national independence movements occasioned an increase in the role of the military in the Developing World. More specifically, the military was generally the strongest institution in a new state due to the former colonial powers’ monetary and training assistance. More often than not, politicians would be fighting for power often with motives that contradicted those of the military. The conduct of national affairs, according to Koonings and Kruijt (2002), “is too important to leave to civilians, especially in situations of crisis: collapse of governability or legitimacy of the existing regime, severe socio-economic problems and contradictions, internal conflicts or violent upheavals. We…observe a more generally ambiguous relation of the military with the notion of ‘democracy’” (21).

Therefore, officers take it upon themselves to be the defender of “the national interest”: “First, there is the notion that the military institution is exceptionally well placed not only to defend but also to define the essence of the nation by birthright and competence. Second, the military ‘know’ that ‘civilians’, that is to say, civilian politicians, the institutional framework of civic governance, the actions of societal interest groups, and the overall political culture tend to be inadequate to address the needs of the nation” (Koonings and Kruijt 2002, 19). Put simply, the military (as the strongest institution present at the birth of the nation) knows what is best for
the nation and competent to defend the nation because their organizational characteristics and resources allow them to do so (Koonings and Kruijt 2002, 21).

21st Century Nation-Building

The influence of the military in the politics of the Middle East and South Asia has garnered renewed attention since 9/11, but more recently, since the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The U.S., in its attempt to nation-build, must overcome the prevalence of authoritarianism in a region where the military is an important institution for regime survival. The recent flooding in Pakistan, in July 2010, caused renewed unrest among the ranks of the Pakistani military as they were responding to the flood and assisting their countrymen while President Ali Zadari was out of the country in England (Perlez, 9/28/10). Situations of domestic crisis raise the awareness within the military of the ineffectiveness of politicians to address the security of the nation. Not just in Pakistan, but in the Arab world as well, the military has been drawn in to “correct” the perceived failings of politicians. Thus, a vacuum of authority is created, which the military is often ready to step in and fill as the guardian of the nation.

As the U.S. is now nine years on in its nation-building endeavors in Afghanistan and seven years in Iraq, understanding military intervention and withdrawal is important because democratization and nation-building cannot happen unless one addresses the failure of political institutions. Understanding how conflict between politicians and the military manifests itself in Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey offers insight into how we might begin to understand what factors will end the endurance of authoritarianism in the Middle East and South Asia.

Plan of the Dissertation

In Chapter Two, the relevant literature underpinning this work will be examined. Specifically, the literature on the role of the military in politics will be examined with an eye towards the military’s relationship with political elites and society in the Middle East and South
Asia. Since this dissertation seeks to measure the conflict present in this relationship, bureapolitics will be used as a measure of conflict to build upon concordance theory—one of the latest theories regarding civil-military relations in the Developing World.

Chapter Three lays down the “rules of the road” by asking: “Why do militaries intervene in politics and, subsequently, Why do militaries return to the barracks?” Several hypotheses are developed regarding the relationship of military elites vis-à-vis political elites; political elites vis-à-vis society; and the influence of international actors, such as the United States, Russia, or the European Union.

Chapters Four, Five and Six are the case studies of Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey, respectively. There are a number of similarities and differences across these three dynamic cases. Accordingly, these cases are an examination of the extent conflict is present in the civil-military relationships throughout each state’s history. Chapter Seven ties everything together and highlights which causal factors predominate the civil-military relationships in the Middle East and South Asia necessitating “men on horseback” coming to the aid of the nation. Studying the causes and consequences of military interventions and withdrawals, in the end, allows for a better understanding of the importance of the military as an institutional explanation for enduring authoritarianism in the Middle East and South Asia.
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

Civil-Military Relations is a sub-field of political science concerned with the study of militaries and their relationship with political leadership. The study of civil-military relations traces its origins to the classic work by Samuel Huntington, *Soldier & the State*, written in the 1950s. Huntington (1957) examines the military as an institution in western democracies and argues that professionalism is the key to military autonomy and maintaining objective civilian control over the military. In a sense, “[m]anaging the coercive power of the military—making sure that those who govern do not become tyranny to the governed—is the central focus of civil-military relations” (Feaver 2007, 4). Subsequently in the 1960s and 1970s, scholars were concerned with political development and the role militaries had in the modernization of various Third World states. This necessitated the study of the military as both an institution and a societal phenomenon affecting politics.

Generally, scholars have asked the following questions regarding the relationship between military officers and political development: Why do militaries engage in *coup d’états*?; How do military dictatorships fare? There are three theoretical schools of thought regarding military intervention in these states’ politics. One group puts more emphasis on the organizational dynamics within the army then on outside forces influencing states. Janowitz (1964[1977]) is the leading scholar of this view. He examined the structure of the military and concluded that the military’s organizational unity, cohesion, and control over the ‘instruments of violence’ allowed it to intervene in politics more readily than civilians (27-8, 31-2).

Huntington’s (1968) *Political Order in Changing Societies* also addresses military intervention in politics and argues that intervention is a result of general politicization of social
forces and institutions. The inability of political institutions to cope with increasing social mobilization causes disorder and chaos thereby increasing the likelihood of military intervention (196). Huntington argues that the military as an institution is “the advance guard of the middle class” which promotes social and economic reform, and national integration (222). The weakness of civilian institutions and civilian politicians to deal with their state’s problems causes the military to become politicized.

The second group focuses on society as reason for military rule. In *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics*, Finer (1976) examines how the military intervenes in politics and concludes that the form military intervention takes is different for each society. Specifically, he looks at subjective and objective factors, which he calls the disposition and opportunity to intervene in politics. In short, a military’s disposition to intervene in politics comes from the following reasons: the national interest, corporate self-interest, social (especially ethnic or class) self-interest and individual self-interest (Chapter 4). The military believes it is its political duty to be the custodian of the national interest. This role throughout history has taken a number of forms. On one hand, the military overtly rules the nation and establishes a political agenda. On the other hand, the military is seen as an arbiter or veto that will intervene if a decision or policy by civilian politicians is perceived as a threat to the permanent interest of the nation (31). Intervening on behalf of the national interest is often used by militaries as justification to hide their real motives, that of self-interest and corporate interest. Both terms are highly related, in that the military is considered a professional organization and issues such as pay, military spending and national security matters are considered the purview of the military. As such, Finer argues, “Anxiety to preserve its autonomy provides one of the most widespread and powerful of the motives for [military] intervention” (41). In essence, the disposition to
intervene for Finer is an emotion “….and though it is true that some armed forces, like some individuals, act blindly on their emotions, most people make some kind of rational calculation before doing so” (63). In making the decision to intervene, Finer argues that the objective conditions on the ground in a particular state must be taken into account; these are the “Opportunities to Intervene”.

Finer’s discussion of “Opportunities to Intervene” includes: an increased civilian dependence on the military, the effect of domestic circumstances, and the popularity of the military. As discussed above, the military is generally viewed as a professional organization with an ethos and is often deferred to in regards to national security and foreign policy issues. Finer contends this dates back to the Cold War era. The context of foreign policy decisions at the time involved large military expenditures, a nuclear threat, the increasing technicality of warfare, making decisions by civilian leaders a lot harder since not all of them would be able to competently assess military tactics and strategy (66). Next, some examples of domestic circumstances for intervention would be crises situations, labeled as overt, latent, chronic or power-vacuum situations, where the military must intervene as a police force. This breakdown in domestic security tends to feed the population’s dislike for civilian politicians. The popularity of the military increases with the perception of civilian incompetence and the military as the nation’s savior (73). Taken together, both the disposition and opportunity for intervention coalesce around the strength or weakness of the civilian population’s attachment to civilian institutions. Finer calls this the level of political culture and argues that the higher the level of culture, the fewer opportunities are open for militaries to intervene in politics; and if it tries to intervene anyway, the less support it will receive. Conversely, a lower political culture affords more opportunities for intervention and greater likelihood of public support (75-6). Interestingly,
though, the longer the military stays in power after intervention, the more the level of political
support will wane and turn public opinion against the military (one influence for a military
withdrawing from politics and returning to the barracks). The military’s return to the barracks
will be discussed shortly, but first a discussion of military elites’ self-interest and military
corporate interests is in order.

The third group of interventionist scholars focuses on internal dynamics of military
hierarchy, corporate interests, personal ambitions, and idiosyncrasies of particular military elites.
Scholars such as Eric Nordlinger (1977) and Amos Perlmutter (1977), are concerned with how
the military as an institution influences military elites. Nordlinger’s (1977) *Soldiers in Politics:
Military Coups and Governments* defines military corporatism as the protection and
enhancement of the military’s own interests through adequate budgetary support, autonomy in
managing their internal affairs, the preservation of their responsibilities in the face of
encroachments from rival institutions and the continuity of the institution itself (65). For
Nordlinger, military corporatism is the number one explanation for why militaries intervene.
Another important question asked by Nordlinger is “when do soldiers intervene?” To answer
this question, Nordlinger examines civilian governments’ performance failures and the resulting
loss of legitimacy. In effect, Nordlinger argues, “The officers can more easily rationalize and
justify their coups when acting against incumbents whom they see as incompetent or corrupt.
More important, performance failures lead to the deflation of governmental legitimacy within the
politicized stratum of the civilian population. It is this factor that encourages and allows the
officers to act upon their interventionist motives” (64). Perlmutter (1977) would concur with
Nordlinger’s argument and would add that the decision to intervene is purely a political decision
involving: political readiness and the nature of the coup’s leadership (102).
**Military Withdrawal from Politics**

Once militaries have attained power, they tend not to stay in power very long. In the literature this has been known as military withdrawal or disengagement from politics. Scholars who have studied military intervention have also looked into military withdrawals from politics.

Finer (1977) argues that military disengagement occurs as a culmination of three conditions: the disintegration of the original conspiratorial group, the growing divergence of interests between the junta of rulers and those military who remain as the active leaders of the military branches, and the political difficulties of the regime (174). Nordlinger (1977) argues further that the most important factors behind why militaries disengage are: the desire to retain governmental power and its related privileges is less strongly felt by military than by civilian incumbents, when the military feels civilian governments would not overturn their policies, and to return to life as a professional soldier to preserve the military’s reputation (147).

Claude Welch (1987) examines whether factors specific to a single country (leadership, idiosyncratic historical factors), factors characteristic of a large number of countries or a single geographic region (ethnic diversity, historical patterns of civil-military relations), or factors found universally (economic development, levels of social mobilization) account for varying paths of disengagement (26). Furthermore, Welch (1987) posits six hypotheses on why militaries disengage from politics: 1) Military elites questioning their further involvement in politics; 2) Funding and internal management of the military; namely, that the military will withdraw when they feel that their interests will be respected by civilian governments; 3) the role of the military in protecting the nation or its use in international peacekeeping efforts; 4) to avoid or reduce internal conflict (i.e., strikes, protests or ethnic tensions); 5) the downturn in the economy; and 6) political conditions whereby a civilian political official that is deemed
acceptable to the military is found (21-3). Each of these factors was examined in selected states of Africa and Latin America.

Welch (1992) argued that a typology has yet to develop regarding a military’s return to the barracks despite there being over 80 cases of military disengagement between 1940-1980 (324). In 1992, research regarding military disengagement was linked to broader themes such as the breakdown of authoritarianism and democratization. Most of the research was done on a region-by-region basis through case studies. Patterns were identified in a number of the case studies that were done across Latin America and Europe; namely, the speed and nature of military withdrawal from direct political roles, the relative extent of liberalization and democratization, and the impact of military professionalism on political change (325). In short, these patterns as presented in case studies have, “given the flux, dynamism and uncertainty about the basic phenomena being considered,” by presenting disengagement, liberalization and (re)democratization “more as random events than as manifestations of (potentially) broader currents of change, globally or regionally” (Welch 1992, 324).

Accordingly, Welch (1992) also shows “areas of disagreement or uncertainty” in military training and attitudes, economic impacts, internal disorder, and gradual v. revolutionary change. He argues, “The respective roles of civilians and officers in the process of disengagement, liberalization, and democratization remain disputed” (Welch 1992, 337). Furthermore, Welch (1992) acknowledges, theoretically, the importance economic factors play, as well as the relative merits of gradual change versus revolutionary transformation, saying that evidence of the latter is “mixed and inconclusive” (337). Finally, Welch (1992) discusses the gaps he sees in the disengagement literature reflecting an absence of research by Third World scholars, knowledge of intramilitary attitudes, political culture, and the need for case studies in conjunction with
hypothesis testing. In short, Welch (1992) is an overview of causal phenomena leading to military disengagement, but empirical examples grounded in theory were absent as Welch threw down the gauntlet for future researchers to take up this cause in the search for “exciting, policy-relevant research across a wide variety of political, economic and social settings” (Welch 1992, 339).

Military Interventions & Withdrawals in the Middle East

The Middle East has been a region of the world consistently in need of the policy-relevant research called for by Welch (1992). Since the 1950s and 1960s, regimes in the Middle East were studied for a number of reasons; namely, debates on the causes and consequences of military coups, modernization, and early studies of nationalism and postcolonial state building. However, since the 1980s, scholarship on the Middle East has been marginalized within the study of developing countries and, even more, in the broader field of comparative politics (Posusney 2004, 127). The literature during the 1980s and early 1990s was influenced by the successful democratic transitions occurring throughout Southern and Eastern Europe and Latin America but studying cases that symbolized the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East were “almost completely absent from the most important works on political transitions, including those that explicitly focus on the developing world” (Posusney 2004, 127). In explaining the development of democracy in Latin America and Europe, scholars argued that there are two critical factors involved with transitions: 1) cracks within the regime signal an opportunity for society to organize, and 2) pacts that ensure authoritarian leaders’ interests are secured (Cook 2007, 6).

Throught the 1990s, however, these cracks, or political crises, did not generate political openness in the Middle East. According to Steven Cook (2007), scholarship on the Middle East
“viewed greater political openness in response to Islamist mobilization as an indicator that a transition to democracy was under way. Although the emergence of freedom of expression, the development of an independent press, and the concomitant deterioration in the coercive power of the state did augur the collapse of authoritarian politics in Eastern Europe and Latin America in the late 1980s and early 1990s, this was not the case in the Middle East” (4). In practice, since the 1990s, Islamist movements took advantage of these cracks in authoritarian regimes to participate in the political arena of various states through the use of the pseudodemocratic or semidemocratic institutions present throughout the Middle East. The continued prevalence of these conditions in the Middle East occasioned the study of the endurance of authoritarianism in the region as well as the role militaries can play in maintaining authoritarianism.

The endurance of authoritarianism is the subject of a recent book by Council on Foreign Relations scholar Steven Cook (2007) entitled Ruling But Not Governing: The Military and Political Development in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey. The author examines the Egyptian, Algerian, and Turkish militaries use of democracy as a façade to prolong their rule. Each state has used, according to Cook (2007), “A democratic façade of elections, parliaments, opposition press, and the ostensible guarantee of basic freedoms and rights in these countries’ constitutions [to] . . . provide dedicated counter-elites (in the present cases Islamists) the opportunity to advance their agendas” (x). Although, at the first sign of success by the Islamists, the military regimes step in to nullify the results. Cook argues this pathological pattern of including and excluding Islamists reflects the stability of these regimes (x). To best understand why democratization has not taken hold in the Middle East, Cook highlights the relationship between what he calls the military enclave of military elites and civilian politicians in Egypt, Algeria, and Turkey and proscribes what external actors could do to influence this relationship.
For Cook (2007), the military is an organization with varied interests and because of its “high modernist” nature it is the only institution with the necessary skills needed for modernization (15). There are a hierarchy of interests—lesser-order interests, core-parochial and institutional interests, and existential interests—which influence the military’s relationship with civilian elites. Encroachment on these interests by civilian elites are met with varied responses by the military enclave, especially if the military’s core interests relating to the economy, foreign and security policy, the political and state apparatus, and nationalism are infringed upon. These are considered core interests because:

1) For military elites, economic independence is the best way to achieve economic development;

2) The military is an institution in Egypt, Algeria and Turkey where the formulation and execution of security policy remains the sole province of the officer corps;

3) The military enclaves have embedded within these political systems various means of control and have demonstrated that protecting the integrity of these tools is of primary importance;

4) The military uses nationalist narratives to depict officers as the vanguards of a struggle against colonialism, external aggression, and the realization of the ‘national will’ (Cook 2007, 18-28).

Furthermore, a democratic façade is established that allows the military to “rule but not govern” as the military uses “the presence of pseudo- or quasi democratic institutions allow[ing] authoritarian leaders to claim that they are living up to their oft-invoked principles about democratic governance with practice” (Cook 2007, 134-5). In describing the Egyptian, Algerian,
and Turkish cases, Cook (2007) highlights the friction between Islamists and the military and says that predicting precisely when a military will exert its influence is difficult. Ultimately, the author is defining the unfolding battle over control of state institutions in the Middle East and the persistence of authoritarianism in the region.

**Concordance Theory**

One such researcher who has worked to build upon the civil-military relations literature in the Third World is Rebecca Schiff with her theory of concordance. Put simply, concordance theory argues “that three partners—the military, the political elites, and the citizenry—should aim for a cooperative relationship that might involve separations but does not require it” (Schiff 2009, 32). These three partners must agree on the following four indicators: the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment method, and military style. The officer corps, by virtue of their education and professionalism, oversees the day-to-day functioning of the armed forces. These are “the career soldiers who dedicate their lives to soldiering and to the development of the military and who help to define the relationship of the military to the rest of society” (Schiff 2009, 45). Consequently, the composition of the officer corps is a primary indicator of concordance. Next, the political decision making process refers to the institutions that determine important military interests (such as budget, materiel, military size, and structure) and the relationship between civilian politicians, the military-industrial complex, and whether the citizenry will support this relationship (Schiff 2009, 45-6). Third, recruitment method refers to the system of enlistment of citizens into the armed forces. Schiff (2009) argues that a coercive or persuasive recruitment method influences the possibility of concordance. Coercive methods refer to forcible conscription of citizens and supplies for military purposes and such demands “are often harsh because citizens are forced to cooperate
against their will . . . [preventing] concordance between the military and the citizenry” (Schiff 2009, 46). Alternatively, persuasive methods refer to the voluntary or involuntary enlistment based on a population’s belief that military service “is worthwhile for the sake of security, patriotism, or any other national cause. . . . imply[ing] an agreement among the political leadership, the military, and the citizenry over the requirements and composition of the armed forces” (Schiff 2009, 46). The final indicator, military style, refers “to the external manifestations and inner mental constructions associated with the military: what it looks like, what ethos drives it, and what people think about it” (Schiff 2009, 47). In a sense, Schiff is describing military professionalism and whether or not civilian politicians and citizens respect it. If they do, than concordance occurs.

Therefore, concordance theory postulates that domestic military intervention is less likely to occur when there is agreement among the military and civilian elites on the four indicators (Schiff 1995; Schiff 2009). For Schiff (2009), concordance is a theory highlighting “dialogue, accommodation, and shared values among the military, the political elites, and society”, thereby “. . . . determining the military’s role in the domestic sphere (i.e., the government and society” (Schiff 2009, 43). Cooperation and agreement results “in a range of civil-military patterns, including separation, the removal of civil-military boundaries, and other variations” (Schiff 1996). This ambiguity in defining her theory opened Schiff (1995) up to critiques from Western civil-military relations scholars who have long emphasized the importance of objective civilian control as first discussed by Huntington (1957). In her attempt to move beyond the western model of civil-military relations, to account for the Post-Cold War world, Schiff (1996; 2009) essentially incorporated elements from the institutional and sociological schools of civil-military
relations. Schiff (1995; 2009) argued that concordance theory was a reconsideration of Huntington’s theory of civil military relations.

Richard Wells (1996) in “A Theory of Concordance in Civil/Military Relations: A Commentary” argued that Schiff’s article does not represent anything ‘new’ in the way of theory (269). His contention with concordance theory can be boiled down to two points: 1) the characterization of civil-military boundaries and how separate they are; and 2) the predictive and applied value of concordance theory. In response, Schiff (2009) argues “that there is no ‘single concrete standard of civilian control’ nor should there be; nor is it always politically neutral; and social groups across the spectrum of ethnic and religious lines, for example, may recognize and relate to the military in vastly different ways” (37-8). On the second point regarding the predictive and applied value of concordance theory, Wells (1996) asks:

if agreement of three partners on four indicators is an index of intervention, is agreement a condition of a subsequent state of intervention or nonintervention, or is intervention the condition of agreement? It would seem that the theory would have certain problems of application. How is one to distinguish between the absence of intervention and the presence of agreement? The argument seems to presume that agreement/concordance is somehow unrelated to forms of coercion/persuasion (Wells 1996, 272).

Accordingly, Schiff (2009) argues for the need for cultural understanding: “To assume that “civil” as it appears in post-World War II United States should apply to all nations, even non-Western ones that may possess no real history of the civil or a variant society, is to offer imported assumptions about the indigenous and historical character of a nation” (48).

Wells’ (1996) second point is valid. Schiff’s The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations (2009) provides a disparate number of empirical cases on which to test her theory—from post-revolutionary United States from 1790-1800, India
and Pakistan, Argentina’s Peron Period from 1946-55, and Israel. Her case studies are organized around the four indicators referenced above; however, military interventions occurred during different time periods, with differing cultures, and political and military institutions involved, thereby making the comparison across the cases more difficult. Therefore, to improve the understanding of the relationship between the military, politicians, and society, the use of bureapoltics can measure the level of ‘agreement’ or concordance between these actors’ various interests. Moreover, through a study of two regions (in this case, the Middle East and South Asia) with states sharing similar characteristics—politically, economically, and socially—comparisons can be made that should lend to the strengthening of the theory for the broader civil-military relations literature.

**Strengthening Concordance: Bureapoltics as a Measure**

The study of bureaucratic politics has been in vogue for many years, dating back to the time of Max Weber and Woodrow Wilson, but only within the last 50 years with the need to find alternative explanations for state behavior in international relations, has bureaucratic politics become an acceptable explanatory variable. While realists view states as unitary rational actors, bureaucratic politics sees policymaking as a pluralistic endeavor with multiple stakeholders, be it organizations or individuals, each vying to have their say (’t Hart & Rosenthal, 1998). Scholars interested in examining the influence of bureaucratic politics examine the influence bureaucracy has on a state’s foreign policymaking. More specifically, the study of bureaucratic politics still relies heavily on seminal works by Graham Allison (1971) and Morton Halperin (1974). Their work, however, was only an initial effort which drew many criticisms for their conceptual and methodological deficiencies (see Welch 1992). Today, foreign policy scholars are still wrestling with how to use bureaucratic politics as an explanatory variable because “international relations
scholars have tended to treat bureaucratic politics as an invariant feature of the foreign policy process instead of as a contingent phenomenon whose form and intensity vary across situations, policy domains, and national administrative systems” (Preston & ’t Hart, 1999).

Accordingly, scholars sought to study bureaucratic politics as a dependent variable. One example is Rosati (1981), who examines both the decision structure and the decision context. The decision structure is defined as the degree of top-level involvement in the decision-making process and the decision context is the critical and non-critical nature of the issue in the broader external setting (Preston & ’t Hart, 1999). As a result, Rosati (1981) hypothesizes that bureaucratic politics will most likely emerge in middle-range issues. Here, moderate issue salience causes executive involvement to be low and many bureaucratic actors enter the decision-making arena (Preston & ’t Hart, 1999). This helps explain military intervention and withdrawal in politics because the decision to intervene or withdraw is not done by the president, but amongst a group of actors in the military or bureaucracy upset with the actions of the executive.

Moreover, the ubiquity of bureaucratic politics raises complex normative questions about the “legitimation and distribution of bureaucratic power in the administrative system” (Preston & ’t Hart, 1999). These questions have been raised frequently in public administration and often refer to studies of actors’ motivations based on Miles’ law. In foreign policy, bureaucratic politics is often described as a one-dimensional battle for power at the executive level whereby “[o]ne may, at best, respect the crafty gamesmanship of certain players, but underneath there is a fundamental unease with the idea of bureaucrats operating in self-consciously political ways” (Preston & ’t Hart, 1999: 54). Moreover, policymaking is also a goal-seeking activity and in foreign policymaking values and goals are viewed through diverging interpretations (Preston &
Preston and ’t Hart (1999) sought to marry these two interpretations by providing an empirical and normative conceptualization of bureaucratic politics.

Preston and ’t Hart (1999) take into account the structure of the policymaking arena as well as the policymaking process in their development of an operational definition of bureaucratic politics. Accordingly, bureaucratic politics has six key features:

1. There are multiple bureaucratic actors in the policymaking arena (structure).
2. These actors have diverging and conflicting interests, and they are involved in multiple-n game contexts with one another, requiring cooperation in areas of disagreement because of the necessity for future policy interaction (structure).
3. Power relationships between these actors are diffuse; for example, some institutional, bureaucratic, or inner-circle actors are more powerful than other actors in certain policy contexts, and not as powerful in others (structure).
4. Interaction is characterized by continuous “pulling and hauling” and bargaining between (clusters of) actors (process).
5. Decisions are reached by bargaining, coalition formation, and compromise building between different parties (process).
6. Decisions outcomes tend to be sensitive to temporal slippage (e.g., time gaps and delays between decision-making and actual implementation) and content slippage (e.g., post-decisional modification of the content of the policy) (process). (Preston & ’t Hart, 1999: 55).

Throughout the decision-making process, each of these features occurs at varying times and intensity. Thus, Preston and ’t Hart (1999) argue that bureaucratic politics can be viewed as a continuum. On one end, bureaucratic politics can be viewed as bureaucratic consensus seeking—consisting of low intensity, with relatively few players whose views and interests differ only gradually, bargaining toward consensus within a closed policy arena featuring clear rules of the game and a relatively transparent power structure (55). On the other end of the continuum, is bureaucratic confrontation—there are many players vigorously pushing and hauling their parochial viewpoints in a “relatively open and ill-structured constellation of forces” (55).
Consensus seeking and confrontation are said to occur during a decision making episode when four of the six indicators (see figure 1 below) are present.

**Bureaucratic Consensus-Seeking**
(Extreme manifestation: “groupthink”)

**Bureaucratic Confrontation**
(Extreme manifestation: “warfare”)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Consensus-Seeking</th>
<th>Bureaucratic Confrontation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limited</td>
<td>(1) Number of actors</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aligned</td>
<td>(2) Positioning of Interests</td>
<td>Opposed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed Arena</td>
<td>(3) Contingent power structure</td>
<td>Open network</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collegial</td>
<td>(4) Interaction by “pulling &amp; hauling”</td>
<td>Competitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quick</td>
<td>(5) Compromise formation</td>
<td>Slow</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low</td>
<td>(6) Implementation slippage</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: Figure adapted from Rosenthal et al. (1991)*

**Figure 1.** Degrees of bureaucratic politics: The empirical dimension
Source: (Preston & ’t Hart, 1999: 56.)

Next, Preston & ’t Hart (1999) construct a second continuum to highlight the impact of bureaucratic politics on the decision-making process. The authors use Alexander George’s (1980) three process criteria of reality-testing, acceptability and efficiency. Reality-testing examines whether all the information available in a policy making system is available to key decision makers and whether the decision makers consider multiple options at any stage in the decision process. Acceptability refers to whether or not relevant stakeholders in particular decisions are present in a decision making group and if ideas and concerns of outgroups and constituencies. Finally, through efficiency, one can see what costs are in terms of time, decision makers’ attention, and expenditure of organizational resources and political capital to achieve policy decisions (Preston & ’t Hart, 1999).
Compromise Formation

(3) Efficiency:
Bureaupolitical haste ← Bureaupolitical waste 
Economy →

**Figure 2.** Bureaucratic politics: The normative dimension. Source: (Preston & ’t Hart, 1999: 57)

The normative dimension above (See Figure 2) characterizes decisional pathologies in bureaucratic politics. The left and right of the continuum are the extremes with the middle position being the most productive (Preston & ’t Hart, 1999). According to Preston & ’t Hart (1999), “Taken together, Figures 1 and 2 provide us with tools to establish the benefits and costs of different modes and levels of bureaucratic politics [by] . . . enab[ling] us to observe and categorize the structure and process of executive policymaking, and then evaluate its quality in terms of the George criteria” (58).

This dissertation uses the normative and empirical dimensions of bureaupolitics discussed by Preston and ’t Hart (1999) to move the civil-military relations literature in a direction that examines conflict present within the group dynamics of the military as an institution, the juntas of generals who decide to intervene in politics, and politicians in government. Whereas the civil-military literature in the past focused on the military as an institution, the influence of society, and the relationship with politicians, there was scant attention played to the role of military elites and juntas in the decision-making context and the interplay between the small groups and larger institutions. Thus, an examination of the decision context between institutions, individuals and society, why a governmental decision was made, or why one pattern of governmental behavior emerged we can “….identify the games and players, to display the coalitions, bargains, and compromises, and to convey some feel for the confusion” (Allison & Zelikow 1999, 257).

Moreover, the use of Preston and ’t Hart’s (1999) bureau-politics allows us to measure why one nation maintains concordance between the military, political elites, and another does not because states “….facing nation-building efforts and/or domestic military intervention…are
hungry for a theoretical explanation that incorporates the indigenous qualities of a nation—qualities that are often not objective nor rational as we are finding in Iraq and Afghanistan” (Schiff 2009, 11).

Conclusion

By describing the relationship between the military and society in Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey, this dissertation seeks to more systematically test the relationship between the military, politicians, and society outlined in concordance theory to shed light on which variables hold the most weight in explaining military interventions & withdrawals in the Middle East and South Asia. Through the use of a bureaupolitical approach found in the literatures of public administration, political psychology, and international relations, the full extent of the relationship can be more theoretically grounded. The level of bureaucratic conflict and cooperation will be the measure of “agreement” that Schiff (2009) says is a predictor of military intervention.

The next chapter will detail the methods that will be employed to conduct the research contained in the three case studies. Afterwards, a concluding chapter will examine the similarities and differences across the three case studies and offer observations of important implications this research has for the broader civil-military relations literature.
Figure 3: Leaders & Bureapitical variation: The normative dimension

High in Need for Information/Sensitivity to Context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Administrative Leadership Style</th>
<th>Predominant Leadership Style</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Leader actively involved in policymaking with open advisory network)</td>
<td>(Leader personally dominates policymaking with closed advisory network)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bureaucratic Compromise Formation, Deliberation, & Economy**
- Broad range of advisers participate in policy formulation & decision (not limited to inner circle).
- Emphasis on broad information search & detailed staff work
- Leader active in guiding policy process, but seeks consensus among advisers.
- Tolerance of conflict: Multiple policy options & views debated prior to policy decisions.

**Bureaucratic Oversimplification, Isolationism, & Haste**
- Lack of broad information/advice gathering & leadership/inner circle dominance results in narrow, limited analysis of policy.
- Leader/inner circle dominance leads to policymaking isolated from broader political environment.
- Emphasis on leader/inner circle preferences leads to quick policy consensus.

**Bureaucratic Distortion, Paralysis, & Waste:**
- Over time, restrained competition policymaking results in bureapiticalicking within broader political system.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Group Consensus Leadership Style</th>
<th>Laissez-faire Leadership Style</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Leader minimally involved in policymaking with open advisory network)</td>
<td>(Leader absent/minimally involved in policymaking with closed advisory network)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Bureaucratic Compromise Formation & Deliberation:**
- Broad range of advisers participate in policy formulation & decision (not limited to inner circle).
- Emphasis on broad information-search & detailed staff work.
- Leader inactive in guiding policy process, seeks consensus among advisers as non-directive participant.
- Tolerance of conflict: Multiple policy options & views debated prior to policy decisions.

**Bureaucratic Distortion, Paralysis, & Waste:**
- Lack of directive leadership leads to overanalysis of policy problems & decision-making inefficiency.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Low in Need for Control</th>
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</table>

- Low in Need for Control
CHAPTER THREE

METHODS

In a praetorian society . . . not only are the actors varied, but so also are the methods used to decide upon office and policy. Each group employs means which reflect its peculiar nature and capabilities. The wealthy bribe; students riot; workers strike; mobs demonstrate; and the military coup.—Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (1968, 196).

This study examines civil-military relations in Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey. Through the use of a structured comparison case study approach, this study will examine how military interventions and withdrawals (the dependent variables) have occurred in these three states. By examining important factors that influence military interventions and withdrawals (the independent variables) this study is a plausibility probe to determine the applicability of the broader intervention/withdrawal literature to the greater Middle East and South Asia. The major questions this project seeks to answer are: why do militaries intervene in politics and why do militaries return to the barracks?

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK & DEFINITIONS

Military interventions are more commonly known as coup d’états. Generally, this term is used to refer to the military assuming control of a state’s political institutions (i.e. the foreign ministry, bureaucracy), and means of communication. It is not a new phenomenon, for it has been in existence for more than 300 years since the rise of the modern state (Luttwak 1968: 19). As noted military historian Edward Luttwak (1968) argues, “A coup consists of the infiltration of a small but critical segment of the state apparatus, which is then used to displace the government from its control of the remainder [of the state]” (27). Furthermore, the coup d’état succeeds if its opponents fail to thwart the coup, allowing the military to consolidate their positions, obtain the
surrender of the overthrown government or acquiescence of the populace and the surviving armed forces.

Once militaries have attained power, they tend not to stay in power very long. In the literature this has been known as military withdrawal, military disengagement from politics, or “returning to the barracks”. A military’s “return to the barracks” is defined as the level and nature of military involvement in politics having moved from military control to military participation, or from military participation to military influence in politics (Welch 1987). Since the end of colonialism, there has been a proliferation of states in Europe, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East that have been subject to military interventions & withdrawals. Moreover, since the late 1960s, academia was more focused on the examination of the causes and consequences of the military in political development as states in Europe, Asia & Latin America transitioned from authoritarianism to democracy. Many states in these regions were successful in their democratic transitions, but in the Middle East, authoritarianism has prevailed over democracy. To better understand the democratization process, and more specifically, why states in the Middle East have not experienced the same progress as other regions in terms of democratization, it is important to gain an understanding of the various factors that influenced military interventions and withdrawals in the Middle East.

Why have democratic transitions and consolidations not happened in the Middle East? In a special edition of the journal *Comparative Politics*, Eva Bellin did a survey of 21 states of the Middle East and found that the failure of democratization in the region is a result of a lack of a strong civil society, a lack of market economies, adequate income and literacy levels, a lack of democratic neighbors (with the exception of Turkey), and a lack of democratic culture (Bellin 2004: 141). By no means is the Middle East without these features; the problem is that they are
continually repressed by the state. Specifically, she argues that these Middle Eastern states’ coercive capacity is fostering robust authoritarianism and prohibiting a transition to democracy (Bellin 2004: 143). What does the state’s coercive capacity look like? Essentially, the answer lies in the strength of the state and the state’s capacity to maintain a monopoly on the means of coercion. Bellin quotes Theda Skocpol (1979), “If the state’s coercive apparatus remains coherent and effective, it can face down popular disaffection and survive significant illegitimacy, ‘value incoherence,’ and even a pervasive sense of relative deprivation among its subjects” (Bellin 2004: 143). The strength, coherence, and effectiveness of the state’s coercive apparatus, Bellin continues, “distinguish[es] among cases of successful revolution, revolutionary warfare and nonoccurrence” and could be applied to democratic transitions to see if the state’s coercive apparatus had the will or capacity to crush the democratic process (Bellin 2004: 143).

This project seeks to fill a gap in the literature by examining the coercive apparatuses of the Algerian, Pakistani, and Turkish state—the military. The militaries in these states have used nationalism to justify their interventions in the politics of these states while ensuring that withdrawal would only occur if national identity were protected. The choice of these three cases—two from the Middle East and one from South Asia—allows for a comparison of states that have experienced a similar historical trajectory and briefly experimented with democracy before. Also, each is a multi-ethnic state where the military became a dominant institution in the creation of the state predominantly because of the influence of the hypotheses tested here.

A brief definition of national identity, nationalism and what is meant by use of nationalism is in order before examining their uses in Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey. A military’s use of nationalism in the Developing World results from the military needing to build national identity. Leaders in the Developing World consistently speak of the need to build unity.
Generally this is done in states where a variety of different ethnic groups and the end of colonialism forced these leaders to build a state. Many scholars in political science, anthropology, and history have sought to identify how communities of individuals have organized themselves. In political science, this takes the form of a debate between scholars known as “primordialists” (Smith 1993; Gellner 1983) and “modernists” (Anderson 1991; Hobsbawm 1991). Primordialists argue “that national identity is connected to ethnic identity and is essential to our nature” while modernists argue “that because of a range of historical factors such as the need for a centralized workforce and the expansion of literacy, nationalism—in the sense of a group identification that is directed toward the establishment or predominance of a nation-state—is essentially a modern phenomenon” (Searle-White 2001, 59).

Regardless of which camp one falls in, the concepts of “nation” and “nation-state” have been important identifying concepts for individuals in the 20th and 21st Century. The nation is defined as a community of people who share a common heritage and destiny for the future. Therefore, according to Rupert Emerson (1960), “‘The nation is today the largest community which, when the chips are down, effectively commands . . . loyalty, overriding the claims both of the lesser communities within it and those which cut across it or potentially enfold it within a greater society. . . . In this sense the nation can be called ‘a terminal community’ with the implication that it is for present purposes the effective end of the road for man as a social animal’” (Cottam & Cottam 2001, 2). Throughout the 20th and 21st Century, individuals have identified with a variety of identity communities; namely, racial, ethnic or the nation. When the nation is given primary loyalty, these individuals are called nationalists.

However, not every individual in a state identifies primarily with a nation. After the secession of Pakistan from India and the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the military was the
strongest institution in each state. Both militaries were forced to “use nationalism” in the attempt to build a Pakistani & Turkish nation. To “use nationalism” is defined as the military using its position in the state to develop and implement an ideology to ensure the survival of the state. Below, this project will analyze the Algerian, Pakistani and Turkish militaries’ efforts to use nationalism for their own self-interested purposes. Nationalism, for the Algerian, Pakistani and Turkish militaries, is an ideology that is being used to paper over the ethnic and linguistic differences of regional groups within the state. In a sense, this constructed nationalism by the military is an intervening variable to the independent variables outlined below. Put differently, the use of nationalism by the military is not used to strengthen the Algerian, Pakistani and Turkish nation-state; instead, it strengthens the Algerian, Pakistani and Turkish praetorian state.

METHODS

This project’s methodology uses Alexander George’s controlled comparative case study method. This method is a qualitative one that employs a structured focused comparison in which cases are selected that are relevant to the data requirements and research objectives of the study in question. According to George and his co-author Andrew Bennett (2004), there are four strong advantages of case methods that make them valuable in testing hypotheses and particularly useful for theory development: “Their potential for achieving high conceptual validity; their strong procedures for fostering new hypotheses; their value as a useful means to closely examine the hypothesized role of causal mechanisms in the context of individual cases; and their capacity for addressing causal complexity” (19).

In addition, general questions are asked of each case as a way “of standardizing data requirements so that comparable data will be obtained from each case…” (George and Bennett 2004, 86). Questions are asked in a general nature to be relevant across all cases that are
selected. Additionally, this method does not prevent investigation of individual characteristics of one or more characteristics, nor does it prevent the exploration of idiosyncratic features of specific cases that may be relevant for theory development or future research (George and Bennett 2004, 86).

The qualitative design of this study is justified because coding whether military intervention and withdrawal occurred, and which independent variables had the most influence on the dependent variables, requires a nuanced discussion of the years surrounding military intervention and withdrawal. Quantitative analysis would be useful in conducting larger studies across multiple regions to compare similarties and differences between states experiencing military intervention; however, region-to-region certain variables are more important and are influenced by given historical factors at the time. This study is examining the Middle East and South Asia, two regions of renewed importance for U.S. policymakers, so at this time, a qualitative study is necessary to fill a needed gap in the literature to explain the institutional, elite and historical explanations for military intervention and withdrawal as well as the endurance of authoritarianism in the Middle East and South Asia.

**DESIGN & STRUCTURE**

As discussed in chapter two, the literature on the subject of military interventions and withdrawals has touched upon many factors that have influenced military involvement in politics. Although, despite there being over 80 cases of military disengagement from politics between 1940-1980, there has yet to be a typology developed regarding a military’s return to the barracks (Welch 1992, 324). Many of the hypotheses that were developed in the past were done so on a regional basis but “they have neither coalesced into a generally accepted paradigm nor served to guide collection of data on a wider basis” (Welch 1992, 324). This study attempts to
rectify this fact by building the following testable hypotheses of military intervention and withdrawal from the literature:

**MILITARY INTERVENTION HYPOTHESES:**

*H1:* If military corporatism was present in Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria, then military intervention occurred positively in each of those cases.

*H2:* If the military self-interest reached critical mass in Turkey, Pakistan, Algeria, then military intervention resulted in those cases.

*H3:* If the military bureaucracy in Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria contested political parties and extremist groups, then military intervention resulted in those cases.

*H4:* If the military elites ordered the military to be heavily involved in domestic policy or counterinsurgency, then military intervention occurred.

*H5:* If politicians or bureaucrats interfere in military elites’ and military institutional self-interests, then military intervention occurred.

*H6:* If bureaucratic conflict is present between different factions of military elites in Turkey, Pakistan, and Algeria, then military intervention occurred.

**MILITARY WITHDRAWAL HYPOTHESES:**

*H1:* If contestation remains high between the military institutions and political groups, then military withdrawal will not occur.

*H2:* If military elites believe that their self-interests are protected, then military withdrawal occurs.

*H3:* If European Union, United States, or Russia is perceived as being involved in the domestic politics of Turkey, Pakistan or Algeria, then military withdrawal unlikely to occur.

*H3a:* If European Union, United States, or Russia is perceived as supportive of civilian regime then military withdrawal unlikely to occur.

*H4:* If bureaucratic conflict occurs between factions of military elites resulting in consensus-seeking, then military withdrawal will occur.

*H5:* If bureaucratic conflict occurs resulting in confrontation between military elites and internal societal actors, military withdrawal does not occur.

*H6:* If withdrawal arises from factional disputes and/or upheaval in military leadership, then the process is likely to be both rapid and precarious.

*H7:* If withdrawal arises from general agreement among senior, flag-rank officers regarding its value, then the process is likely to involve a protracted effort to structure planned competitive elections along lines acceptable to them—returning political power to civilians while restricting political participation.

This project is a theory driven qualitative content analysis based on primary and secondary sources written in English. Data will be used from a variety of sources: books, academic and military journal articles, various press sources (American, English, Arab World,
Turkish, Pakistani, and Algerian), political party manifestos, government statements, and official and unofficial documents issued by the government (when possible). Information from sources will be triangulated, whenever possible to verify content due to the fact that the subject of the research is the military in authoritarian regimes, certain information is classified and unavailable to researchers.

Therefore, my use of primarily English sources is justified in two ways. First, I do not speak French, Urdu, or Turkish and given normal time constraints, language training would be cost prohibitive. Second, there now exists a large and varied source of good quality English language books, journal articles, and press items available on Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey, as well as source material accessible from these nations through the Internet.

**Specification of elements employed in analyzing the controlled case comparison**

**Variables:**

**Dependent Variables**—

Military Intervention
Military Withdrawal or “Return to the Barracks”

**Independent Variables**—

Military Corporatism
Military Institutional Self-Interest
Military Elite Self-Interest
Bureaucratic Conflict
Internal Societal Actors

**Independent Variables:**

**Military Corporatism**—Military corporatism is defined as the protection and enhancement of the military’s own interests through adequate budgetary support, autonomy in managing their internal affairs, the preservation of their responsibilities in the face of encroachments from rival institutions and the continuity of the institution itself. To code this variable one must look at the
activities that transfer resources and opportunities from the public and private sectors to an individual or a group within the military without following the norms of public accountability and for the purposes of personal gratification. This includes military engagement in non-traditional roles such as farming or running businesses like hotels, airlines, banks, or real estate. The penetration into the society and economy establishes the military’s hegemony.

**Military Institutional Self-Interest**-institutional self-interest involves, first and foremost, the protection of the state. To protect the state, the military’s institutional interest is in maintaining institutional autonomy in their area of expertise—the management of violence—for the military must control or even monopolize violence within society. Furthermore, the military institution deals with foreign threats to the state and therefore concerns itself with foreign policy decisions. To code this variable one must look at official government documents on government websites or in the press to locate information regarding Turkish, Pakistani and Algerian defense budgets, doctrine and policies regarding pay, esprit d’corps, and professionalism. Self-interest will be measured as high when content analysis reveals areas of interest that militaries view as within their expertise and there is agreement among more than one source that politicians are challenging or attempting to undermine these interests.

**Military Elite Self-Interest**- Military elite self-interest is defined as field grade military officers (major, lieutenant colonel, colonel), generals in a National Security Council-type body, and generals commanding in the field having a bias against mass political activity and politicians and exhibit common behavior patterns such as the defense of the military’s corporate interests and work to preserve the status quo, correct malpractices and deficiencies and effect political change and/or socioeconomic change. To code for this variable one must look at professional military journals, foreign policy journals, or the press to look for individual officer’s statements regarding
their country’s political situation or comments on foreign policy. Elite self-interest is considered to be high when content analysis reveals statements reflecting anger toward politicians or other internal societal actors and discussions of policies meant to counter this.

**Bureaucratic Conflict**—Bureaucratic conflict is present between the junta of rulers and those military elites who remain as the active leaders of the military branches or members of a national security council-type institution and a confrontational domestic political context between various political parties or non-state actors (Finer 1977). This includes conflict with internal societal actors. Bureaucratic conflict is characterized by these many players vigorously pushing their parochial viewpoints in a relatively open policy arena. The reverse side of the coin brings bureaucratic consensus-seeking, characterized by low intensity, with relatively few actors, whose views and interests diverge only gradually, bargaining toward consensus within a closed policy arena (Preston and ’t Hart 1999).

Bureaucratic conflict can be viewed as a continuum. Accordingly, this dissertation will look for consensus-seeking on one end where there is relatively few players (factions of military elites, political parties, Islamist groups) whose views and interests diverge only gradually, bargaining toward consensus within a closed policy arena featuring clear rules of the game and a relatively transparent power structure. On the opposite end of the spectrum is bureaucratic confrontation, characterized by many players (factions of military elites, political parties, politicians, Islamist groups) vigorously pushing their parochial viewpoints in a relatively open and ill-structured constellation of forces.

**Internal Societal Actors**—The operationalization of this variable will include groups, movements, or political parties outside of the state apparatus that are attempting to influence national identity. The coding of this variable will look at the “use of nationalism”, defined as an
actor using its position in the state to develop and implement an ideology, though the use of party manifestos, press releases and correspondence with the state and military elites. In Turkey this refers to two dominant political parties, the Republican People’s Party and the Islamic Development Party (AKP). Algeria’s dominant parties are the Front Liberation Nationale (FLN), Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) and Armed Islamic Group (GIA). In Pakistan, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q & PML-N), as well as the coalition of Islamist political parties Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) which includes the largest and most influential Islamist party, Jaam’a-I Islami (JI).

**SELECTION OF APPROPRIATE CASES**

The cases selected for this study have witnessed various levels of military involvement in politics. In fact, they represent the most recent cases of military intervention in politics worldwide. Furthermore, Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey have experienced similar trajectories in their political development—colonial powers installed strong institutions while dividing and ruling ethnically mixed populations, leading to a number of competing actors trying to influence the development of the state. Each state has witnessed multiple military interventions and withdrawals so it is pertinent to examine the years preceding and following the coups to examine the role the independent variables had on the dependent variables.

*Algeria*

From 1954-1962, Algeria found itself in one of the bloodiest wars for independence of the 20th Century. The war was launched in response to years of French colonial rule which had begun in 1830 turning Algeria into a “settlement colony” (Quandt 1998, 15). Algeria is a multiethnic society comprising Arabs and Berbers and as a French “settlement colony” was forced to assimilate with European colonists (*Pied Niors*) who settled in the major coastal cities.
of Algeria. There were farmers, shopkeepers, and administrators—a fully articulated European society with an identity of its own (Quandt 1998, 15). Algeria was considered an integral part of France and as a result of the settlement policy, Algeria’s traditional leaders had been driven away from politics, their land taken away, only to be replaced at all levels of power by Europeans. This colonial relationship with the French would be the spark for various uprisings that culminated in the 1940s with the first expressions of Algerian nationalism.

Algerian nationalism is expressed in populist overtones, blending national symbols with themes from the Middle East, such as Arab revival and Islamic reform (Quandt 1998, 16). As the driving force behind the Algerian War of Independence, nationalism drove a revolution that was not only against the French, but also against political institutions. According to political scientist William Quandt (1998):

Like populists everywhere, these self-appointed fighters for their country’s freedom saw themselves in heroic light, sacrificing all for the people. Those who represented parties were seen as self-interested and divisive; they weakened the common will, playing into the hands of the French, who were skilled at divide-and-rule politics. The revolution, they hoped, would unify the masses and lead to a break with the past. To a large extent it did. But it also sacrificed the incipient democratic tendencies in Algerian political life for a kind of radical populism that eventually came to be seen as responsible for many of Algeria’s problems (18-19).

A group called the *Front de Liberation Nationale*, or FLN, became the populist face of the Algerian nationalist movement. Interestingly, within its ranks were socialists, Islamists, Berbers and Arabs, peasants and intellectuals; what bound them together in a common cause was nationalism.
The FLN was composed of committees, cliques, and clans with intense rivalries resulting in several distinct centers of power: guerrilla mujahideen, the leaders of the military regions (or willayas), the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN), the Provisional Government (Le Government Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne, or GPRA), and prominent personalities who were jailed at the start of the war of independence (Quandt 1998, 20). At the end of the war, a power vacuum was created resulting in each of these groups attempting to influence Algeria’s development. The military, the self-perceived leaders of the revolution, felt that as a disciplined body with a monopoly of force, and as a national organization was in the best position to lead the development of an independent Algeria.

The ALN became the L’armée Populaire Nationale or ANP and “its military nature makes the army the best organized and only truly national (that is, drawing from the entire population) group in the country; its organization gives it special interests to watch over and defend; its successor relation to the . . . ALN makes it the strongest political institution to grow out of the revolution; and its past performance and beliefs (namely, Fanonism) shows it unafraid to use its power to defend the Revolution or its own interests” (Zartman 1973, 212). The ANP, during these early years, was heterogenous with officers forming clans with like-minded officers. More specifically, ANP officers came from the wilayas, the ALN, and postwar recruitment and coalesced into two main groups—an old guard and junior officers.

The “old guard”, as members of the interior ALN, were guerrilla fighters who fought in the war of independence. Their view of the peacetime ANP was as a military that watched over the “Revolution” and over the interests of those who fought for Algeria’s independence (Zartman 1973, 214). Alternatively, there was an external group of officers in the ALN who organized and trained during the war on bases in Tunisia and Morocco. Some of these officers had experience
serving in the French military; therefore, their experience and desire was the development of a professional army to serve as the “watchdog over the Revolution” (Zartman 1973, 214). This group consisted of two officers who would play an important role in the development of Algeria: Ahmed Ben Bella and Henri Boumedienne.

After the war, there was a scramble for power as these young officers and their respective groups opposed politicians in the provisional government despite the government’s negotiation of Algerian independence. Ben Bella won out in this internecine struggle and became president of Algeria with the backing of the army and some of the willaya commands, with Henri Boumedienne becoming Army Chief-of-Staff. Throughout his tenure in office, Quandt (1998) argues, “Ben Bella lacked an institutional base of support when he became president and spent much of his three years in office pitting one faction against another in order to stay in power” (23). Under Ben Bella, the government became increasingly socialist and authoritarian. Boumedienne felt that Ben Bella had strayed from the populist aims of the revolution, because Boumedienne had a reputation as “an ascetic, a strong nationalist, with more of an Arabist education than most of his contemporaries” (Quandt 1998, 23). Consequently, Boumedienne implemented a coup in 1965 overthrowing Ben Bella.

After the 1965 coup, Boumedienne worked swiftly to consolidate his hold on power. Many of Ben Bella’s supporters were pushed aside and the Oujda group (Boumedienne’s men) were installed in the political administration of the country. For Boumedienne, “when the professional control and development of the army are threatened by the government . . . the army must intervene actively to protect its interests and, secondarily, the interest of the Revolution…. [because] [w]ith the government in ‘sure’ hands, the army officers can then return to the task of building up their own organization” (Zartman 1973, 214). Additionally, the FLN was
downgraded in importance, the Military Security organization was strengthened, and social and economic policies were designed to win acquiescence (Quandt 1998, 23-4). Boumedienne, until his death in 1978, established and ruled over the prototypical authoritarian regime.

By this time, the military had firmly established itself as the dominant institution in Algeria. The 1970s and 80s would be a time of growth and modernization for Algeria, as agriculture was collectivized, a massive industrialization program was launched, and the oil industry nationalized. Boumedienne and his successors’ goals “were rapid development, the creation of a strong industrial base, and the maintenance of a viable safety net to keep ordinary people satisfied while the state laid the foundation for a modern society” (Quandt 1998, 27). This drive for modernization brought considerable demographic changes, an emergence of new industries and a nation-wide education plan that raised the literacy rate. In effect, by the 1980s Algeria was experiencing a youth bulge.

As a result of both this new youth generation coming of age and their dissatisfaction with one party rule, two conflicting protest movements developed: communists (including Berber identity movements) and Islamic parties, most notably the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). In addition to protesting the government, the two groups clashed with each other throughout the 1980s culminating in the October 1988 uprising that forced President Chadli Bendjedid to concede the end of one party rule and call elections for December 1991. The FIS won the first round of the country’s multi-party elections and the military then intervened and cancelled the second round of the elections. President Benjedid was forced to resign and the military banned all political parties based on religion, including the FIS (Quandt 1998). According to Quandt (1998), “They [the military] were protecting their institutional prerogatives, throwing over an unpopular president in order to survive. The senior officers were protecting a comfortable way
of life as well, since many had gotten rich from power. The Algerian generals were prepared to fight—for their lives, their families, their privileges, but also for their country” (60). In effect, the military had determined who held Algeria’s top office in 1965, restored civil order in 1988 and 1991 after serious confrontations between government and civil society, and the military-bureaucratic elite cancelled elections halting the political liberalization process (Mortimer 1993).

**Pakistan**

The reasons mentioned above for why militaries intervene in politics—the national interest, corporate self-interest, social (especially ethnic or class) self-interest and individual self-interest—are evident in each of the coups undertaken by the Pakistani military. The army’s relationship, notes Cohen (2004), can be defined as a five-step dance: “First the army warns what it regards as incompetent or foolish civilians. Second, a crisis leads to army intervention, which is followed by the third step [to] ‘straighten out’ Pakistan, often by introducing major constitutional changes. Fourth, the army, faced with growing civilian discontent, ‘allows’ civilians back into office, and fifth, the army reasserts itself behind a façade of civilian government” (124).

In 1958, Ayub Khan became the first military dictator of Pakistan. Ayub sought to build a “fortress” to protect Pakistan from its sworn external enemy, India, as well as from domestic enemies. He believed that the Pakistani military was best equipped to protect the national interest. In addition, Ayub used the 1962 constitution to ensure that Pakistan’s political institutions and processes and a small segment of the political elite would follow the army’s wishes.

Essentially, the political and constitutional arrangement just described was a patron-client relationship that drew its power from the proximity to Ayub (Cohen 2004, 124). The military
junta of Ayub lasted for four years until Ayub became ill and was forced to hand control over to Yahya Khan. Yahya’s rule has been characterized by Cohen as “the most atypical military intervention” because he had no plans to reform or straighten out Pakistan’s political order (Cohen 2004, 125). What Yahya did was “kept the bureaucrats at arm’s length from the decision-making process”, alternatively preferring to place an air force general as staff officer to the president (a de-facto prime minister) with army officers below him to deal with martial law and civil affairs (Talbot 2005, 191). As result, bureaucratic in-fighting occurred. While all of this was going on, the Bengalis were increasingly calling for their own state. Yahya called elections for 1970, the outcome of which decided the future of Pakistan by splitting East and West Pakistan and creating Bangladesh (See Talbot 2005: 194-213 for a full account).

The importance of the separation of Pakistan cannot be understated. Having, first, suffered a defeat to India, and now to lose the largest percentage of the population, discredited the Pakistani military, Yahya was disgraced and had to step down. The intervening seven years of rule by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto would be marked by similar circumstances as his civilian predecessors—how to assert authority of elected state institutions over the military and bureaucracy, establish a functioning federal system and resolve the role of Islam. The rule of Bhutto ultimately led to a coup by Zia in July of 1977 because of the perceived corruptness of Bhutto and other civilian politicians.

Zia’s intervention was done in the name of national interest and national security. According to Cohen, Zia “wanted to set Pakistan ‘straight,’ or, as Zia used to say, correct the politicians’ qibla, or direction of prayer” (Cohen 2004, 125). Islam was used by Zia as a motivational force coupled with professionalism and had four major consequences:
1. Zia used Islam and conservative Islamic groups to legitimize his rule and encouraged Islamic conservatism and orthodoxy in the Army.

2. Some of the Islamic groups, such as Jama’at-I-Islami, were allowed to make inroads into the Army and bureaucracy and [were] associated with the government’s Afghanistan policy.

3. The Islamic Revolution in Iran had a profound impact on civilians as well as military circles in Pakistan. It strengthened the conservative Islamic elements and created an environment which in part facilitated Zia’s efforts to push through his Islamization programme (Rizvi 2000, 245-8).

In sum, Islamist groups have been state sponsored at various times beginning with Zia’s regime to influence domestic politics and support military dominance. As Hussein Haqqani (2005) so aptly puts it, “This duality in Pakistani policy is a structural problem, rooted in history and a consistent policy of the state. . . [whereby] such rulers have attempted to ‘manage’ militant Islamism, trying to calibrate it so that it serves its nation-building function without destabilizing internal politics or relations with Western countries” (317).

After Zia was killed in a mysterious plane crash, Pakistan went through 11 years of alternating rule between Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. In 1999, Nawaz Sharif appointed Pervez Musharraf as Army Chief of Staff because he thought he would be someone he could control. While Musharraf was out of the country, Sharif appointed a successor who was a crony of his. Musharraf had enough allies in the army that he was able to put down this attempt at removing him and, instead, removed Sharif from office.
Musharraf’s 1999 coup is characterized as an intervention to protect the state because other institutions, in this case the political parties, had badly decayed (Cohen 2004, 125). He introduced educational requirements for officeholders and nonpartisan local elections as well as creating a constitutional role for the army in a National Security Council. The National Security Council’s jurisdiction includes economic, foreign and domestic policy. Musharraf’s regime was modeled after Ayub Khan, and similar to both Ayub and Zia, Musharraf used Islam to further the military’s interests.

Specifically, after 9/11, during the Pakistani National Assembly elections, the military cobbled together an alliance with the Pakistani Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif and the Islamist parties in the NWFP to prevent the Pakistani Peoples Party of Benazir Bhutto from gaining seats (Nasr 2004, 202). Effectively, these alliances allowed Musharraf to move beyond Zia’s model to allow him to ally with the modern middle classes and “liberal” Muslims to use the Islamist parties as strategic tools (Nasr 2004, 201).

While the role of civilian politicians in the country’s history and the lack of strong civilian institutions has played a role in the Pakistani military’s interventions; time and again, the military unsuccessfully uses its position as the strongest state institution and protector of the national interest to advocate the use of Islam as the glue to build a Pakistani nation-state.

**Turkey**

Turkey has been seen by many as a model for democracy in the Middle East. However, the road on which it has traveled to get where it is today has not been an easy one. The Turkish military has intervened four times and willingly returned to the barracks shortly after intervention. The reason Turkey has accomplished this is because of one man: Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk. After the fall of the Ottoman Empire, Atatürk, a former general in the
Ottoman army, realized that the Western techniques used to defeat the Ottomans were vastly superior and thereby founded the Turkish republic with a military that was Westernized in its weapons and educational methods (Taspinar 2007, 116-7). After the founding of Turkey, the Kemalists implemented a top-down project of radical modernization of Turkey. This modernization was known as Kemalism and is enshrined in the Turkish constitution and includes “a rigorous commitment to secularism, territorial integrity, and cultural homogeneity” (Jenkins 2001, 7). Over the last 30+ years, Kemalism has been taught in schools and military academies to promote two ideologies: radical secularism and assimilationist nationalism. Put differently, Atatürk wanted a nation of mostly Muslims to forswear Islam and pledge loyalty to a “common national, linguistic and territorial identity”—Turkishness (Taspinar 2007, 119).

This policy continues to divide Turkish society today. The Kemalists wanted to control Islam because they felt it was a threat and would cause the decline of Turkey just as it had with the Ottoman Empire. According to Ömer Taspinar, “Having realized . . . that eradicating Islam altogether was not a realistic option, they [the Kemalists] tried to promote a ‘civilized’ version of it . . . . by encorporating religious personnel into the state bureaucracy” (Taspinar 2007, 119). Under the second ideology, assimilationist nationalism, the Turks rejected multiethnic and multinational cosmopolitanism. If you were not Turkish you were banned from government service. Specifically, as an Armenian, Greek or Jew “the ‘secular’ Turkish republic turned out to be less tolerant toward [these] non-Muslim minorities than the ‘Islamic’ Ottoman Empire had been, partly because Turkishness was associated with being Muslim” (Taspinar 2007, 119). As a result of this policy of assimilationist nationalism, violent Kurdish Islamic uprisings happened in the 1920s. These uprisings, according to Taspinar, “[C]onvinced the generals that from then on they would have to act as the custodians of secularism and nationalism” (Taspinar 2007, 119).
In 1938, the death of Atatürk and the beginning of the Cold War forced Turkey under Ismet Inönü to make a choice between the Soviet Union and the United States. Inonu was encouraged to hold multiparty elections as a result of the prospect of joining NATO and qualifying for assistance under the Marshall Plan (Taspinar 2007, 120). At this point, with communism as the main threat, Kemalist secularism and nationalism were no longer as big of a threat. The new threat, notes Taspinar, “...was ideological—an opposition between the right and the left—rather than religious or ethnic” (Taspinar 2007, 120). Kurdish and Muslim voices were not kept silent, they just changed their tune. The Kurds joined Turkey’s new fledgling socialist movement and political Islam allied with conservative anticommmunist political parties. Ultimately, during the Cold War, the military intervened three times—in 1960, 1971, and 1980.

The 1990s were characterized once again by political Islam and Kurdish dissent. This was “a decade of war with Kurdish separatists, polarization between secularists and Islamists, economic turmoil, and systemic corruption” (Taspinar 2007, 122). Moreover, there were nine different coalition governments that ruled Turkey in the 1990s. By the end of the decade, David L. Phillips (2004) argues, “Only 15 percent of Turks ‘trusted’ politicians, and 43 percent called politicians ‘liars’” (86). It was during the mid-late 90s that the influence of the pro-Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party rose. The Refah Party won local elections nationwide; including the mayoral contests in Ankara and Istanbul. These wins sent shockwaves up through the secular establishment, as they began to worry that the new Islamist-led government would adopt an Islamic agenda (Taspinar 2007, 122). Consequently, on February 28, 1997, the military forced out the Welfare Party in what became known as the “coup by memorandum”.

The 1997 coup actually benefited the Islamists a great deal. Essentially, “it paved the way for serious soul searching among Turkey’s Islamists, eventually causing a generational and
ideological rift within their movement” (Taspinar 2007, 123). The pragmatic leaders of the Welfare party, Erdogan and Gül saw the writing on the wall. According to Taspinar (2007), “After having participated in democratic politics for over three decades, they had already learned to temper their views in order to gain electoral legitimacy; by the late 1990s, political Islam was well integrated into the mainstream political system” (123).

Erdogan and Gül created a new party, known as the Justice and Development Party or AKP, after the Refah Party dissolved. The AKP appealed to Turkey’s impoverished underclass to try and improve the gap between the haves of the urban areas and the poorer, have-nots of rural areas. This strategy was effective and the AKP won Turkey’s 2002 parliamentary elections.

Now that we have briefly discussed the historical circumstances surrounding Turkey’s political history, we shall turn to a discussion of who the military is and how they have used nationalism, or Kemalism, to justify their interventions into politics.

*Turkish Military in Society*

Each of the reasons for military intervention are present in the Turkish case. According to Nasser Momayazi (1998), “[E]very civilian government that reduced the material privileges of the Turkish officer corps was overthrown by the military. Two other motivating factors for Turkish officers to intervene in the government have been the inability of civilian governments to control violence and terrorism which threatened . . . ‘secularism’” (27-8). In other words, the Turkish military is justifying intervention because it is the guardian of national interest and secularism. However, the Turkish military has a disdain for politics and only took action “when it believed that the machinery of government was unable to cope with critical problems or when it feared a deviation from Kemalist principles; and coups have always been seen as temporary,
emergency measures preceding an eventual return to civilian rule, rather than attempts to change the system of government and establish permanent military rule” (Jenkins 2001, 34).

In the last fifty years, the Turkish military has performed four coups against civilian governments: twice (1960 & 1980) through full-blooded coups and twice (1971 and 1997) by applying pressure from behind the scenes. Furthermore, the 1960 and 1971 coups caused considerable divisions within the officer corps. In 1960, Adnan Menderes tried to interfere in the appointments of military officers and also became increasingly authoritarian by limiting free speech and flouting the constitution (Jenkins 2001, 36). After the military stepped in, however, there was still partisan bickering, mounting political violence and a conservative backlash which caused the military to intervene again in 1971.

The 1971 coup failed to create political stability, because of a growing economic crisis and escalating political violence between ultra-left and ultra-right nationalists. According to Garreth Jenkins (2001), from 1971-1980, Turkey “witnessed a reawakening of Kurdish nationalism as Marxist Kurds began to form leftist Kurdish parties and the reemergence of Kemalism’s other bete noire, political Islam” (38). In 1980, General Kenan Evren felt that the security situation was getting out of hand and implemented the coup by dissolving parliament, declaring a state of emergency and suspending all political parties. By 1997, when the Welfare Party was elected, the military initiated the coup by memorandum which used formal and informal methods of working with civil society and the press to force out the Islamist-led government (Jenkins 2001, 38-40).

As the purpose of this study is to examine the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable around the years preceding and following the coups in question, it is
important to set forth the “theoretically relevant general questions” which are asked of each case (George and Bennett 2004, 86).

**General Questions to be Asked**

The questions that have been chosen are designed to offer insight into the interplay between the independent variables and the dependent variables. As with the selection of variables, the questions have been chosen to highlight the nature of the relationship between the variables during the time periods surrounding each of the military interventions and withdrawals from politics.

1. How many actors are involved in the decision to intervene and withdraw from politics? What is the military’s view of the political process, of internal societal actors? What are the military’s institutional & corporate interests? What are military elites’ interests? What are internal societal actors’ views of the military?

2. What is the level of bureaucratic politics? Is there bureaucratic confrontation or bureaucratic consensus-seeking?

3. What influence do international actors, such as the European Union, the United States or Russia, have on domestic politics?

The three case studies will be carried out using the standard procedures of historical inquiry. Once a case is identified, the domestic and international context will be explained followed by an examination of the extent the independent variables are present and influence the dependent variables during the aforementioned time periods of military interventions and withdrawals from politics. Afterwards, the questions will be answered for each case in a table to offer a comparison of the relative influence each variable has in the cases.

The layout of these cases offers an excellent opportunity for a less rigid discussion, as the timeframe for the military interventions and withdrawals have occurred in different time periods of each state’s history. There will be more time allotted to discuss the aspects are important to
each particular case. Given this, there will be marked variance in the amount of time spent discussing each of the variables, as some will be more important in certain cases. However, through answering the questions in a standardized manner this study will be able to maintain rigor and uniformity across the cases and, therefore, able to offer valid comparisons. Ultimately this method will allow for not just the investigation of the variables affects on the cases in question, but will highlight the similarities and differences of each case and their effect on the variables. A concluding chapter will assess the relationship between the variables as a whole to answer the research questions presented in the literature and offer insight into the findings generated by this study.
CHAPTER FOUR
ALGERIA

The capture of the minds of the young, and indeed the very young, has to be one of the primary objectives of any revolution.—Alistair Horne, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (2006, 403).

Nationalism, that magnificent song that made the people rise against their oppressors, stops short, falters and dies away on the day that independence is proclaimed. Nationalism is not a political doctrine, nor a program. If you really wish your country to avoid regression, or at best halts and uncertainties, a rapid step must be taken from national consciousness to political and social consciousness—Frantz Fanon, Wretched of the Earth (1963, p. 203).

Algeria is a state with a history marred by violence. From 1954-1962, Algerians waged their War of Independence against French colonialism. The war became a defining period in the development of the Algerian state. Algerians coalesced around the Front Liberation Nationale (FLN) or National Liberation Front as the vanguard of the Algerian nationalist movement. The FLN was not one unitary organization, but more of an umbrella organization for a number of different factions or clans. As part of the FLN, the Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN) played a dominating role in Algerian politics as the only effective powerbroker at independence.

During the authoritarian regime of Col. Houari Boumedienne from 1965-1978, the ALN was a “people’s army” that was “depoliticized” in 1988 with the introduction of a multi-party system. At this point, multiple factions formed political parties to run in democratic elections. After the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) won the first round of local elections, the ALN stepped in to cancel the second round of elections to prevent an Islamist party from coming to power. This military coup may have prevented an Islamist party from coming to power, but it sparked a civil war claiming hundreds of thousands of lives during the 1990s. This chapter will examine the domestic and international influences that affected the conflicts between the various factions & clans within Algerian society and the ALN.
Algerian Identity & Nationalism

For centuries Algeria was a gateway uniting Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia resulting in six major invasions prior to 1830: the Phoenician-Carthaginian invasion, from 1100 to 147 B.C.E.; the Roman, from 146 B.C.E. to 432 C.E.; the Vandal, from 432 to 533; the Byzantine, from 533 to 633; the Arab, from 755 to 1516; and the Turkish, from 1516 to 1830 (Stora 2001, 2). For our purposes, however, the most important invasion influencing Algerian identity and nationalism was that of the French in 1830. Algeria’s relationship with France would last for 132 years and serve “as a reference point to all citizens of the modern republic: nationalists and Islamists, modernists and traditionalists, Arabs and Berbers. The history, or perhaps more often, the mythology, of this period underpins the consciousness to shape the unconscious of the country’s vast youth” (Stone 1997, 30). Therefore, before further discussing French influence in Algeria, it is important that we ask: Who are Algerians?

There are two dominant elements of Algerian society: Islam and the tribe. Islam has been a part of Algeria since the seventh century. Although there are tiny Christian and Jewish communities in Algiers and other northern cities, nearly all Algerians are Muslims. Also, Algeria is a youthful society, since 75 percent of the population is under 30 (Stone 1997, 7). According to Martin Stone (1997), “Under the rule of the Arabs, the local Berber kingdoms and later the Turks, the inhabitants of what is now Algeria fused their own pre-Islamic beliefs with the mainstream Sunni rite to create their own particular brand of Islam” (12). At independence, Islam’s influence was relatively weak in towns and cities but more widespread in the countryside. With the mass migration of the rural populations in the 1960s and 1970s to the cities, tensions developed between the conservative, poorer newcomers and the liberal elite. Simultaneously, the government sought to use Islam for its own purposes to mobilize the
population against its enemies. This, effectively, helped to spur the rise of political Islam in the 1980s and 1990s.

The next important element of Algerian identity is the tribe. In the Arab areas the primary unit was the *ayla* (family), whose members descended through male landowners. Furthermore, clans “are a collection of lineages descended from an even more remote common ancestor; clans joined together to form tribes based on common…ancestors or for their mutual benefit” (Stone 1997, 14). Prior to independence, tribes operated independently but during times of war, invasion, or threat did not hesitate to form larger confederations. However, after independence, the traditional dynamic of kin vs. non-kin was given up in favor of promoting a common predicament—in this case, the revolution. New tribes and clans continued to emerge, be it the Berbers, Kabyle, or the senior military elite. Interestingly, these senior military elite used the revolutionary war to rally the public to their cause of building a strong Algerian state free of the French. Consequently, William Zartman (1973) argues:

> Those who participated in the war expected things to be better after it was over: in a typically ambiguous set of feelings, they expected to be rid of the disruptive and humiliating foreigner in order to return to their life undisturbed but also in order to benefit from social change and economic improvement. In addition they expected an immediate inheritance of the visible goods of modern life in Algeria and accession to the newly vacated positions of power, prestige, and employment (211).

Another important influence on Algerian identity that cannot be overstated is language. As Stone (1997) argues, “Language is a primary political, ideological, social and psychological issue in Algeria . . . . connected with the country’s search for its identity and is a unifying force in a land of enormous regional and ethnic diversity” (18). In 1962, French and Maghrebi Arabic were spoken throughout cities in the north, while in the rural areas of the Sahara Maghrebi
Arabic was spoken. French and Berber dialects were spoken in the Kabylia region. (Stone 1997, 18). Conflicts that developed were directly associated with the government’s efforts at Algerianisation and Arabisation during the regimes of Ben Bella and Boumedienne. With 90% of the population illiterate at the time, Ben Bella promised education for everyone. Consequently, thousands of “third rate and unenthusiastic” teachers were brought in from Egypt, Iraq and Syria confusing “a bewildered population by teaching their own local version of Modern Standard Arabic in an idiom almost incomprehensible to the local population and with foreign cultural references” (Stone 1997, 19). Ben Bella’s policy, ultimately, alienated the youth population from the older generations who had been educated in French. In the 1970s, Boumedienne accelerated the effect of Arabisation by mandating Arab be spoken in local government, the courts, and central government.

However, by the 1990s, Stone (1997) notes, “Within the central government only the justice and religious affairs ministries continue[d] to operate entirely in Arabic. . . .” (20). In many respects, a large proportion of Algerians remained francophone, because to many it was used with pride as a sign of education. The influence of France in Algerian identity was summed up astutely by former Algerian Foreign Minister Taleb Ibrahim, “We are Mediterranean people in an Arab context. It revealed just how complex is the Algerian identity. Yet, even though Algeria is an Arab nation, the legacy of the past is such that no amount of calculated ‘arabisation’ will erase completely the 130 years of links with France” (Horne 2006, 561).

Due to Algeria’s early history as an integral part of France, the nationalist movement began during the interwar period but gained prominence after World War II. Noted historian Alistair Horne (2006) argues, “Because of Algeria’s unique status as an integral part of France, which cut it off from undercurrents of Arab nationalism in the outside world more than its
neighbors, one cannot easily state—as with other colonial territories—at what precise point a ‘resistance movement’ began” (38). What is discernible, however, is the presence of three separate strands of Algerian nationalism: a religious movement founded by Sheikh Abdulhamid Ben Badis, the revolutionaries founded by Messali Hadj, and the liberals of Ferhat Abbas. The conflicts between these three movements influenced the development of modern Algeria.

The religious movement is associated with a group known as the Association des Ulema. Founded by Ben Badis, the movement believed that Algeria must return to Islam to “regenerate” (Horne 2006, 38). Ben Badis and the Ulema resembled the Wahabi sect of Islam and were devout Muslims who believed in the power of Islam to transform society. The Ulema championed: the separation of church and state, the value of Arabic as a language, Algeria as a national entity and pan-Arabism as an ideal. According to Horne (2006), “The Ulema did more than any other body to rekindle a sense of religious and national consciousness among Algerians, but tied up in their own theological coils, they failed to find pragmatic applications” (38). Consequently, Messali Hadj and his “revolutionaries” stepped in to provide an alternative to the Ulema. Messali became president of a political group of Algerian workers called the Etoile Nord-Africaine, which “came to have a proletarian character superimposed over its nationalist and religious doctrines” (Horne 2006, 39). In effect, Messali was one of the first to bring in popular socialism to the revolutionary movement that would later influence the FLN and the socialist policies of the Ben Bella regime.

A third strand of Algerian nationalism is the liberal movement. Algeria’s liberals were led by Abbas and were considered the most moderate of the nationalists (Quandt 1969, 25). Becoming involved in politics in the 1930s, Abbas did not believe in a separate Algerian identity. Abbas and his fellow liberals, “[f]rom their early school days[,] had become concerned
with equality and reforms, and these interests were reinforced and given more content as these young men became aware of the other political groups. Developing further their strong commitment to modernization” (Quandt 1969, 33). Abbas believed that through assimilation into the French political community in Algeria social and economic equality would be gained from the French. Therefore, according to Quandt:

“The Liberals . . . favored a policy whereby Algerian Muslims could become French citizens without abandoning their personal religious status. This would have led to full political rights for all Algerians and might have eventually led to total assimilation of the Muslim population into the European community. Conversely, equal rights might have led to much greater Muslim influence so that native Algerians could have pressed for some form of autonomy within a loose French commonwealth. In either case, however, complete independence was neither envisaged nor desired as an outcome of this policy” (Quandt 1969, 39-40).

While complete independence may not have been envisioned, in effect, the policy of assimilation was a point of contention that historian John Ruedy has called a watershed in the nation’s history. For the first time “. . . lower middle-class, working-class, and even poor rural Algerians joined alongside the elites for the first time in challenging the status quo” (Ruedy 1992, 139).

**Algeria Pre-Independence: 1936-1962**

With the guise of forming a unified nationalist movement, the liberals, revolutionaries, and religious movements gathered in Algiers in 1936 for a “Muslim Congress”. At the same time, in France, the Blum-Viollette Plan was created to offer French citizenship with full political equality to certain classes of the Muslim elite, including university graduates, elected officials, army officers, and professionals, which totaled approximately 25,000 Algerians (Toth 1994, 38). This attempt at unity would be short lived because although Abbas and Badis
welcomed the Blum-Viollette Plan, Messali attacked the Plan as “a new instrument of colonialism aimed at dividing the Algerian people, by usual French methods of separating the elite from the masses” (Horne 2006, 41). Moreover, the Pied Noirs took exception to the Blum-Viollette Plan. The Pied Noirs put up procedural opposition to block the legislation because one consequence of the plan would mean the French minority would be subject to a majority Muslim state (Toth 1994, 39). Finally, disillusioned by the failure of the Blum-Viollette Plan, Abbas became convinced that autonomy was preferable to assimilation for Algerian Muslims. As Quandt notes, “This conclusion was the result of the observation that the [pied niors] . . . in Algeria could and would prevent liberal reforms emanating from Paris and that Paris itself might not be receptive to Muslim demands, particularly if undemocratic forces governed in France” (Quandt 1969, 41). By the beginning of World War II, cooperation among the “Muslim Congress” broke apart.

Toward the end of World War II, Abbas offered the French administration “The Manifesto of the Algerian People” which outlined past French colonial transgressions and demanded an Algerian constitution. Furthermore, the manifesto called for “agrarian reform, recognition of Arabic as an official language on equal terms with French, recognition of a full range of civil liberties, and the liberation of political prisoners of all parties” (Toth 1994, 40-41). In response the French responded by passing a modified Blum-Viollette Plan granting 32,000 Muslims French citizenship compared with 450,000 European Algerians (Stone 1997, 35). As a result, a frustrated Abbas joined forces with Messali (who had been imprisoned) to create the “Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty” or AML. According to John Ruedy (1992), the main goals of the AML were:

(1) To enlighten both Algerian and French opinion about the benefits of the Manifesto, (2) to unmask the reactionary maneuvering of both French and
native feudalist forces, (3) to propagate the idea of an Algerian nation federated with a renovated and anti-imperialist France, (4) to wage war against the privileges of the ruling class, and (5) to preach human equality and the Algerian people’s right to the pursuit of happiness and national life (147-8).

The AML were supported by the reformist ulama and Messali loyalists of the Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA), garnering support from the middle classes, but were condemned by assimilationists and communists who were supported by the working classes (Ruedy 1992, 148).

By May 1945, riots broke out among AML and PPA supporters as they marked Victory in Europe Day. The most noteworthy acts of violence occurred in Sétif and Guelma. At Sétif, Ruedy (1992) notes:

Organizers had been told they could demonstrate only if national flags and provocative placards were not displayed….Shortly after the march began, about 8:30, the forbidden flag and placards were unfurled contrary to orders, police charged to break up the demonstrations, some Muslims fought back, and others took out after hapless European civilians or attacked buildings that stood as symbols of colonial authority. By 11:00, some forty Muslims and Europeans were dead (149).

Consequently, as news of the violence spread throughout the countryside, pied noir villages were attacked and open insurrection eventually killed as many as 15,000 Muslims by the time violence was over (Stone 1997, 35). The French government, in response to the violence, called in 10,000 troops to assist the police in trying to quell the violence. Bombings of Arab and Kabyle villages ensued and after a week the worst of the insurrection had subsided. Moreover, by the end of the year, 5,560 Muslims were arrested, including Abbas (Ruedy 1992, 149). Effectively, the Sétif riots are considered by many (Ruedy 1992; Stone 1997; Stora 2000; Horne 2006) to mark the real beginning of the Algerian nationalist movement as “the pauperized masses of the
countryside, the principal victims of the colonial system, had linked up for meaningful action with a nationalist movement that urban Algerians had created and which had been spreading in the cities for fifteen years” (Ruedy 1992, 150). Therefore, the nationalists were more determined then ever to push for separation. From the late 1940s to 1954, they would get their chance.

After the violence in Sétif, the AML was disbanded and after his release from prison Abbas created a new party, the Democratic Union of the Algerian Manifesto (UDMA), while Messali created the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD). The former called for “a free, secular, and republican Algeria loosely federated with France” while the latter was “committed to unequivocal independence” (Toth 1994, 42). Interestingly, the MTLD was supported by a clandestine organization known as the Organisation spéciale (OS) and was initially headed by Hocine Aït Ahmed and later Ben Bella. In August 1947, the parties were enfranchised by the French government after the passing of the Organic Statute of Algeria, which would serve as a new constitution. An Algerian Assembly was also created with two sixty-member colleges, one for Algeria’s 1.5 million Europeans and the other for the 9 million Muslims (Stone 1997, 36). Although, as Stone (1997) notes, “…[T]he Europeans, using a combination of intimidation, vote-rigging, arrests and other illegal practices, managed to prevent the UDMA and the MTLD from ever attaining their true electoral strength in elections for the Algerian Assembly and in local and French Assembly elections over the following six years” (36). The malfeasance on the part of the Europeans further incited tensions that were already simmering beneath the surface in the PPA-MTLD coalition.

One such tension occurred between the Berbers led by Ait Ahmed and Messali’s MTLD. The Berbers complained the Messali and the MTLD were increasingly using too much Islamic rhetoric instead of being more secular and Marxist (Ruedy 1992, 154). Simultaneously, there
were massive arrests and crackdowns forcing the MTLD to dissolve the OS. The dissolution of the OS caused the most militant of Algerian society to leave the MTLD. By late 1951 and into 1952, the weakening of the MTLD was hastened by a conflict between the Central Committee of the MTLD and Messali “who was widely accused of authoritarianism and attempting to impose the cult of his own personality” (Ruedy 1992, 154). Efforts were made to reconcile their varying differences; however, these attempts were for naught as Messali continued to try and re-assert personal control. However, he was arrested and deported to France in 1952, thereby increasing the factionalism of the MTLD (Stone 1997, 36).

During the spring of 1954, the factionalism described above, influenced the creation of a “third force” between the two factions. This third force was the Comite REvolutionnaire d’Unite et d’Action (CRUA) and was created by five former MTLD members: Mohamed Boudiaf, Mohamed Larbi Ben M’Hidi, Moustafa Ben Boulaid, Mourad Didouche and Rabah Bitat with Krim Belkacem, Ben Bella, Mohamed Khider and Aït Ahmed joining during the next two years (Stone 1997, 36). Between March and October 1954 the CRUA created plans for the rebellion against French Rule when it became clear that the MTLD was irretrievably split (Ruedy 1992). On Nov 1954, the CRUA changed its name to the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN), the political wing of the Armee de Liberation Nationale (ALN), and launched the revolution leading to Algeria’s independence from the French.

**Algeria’s War of Independence: 1954-1962**

The War of Independence—or as Algerians call it, the Revolution—was a bloody period in Algerian history with attacks perpetrated throughout Algeria against military installations, police departments, warehouses, communication facilities, and public utilities. The FLN, as the vanguard of the revolution, called for Algerian Muslims in a national struggle for “the
restoration of the Algerian state, sovereign, democratic, and social, within the framework of the principles of Islam” (Toth 1994, 44). The Algerians’ war of independence was not merely a fight between colonizer and the colonized. In fact, one could argue there were multiple conflicts—between the pied noirs and Muslims, as well as internecine rivalries between Algerian Muslims.

The FLN leadership recruited broadly throughout Algerian society. According to Quandt, “To keep the FLN together as a broad front, the leaders kept the focus on the one thing they agreed upon—Algeria’s independence within an Arab/Islamic framework. But it was nationalism rather than any other ideology that inspired the movement” (Quandt 1998, 19). The FLN operated under collective leadership and consisted of numerous committees, cliques and clans. Externally the FLN was led by Ben Bella, Khider, and Ait Ahmed in Cairo and were assisted nominally by Gamel Abdel Nasser. The external leadership worked to gain foreign support and acquire arms, supplies and money for the war effort. Internally, the FLN established a leadership committee of six led by Mohamed Boudiaf, who established six military regions, known as wilaya. Each wilaya was headed by a colonel of the ALN and supported by three assistants—political affairs, logistics, and public affairs (Ruedy 1992, 158-9).

The war’s first shots were fired on November 1, 1954 and all of northern Algeria was engulfed in violence by the end of 1956. The ALN and its clandestine terrorist groups “engaged in direct attacks against the French army and security forces as well as assassinations, economic sabotage and intimidation of the FLN’s opponents within both the Muslim and European opponents” (Stone 1997, 37). It was the massacre of 123 civilians in the town of Philippeville in 1955 that redefined the war. A wilaya commander for the Constantine region decided that escalation was needed, but the large number of civilian deaths struck a chord with Jacques
Soustelle (France’s Governor General of Algeria) who ordered government retaliation killing 1,273 FLN guerillas, according to the French government (Toth 1994, 46). The FLN claimed 12,000 Muslims perished “in an orgy of bloodletting by the armed forces and police, as well as [pied noir] gangs” (Toth 1994, 46). In effect, scholars (Ruedy 1992; Stone 1997; Stora 2000; Toth 1994) all claim that the Philippeville massacre was the beginning of all out war in Algeria.

By 1956, the ALN “had evolved into a well-disciplined force of some 20,000 armed men with a well-developed terrorist capability” (Stone 1997, 37). Also, the FLN had consolidated its power co-opting all of the nationalist movements except for one—Messali Hadj. Messali’s Mouvement Nationale Algerien (MNA), the successor to the MTLD, was active among Algerian immigrants in France and in the Kabilya engaging in street battles with FLN supporters (Stone 1997, 37). The MNA established a 500 person militia to try and counter the FLN; however, because of defeats received at the hands of the FLN and French success in co-opting smaller factions, the MNA ceased to be a major threat to the FLN (Ruedy 1992, 146). Effectively, Quandt (1998) argues, “. . . [T]he most famous figure of modern Algerian nationalism at the time of the revolution was shunted aside, treated as a traitor, and his followers were systematically eliminated” (19).

Moreover, the rise in violence around Algeria was not limited to just the FLN. Throughout 1956 and 1957, the FLN was successful in a number of terrorist attacks against French government and pied noir interests. The French government under Soustelle’s successor, Governor General Robert Lacoste, dissolved the Algerian Assembly and ruled Algeria by decree. The French responded by placing most of northern Algeria under a state of emergency. According to Stone (1997), “Repealed French initiatives to find a compromise solution
foundered on the weakness of successive coalition governments in Paris and the strength of resolve of the European colonists, who stubbornly insisted that aid from abroad, particularly Arab nationalist regimes such as that of President Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, was the mainstay of the FLN rebellion” (38). Consequently, the French army divided Algeria into sectors to try and reduce the amount of terrorism. Although, their efforts at combating the FLN were hindered with the independence of neighboring Tunisia and Morocco, where the FLN was able to maintain sanctuaries to attack into Algeria (Ruedy 1992, 165).

Despite their repeated successes, the FLN was experiencing coordination problems. These problems occurred because, as Ruedy (1992) argues, “FLN efforts on the ground were weakened by interpersonal or intergroup conflicts largely irrelevant to the national struggle; they were hampered by the bewildering turnover provoked by the terrible toll of lives; French counterinsurgency tactics were increasingly effective at isolating the wilayas from each other” (166). To overcome French tactics and improve coordination, the FLN leadership met at Soummam Valley and drafted a forty-page platform that “clarified the objectives of the revolution, formalized the military structures that had been evolving ad-hoc, and gave the revolution for the first time a set of overall political institutions (Ruedy 1992, 166). The Soummam conference also established the *Counseil National de la revolution algerienne* (CNRA), which would become Algeria’s first sovereign parliament. The conference reaffirmed the principles of collegial decision-making within the FLN as well as political leadership over the military. In effect, the conference “affirmed the primacy of the internal leadership over the external, a position which was easy to take since none of the external leaders had made it to the Soummam Valley” (Ruedy 1992, 166). Why had the leaders missed the conference? Ben Bella and his colleagues had waited in San Remo and then Tripoli to be escorted into Algeria for the
conference. However, according to Ruedy (1992), “They [Ben Bella & the other Externals] were still waiting at Tripoli when word arrived the Congress had convened, met for twenty days, and then adjourned” (166). Accusations were then made that the internals had deliberately misled the external leadership; namely, that the split between the internals and externals “contain[ed] hints of the unresolved issues separating Arabs from Kabyles that had already surfaced within the Organisation spéciale in 1949” (Ruedy 1992, 167). Another factor affecting events was the capture of Ben Bella, Ait Ahmed, Hider, Bitat and Boudiaf—five of the nine historic chiefs of the FLN & members of the outside leadership—who were imprisoned in France for the remainder of the war (Ruedy 1992, 38).

At this point, the French felt they were gaining an upper-hand in combating the FLN. By the fall of 1956, the French had built up their forces to over 400,000 (Ruedy 1992, 167). These forces were divided up into small units for patrol as well as implementing a resettlement policy of populations outside of regions “where the FLN was most active in order to rob the rebels of revenue, supply, and shelter—in effect, ‘taking the water away from the fish’” (Ruedy 1992, 167). Accordingly, the internal leadership sought to demonstrate its leadership over the Algerian population by calling for an eight-day general strike and to carry the battle from the countryside to major urban centers through the use of terrorism. The most famous outcome of this policy was the Battle of Algiers in September 1956. As is so accurately depicted in Gino Pontecorvo’s stunning film, The Battle of Algiers (1967), Saadi Yacef, the commander of the Autonomous Algiers region orchestrated bombings and killings from his hideout in the Casbah section of Algiers aimed at the pied noir population of the city. In fact, the attacks occurred until the spring of 1957 claiming a number of innocent civilians (Ruedy 1992, 168). The French responded with a military campaign to isolate the Muslim populations and their neighborhoods. French tactics
included harassment and, most notably, a “widespread and systematic use of torture as an aid to interrogation” (Ruedy 1992, 168). The effects of torture on the Algerians and French war efforts are well documented elsewhere (Horne 2006; Ruedy 1992; Stora 2001), but suffice it to say, while the tactics used by the French had a short term goal of winning the battle, it precipitated the French losing the war.

Both the FLN and the French suffered setbacks from the Battle of Algiers. The French had effectively repressed the FLN’s terror campaign within Algiers and “[t]he overwhelming, multifaceted repression further disrupted already fragile communications and command structures” (Ruedy 1992, 169). In part, the French rounded up Algerians by the thousands into settlement camps and secured the borders with neighboring Tunisia and Morocco to cut off communication between leadership who had fled the country and those revolutionaries who were still in the country. The internal leadership was criticized for calling a general strike that failed and launching a campaign of urban terrorism that strayed from the revolutionary aim of appealing to the rural population (Horne 2006, 223-224; Ruedy 1992, 169). The criticism was appearing from a number of different sources within the FLN leadership; namely, loyalists to Ben Bella, led by Ramdane Abane, the leader of the internals, and a rising class of military men known as “the colonels”, led by Abdelhafid Boussouf, “who had gradually taken over direction of the war as death, imprisonment, or demonstrated incompetence thinned the ranks of the original revolutionaries” (Ruedy 1992, 170). Abane was firmly opposed to the military dominating a political organization and publicly attacked Boussouf, stating that he and the military were robots. (Horne 2006, 225-226). The wilayas had become isolated since the Battle of Algiers from the CCE. Consequently, each wilaya developed its own command style and found itself with greater autonomy and power with the lack of directives from the CCE (Horne
The most notable example being Wilaya 5 under Boussouf and his assistant Boumediene, who established a closely-knit, disciplined military machine. As Horne (2006) explains, Boussouf “….was held by his subordinates in considerable awe, had imposed a strong stamp of his own personality on Wilaya 5 and would henceforth assume a central role in the FLN leadership” (225). As a result, a meeting of the CNRA was held in Cairo in July 1957 and reversed the Soummam Valley decisions, thereby expanding the CCE (Comité de coordination et d’exécution, or executive cabinet) which became dominated by the five wilaya colonels. Abane continued to make disparaging comments against the colonels, stating: “‘You are creating a power based on the army. The maquis is one thing, politics is another and it is not conducted either by illiterates or ignoramuses!’” (Horne 2006, 227). The conflict between Abane and the colonels came to a head with the colonels orchestrating Abane’s strangulation in Morocco in December 1957 (Horne 2006, 227-230). Therefore, with the death of Abane, the colonels became the undisputed power brokers in the FLN.

By spring 1958, the FLN’s leadership quarrels and French counterterrorist measures had left the FLN at a disadvantage at this point in the war. According to Ruedy, “….[T]he operational balance of the war more and more favored the colonialists by the spring of 1958. Urban terrorism had been quelled, operational successes in the interior countryside were few and small, and the war on the frontiers had stagnated.” It was at this point, however, that “France’s interest in a system equitable enough to insure the long-term loyalty of the Algerian Muslims, had, for more than a century, been overridden by that of settlers determined to guarantee their own monopoly of political and economic power” (Ruedy 1992, 170). In other words, French citizens were beginning to question whether it was worth the money, materiel, and lives to support the pied noirs, whose overall interests were beginning to diverge from France. In
France, the 4th Republic was experiencing instability as the thirteenth government was being formed by Prime Minister Pierre Pflimin and pied noir protests were occurring in response to increasing violence (Ruedy 1992, 172). French army commanders “chafed at what they took to be inadequate and incompetent government support of military efforts to end the rebellion” (Toth 1994, 51). Thus, the army and pied noirs pressured the French government, specifically French President René Coty to name de Gaulle as prime minister of a government of national unity. On June 1 1958, de Gaulle’s acceptance of an invitation by President Coty to form a government was approved by parliament and de Gaulle was able to rule by decree for six months (Ruedy 1992, 172).

Upon taking office, DeGaulle established the Fifth Republic and proposed that Algeria would be a partner with, rather than an integral part, of the Fifth Republic (Stone 1997, 39). De Gaulle’s proposals included “measures for accelerating Algerian integration into France by granting universal adult suffrage, instituting a single electoral college, and assuring that a minimum of two-thirds of Algerian representatives in the Parliament of the Fifth Republic would be Muslims” (Ruedy 1992, 173). In response, the CNRA implemented a three-part offensive to counteract DeGaulle’s efforts. First, the revolution was brought to France to pressure the émigré community. Second, Ben Khedda appealed to China for military arms to use “East-West rivalries to Algerian advantage” and finally, a provisional government, the Gouvernement Provisoire de la République Algérienne or GPRA was organized in Tunis under Ferhat Abbas as president and Ben Bella as vice-president (Ruedy 1992, 173). According to Ruedy (1992), “In composition, the GPRA represented the most broadly based executive yet created by the FLN….For all of its breadth, however, the main power positions remained in the hands of the militant triumvirate who had dominated the second CCE: Belkacem Krim as Vice President and
Minister of War, Lahkdar Ben Tobbal as Minister of the Interior, and Abdelhafid Boussouf as Minister of Communications” (Ruedy 1992, 174). In other words, the military began to exert its influence as early as 1958, several years prior to independence.

The French were meeting with success in Algeria. DeGaulle forced the resignation of officers on the Committee of Public Safety and assigned governorship of Algeria to Paul Delouvrier and the army command to Maurice Challe. At this point, a number of generals were declaring the war won as Wilayas Two, Three and Four were in complete disarray (Ruedy 1992, 175). Despite this success, the French public was growing restless and international pressure was increasing. On September 16, 1959, de Gaulle stated publicly for the first time that Algerians had the right to ‘self-determination’ (Stone 1997, 39). This announcement was met with uneasiness in the pied noir community, who by January 1960, attempted an uprising against the colonial government. General Calle put down the insurrections, but many “highly organized and well-armed vigilante groups stepped up their terrorist activities, which were directed against both Muslims and pro-government Europeans, as the move toward negotiated settlement of war and self-determination gained momentum” (Toth 1994, 54). Moreover, in April 1961, important elements of the French army, with support of the Foreign Legion and the well-armed Secret Army Organization (Organisation de l’Armée—OAS) coordinated the pied noir uprisings. According to Toth, “The leaders of this ‘generals’ putsch’ intended to seize control of Algeria as well as topple the de Gaulle regime” (Toth 1994, 54). While the “general’s putsch” was unsuccessful, it was a turning point in France’s attitude toward the Algerian war.

The pied noir uprisings as well as continued violence by the FLN resulted in de Gaulle opening secret negotiations with the FLN in January 1961 “intended to provide a new mandate to carry through his program of self-determination” (Stone 1997, 39). Despite repeated terrorist
attacks by the OAS and guerrilla warfare by the FLN, France and the GPRA met in Evian, France. After a number of meetings in 1961, a cease-fire was agreed to between the France and the FLN known as the Evian Accords. Ninety-one percent of French citizens approved the Evian Accords officially ending 130 years of French rule and offering pied noirs equal legal protection with Algerians over a three-year period (Stone 1997, 40).

However, there continued to be terrorist attacks by the OAS to undermine the FLN agreement with the French. During the spring of 1962, said attacks were a “last desperate attempt to prevent the inevitable by goading the FLN to break the ceasefire….”, but ultimately failed due to a “combination of an efficient police response and internal divisions within the the OAS….,” (Stone 1997, 40). The violence, consequently, sent large numbers of Europeans and pied noirs fleeing back to France. On July 1, 1962, Algerians voted nearly unanimously for independence and on July 3rd, De Gaulle pronounced Algeria an independent country. After eight years of fighting estimates ranged from as low as 300,000 dead according to the FLN to Algerian government estimates, in later years, of 1.5 million dead (Toth 1994, 55). Nevertheless, eight years of conflict had produced factionalism within the FLN between the interior and exterior leadership that would come to define the development of post-war Algeria. As Ruedy (1992) explains:

By the early 1960s, thousands of Algerians who had played leadership roles of many different kinds in the revolution could lay claim to a share of political power but no mechanism had been created to adjudicate and apportion such claims. If the years 1954-56 witnessed a progressive coming together of nationalist leadership, the years 1957-1962 witnessed an ever greater segmentation of the elites. This was in contrast to the society as a whole, which, through the shared experiences of war and repression, had developed the clear
sence of identity …demonstrated so dramatically in the events of December 1960
[to demonstrate Algerian nationalism upon De Gaulle’s visit to Algeria] (181).
The next section will examine the factionalism within the FLN leadership, to examine the rise to
power of two important leaders in Algeria, Ahmed Ben Bella and Henri Boumedienne.


The conflict for power within the FLN involved a number of groups and individuals: The
five ‘historic chiefs’ who had been released from detention in France on the day that the Evian
Accord was signed; the provisional government (GPRA) under Benyoucef Ben Khedda;
moderate Muslim politicians; the military, itself divided between ‘internals’ and ‘externals’; the
commanders of the Wilayas; the trade unions; and leaders of France-based Algerian Muslims
(Stone 1997, 43-4). The most important conflict, however, was between the GPRA and the
military leaders of Wilayas II, III and IV. In effect, these personality conflicts were allowing the
external ALN to become the most cohesive institution in the country. The ALN’s ability to
accomplish this was due in no small part to the work of Boumedienne.

Boumedienne, a member of the external ALN, used “ruthless efficiency” to reorganize
the ALN beginning in late 1960 (Horne 2006, 412). His priority “was to keep the military
apparatus intact, and Boumedienne saw it as his longer-term function to create a well-equipped,
disciplined and trustworthy army with which any future Algerian government of the FLN could
rule an independent Algeria, against all rivals, in the difficult days that might lie ahead” (Horne
2006, 414). His first act was to reign in the lawlessness that was occurring in various commands
of the external ALN. In Tunisia, because of the boredom of inactivity certain groups of soldiers
would mug local Tunisians. Boumedienne rounded up the twenty officers and soldiers and had
them executed in front of the troops (Horne 2006, 412). Also, there was an insurrection of 100
troops in the Moroccan based ALN that was supported by the Moroccan army, which
Boumedienne would ultimately put down. According to Horne (2006), “To eradicate permanently this kind of indiscipline, Boumedienne introduced his own tough deputies . . . to weld the whole army closely under his personal control” (412). The ALN General Staff was remodeled along the lines of the French system to include four bureaus, which would include defectors from the French army, to oversee training programs as new weapons from the Communist bloc began to arrive. As part of this training program, Boumedienne included political indoctrination. He also worked to rebuild the interior ALN, especially in Algiers, by ordering them “….to maintain a low profile; to refuse combat in the face of continuing French [sweeps]; to break up and dissipate in small groups and, if necessary, take refuge in another Wilaya far from the current offensive” (Horne 2006, 413). Essentially, Boumedienne wanted to remind his fellow countrymen, as well as the international community, that the FLN was still around despite setbacks received at the hands of the French military. With a strengthened ALN, Boumedienne believed that the FLN would be able to rule and counter any rivals that lay ahead in an independent Algeria.

Boumedienne had an ally in this endeavor in Ben Bella. Of all the groups mentioned above who were in conflict, Ben Bella was an “historic chief” of the FLN and the most prominent, mainly due to his arrest during the early years of the war. Consequently, he was able to parlay this advantage through the organization of a political bureau to counter the GPRA. The Political Bureau comprised the five historical chiefs, one wilaya leader, and only one member of the GPRA and was created in Tripoli, Libya to outmaneuver the GPRA (Stone 1997, 44). The GPRA was established after independence in Tizi Ouzou, the capital of Kabylia, which Stone argues was a result of the Kabyle origins of the executive members. Ben Khedda “then attempted to impose his authority over the powerful ALN by dismissing . . . Boumedienne”
Accordingly, Boumedienne threw his support behind Ben Bella’s Tlemcen clan and supported Ben Bella’s candidacy over Ben Khedda’s. Joining Boumedienne in support of Ben Bella was Boumedienne’s Oujda clan, Ferhat Abbas, who was President of the National Assembly, and Mohamed Khider, the Secretary General of the Political Bureau (Ruedy 1992, 198).

The main contention in the struggle for power occurred over the drafting of a constitution, the creation of political institutions, and defining the powers of government, assembly, and party (Ruedy 1992, 198). Abbas argued that the National Assembly was the only institution with power to draft and vote on a constitution, while Khider believed that policy making and constituent authority rested with the party. As a result, Ruedy (1992) notes, “The Assembly promptly bogged down in debating its rules and procedures so that, well into 1963, it could not pass a single statute much less deal with the fundamental law” (198). Furthermore, continues Ruedy (1992), the FLN as a party “separate from the wartime military and bureaucratic apparatus scarcely existed; institutionally, in 1962, it was the five-man Political Bureau” (198). Ben Bella, therefore, ruled by decree and was able to strengthen his power base.

Ben Bella would face repeated resistance from internal wilaya commanders of wilayas II, III, & IV. Their opposition concerned the fact that the externals would be charged with transforming the ALN into the Armée Nationale Populaire (ANP) “claiming that the plan contravened the spirit of the revolution” (Stone 1997, 44). Stone (1997) notes: “‘Internal’ military commanders resented Boumedienne’s ‘Army of the Exterior’ for failing to assist them during the war and were anxious to preserve their own authority and privileges that they had established during the previous seven years” (44-5). The Political Bureau attempted repeatedly to negotiate with the Internal commanders to no avail. On August 30, 1962, negotiations
between the Bureau and commanders broke down and the Bureau ordered the ALN to move on Algiers from Oran. Algeria was on the precipice of civil war. Various wilayas worked to assure their autonomy, especially Wilayas III and IV who maintained their own councils, until the Political Bureau ordered the ALN and the troops of Wilayas I, II, V, and VI to march on Algiers (Stora 2001, 127). As Stone (1997) argues, “Full scale civil war was only averted by the speed and ease of the ALN’s conquest of Algiers and by the population’s clear disgust at this new period of violence so early in the existence of the newly-independent state” (Stone 1997, 45).

Consequently, with the interior military’s defeat, the Political Bureau drew up a new list of candidates for the National Assembly election and Ben Bella ordered the removal of one-third of the candidates (fifty-nine names), including Ben Khedda (Stora 2001, 128). The Political Bureau’s list of candidates won a “suspicious” 99 percent of the vote with members of the Tlemcen coalition dividing power among themselves (Stone 1997, 45; Stora 2001, 128). Ben Bella became head of government with Khider becoming secretary general of the political bureau, Boumedienne defense minister and Abbas becoming president of the National Assembly. According to Stora (2001), “For the most part, the FLN drew its legitimacy from the very recent history of the war of independence. It did not possess democratic legitimacy” (132). After the election, Ben Bella, Boumedienne and Khider formed a triumvirate of the army, the party, and government to run Algeria. However, “Ben Bella’s ambitions and authoritarian tendencies wee to lead the triumvirate to unravel and provoke increasing discontent among Algerians” (Toth 1994, 57).

The war of independence and the aftermath severely hurt Algeria’s society and economy. The physical destruction notwithstanding, the pied noirs returned to France thereby depriving Algeria of most of its managers, civil servants, engineers, teachers, physicians, and skilled
workers (Toth 1994, 57). Algeria’s Muslim population was prohibited from many of these professions as a result of French colonial policy. Moreover, homelessness was in the hundreds of thousands with almost 70 percent of the workforce unemployed (Toth 1994, 57). By 1963, Ben Bella issued the “March Decrees” which declared all agricultural, industrial, and commercial properties as vacated and thus property of the Algerian state. This policy became known as “Algerian socialism” and incorporated what became known as self-management. With the departure of European owners and managers from factories, workers took control of firms and established state-owned farms and cooperatives. Each had elective boards of managers “that directed production activities, financing, and marketing in conjunction with state-appointed directors” (Toth 1994, 58). Self-management would ultimately fail due to bureaucratic incompetence, graft, and theft, as well as being a temporary conservative formula more than a fundamental political choice (Toth 1994; Stora 2001). As David and Marina Ottaway (1970) aptly posit:

The adoption of the self-management system in Algeria was largely the outcome of the chaos that reigned in the country at independence. In the confusion, a small group of intellectuals dominated by foreign Trotskyites was able to impose its ideas. Unfortunately, these intellectuals were only interested in promoting the takeover of power by the workers in order to prevent the bureaucracy from choking the revolution, as they believed had happened in the Soviet Union and other Communist countries (67).

Therefore, Ben Bella saw self-management as a popular political solution of the moment to strengthen his own position against his opponents and was not interested in the economic effects of a socialist economic policy. Nevertheless, self-management “became a key issue in the politics of independent Algeria, the rallying cry of the workers, and the indispensible slogan of two successive regimes” (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, 68).
Ben Bella believed that the establishment of a presidential regime was the most effective way of ensuring his authority, marginalizing his opponents, and guaranteeing the adoption of self-management. A new constitution was drawn up under FLN supervision and Ben Bella was confirmed as the party’s choice to lead the country for a five-year term (Stone 1997, 46). The new constitution gave Ben Bella the powers of chief of state, head of government and supreme commander of the armed forces. His main supporters were the Political Bureau, the ‘Tlemcen Group (Boumedienne, Khider and Abbas) and the ANP, particularly the ‘Oujda clan’. Ben Bella’s coalition was in a fragile state, as he was supported by those with their own ambitions (Stone 1997, 46). Consequently, Ben Bella’s policies would continue to meet resistance.

Challenges from outside the government included supporters of Messali Hadj, the Communist Party (PCA), and the Parti de la Révolution Socialiste (PRS) led by Boudiaf. The PCA were excluded from the FLN as a party and continued to criticize Ben Bella’s regime in their Algérie Républicain newspaper. With a readership of about 80,000, it had a circulation twice that of the government-run paper Al-Chaab, and was considered the most influential paper in the country (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, 91). Because of their influence with the Algerian people, Ben Bella never banned them from government. He did, however, go to great lengths “to make it clear that Algeria was not anti-Communist and even invited the Communists to join the FLN as individuals” (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, 91). His reasoning had to do with the image he was attempting to portray of his regime. As Ottaway and Ottaway (1970) explain, “Ben Bella was apparently fearful that the banning of the PCA would tarnish his revolutionary image and impair Algeria’s relations with the Soviet Union because as late as April 1963 he was still publicly offering explanations for his actions” (91).
Furthermore, the PRS, founded by Boudiaf as a clandestine organization in September
1962, was not taken seriously by Ben Bella. Boudiaf was considered a Marxist and “claimed to
be a rigourous ‘scientific socialist’ and advocated immediate nationalization of key sectors of the
economy, state control of foreign commerce, the organization of a truly revolutionary party, and
the creation of a powerful, autonomous labor union” (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, 93). The PRS
consisted of only a few hundred Algerian workers in France and disgruntled labor union officials
and only distributed a limited number of propaganda leaflets against the regime. Boudiaf
criticized the slowness of socialist reforms, Ben Bella’s improvisations and lack of planning, for
failing to purge the party and civil service, and for collaborations with opponents of socialism—
Ferhat Abbas and Teufik el-Madani (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, 94). Boudiaf’s arrest caused
the PRS to melt away.

However, resistance to Ben Bella’s policies continued from within government as Ait
Ahmed resigned from the National Assembly to protest the “dictatorial tendencies” of Ben
Bella’s regime (Toth 1994, 59). Ahmed was upset that the National Assembly would be little
more than a “rubber stamp” for Ben Bella’s policies. His ire would lead him to join with the
Wilaya III (Kabilye) commander Mohand Ou el-Hadj to form a resistance group known as the
Front des Forces Socialistes (FFS). The FFS was a Kabyle movement and was dedicated to
overthrowing the Ben Bella regime through force (Toth 1994, 59). Throughout the summer of
1963 there were periodic uprisings attributed to the FFS, which Boumedienne had no qualms
about sending the army to crush when he felt they posed a threat to the state (Toth 1994, 59-60).
Ben Bella also used a short border war with Morocco\2 to claim that Ait Ahmed was a Moroccan

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\2 In 1962 Morocco had pressed a claim to vast parts of the western Algerian Sahara, which were rich in iron-ore. The Ben Bella regime “refused to negotiate on the grounds that surrender of the land would have required an unacceptable betrayal of Algeria’s hard won sovereignty, nationalist ideology and prestige” (Stone 1997, 47). The conflict lasted for three weeks, thawed relations between Algeria and Morocco throughout the 1960s, but in 1969 a
agent and an enemy of the Algerian revolution. A year later in Kabyle and in the southern Sahara, Ahmed helped organize an insurgent movement consisting of remnants of the FFS, the PRS, and the surviving regional military leaders. While the ANP was fighting the insurgents, Ben Bella sought to purge the FLN and the assembly of his opponents. However, when Ben Bella attempted to co-opt allies from among some of the same regionalists whom the army had been called out to suppress, tensions increased between Boumedienne and Ben Bella (Stone 1997, 48-49).

By late 1964, Ben Bella’s regime consisted of himself and a few supporters. According to Stone (1997), “This centralization of power in the hands of such a small group of people and the lack of any viable political base left Ben Bella dangerously exposed, particularly to the single faction over which he had so far been unable to assume control—the general staff” (49). Accordingly, Ben Bella sought to further consolidate his power by turning his attention toward Boumedienne’s Oujda clan. First, Ben Bella appointed a loyalist, Tahar Zbiri as chief of staff of the ANP. Next, in April 1965, Ben Bella issued orders to local police to report directly to him rather than through normal channels in the Ministry of Interior. The minister, Ahmed Medeghri, one of Boumediene’s closest associates in the Oujda Group, resigned his portfolio in protest and was replaced by a Political Bureau loyalist. Third, Ben Bella sought to remove Abdelaziz Bouteflika, another Boumedienne confidant, as minister of foreign affairs and was believed to be planning a direct confrontation with Boumedienne to force his ouster (Toth 1994, 60; Stone 1997, 49-50). The final straw “came with leaks that Ben Bella planned to revive Kabyle support for the President against Boumedienne by replacing Bouteflika with the imprisoned Ait Ahmed”

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twenty-year cooperation treaty was signed and the iron-ore was exploited by a joint Algerian-Moroccan company (Stone 1997, 47).
On June 19, 1965, Boumedienne deposed Ben Bella in a swift and bloodless military coup d’état.

**Henri Boumedienne, 1965-78**

Boumedienne has described the 1965 coup as “a ‘historic rectification’ of the Algerian War of Independence” (Toth 1994, 60). Boumedienne dissolved the National Assembly, suspended the 1963 constitution, disbanded the militia and abolished the Political Bureau which he considered an instrument of Ben Bella’s personal rule. Until a new constitution was adopted, political power resided in the Council of the Revolution, “a predominantly military body intended to foster cooperation among various factions in the army and the party” (Toth 1994, 60). The council’s original twenty-six members included former internal military leaders, former Political Bureau members, and senior officers of the ANP closely associated with Boumedienne in the coup. Boumedienne was declared President of the council and was charged with forming a new government. According to Ottaway and Ottaway (1970), “The composition of the council suggested that he had finally succeeded in reconciling the wilaya leaders and the officers of the ANP. It also suggested that he had won over two of the most prominent figures in the Ben Bella government, Mahsas and Boumaza, and thus that there might be some continuity in the country’s socialist policies, as the council promised” (193). Furthermore, the council was expected to exercise collegial responsibility for overseeing the activities of the new government with a largely civilian Council of Ministers, or cabinet, appointed by Boumedienne. The cabinet was inclusive and shared some functions with the Council of the Revolution—an Islamic leader, technical experts, FLN regulars, as well as others representing a broad range of Algerian political and institutional life (Toth 1994, 60).
Boumedienne was an ardent nationalist, deeply influenced by Islamic values, and he was reportedly one of the few prominent Algerian leaders who expressed himself better in Arabic than in French. Accordingly, the use of French was minimized and the use of Modern Standard Arabic encouraged. Ottaway and Ottaway (1970) argue, “Boumedienne’s opposition to Ben Bella’s policies was veiled behind a pseudo-religious argument over the compatibility of Islam and Marxist socialism” (179). He seized control of the country not to initiate military rule, but to protect the interests of the army, which he felt were threatened by Ben Bella. Boumedienne’s use of religion “assumed great importance during the preparations for the party congress, when the Boumedienne faction objected to the strongly Marxist orientation of the party’s new ideological charter, insisting that Islam be declared the country’s fundamental doctrine” (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, 179). However, the dissension between Boumedienne and Ben Bella was not based primarily on ideological differences. Boumedienne “was above all concerned about Ben Bella’s rapprochement with the UGTA and the Algerian Communists because he feared that with the help of these new allies the president would eventually oust him” (Ottaway and Ottaway 1970, 180).

Boumedienne’s position as head of government and of state was not secure initially, partly because of his lack of a significant power base outside of the armed forces. This situation may have accounted for his deference to collegial rule as a means of reconciling competing factions (Toth 1994, 60). One major program continued by Boumedienne was the Arabization program established under Ben Bella. The purpose of this program was to fully transform a Maghrebi-European society into a fully Arab society. As Stone (1997) notes, “The architects of the program believed that this would transcend the enduring ethnic, tribal, clan and geographical fragmentation that traditionally inhibited the creation of a nation-state conceptualized in largely
European terms” (52). Boumedienne’s policies have been called “Arab-Islamic socialism” or Boumediennism” and are “a synthesis of diverse political, social and cultural influences and ideologies ranging from the teachings of Islam to the nationalisms of the mudjahidine [sic] and the Arab east, and the socialism and Marxism of Algerian intellectuals educated in France and later in the Soviet bloc” (Stone 1997, 53).

The policies to garner the most attention were both political and developmental. The first changes made were offered to deliver constitutional government and establish public participation in political life. The 1963 constitution was discarded and work began on a National Charter (a process that would ultimately not be completed until 1976). Boumedienne’s vision was “one of political institutions rebuilt through a systematic process of political education at the base supervised from above” (Ruedy 1992, 209). Accordingly, elections were held for the communal assemblies (assemblees populaires communales-APCs) in 1967 and the wilaya assemblies (assemblees populaires des wilayat-APWs) in 1969. Although their purpose was to implement decisions from above and to provide an avenue for political advancement at the local level, the members of these assemblies were members of and approved by the FLN (Stone 1997, 52).

Second, Boumedienne’s Arabization program sought to streamline and homogenize the population to create a state “based on the interplay between the rulers and the ruled, where political education and mobilization were to be channeled from the base upwards….” (Stone 1997, 54). However, in practice, Boumedienne’s policy created an increasingly influential class of bureaucrats and technocrats. Moreover, due to the haphazard and ineffective implementation of the program, two tiers of educated Algerians developed, one educated in Arabic, the other in French. The result was the predominance of the French-speaking middle class, as industry and
commerce continued to operate mostly in French with Arabic speakers denied jobs (Stone 1997, 53-4). Despite state rhetoric, the state “concentrated more on building itself and laying the foundations of a modern industrialized economy than effectively developing the country at large, and the ordinary Algerian was largely denied access to the decision-making process” (Stone 1997, 55). Additionally, Ruedy (1992) notes, “With the streamlining and homogenization of the government, the growing authority of the technocracy, the bureaucratization of the party, and the harnessing of the labor, student, youth, and women’s organizations, Algeria by the 1970s had become increasingly depoliticized” (209). The bureaucrats, technocrats, and military officers who made policy, Ruedy (1992) continues “were functioning in increased isolation from public opinion…. [taking] decisions of enormous consequence, making vast commitments of human and material resources with little consultation beyond their own tight circles” (209). There was continued criticism of Boumedienne and attempted to eliminate dissention through a practice of collegiality. Their criticisms concerned his policy of self-management and the betrayal of “rigorous socialism”.

Additionally, some military officers were unsettled by what they saw as a drift away from collegiality. In 1967, there was an attempted coup against Boumedienne led by Tahar Zbiri, but Boumedienne was able to put down the coup by coming to terms with other opposition leaders through cooptation by placing them into nongovernmental posts or into governmental positions without portfolio (Ruedy 1992, 208). Many opponents, at an extreme, were imprisoned and even exiled. Boumedienne’s power was consolidated due to the Oujda clan’s control of the army.

To this end, the military was experiencing the transformation of the ALN into the professional ANP and this continued throughout the early years of the Boumedienne regime. These early years saw the rise of professionally educated Algerian officers who had received
their education in France who were not supported by clans who had taken part in the War of Independence. As a result, by the mid-1970s, “the armed forces had developed into a separate faction that perceived itself as the supreme embodiment of the spirit of the Algerian war of independence and Algerian national identity” (Stone 1997, 54). Thus, the military as one of the surviving institutions of the Algerian War of Independence, worked to transcend the divisiveness that ensued over the course of the war and in the early years of independence. As Stone (1997) argues, “The mythologization of the war carried out by the regime’s internal propaganda machine and through the channel of the educational system assured public respect for the military” (55). The military, in essence, was writing a history of the revolution “that began in June 1966, when a decision was made to establish a measure of sovereignty by ‘nationalizing’ the teaching of history via Arabization” (Stora 2001, 173). In other words, events of the War of Independence, as well as the names of certain leaders in the war were removed from school textbooks and street signs. The political pluralism present prior to 1954 in the conflict between Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas, and the religious ulema was concealed. Instead, the dead were revered and according to Stora (2001), “The traces of the terrible ‘settling of accounts’ between Algerians (which had produced thousands of victims, particularly among the émigrés) were effaced” (174). These acts contributed to a depoliticization of Algerian society that would sow the seeds of future violence.

Third, Boumedienne implemented a number of economic reforms. These reforms occurred between 1966 and 1971 and included the nationalization of the minerals, banking, insurance, manufacturing, and oil and gas industry (Stone 1997, 55). Essentially, a policy of rapid industrialization was imposed which resulted in industrial development that was too rapid, resulting in low productivity, a soaring foreign debt, and colossal demographic growth.
Finally, eleven years after taking power, in April 1976, Boumedienne set out in a draft document called the National Charter the principles on which the long-promised constitution would be based. After much public debate, the constitution came into effect in November 1976 with Boumedienne elected president with 95 percent of the votes (Toth 1994, 61). According to Ruedy (1992), “There were seven chapters devoted to (1) an analysis of socialism as it applied to Algeria; (2) the party, the state, and the relations between the two; (3) the main areas and themes of socialistic development; (4) national defense; (5) foreign policy; (6) the main emphases of development policy; and (7) the principal objects of development” (209). Therefore, the National Charter established Algeria as an Islamic state, with a republican political system, and socialist economy. The FLN would continue to play a role in the state through the Political Bureau and Central Committee and was tasked with drawing up bills to be put before the Popular National Assembly (APN).

However, legislative power was constrained by the power of the executive. The President of Algeria would be nominated by a full congress of the FLN and then elected by popular vote. He named the cabinet and was not responsible to the legislature beyond answering questions. If so desired, he could appoint a prime minister or vice president and dismiss them at will. He was also Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces and Secretary General of the FLN. Ultimately, “the great political restructuring of 1976, trumpeted as the vehicle for readmitting the Algerian people to the political process, served to reinforce Boumedienne’s powers in the same way the constitution of 1963 and the Algiers Charter of 1964 reinforced Ben Bella’s” (Ruedy 1992, 210).

Boumedienne suddenly passed away on December 27, 1978 and set off a struggle for power within the FLN to choose a successor. The two main contenders for the presidency were
Mohamed Salah Yahiaoui and Mohamed Bouteflika. Yahiaoui was Coordinator of the FLN, a position he was appointed to by Boumedienne and, thus, considered a Boumedienne loyalist. His supporters were drawn from labor, leftist youth, proponents of Arabization and sections of the army. Bouteflika, who was Boumedienne’s foreign minister, had support from bureaucratic and technocratic elites as well as members of the private sector (Ruedy 1992, 232). In a compromise to break a deadlock between the two candidates, the army’s delegates to the FLN congress and suggested Colonel Chadli Benjedid, a relative outsider, Commander of the Oran military district, and one of the ANP’s most senior and respected officers. Chadli was sworn in on February 9, 1979 after his nomination was ratified by 95 percent of the national electorate that went to the polls (Toth 1994, 61).

**Chadli Benjedid, 1978-1991**

Chadli was regarded as a moderate and was not identified with any particular faction or clan. He did have wide support in the military. In June 1980, he summoned an FLN Party Congress to examine the draft of the five-year development plan of 1980-84. The First Five Year plan liberalized the economy and broke up unwieldly state corporations. According to Ruedy (1992), “By adopting the theme ‘Towards a Better Life,’ the planners and the congress signaled a new concern with agriculture, social infrastructure, and light industry, and a relaxation of the austerity theme of the Boumedienne years” (233).

Moreover, while much was made of Chadli’s declaration of support for economic liberalization, in reality, Chadli’s principal objective was to decentralize the system to be more responsive to capitalism and the needs of society. Corruption had become widespread in state companies, so the 66 public corporations were broken down into 474 smaller enterprises; 19 huge state industries were divided into 120 smaller ones and spread throughout the country
beyond the industrial hubs of Oran, Algiers and Constantine (Ruedy 1992, 235). Algeria limited its earnings to the production and sale of oil and gas, because its oil and gas were paid in dollars and Algerian central planners pegged the dinar at a high rate to exert pressure on the price of imports. In short, the first Five Year plan was considered a disappointment, because Algeria’s economic crisis deepened in the mid-1980s, resulting in increased unemployment, a lack of consumer goods, and shortages in cooking oil, semolina, coffee and tea (Toth 1994). Additionally, women were waiting in lines for food, young men milled around in frustration unable to find work. To add insult to injury, 1986 saw a huge drop in world oil prices. Dismantling Algeria’s state controlled economy seemed to Chadli the only way to improve the economy.

Social unrest continued to increase in Algiers and other cities as the economy foundered from 1985-1988. The alienation and anger of the population were fanned by the widespread perception that the government had become corrupt and aloof. As Stone (1997) notes:

The government was forced to reduce subsidies on staple foodstuffs; order inefficient co-operative farms to sell off land; drastically cut back on imports; and impose a freeze on wages. All these measures provoked widespread resentment of the government’s economic policies, particularly when party and state officials, who often participated in black market activities, were allowed access to special state shops (66).

Moreover, there was rising unemployment and a booming birth rate in the 1970s, which resulted in 65 percent of Algerians being under 25 (Stone 1997, 66). There was increasing strain placed on Algeria’s education system and infrastructure. Coupling Algeria’s demographics with the state’s economic problems produced protests that would come to a head in October 1988.

A series of strikes and walkout, in October 1988, by students and workers in Algiers degenerated into rioting by thousands of young men, who destroyed government and FLN
property. The violence then spread to Annaba, Blida, Oran and throughout the countryside, necessitating a state of emergency called by the government. More than 500 people were killed and more than 3,500 were arrested. As Toth notes, “The stringent measures used to put down the riots of ‘Black October’ engendered a ground swell of outrage” (63).

The most notable opponents of Chadli’s regime participating in the Black October riots were Berber university students and Islamists. Berber university students objected to Arabization measures in government and especially in education. According to Toth, “Although Benjedid reaffirmed the government’s long-term commitment to Arabization, he upgraded Berber studies at the university level and granted media access to Berber-language programs” (62). These concessions provoked counter protests from Islamists.

Islamists in Algeria were gaining influence due to the government’s inability to keep its promises regarding economic reforms. Muslim activists first began their protests against the Algerian government in the late 1970s. These protests included harassing women whom they felt were inappropriately dressed, smashing establishments that served alcohol, and evicting official imams from their mosques (Toth 1994, 62). By 1982, there were calls for the abrogation of the National Charter and the formation of an Islamic government as violence increased on university campuses. The arrests included the prominent leaders of the movement, Shaykh Abdelatif Sultani and Shaykh Ahmed Sahnoun, which resulted in a lessening of Islamist actions for several years. According to Toth (1994):

The State viewed them [Islamists] as a threat but also with respect. For example, the government opened in Constantine one of the largest Islamic universities in the world in 1984. That same year, acceding to Islamist demands, the government changed the family status law to deprive women of freedom to act on their own by making them wards of their families before marriage and of their husbands after marriage (62).
Despite these concessions to the Islamists, the protests continued as unsanctioned independent organizations of lawyers, students, journalists, and physicians sprang up to demand justice and change.

In response, Chadli dismissed senior government officials and drew up a program of political reform, which in essence, was to become a second Five-Year Plan. A new constitution, approved overwhelmingly in February 1989, “dropped the word socialist from the official description of the country; guaranteed freedoms of expression, association, and meeting; and withdrew the guarantees of women’s rights that appeared in the 1976 constitution” (Toth 1994, 63). Moreover, the FLN was not mentioned and the army was discussed only in the context of national defense, reflecting a significant downgrading of its political status. Black October “….permanently altered the role of the FLN and its relationship to the regime and finally demolished the myth of the military as the honorable guarantor of the revolution” (Stone 1997, 65-6).

Most notably, Chadli’s reform of the constitution was the first step to establishing a multi-party democracy in Algeria. Chadli “was particularly anxious to repair his credibility which had been severely dented in the October 1988 riots, and intended his role as ‘father of the nation’ to be that of a powerful arbiter between its various factions” (Stone 1997, 69). The constitution allowed for the creation of “political associations”, but specifically banned those based exclusively on religion, language, region, sex and race or those advocating violence (Stone 1997, 69). In other words, these associations soon attracted a large following. In February 1989, Abbassi Madani and Ali Belhadj founded the Front Islamique du Salut, or Islamic Salvation Front (FIS). According to Frederic Volpi (2003), “Benefiting fully from the novelty effect, the lack of serious religious and political competition and the public impression that the Islamic
movement had forced the regime into concessions, this very first Algerian Islamic party immediately attracted a large following.... [with] the first issue of the FIS newspaper [selling] 100,000 copies” (46).

Although the constitution prohibited outright religious parties, the FIS was able to form due to the government’s choice to interpret the association clause as “allowing organizations ‘inspired by Islamic values’” (Stone 1997, 69). Unlike other parties, a national congress did not run the day-to-day operations of the FIS. Instead, the party was run by a Majlis Shura consisting of approximately thirty-five members and headed by a four-man executive body called the National Executive consisting of Abassi, Belhadj, Benazouz Zebda and Hachemi Sahnouni (Willis 1997, 149). According to Michael Willis (1997), “The precise structure and organization of the FIS remained largely obscure during the first eighteen months of its political life” (149). The FIS established a top-down administrative structure. Executives of the party were established at the wilaya and communal level and were the second and third tier of leadership located just under the National Executive. These three levels dealt with issues of organization, coordination, education, social affairs, planning and programming, and information (Willis 1997, 192).

In local and provincial elections held in June 1990, the FIS handily defeated the FLN in part because most secular parties boycotted the elections. Although, Chadli also encouraged the FIS “in an effort to prevent a victory by (and thus damage his opponents within) the FLN....” (Willis 1997, 157). Chadli had underestimated the popular support for the FIS, but was confident that he could prevent the FIS from threatening his power base. In fact, one of the main reasons for this optimism was Chadli’s belief that “the FIS would struggle to maintain its level of popular support once it took control of the majority of local authorities it had won.... [and] prove
incapable of fulfilling the frequently ambitious promises it had made during the election campaign and would consequently suffer increasing popular disillusionment” (Willis 1997, 158). The FIS, however, won control over Local Councils in all three urban centers—Algiers, Oran, and Constantine—thereby providing relatively efficient social services by improving cost-effectiveness (Volpi 2003, 49).

Nevertheless, the FLN and Chadli, were going to do all they could to undermine the FIS. The first attempt by the FLN occurred prior to the parliamentary elections of December 1991. The FLN’s response was to adopt a new electoral law that openly aided the FLN. The FLN “thought it would be a good tactical move to redraw the constituencies’ boundaries so as to favor their own candidates” (Volpi 2003, 50). The new electoral law increased the number of seats in the assembly from the current 295 to 542. This drew criticism from the smaller democratic opposition parties and the FIS, because the seats were allocated disproportionately to the south of Algeria where the FLN had performed well in the 1990 local elections (Willis 1997, 172). The FIS, in turn, called a general strike, organized demonstrations, and occupied public places. Parliament, backed by Chadli, indicated that it would not reconsider its decision, because the FLN was afraid of complete rout at the polls (Volpi 2003, 50). Consequently, the FIS leadership “branded the new electoral law ‘high treason’ and Abbasi Madani, for the first time attacking the President in person, accused Chadli of betraying the agreement he had struck with the FIS in which he had promised to conduct the electoral process openly and fairly” (Willis 1997, 173). There were two reasons to call for the general strike. As Willis (1997) notes:

First and foremost, Abassi [Madani] saw a general strike, or the threat of one, as one of the only means of persuading the government to abandon its attempt to electorally hobble the FIS through the election laws. He considered the other two possible options open to the party, that of acceptance of the changes and that of a
boycott of the forthcoming elections as being equally damaging. The first of these alternatives would have led to defeat and humiliation for the party, whilst the second risked charges of being unwilling to play the democratic game and may even have led to the sidelining of the party politically (174-5).

A second motivation behind a general strike for Abassi was the fact that the strike would allow Abassi to distance himself from the rest of the FIS leadership. In effect, providing a means to distract attention from the internal battles that were occurring within the FLN leadership. Abbasi’s opponents within the Majlis Shura frequently voiced their unhappiness with the independence of Abbasi’s leadership and sought to work in closer alliance with other Islamist parties, with the hope of continuing to build on the gains already made (Willis 1997, 175-6). In short, “[f]or many on the FIS’s ruling council, the electoral law was not the crucial issue that Abassi perceived it to be” (Willis 1997, 176).

On May 23, 1991, the Majlis Shura met to discuss “the wisdom and efficacy” of a general strike (Willis 1997, 176). Abbasi threatened to resign if he did not get his way and eventually persuaded the Majlis Shura to support the general strike by promising that the strike would last only three days (Willis 1997, 176). The strike began on May 25, 1991, however the strike elicited a weak response: “‘Shops and cafes stayed open, schools and universities continued giving classes, buses and trains ran on, and the wheels of industry failed to grind to a halt’” (Willis 1997, 177). According to Volpi (2003), “….Because of the Islamic party’s lack of support within the trade unions, the FIS ‘general strike’ never took off and the party cadres had quickly to organize a series of demonstrations in Algiers to show their strength to the government” (50). Tensions began to rise as marchers and demonstrators continued to protest as the strike moved into its fourth and fifth days. While the protesters initially showed restraint against the police, sporadic gunfire broke out as the FIS spread out throughout four districts in
Algiers to demonstrate “its ‘strike’ could paralyze the capital by asking its supporters to continue occupying all the public places in central Algiers” (Volpi 2003, 50). As violence continued to mount, the police declared that they were unable to cope with the disturbances in Algiers, thus necessitating military intervention.

President Chadli approved the intervention of the ALN “to evacuate the ‘striking’ FIS protesters from the centre of Algiers.” (Volpi 2003, 50). As the army rolled into Algiers they were met with continued resistance by protestors and Chadli declared a “state of siege” for a period of three months on June 5, 1991, but he also asked his minister of foreign affairs, Sid Ahmed Ghozali, to form a new government of national reconciliation. Although the FIS seemed satisfied with Ghozali’s appointment and his attempts to clean up the electoral law it continued to protest, leading the army to arrest Belhadj, Madani, and hundreds of others (Willis 1997, 179).

Interestingly, just prior to their arrests, Belhadj and Madani negotiated concessions from the government in return for calling off the general strike and protest campaign. Consequently, as Madani would state in a interview:

‘The talks which have taken place between us and the regime have resulted in the agreement on holding early presidential as well as legislative elections within these (next) six months, God willing. Mr. Ghozali has been appointed Prime Minister of a government which will supervise free, legitimate elections devoid of any suspicions of rigging. We tell all workers to go back to work tomorrow’ (quoted in Willis 1997, 179-80).

In short, Chadli chose to postpone the elections to allow some time for a cooling-off period. Chadli hoped the extra time would allow the chance for him to raise the appeal of the FLN vis-à-vis the FIS. Although “[t]he comprehensive nature of the regime’s crackdown against the FIS which went some way beyond measures needed to end Islamist agitation on the streets and the
activities of the party’s militant fringes, indicated that there had been a shift in official attitudes towards the FIS” (Willis 1997, 182).

One of the most important institutions of note regarding official attitudes was the ANP. The army viewed the FIS as a direct challenge to the Algerian state. As Willis notes, “Largely trained abroad in secular states such as the Soviet Union and France, most of Algeria’s senior military figures were essentially hostile to the ideas of Islamism, which were seen as a threat to the foundations of the Algerian state as well as to their [the army’s] own positions, should it achieve political power” (Willis 1997, 183). At the time, the chief of the military, General Mustafa Chelloufi, was critical of both the FIS and of the Chadli regime’s tolerance of actions leading up to the local elections of 1990. He spoke in *El Djeich*, a journal of the ANP about “the army’s intention to ‘defend the Constitution’ against elements which ‘want to exploit democracy’, statements which were rightly taken as implicit warnings to the FIS” (Willis 1997, 183). Moreover, Willis continues, “This mutual hostility persisted even following the replacement of Chelloufi with a figure, Khaled Nezzar, who was generally perceived to be far less fundamentally hostile to Islamism” (Willis 1997, 184). Similar to his predecessor, “he confirmed the army’s willingness to ‘… respond to any organized excesses that might jeopardize the national unity of the country… [and] would not hesitate to intervene and to re-establish order and unity so that force remains in the hands of the law’” (Willis 1997, 184).

In October 1991, despite the ever-present threat of military intervention hanging in the air, the FIS began preparations for the December 1991 parliamentary elections. The new, provisional leader of the FIS, Abdelkader Hachani, “succeeded in imposing his views on a strict electoral strategy and legalistic line, with the backing of the FIS mayors who were elected in 1990” (Volpi 2003, 51). On December 26, 1991, the parliamentary elections garnered the FIS
nearly half of the parliamentary seats in the first round—winning 188 out of 430 seats in a straight majority vote (Volpi 2003, 52). In other words, the party took nearly 44% of the total votes cast with no other party winning more than 10% of the vote, far ahead of the FLN’s fifteen seats (Willis 1997, 231).

At this point, Algeria looked as if it would be the first country to elect an Islamic fundamentalist regime. According to FIS leader Mohammed Said, “‘The people must be prepared to change their clothing and eating habits’” (Hermida 1992, 14). As a fundamentalist regime, the FIS wanted to impose shari’a law on Algerian society. The possibility of an Islamic fundamentalist regime “sent shockwaves through Algerian society”, so much so that 40% of the electorate, approximately 5 million people, did not vote (Hermida 1992, 14). Essentially, “[m]ost Algerians were disillusioned after 30 years of [the] FLN’s …. mixture of Marxist economic doctrine and nationalism [that] had left the country in a mess, with raging inflation, few jobs, and widespread poverty” (Hermida 1992, 14). Protests became widespread from women’s groups, intellectuals, trade unions, and smaller parties. Despite the protests, Chadli firmly believed he could keep the FIS in check by relying on a provision in the Algerian constitution which states that the head of state has the right to reform the constitution. In effect, Chadli was considering a government of cohabitation (Willis 1997, 244; Hermida 1992, 14).

January 11, 1992 Coup

While Chadli was willing to consider sharing power with fundamentalists to keep the democratic experiment alive, some members of Chadli’s cabinet, fearing a complete FIS takeover, forced the president to dissolve parliament and to resign on January 11, 1992. Leaders of the coup included Ghozali, and generals Khaled Nezzar (minister of defense) and Larbi Belkheir (minister of interior). The ANP “was carefully staged to avoid the appearance of a
“military takeover” (Hermida 1992, 14). However, as journalist Alfred Hermida (1992) notes, “Prime Minister Ghozali appeared on television to assure people he was in charge and not the generals. But with tanks and heavily armored troops surrounding key government buildings in the capital, Algiers, Ghozali was unconvincing” (15).

After the ANP declared the elections void, the takeover leaders and Mohamed Boudiaf formed the High Security Council (HCS) to rule the country. The HCS is the body which officially issued an edict that “it would be impossible to pursue the electoral process in such circumstances and suspended the second round of parliamentary elections” (Volpi 2003, 56). On January 14, 1992, the HCS handed power over to a newly created institution called the *Haut Comite d’Etat*, or HCE. The HCE was an institution created as the provisional government until new presidential and parliamentary elections could be held and was headed by Boudiaf, the former leader during the War of Independence; He was assisted by four other members, most notably, Nezzar, the Defense Minister (Volpi 2003, 57). Having Boudiaf as leader was done “to give the new regime a semblance of historical legitimacy. But there is little doubt that … Nezzar is the strongman of the Council” (Hermida 1992, 15). Nevertheless, Nezzar was able to build a coalition of support in the high command of the ANP among the generals: “General ‘Abd al-Malik Guenaizia, a longtime supporter who, like Nezzar, began his career in the French army; General Muhammad Lamari, commander of ground forces and leader of the faction of the army most vehemently opposed to the Islamists; General Muhammad Touati, chief of military operations, considered the army’s leading intellectual for his analyses in *Al-Jaysh*, the official organ of the ANP; General Muhammad Mediene, director of the long-geared military internal security bureau; General ‘Abbas Gheziel, commander of the gendarmerie; and the head of the navy, Inspector-General ‘Abd al-Majid Taright” (Mortimer 1996, 22).
The generals spoke of the need to safeguard national security and public order, but their real motivation was clear: “Having snatched power from the fundamentalists, the military-backed authorities went on the offensive to stamp out the movement” (Hermida 1992, 15). As Willis notes, “For many senior figures in the military, a FIS government would spell disaster, economically and politically for the Algeria they had pledged to defend” (Willis 1997, 245). In particular, the generals were worried about Algeria’s colossal debt of approximately $25 billion in December 1991, and stood to lose money and investment from foreign oil and gas companies’ exploitation of Algeria’s oil and gas resources (Willis 1997, 245). Politically, the ANP was concerned about the possibility of both internal and external conflict. The ethnically distinct areas of Kabylia and Mzab had decisively rejected the FIS candidates in the 1990 and 1991 elections and the military senior leadership did not want to rule out the possibility that civil war could pit Berbers v. Arabs or, even, the FIS provoking one of Algeria’s neighbors (Willis 1997, 246). Most importantly for the military were fears of the survival and integrity the military and the Algerian state. Both senior & junior officers were concerned with the FIS achieving a majority in the National Assembly. Therefore, Willis (1997) argues:

There was considerable concern amongst the senior figures in the army that once in power the Islamists would waste no time in seeking to use their new political powers to attempt to neutralize their traditional foes, and only truly powerful enemies, the general staff of the military. Such fears were also shared by more junior officers who also saw themselves as the potential targets of the rumored ‘popular tribunals’ and who, having often had a secular and frequently foreign military training were similarly anxious for the survival of a modern and secular state (246).
In short, the ANP was highly suspicious of Chadli and believed he would negotiate with the FIS to prolong his rule in some sort of cohabitation arrangement (Willis 1997, 246). Thus, Nezzar built a coalition around supporters of the military.

The FIS and the FLN clamored for a return to the electoral process, but police and troops countered with massive arrests, most notably of two newspaper editors. There were clashes even within the FLN between supporters who favored an alliance with the FIS and more conservative elements who supported the HCE and the military (Volpi 2003, 58). In February 1992, violent demonstrations broke out in many cities between policemen and youths led by Imams. On February 9, 1992 the government declared a one-year state of emergency and the next month banned the FIS (Toth 1994). According to Volpi (2003), “The regime justified its change of policy by arguing that these political parties had themselves changed their stance, and that the state authorities were only responding to these developments. (Hence, the Imams’ preaching became ‘vindictive’, necessitating prompt recession) the press became ‘uncontrolled’ and needed censorship, the Islamic associations were judged to be ‘substituting themselves for the state’ and needed to be chastised….” (61).

The end of FLN rule over Algeria opened a period of uncertain transition. Widespread discontent with the party stemmed from many roots. People were frustrated and angry because they had no voice in their own affairs, had few or no prospects for employment, and had a deteriorating standard of living. In addition, the poor and the middle class grew outraged over the privileges enjoyed by party members, and many Algerians became alienated by what they felt was unwelcome encroachment of secular, or Western, values (Toth 1994; Volpi 2003). Democracy unleashed these feelings and Islam continued to serve as an alternative to the corrupt, socialist, authoritarian regimes since independence.
In June 1992, Boudiaf was assassinated by one of his bodyguards, a member of the army’s Special Forces. According to Volpi (2003), “Although the exact circumstances were never fully brought to light—an isolated act by a supporter of Islamic fundamentalists infiltrating the army, a military plot to eliminate someone with too great political ambitions, and so on—in the public eye Boudiaf appeared to be the victim of the military officers’ behind-the-scenes struggles” (63-4). The military elite in the HCE, first and foremost, wanted to contain the threat posed by Islamic guerrillas. This was taken seriously due to members of the army defecting to support the Islamists (Volpi 2003, 64). In response, the military began to impose laws banning the use of religion for political purposes. As part of this policy, two FIS leaders, Madani and Belhadj, were sentenced by military tribunal to twelve years in prison. Moreover, new “anti-terrorist” laws were passed to give more coverage of actions of the security forces. Violence continued to increase across the country culminating in February 1993 with the HCE announcing it would extend the state of emergency for one more year “to create ‘favorable conditions’ for a new democratic transition” (Volpi 2003, 64-5).

Algerian Civil War 1993-1998

Social and political protest reached its zenith from 1993-1998, as military repression failed to halt Islamic insurrection against political, economic, and social conditions within Algeria. This climate “hastened a reshuffle of the military leadership and of the government in the summer of 1993” (Volpi 2003, 65). In addition, the dissolution of the FIS engendered a debate within the Islamist movement of how to counter the state. To better understand the conflict polarizing the nation during this time—military vs. Islamism—this section will detail the

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3 For a full account of the Algerian civil war, see Luis Martinez (1998) The Algerian Civil War, 1990-1998. This section will only highlight instances during the conflict where independent variables impacted the dependent variables. The ANP remained in control of the Algerian state during this time, however it repeatedly came into contact with the FIS, including another armed Islamist movement, the GIA, severely hampering the democratization process and continuing military rule.
conflict between “eradicators” and “conciliators” in the ANP and between “radicals” and “moderates” inside the FIS. The outcome of these two conflicts, and ultimately the civil war, would define the relationship between the military and political elites to this day.

The “eradicators” and “conciliators” were concerned with how to restore civil order in Algeria. After the death of Boudiaf, General Nezzar declined the role of president of the HCE, instead entrusting it to a civilian, ‘Ali Kafi, who along with another civilian, former diplomat Ridha Malik, were charged by Nezzar with the responsibility of rebuilding Algeria’s political system. In effect, “[t]he army… continued to make policy behind the ‘veil’ of the HCE after the death of Bodiaf” (Mortimer 1996, 28). On one hand, there were the officers who were aligned with General Lamari, as the leader of the “eradicators”, and not willing to share power with the Islamists, instead favoring all-out repression in dealing with political Islam (Roberts 1995, 251). In July 1993, General Lamari became Chief of Staff. On the other hand, the “conciliators” argued against repression and that a political solution based on a compromise with the Islamists was necessary (Roberts 1995, 251). This faction was led by a retired general named Lamine Zeroual, who was chosen by Nezzar to succeed him as defense minister, because his retirement in 1989 gave him a “clean” record for not being involved in decisions during the last four years (Mortimer 1996, 29). Therefore, Robert Mortimer argues, “He [Nezzar] was … careful to maintain a balance between options within the top military leadership, thereby maintaining his own role as the ultimate arbiter” (Mortimer 1996, 29).

Similar to the conflict within the military, the Islamists were of differing opinions regarding how to deal with the state. The Moderates, headed by Abbassi Madani and Abdelkader Hachani argued that “their political participation in the ruling institutions ought to be dictated by pragmatic considerations, such as its consequences for the Islamicisation [sic] of
society” (Volpi 2003, 67). While the Radicals, on the other hand, led by Ali Belhadj and Qamreddine Kerbane, “had pointed out that this political involvement was a means of ensuring that the state repressive apparatus could not be utilized against the Islamic movement” (Volpi 2003, 67). Essentially, the Radicals led by Kerbane and Mohammed Said (after the arrest of Madani and Belhadj) argued that the state would continue to repress them and this justified the development of military capabilities by the FIS. The Moderates “retorted that these tactics were counterproductive and that, besides handing over the moral high ground to the regime, they would endanger the very institutions that the party wanted to utilize for the propagation of Islamic reform” (Volpi 2003, 67). Nevertheless, repression destroyed the organizational capabilities of the FIS by severing links between the party leadership and the base. Consequently, the Islamist movement was left without a party and to fill the void more radical Islamic fundamentalist groups emerged to recruit disgruntled FIS members and sympathizers who had been repressed by police and military brutality (Volpi 2003, 67-8).

Examples of these radical fundamentalist groups include Mouvement Isamique Armé, or Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) and the Groupe Islamique Armé, or Armed Islamic Group (GIA). The MIA was led by Abdelkader Chebouti and established after the banishment of the FIS. In fact it is a revival of a group led by Mustapha Bouyali between 1982 and 1987, (Roberts 1994, 24). Its members consist of former Bouyalists and FIS militants who felt guerrilla activity was the only viable alternative to challenge the state after the dissolution of the FIS. Although, as political scientist Hugh Roberts (1994) contends, “It is not clear that the MIA has ever seriously envisaged a revolutionary seizure of power. It has never attempted to mobilize popular support on a large scale, or to provoke collapse of the state by targeting senior power holders” (24). Instead, MIA strategy is one of applying pressure to “make the regime regret its decision to
ban the FIS, and to induce the government to readmit the substance of radical Islamism to the political process” (Roberts 1994, 24). The divergence in views of the MIA and GIA caused a number of defections of MIA members to the GIA. This convinced the FLN to establish its own militia to give “an explicit political content to its violence, giving it the aim of the re-legalization of the FIS” (Martinez 2000, 201). The Armée Islamique du Salut, or Islamic Salvation Army (AIS) was established to counter the GIA and with its guerrilla tactics pushed for the relegalization of the FIS (Roberts 1995, 254).

The GIA developed to present an alternative by “subsum[ing] various elements which were never part of the FIS and always opposed the FIS’s constitutionalist strategy, including the ‘Afghans’—Algerian veterans of the Afghanistan war— and ….appear to be more or less autonomous but share a refusal to negotiate with the state and a penchant for ferocious and savage attacks” (Roberts 1994, 25). The GIA distinguished itself through a series of attacks against civil servants and members of the government to show that the state could not protect its own, let alone, the population. Attacks intensified, as politicians, journalists and intellectuals supportive of the regime were targeted (Volpi 2003, 69). Like the MIA before it, the GIA “relied principally upon newly “Islamicised’ urban youths with little supervision from established Islamic fundamentalist leaders” (Volpi 2003, 69). This support occurred due to urban youths’ acting out to the suffering received at the hands of the military, either through police brutality or indirectly through economic consequences (Volpi 2003; Martinez 2000).

Throughout 1993, the HCE’s task was to engineer its “demise”; namely, returning the state toward some semblance of an electoral process. According to Mortimer (1996), “[T]he key question was whether or not the FIS should be associated in these talks on Algeria’s future political institutions” (30). For the HCE, political parties had to renounce the use of violence,
but the FLN contended that requiring the renunciation of violence necessitated the recognition of Islamist parties. In mid 1993, the HCE issued a document entitled “A Platform for Democracy” calling for a national conference. Participation in the conference would hopefully lead to a solution that would work for Islamists, the FLN, and the legal parties or “peaceful opposition” to the regime. As Mortimer (1996) notes, “Most of the legal parties insisted on the inclusion of the FIS in any such conference, arguing that this was the only course that could restore security. Certain parties, like the RCD and Ittahadi, opposed any such gesture of inclusion, as did a segment of the press and the most militantly anti-Islamist associations” (31).

During this period, marred with increasing violence, one saw precarious conditions within the ALN. Nezzar, who had recently become quite ill, engendered a debate between the eradicators and conciliators regarding his succession. The nomination of an eradicationist prime minister, Ridha Malik, and the return of defense minister Zeroual would ensure a continued struggle over how to deal with the Islamists. In fact, efforts to negotiate with the FIS occurred behind the scenes, with the FIS demanding the release of their leaders for the party to agree to participate in the national conference. According to Mortimer (1996), “…Defense Minister Zeroual, at this point, took the further initiative of a secret meeting with the imprisoned politicians in order to see whether they would accept two conditions set by the army for their release: the renunciation of violence, and a declaration of respect for a secular form of government with alternation of power” (32). Both Madani and Bel Hadj demanded their unconditional release, but the army was not willing to accede to their demands.

Therefore, in 1994, the HCE came to an end as the national conference was convened in January. Unfortunately, for the military, “as the non-Islamist opposition had consistently argued that such a conference would be pointless without the participation of the Islamists, not a single
political party agreed to attend” (Mortimer 1996, 32). Instead, the military established an institution called the High Security Council (HSC), which appointed Zeroual as Algeria’s new president. On balance, the relationship between the conciliators and eradicators shifted toward the conciliators with the accession of Zeroual.

In what became known as the “Zeroual Initiative”, President Zeroual attempted once again to reach out to the FIS to forestall a continuing rise in violence. Two of FIS leader Madani’s associates were released by Zeroual with the hope that they would take steps to reduce the violence as a good faith effort to work with the regime. With the continued violence engulfing the nation, Zeroual “had little room for maneuver in his own camp because the intensity of the hostilities served the arguments of the hardliners” (Mortimer 1996, 33). Essentially, the army, Islamists, and democrats constrained their own actions resulting in a continuing cycle of violence:

The army insisted that the first concession come from the opposing camp. On the Islamist side, the political leaders of the FIS could ill afford to give an order that the armed insurgents would ignore; the defection of a major FIS personality, Muhammad Sa’id, to the GIA illustrated this difficulty….In the third camp, even the advocates of negotiation among the non-Islamist opposition were wary of a military-Islamist deal that would exclude them and snuff out the democratic opening as well (Mortimer 1996, 34).

Zeroual reached out for a second time to the FIS. However, the GIA responded by issuing a statement refusing “‘any reconciliation, any truce, and any dialogue with the illegal government’; at the same time, various anti-Islamist groups criticized the government for a ‘unilateral concession’” (Mortimer 1996, 34). As Mortimer notes, “In the place of the hoped-for truce, Zeroual found himself confronted by an unprecedented escalation of terrorism: car bombs, another wave of assassinations, and attacks on schools and factories” (Mortimer 1996, 34).
Consequently, the level of violence constricted the chance for a settlement between the regime and the FIS, because neither side was willing to find common ground to begin negotiations often resulting in the extremists “outflank[ing] those who might have been tentatively disposed to negotiation” (Mortimer 1996, 35).

The continued violence and the regime and FIS’ intransigence occasioned opposition parties to meet in Rome, Italy at the behest of the Sant’Egidio community of Catholic laymen to attempt to reach an agreement on a platform of reconciliation. The Sant’Egidio Platform was designed to serve as the basis for negotiation with the regime and the way forward to return to multi-party elections and included six principles:

1) Respect for human rights, support for contested elections, popular sovereignty, the rule of law, and the constitution of 1989;
2) Rejection of violence as a way of gaining or maintaining power; opposition to dictatorship of any kind; and the return of the army to the barracks;
3) Recognition that the Algerian personality is made up of Arabism, Islam, and ‘amazighite’ (Berber cultural identity) and that both Arabic and Berber are national languages that should be promoted;
4) Before negotiations begin, the FIS leaders should be released and all political parties should resume their activities;
5) Press freedom should be restored; torture should cease, along with extrajudicial killings; and all political prisoners should be released;
6) Attacks on civilians and foreigners should be condemned (Quandt 1998, 70-1).

Zeroual and his regime rejected the platform stating that “it had been worked out under foreign auspices and therefore was unacceptable from the outset” (Quandt 1998, 71). Interestingly, many of the points in the platform “actually mirrored the regime’s own language—the support for elections, for ‘alternance,’ or the change of government by elections, condemnation of violence, respect for the constitution, and so forth” (Quandt 1998, 71).
Despite renouncing the Sant’Egidio Platform, Zeroual still wanted to maintain political momentum generated from the talks. Therefore, he declared that presidential elections would be held in December 1995. As Volpi notes, “Zeroual’s attempt at circumventing the FIS by appealing directly to the people was implicitly aimed at drawing a line under the legitimacy crisis that had beset the regime since 1992” (Volpi 2003, 73). Zeroual received support from the moderate Islamic party led by Mahfoud Nannah, Hamas, and the secular, democratic and Berberist party led by Said Sadi, the RCD. However, the FIS, the FFS, GIA and FLN boycotted the elections. Nevertheless, state-sponsored television officially declared Zeroual President-elect with more than 60 percent of the vote and a turnout of 75 percent (Volpi 2003, 74-5). This blatantly fraudulent election result highlighted the opposition’s claim that “the participation rate and Zeroual’s share of the votes had been artificially increased to show massive popular involvement and to have the president endorsed by more than half of the electorate” (Volpi 2003, 75). Although President Zeroual was able to gain support of Hamas and the RCD, their partnership soon became viewed as “…the same authoritarian, nepotistic, and kleptocratic tendencies as their predecessors” (Volpi 2003, 76). With his regime’s popularity waning, Zeroual, as is the norm in authoritarian regimes, reformed the political institutions through a rewriting of the constitution.

The draft constitution was a document written after consultation granting large discretionary power to the President. More specifically, he would have emergency powers to name and replace the head of government. Also, there would be presidential term limits of two, five year terms, parliament would be selected using proportional representation instead of previous winner-take –all majority system, and the Constitutional Council would rule on constitutionality of laws (Quandt 1998, 74). Moreover, the constitution gave the president the
power to nominate one-third of the Senate and any law voted on by the parliament had to be ratified by three-quarters of the senators to become law (Volpi 2003, 76). Thus, the president’s nominees always had a de facto veto over any law passed by parliament. In November 1996, the constitution was put before the people in a referendum and passed with 80% of the vote in favor. According to Quandt, “Supposedly more people voted in the referendum than in the presidential election of the previous year—some 80 percent—and of those about 80 percent voted in favor of the of the new constitution. Suffice it to say that few Algerian commentators believed the figures” (Quandt 1998, 74).

In addition to rewriting the constitution, parliamentary elections were held in 1997. The Zeroual regime was counting on these elections to provide legitimacy and did not want a repeat of 1991-2. Consequently, “[o]ne step toward assuring an outcome acceptable to the regime was the banning of the FIS and obliging Hamas and Nahda to drop the word ‘Islam’ from their names” (Quandt 1998, 76). The regime also backed its own party the Rassemblement National pour la Démocratie, or National Rally for Democracy, which was established only three months before the parliamentary elections to counter the influence of the FLN and FFS. As Volpi notes, “The RND was an ill-assorted assemblage of former civil servants and FLN cadres close to the President that was to provide Zeroual with reliable partners in Parliament” (Volpi 2003, 76-7). The results of the election saw the MSP (formerly Hamas) come in second with 69 seats and the FLN came in third with 62 seats (Quandt 1998, 77). The RND, MSP, and FLN formed a coalition, but protests erupted and were repressed by security forces. The blatant rigging of the election and the protests “undermined rather than consolidated the position of the regime . . . . These rigging tactics showed crudely that electoral contests were primarily designed to provide the ruling elite with a façade of political legitimacy and not to elect representative political
institutions” (Volpi 2003, 77). After the June 1997 elections, the opposition parties continued to protest the election results. As a result of pressure from his peers (officers within the ANP), Volpi (2003) argues, “Zeroual followed the example of Chadli and in September 1998 announced that he was stepping down from the Presidency and called for an early presidential election in 1999” (78-9).

The 1999 presidential election was a hotly contested election with eleven candidates: Bouteflika, Taleb Ibrahimi, Ait Ahmed, Hamrouche, Djaballah, Sifi, Khatib, Ghozali, Boukrouh, Hanoune and Nannah. Of the eleven candidates, Bouteflika was the unofficial candidate of the regime (Volpi 2003, 79). Ghozali, Boukrouh and Hanoune were disqualified for not receiving enough endorsements from elected representatives, while Nannah failed to provide a certificate from the National Association of Mujahidin certifying his participation in the War of Independence (Volpi 2003, 79). As would be uncovered later, Nannah’s inability to meet this constitutional requirement for the Presidency was “….engineered by the regime to prevent the moderate Islamic leader from joining forces with the rest of the opposition after the election” (Volpi 2003, 79). Subsequently, Bouteflika would receive the support of two-pro regime parties, the FLN and RND.

His main challenger was Ibrahimi, who was a well-known pro-Islamic candidate from a religious family; his father was the president of the Islamic reform movement prior to Algerian independence. Ibrahimi’s campaign platform of “national reconciliation” and inclusion of the “ex”-FIS in the political process received support from the executive committee of the FIS abroad; however, on election day, after convening a joint meeting, all the presidential candidates withdrew their names from the ballot (Volpi 2003, 80). Consequently, protests erupted in the Kabylia region and in Algiers and Oran in support of the opposition candidates and the
fraudulent election result of Bouteflika winning 70 percent of the vote with independent media reporting a turn-out of 20 percent and the regime reporting a 60 percent turnout (Volpi 2003, 80). Bouteflika, with support of the military, worked behind the scenes to build a coalition with the RND, FLN and Islamic parties. However, despite their opposition to Bouteflika, the opposition had very little in common with each other and this led to an inability of projecting a unified front vis-à-vis the military.

During this period prior to the parliamentary and presidential elections, the “eradicator” faction under Lamari began to dominate the debate. One result of this outcome was that between a two year period, 1995-1997, changes were occurring within the military hierarchy, especially within middle-ranking officers. In addition, regional commanders were being replaced by younger officers who had only been in command of army units since the beginning of the civil war. Accordingly, Volpi (2003) notes, “These newcomers had fewer connections with the clans of the war of independence and owed much of their authority to the senior officers nominating them” (85). Moreover, the political, economic, and military autonomy of the clans in each military region was diminished as regional commands were left to languish in favor of more elite forces, particularly the anti-terrorist gendarmerie. These elite forces were better trained and better paid than the regular army of conscripts and were equipped with modern military weaponry (Volpi 2003, 85). The distribution of military hardware was used to strengthen certain units and officers as part of specific patronage networks (86). In the ANP, “the chain of command was organized in such a way that local commanders needed a direct authorization from the regional commander or the High Command before ordering any movement of troops” (Volpi 2003, 86).
Interestingly, in 1998, Lamari’s control of the political process came into sharp relief. Following Zeroual’s announcement calling for new presidential elections, Lamari “vaunted the merits of the new ‘Algerian democracy’ in a speech intended for the armed forces. After applauding the choices of the President….he concluded with a warning that ‘accession to power and alternation of power by means of elections must be, from now on, irreversible practices and the foundations on which rest democracy, the state of law and social justice’” (Volpi 2003, 86-7). In short, Lamari was paying lip service to democracy while simultaneously justifying a role for the military in Algerian politics, specifically the control of the state’s political institutions. As Volpi (2003) argues:

When he [Lamari] indicated that the military would certainly not contest the winner of an electoral process, he implied that the successful candidate would have to reach an agreement with the military before the elections. Furthermore, when he pointed out that this ‘electoral’ system would be the only mode of accession to power, he also warned the population and the political opposition than any popular protest, boycott or political agreement against this ‘official’ process of legitimation would not be tolerated by the military (87).

An example occurred after the 1999 presidential election. To buttress the Bouteflika presidency, the High Command backed an agreement between the FIS-AIS and the government as they did after the 1997 elections (Volpi 2003, 81). The military commander of the AIS, Mezrag wrote a communiqué to Bouteflika stating that he was willing to formalize a truce that was first declared in 1997. Bouteflika responded by “giving a legal framework to this initiative” and two days later, Mezrag answered signaling the intention of the AIS to renounce all military action and place the organization under state control (Volpi 2003, 81). Although a deal with the AIS was worked out, the agreement was not recognized by Hachani, Belhadj Ibrahimi, and Ait Ahmed, who were “concerned by the fact that this agreement did not address the issue of the re-
legalization of the Islamic party, the problem of the ‘disappeared’ and the ending of the state of emergency (in place since 1992)” (Volpi 2003, 82). Subsequently, Bouteflika decided to release Madani and Belhadj with the condition that they retire from public life and held a referendum called the “law on civil concord” on his agreement with the guerrillas and on the associated general amnesty (Volpi 2003, 82). Thus, with an approval of 98.6 percent and a turnout of 85 percent, the civil war had “ended”. The stark reality, however, showed, according to Volpi (2003), “…[T]hese short-term solutions to the problem of political violence strengthened the hold of the military establishment on the political system and marginalized the role of the electoral process in selecting the country’s leadership” (82).

In fact, Bouteflika has managed to stay in office now for ten years. He continued to receive support from the FLN and the institutional Islamist party MSP-Hamas, What explains this longevity? His longevity can be explained by the support of the military (discussed above), international support, specifically in the form of economic assistance, and a continued presence of Islamist terrorism. After the 1992 coup, Volpi (2003) notes, “…[T]o secure the cash incomes of the state (and of the army) became a top priority of the new military rulers of the country. The financial situation of the Algerian state had never been very bright from the mid-1980s onwards…” (110). If one recalls the earlier discussion of the socialist period of the 1970s, Algeria attempted to break away state-sponsored socialism by re-investing oil profits to ensure autonomous economic development after the rise in oil prices following the 1991 Gulf War (Schmid 2009). However, by the end of 1992, the Algerian economy “was beginning to feel the strain of the idiosyncratic ‘socialist’ policies, as well as the costs of the civil conflict” (Volpi 2003, 112). To cope with its increasingly dire financial situation Algeria renegotiated with the IMF an “extended-facilities” loan guaranteeing $1.8 billion a year over a three-year period. In
addition, Algeria was able to access $15 billion in debt reschedulings and loans from foreign
governments, banks, and international financial organizations (Volpi 2003, 113). In response,
Algeria was required to reduce their budget deficit, reduce inflation, cease subsidizing retail
goods, and open their market to foreign investment and private enterprise. Unfortunately, in
1995, the Algerian government spent DA 148 billion to pay off the debts of state-owned
enterprises before privatization, resulting in a budget deficit of DA 168 billion (Volpi 2003, 113-
4). Moreover, Volpi (2003) argues, “For political and geostrategic reasons the United States and
the Europeans prefer to keep afloat the dubious system of governance devised by Algeria’s
military rulers through a system of direct and indirect (IMF and Paris Club) aid rather than
pressuring for genuine and thorough political and economic reforms” (116).

One area where the Bouteflika regime has benefited is from the rise of oil and natural gas
prices between 1999-2009. As journalist Bernard Schmid notes, “Bouteflika has . . . benefited
hugely from the price of oil. A barrel of crude cost less than US $10 on the world market when
he first took office; at the height of its price-inflation, a year and a half ago, it rose to US $175; it
has since returned to around US $40” (Schmid 2009). This rise in oil prices has filled the state
coffers to the point that its currency reserves are said to be worth around US $140 billion.
Consequently, Algeria’s debt has been paid off (Schmid 2009). Although, as Volpi (2003) notes,
“Today more than ever, the fluctuations in the price of oil and gas commodities on the world
market and the changing priorities of the international community constitute an endemic cause of
instability for the country” (115). Thus, the endurance of authoritarianism in Algeria is partly
based off the oil prices siphoned off by the regime.

The siphoning off of profits by the Bouteflika regime only served to reinforce the
population’s distrust of government. As a result, popular discontent “fuels the ambition of the
Islamic fundamentalists to reform (or topple) the secularist ruling elite and indirectly contributes to the overall instability of the country” (Volpi 2003, 116). For example, over the last couple years there have been isolated, high-profile attacks by a relatively new movement consisting of the last remaining armed Islamists from the civil war—Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQMI). AQMI was founded in 2007 by a group named the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, the most extreme faction of the former Islamist movement GIA, who joined with Al-Qaeda and subsequently changed their name to reflect their new affiliation (BBC NEWS, 6/3/2009). The attacks continued to mount throughout 2008 and 2009 against Algerians and foreigners alike.

Conclusion

A state forged in the throes of violence has continued to come to grips with its identity as it has transitioned from authoritarianism to “democracy”. The case study above detailed a strongly egalitarian, nationalist people who, after achieving independence, were swept up in clan politics that grew to define its political system. The ALN, FLN and FIS each became subsumed in the inter-clan rivalry and it was these relationships that influenced the course of Algerian politics—from the rivalries within the FLN during the war of independence to the conflicts within the ANP since 1965. Intervention occurred during periods of intense conflict within the military between members of the Military High Command and the generals who would lead the country at various times through its history—Boumedienne, Chadli, Nezzar, Zeroual, and Lamari—as well as during periods of intense conflict with Algerian political elites (Ben Bella and Boudiaf) and Islamists (GIA, MIA, FIS, and presently AQMI).

Military withdrawals in Algeria, however, have been few and far between. After the 1965 coup, Boumedienne ruled until his death in 1978, whereby the ANP High Command put forward Chadli as a compromise candidate for the presidency. With their man in office, the
military withdrew until events, such as Black October, forced Chadli to call for the military’s assistance. At this point, the combination of violence, a deteriorating economy, and the emergence of the Islamists forced the ANP back onto the political stage in 1992 after the FIS won the second round of parliamentary elections. Thus, the “democratic experiment” ended and the ANP retained control of government as Algeria comes to grip with how to wrestle with contending forces in Algerian society—nationalist, regional, Islamist, democratic and military (Quandt 1998, 162).

The next chapter will take us to Pakistan, a complex, yet fascinating state, facing a similar struggle between its military, nationalist, regional, ethnic/tribal, and Islamist forces.
CHAPTER FIVE

PAKISTAN

Frontiers are indeed the razor’s edge on which hang suspended the modern issues of war and peace, of life and death to nations.—Lord Curzon, 1907 lecture at All Souls College, Oxford University (Jones 2009, 277).

This is not martial law, only another path towards democracy. The armed forces have no intention to stay in charge any longer than is absolutely necessary to pave the way for true democracy to flourish in Pakistan.—General Pervez Musharraf, Chief Executive of Pakistan, speech to the nation, 17 October 1999, 8:30 pm (Nawaz 2008, 506).

‘The experience of Pakistan, however, suggests that it might be easy for a disciplined army to take over the reigns of government in a developing country... but the military cannot solve all the problems facing a new nation. It may check instability, introduce certain social and economic reforms and accelerate the rate of economic growth but it cannot tackle the real problem which leads to a coup d’etat—creation of a viable framework of political action which can function smoothly without the backing of the military commanders.’—Hasan-Askari Rizvi, 1976 (Cloughley 2008, 30).

The state of Pakistan was founded in 1947 as a state for the Muslim population of India. However, since then, the state has continued to fight numerous ethnic, religious, and linguistic forces as it comes to grip with how to define its identity as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. The death of Pakistan’s founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, in 1948, set off a chain of events culminating in authoritarianism taking hold throughout the state. This continuous instability between the nation’s political elite allowed the state’s strongest institutions—the army and the bureaucracy—to usurp power from the elites who were subsumed in ethnic and regional rivalries. Subsequently, the Pakistani state was subject to military rule four times throughout its history: 1958-1969 under General Ayub Khan; 1969-1971 under General Yahya Khan; 1977-1988 under General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq; and 1999-2008 under General Pervez Musharraf.

This chapter examines the domestic and international factors that brought these men in on horseback and what led to Pakistan’s brief experiment with “democracy” from 1956-58 under
President Iskander Mirza; 1988-1999 under Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif; and 2008-Present under President Asif Ali Zadari. Ultimately, the relationship between the dramatis personae that follows highlights a tale that continues to unfold as the nation comes to grips with itself sixty-two years since independence from the yoke of British colonialism.

**Pakistani Identity & Nationalism**

From the moment of its inception, Pakistan possessed a strong bureaucracy, legal tradition, military, a powerful unifying figure in Jinnah, and an important strategic position as a bridge between South Asia, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Pakistan was created as a Muslim Homeland on the Subcontinent, due to the Muslims being the minority in Hindu dominated India (they were only ¼ the population of India). Interestingly, prior to the British Raj in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, Muslims ruled India for over 800 years (Ahmad 2006, 364). Muslims and Hindus were able to live harmoniously during that time in a multi-cultural and multi-religious society.

However, once the British came to power “overt and covert discrimination based on religious identities became a matter of policy” (Ahmad 2006, 364). A coalition was formed between the British and Hindu elites and systematically new agricultural, educational, and economic systems were put into place to discriminate against Muslims. Moreover, the Indian National Congress, representing the Hindu majority, championed secularism, parliamentary democracy, and socialism. As Kurshid Ahmad (2006) notes, “The thrust of this . . . new system was that it produced a new class of people: Indian in race and blood and British in taste and culture” (364). These Indians described by Ahmad became the new civil and military elites in India and were the instruments of colonial divide and rule policy.
From 1906-1940, Muslims in India thought they could maintain their distinct ideological culture and political identity after previous years of being able to work together. Unfortunately, it was not to be. Consequently, the political leadership of Muslim India, led by Jinnah, proposed the “Two Nation Theory”. This theory “is the principle of plurality of faiths, ideologies, religions, cultures and identities. ‘Two’ does not simply mean ‘one plus one’—it signifies the fact that there are two major political streams, one based on faith, religion, and divine linkage and another committed to a vision that is exclusively secular and of this world, unrelated to religion and divinely related values” (Ahmad, 366). In other words, the Two Nation Theory was arguing for a Hindu and Muslim nation that should live side by side and co-exist, but at the same time justify using Islam to build a state that was different than the western model of secular, democratic nation-state; this was the “Idea of Pakistan” (Cohen 2001).

The “Idea of Pakistan” was first championed by Jinnah, a secular Bombay lawyer and politician. He effectively turned the Two Nation Theory into action by revitalizing the Muslim League in India to pressure the British and the Indian National Congress to accept a state of Pakistan. According to eminent South Asia expert Stephen P. Cohen, “Because he had to weld together disparate elements of the Indian Muslim community, Jinnah’s arguments were deliberately vague” (Cohen 2004, 29). Jinnah use of divisive rhetoric and extralegal procedures prior to independence changed to a vision of a democratic Pakistan that would be tolerant of religious minorities, socially progressive, and constitutionally modern once independence was granted. He continually gave speeches that urged the various ethnic groups to work together. He had to be the glue that held Pakistan together. Although, as Cohen points out, “A few speeches could not erase four decades of emphasis on the differences between Hindus and Muslims and the threat to Muslims from the larger community” (Cohen 2004, 43).
From here we now turn to a discussion of the structure of the Pakistani Army; the largest branch of the Pakistani Armed Forces and the branch where each military dictator has come from.

**The Pakistani Army**

To understand why the Pakistani military intervened in politics it is essential to understand how the military’s identity was formed. As Cohen argues, “Armies are total institutions that mold the beliefs of their members for life” (Cohen 2004, 98). Young Pakistanis wishing to serve the military must first be selected to the Pakistani Military Academy (PMA) and then as officers they attend the Staff College at Quetta, and for generals (aka brigadiers), the National Defense College in Islamabad. This education, in addition to their social and class background, ethnicity, ideology, and corporate identity to the army itself, all shape the worldview of the young Pakistani officer. According to Cohen (1984), there are four generations of Pakistani officers that have influenced Pakistani politics: the British Generation, the American Generation, the Pakistani Generation—1972-82, and the Next Generation.

The British Generation is important because it established the educational and training facilities of the new Pakistani Army and developed a professional army modeled after the British. The American Generation were set apart from the other generations because of the training they received from the American military in doctrine, nuclear planning and the revision of the army structure to include an American-equipped armored division in addition to extra infantry divisions. Also, this generation distorted their perception of themselves in relation to India since they had had no war-time experience against their Indian counterparts. The Pakistani Generation was considered the most “Pakistani” since “they were more representative of the wider society in class origin, had less exposure to American professional influence, and believed
the United States had let Pakistan down” (Cohen 2004, 106). These officers joined after Pakistan lost the second war with India over Bangladesh. This period (1965-71) saw military honor and professionalism slip away, as the military was challenged repeatedly by civilians; namely, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who ridiculed senior military leadership for losing the war (Cohen 2004, 106). Bhutto implemented reforms with the help of his Army Chief of Staff General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. Zia’s long tenure as Chief of Staff and later President was influential among the officer corps because of Zia’s willingness to Islamize the officer corps in pursuit of building the nation. Finally, the Next Generation comes from the middle class and joined the army to improve its standard of living, “because the army is seen as a path to social mobility, [but] . . . in Pakistan’s case, the army is also seen as a path to social and political power” (Cohen 2004, 109). In short, the Pakistani army views itself as the nation’s savior. Accordingly, this generation has seen fit to manipulate civilian politicians, manage civilian institutions, and invest in a military economy to ensure its hold on power (Siddiqa 2007). How is the military able to keep power in Pakistan? The answer to this question is found by examining the years surrounding the coups of 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999.

**Independent Pakistan (1947-1958)**

Pakistan’s independence brought a huge wave of mass migration of Indian Muslims into the new state of Pakistan. Joining the Bengalis (the poorest, but the largest percentage of the population at over half), Punjabis, Sindhis, Baluch, and Pashtuns, were the predominately Urdu speaking migrants, the Mohajirs. The Mohajirs were from North India and most Mohajirs who migrated were from the leadership and professional classes. This group struck up an alliance with the Punjabis, the dominant ethnic group in the bureaucracy and military to form what scholars call “The Establishment” (Cohen 1984; Rizvi 2000; Cohen 2004). Consequently,
tensions would consistently boil over vis-à-vis the Punjab-Mohajir Establishment and the Sindis, Baluchs and Pashtuns. Due to the increasing tensions after independence, the Establishment had to construct an ethnolinguistic-nationalist narrative. This narrative before and after 1970 struck the same refrain: a strong central government and limited provincial autonomy (Cohen 2004, 204-5).

In 1948, a year after independence, the development of the Pakistani state would be forever altered. First, Pakistan and India would go to war over the province of Kashmir. According to Cohen, “For many Pakistanis, but especially that first generation, Kashmir’s captivity conjured up vivid images of oppression” (Cohen 2004, 52). Second, the state witnessed a leadership crisis when Jinnah passed away and three years later his deputy (and successor) Liaquat Ali Khan was assassinated. Third, the inter-ethnic conflict between Mohajirs, who favored a secular state, and the Muslim Leaguers who favored Islamization, a state-managed economy, and a go-slow policy of land reform continued to grow. Ultimately, Jinnah and Khan attempted to build the political institutions and processes of Pakistan based on justice and fair play, tolerance and consent; however, “they did not appreciate the scale of the task of evolving participatory political institutions in the post-colonial societies, they faltered and adopted authoritarian approaches to political management, increasing their reliance on the state apparatus” (Rizvi 2000, 17). The military was all too willing to use this opportunity to acquire political clout and thus began Pakistan’s dance between military rule and “democracy”.

Prior to his assassination, Liaquat Ali Khan, was left with the tremendous task of continuing a complicated nation-building endeavor. Liaquat, a Punjabi, was a British-trained lawyer who attempted to get the various ethnicities’ interests to coalesce. To accomplish this task, Craig Baxter (1995) notes, “Liaquat used his experience in law to attempt to frame a
constitution along the lines of the British Westminster system of parliamentary democracy” (38). However, provincialism and factional politics soon took over. In Punjab, “which had always been the hotbed of internecine political warfare, enough to exasperate Jinnah during his campaign for Pakistan…, it fell into trench warfare of the worst kind with a clash of ambitions” between Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan and Mumtaz Daultana (Nawaz 2008, 77). Both had joined the Muslim League government, but the government was in the process of fracturing as “it struggled to make the difficult transition from a movement for freedom to a ruling party” (Nawaz 2008, 77). While the Muslim League’s leaders were urban professionals, their political base was mainly in areas that were in India. Punjab was not the only province where the Muslim League was facing problems.

In the Northwest Frontier Province (hereafter NWFP), the Muslim League had established a strong position at partition due to the strength of Chief Minister Khan Adul Qayyum Khan and the commissioner in Peshawar, Iskander Mirza, but clashes soon developed between the Muslim League and separatist leader Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan. As political analyst Shuja Nawaz (2008) notes, “Apart from this political conflict the autocratic style of Qayyum and his use of condoning of ‘jobbery, bribery, and nepotism’ that had drawn even the attention of an angry Jinnah, led to a ceaseless battle for control of the province” (77-8). Moreover, in Sindh, there were frequent clashes between a powerful chief minister, Ayub Khuhiro, and Governor Ghulam Hussain Hidayatullah. The conflict between Khuhiro and Hidayatullah resulted in a judicial inquiry which found Khuhiro guilty of multiple charges of poor administration and misconduct. Nevertheless, “the wily Khuhiro got himself elected president of the Sindh Muslim League even while he was still being tried” (Nawaz 2008, 78).
Consequently, these events throughout each of the provinces led to the creation of the Public and Representative Office Disqualification Act (PRODA) which disqualified a person from politics if they were convicted of misconduct. Categories of political crimes were created and politicians were tried by tribunals appointed by the provincial Governor (Talbot 2005, 137). In effect, this Act allowed government to disqualify their political opponents without just cause. Therefore, according to Nawaz (2008):

Jinnah had managed to draw into the fold the masses and the middle class in the struggle for freedom but once Pakistan was achieved, the ruling cliques of the League fell back into its old ways, and factionalism ruled the day. Provincial leaders paid little heed to the needs of the nation as a whole, becoming warlords who negotiated with the central command to gain benefits for themselves and their cohorts (78).

Despite the continued factionalism within the provinces, the central government maintained increasing control as Liaquat centralized power and worked to reinvigorate the Muslim League. In addition to the PRODA, Liaquat oversaw three important developments in the history of Pakistan: 1) the passage of the 1949 Objectives Resolution through the Constituent Assembly; 2) the buildup of the Pakistani army, specifically the Pakistanisation of the higher echelons of the officer corps; and 3) the courting of American aid. Each of these developments will be discussed in turn, as they had important influences on Pakistan’s path away from democracy and toward authoritarianism.

Pakistan’s first Constituent Assembly and its eighty members functioned as Pakistan’s legislature. On March 7, 1949, Liaquat moved the Objectives Resolution through the Assembly (Baxter 1995, 40). The principles of democracy, independent judiciary, freedom, equality, tolerance, Islamic social justice and minority rights were set forth in the Objectives Resolution (Talbot 2005, 139). In other words, the Objectives Resolution, which would become the
preamble of the first Pakistani constitution, enshrined Pakistan as Islamic, democratic, and federal. However, according to Craig Baxter (1995), “…[T]he assembly could not reach agreement on how these objectives would take form, raising fears among minorities and concern among East Bengalis” (40). Moreover, the division of executive power between the governor general and the prime minister, the distribution of power between the federal government and the provinces, the electoral balance of power between West & East Pakistan, and the role of Islam were all issues that needed to be worked out (Baxter 1995, 40). Unfortunately, the next stage of the constitution writing process, the publication of the basic principle’s committee’s report in October 1950, was mired in controversy “mainly because of Bengali opposition to the denial of their demographic majority” (Talbot 2005, 139). As Vali Nasr (2009) argues, “The most serious point of contention was distribution of power between Pakistan’s two wings, separated by the breadth of India. West Pakistan was the capital and political center, but there were many more living in the country’s eastern wing and they wanted power commensurate with their numbers” (209-10).

The continued factionalism present during these early years allowed the Pakistani armed forces to become a prominent player in the direction of the country. Having recently fought against India after declaring independence, the Pakistani Army “had tasted war in its first few months of independence, seen the civilian decision-making up close, and found it wanting” (Nawaz 2008, 79). At independence, the British split the Indian Army evenly in terms of men and materiel between Pakistan and India. This meant that “[h]alf of the army that had controlled the whole subcontinent was a very big fish in the smaller pond that was Pakistan” (Nasr 2009, 211). Also, the first commander-in-chiefs of the new Pakistani army were British and during the first few years of independence the army’s officer corps was an amalgam of both British and
Pakistani officers. Although, shortly after independence, Pakistani officers began to take over more responsibility. In fact, Nawaz (2008) argues:

Many of the promotions were engineered by the senior British officers. [General Sir Frank] Messervy, the first commander-in-chief, and after him [General Sir Douglas] Gracey, had a say in most of the postings and promotions and applied rigorous standards that were often not to the liking of the individuals affected by them. They had little patience for the officers who exhibited strong political leanings…. [Those] who were promoted in those early days were often accelerated to higher levels, often well before they had the experience or the gravitas for command (79).

The promotion policy detailed above was a direct result of Liaquat’s Pakistanization of the officer corps and would be noticed by a major general named Muhammad Ayub Khan. Nawaz (2008) continues, “In retrospect, Ayub Khan saw the birth of Bonapartist tendencies in the officer corps in the early years of Pakistan with young men wearing high ranks and thinking that they had the wherewithal to run the country” (79).

Ayub, a Pashtun from the village of Rehana, located 50 miles north of Rawalpindi, was a member of the Tarin tribe. His upbringing has been characterized by historian Ian Talbot as “comfortable” and this informed his social and cultural outlook (Talbot 2005, 149). He came from a large family where they made ends meet by working the land well. Ayub would later draw on this in his land reform program. Moreover, Ayub’s father sent him to Aligarh College where he would “‘learn to feel like a Muslim’” (Khan 1967, 5; cited in Talbot 2005, 149). This experience afforded Ayub an education that shaped his views regarding modernization and Islam. He stated that Islam was

‘….a dynamic and progressive movement…but with the passage of time, the Muslims at large sought to concentrate more on the dogmatic aspects of Islam. […] Those who looked forward to progress and advancement came to be

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regarded as disbelievers and those who looked backward were considered devout Muslims. It is a great injustice to both life and religion to impose on twentieth century man the condition that he must go back several centuries in order to prove his bona fides as a true Muslim’ (Khan 1961, 110-1; cited in Talbot 2005, 150).

Consequently, “Ayub made little attempt to hide his detestation of the mullahs who he declared had, no less than the politicians, been covetous of ‘wealth and power and did not stop short of any mischief” (Talbot 2005, 150).

By the time Ayub was serving in the Pakistani Army, events from 1948-1951 reinforced in Ayub a dislike for politicians and the certainty that Pakistan’s survivial “was vitally linked with the establishment of a well-trained, well-equipped, and well-led army” (Talbot 2005, 151). Specifically, Ayub was assigned in January 1948 as the commanding officer of East Pakistan and he personally witnessed Bengali uprisings against the central government in West Pakistan. He personally had to send troops to the Assembly building to prevent students from attacking it (Talbot 2005, 151). Furthermore, after his return to West Pakistan, Ayub became a candidate to become the first Pakistani commander-in-chief of the army.

Ayub was not the first choice to be army chief; that went to General Iftikhar Khan. Iftikhar was previously junior to Ayub, as he was commissioned a year later, and was reportedly favored by the British to succeed Gracey. Unfortunately, Iftikhar, his wife and son, and Sher Khan (another senior general) were killed in a Pak Air aircraft that crashed near Karachi (Nawaz 2008, 79-80). With the selection process disrupted, Liaquat invited the senior-most officers to a conference in Rawalpindi to assess them and their thought processes. After Ayub made “a fine presentation”, Liaquat “was sold on him [Ayub] as the first Pakistani commander-in-chief, apparently without bringing into account any regional or other considerations” (Nawaz 2008, 80). Ayub took over his role on January 17, 1951 and would soon be thrust into the political
process. A vital component behind Ayub’s influence in Pakistani politics came from his cementing a relationship with the United States; a relationship which began under Liaquat.

For Liaquat, the central tenets of Pakistan’s foreign policy were the integrity of Pakistan, Islamic culture and economic development. The United States “was Pakistan’s great-power patron of choice, crucial as a source of weapons and economic aid” (Haqqani 2005, 32). Early on, Liaquat viewed an alliance with the U.S. just as vital to the consolidation of the Pakistani nation-state as the use of Islam and opposition to India. Current Pakistani Ambassador to the United States Husain Haqqani argues that since the end of the Kashmir war the Pakistani joint services intelligence was exploring options of how to possibly receive aid from American intelligence to build an “‘Islamic barrier against the Soviets’” (Haqqani 2005, 32). To this end, Liaquat was invited to Washington by President Harry Truman and during his visit declared Pakistan’s alignment with the United States, specifically supporting U.S. actions in Korea. As a result, U.S. economic aid flowed to Pakistan; however, Haqqani notes, “Liaquat balanced his generally pro-West policy with a refusal to align Pakistan completely with the United States ‘unless Washington guaranteed Pakistan’s security against India’” (Haqqani 2005, 33). In fact, to get the U.S.’s attention, he announced a visit to Moscow—which was later cancelled—to counter Indian Prime Minister Nehru’s planned visit to the U.S (Nawaz 2008, 94). Conditions such as these, put in place by Liaquat, upset the army, which was more concerned with keeping itself well-supplied. Nevertheless, Liaquat, his foreign minister, Sir Zafarula Khan, and Ayub would sit down with the U.S. to formalize a treaty just prior to Liaquat’s assassination in October 1951.

Although Liaquat and Ayub had begun negotiating agreements with the U.S., events back in Pakistan were heating up as a group of army officers were dissatisfied and disagreements
began mounting between Liaquat and a group of officers. Shortly after taking office as commander-in-chief of the Pakistani Army, Ayub was informed by Liaquat that a group of army officers and bureaucrats were planning a *coup d’etat*, known later as the Rawalpindi Conspiracy, to install a military-style nationalistic government (Nawaz 2008, 83). The coup was planned by Major General Akbar Khan, chief of the general staff, and he and his co-conspirators felt “that the civilians had let the country down and that the presence of British officers in senior slots in the Pakistan Army was a hindrance to a nationalistic view of things. Others, including Major Ishaq, Lt. Col. Ziauddin, and Sadiq Khan, felt that the ceasefire in Kashmir had prevented Pakistan from liberating Kashmir” (Nawaz 2008, 83). The fourteen conspirators were arrested, tried in secret, found guilty, and imprisoned. However, four years later the conspirators were released after their sentences were commuted (Nawaz 2008, 84).

Meanwhile, Liaquat continued to try and resolve disputes within the Muslim League in the provinces. In particular, he was receiving increasing criticism from Punjabi politicians as a weak, ineffective politician lacking a strong political base. He owed his position in power to Jinnah and was viewed “as an outsider in Pakistan where a battle was brewing between the provincial ‘insiders’—those who belonged to the four provinces that formed Pakistan—and the muhajir ‘outsiders’, who had migrated from India to the new state” (Nawaz 2008, 85). This prevented Liaquat from concentrating on the production of a constitution for Pakistan and, instead, work on the constitution was delegated to bureaucrats, which allowed them to take a prominent role in the direction of the country along with the army. As Nawaz (2008) argues, “Political systems abhor vacuums much like the laws of physics. A weak and dithering central authority gave both the bureaucrats and the Pakistan Army a chance to assert their role in shaping policy nationwide” (84).
Complicating the situation further after Liaquat’s assassination was a bureaucratic tug-of-war for power which one author (Nawaz 2008) defined as “The Post-Liaquat Mess”. After Liaquat’s assassination, Ghulam Mohammad, a Punjabi from the civil service and the former finance minister under Liaquat’s administration, was named Governor General replacing Khwaja Nazimuddin, a Bengali, who became prime minister. Mohammad’s elevation to governor general meant the ascendancy of the first Pakistani bureaucrat to a position of power (Nawaz 2008, 86). According to Craig Baxter (1995), “Ghulam Mohammad, who relished the trappings of dominance earlier held by Jinnah, asserted his power by declaring martial law in 1953 in Punjab.…[and] [a] year later, he imposed governor’s rule after the Muslim League defeat in East Bengal” (40). Subsequently, Nazimuddin attempted to limit the powers of Mohammad through amendments to the Government of India Act of 1935, which was still the basic law for Pakistan at the time. This direct confrontation resulted in Nazimuddin asking for the army’s assistance. Thus, “Major General Muhammad Azam Khan, who had earlier endeared himself to the population of Lahore by using the army to fight the ravages of floods.…established the presence of the army as a new major force on the national political scene” (Nawaz 2008, 87).

By April 1953, Mohammad dismissed Nazimuddin and appointed a “cabinet of talents” headed by Mohammad Ali Bogra, a former Pakistani ambassador to the United States, containing both military and civilian leaders. Former head of the civil service, Chaudhuri Mohammad Ali became finance minister, Ayub Khan became minister of defense and retained his position as commander in chief, while Major General Iskander Mirza (who was governor of East Pakistan during Mohammad’s governor’s rule) became minister of home affairs. In short, “[t]he cabinet…provided an opportunity for the military to take a direct role in politics” (Baxter 1995, 41). More specifically, Nawaz (2008) argues, “Ayub was thinking at that time not only of
the domestic situation but also about the foreign policy of Pakistan. As the domestic political edifice crumbled and headed for a fall, the army was already working towards a future in which it would control the direction of the country, at first from the sidelines and later directly” (89).

There was continuing internecine warfare between politicians, bureaucrats, and the military during the next two years with the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly and then the adoption of a new constitution. The politicians “who led the Pakistan movement used the principles and legal precedents of a nonreligious British parliamentary tradition even while they advanced the idea of Muslim nationhood as an axiom. Many of them represented a liberal movement in Islam, in which their personal religion was compatible with Western technology and political institutions” which was in contrast to the traditionalist ulama, “whose position was a legalistic one based on the unity of religion and politics in Islam” (Baxter 1995, 41-2).

The ulama “asserted that the Quran, the sunna, and the sharia provided the general principles for all aspects of life if correctly interpreted and applied” (Baxter 1995, 42). In a sense, the government could not ignore a group who enjoyed influence among the masses in Pakistani society, especially in urban areas among the lower middle class, refugees, and students. Moreover, politicians could not be seen as anti-Islamic, and thus were willing to accommodate the ulama. In particular, a group known as the Jama’at-i-Islami (hereafter JI) has been the most influential Islamist movement in Pakistan. As Baxter (1995) notes, “Unlike the traditional ulama, the Islamist movement was the outcome of modern Islamic idealism. Crucial in the constitutional and political development of Pakistan, it forced politicians to face the question of Islamic identity” (42).

The JI was established in 1941 and developed “systematically an Islamic ideology, a modern revolutionary reading of Islam, and an agenda for social action to materialize its vision”
(Nasr 2001, 94). To accomplish the above, JI established its party’s organizational structure to encompass the national level down to the village level. At each level of the hierarchy, leadership of the party is entrusted to an amir, deputy amir, majlis-i shura (shura), and secretary-general. Each of the offices is contested through elections and each level is accountable to the one above it. The focus here is exclusively on the national level, since it is at this level where the most interactions occurred between both the Pakistani government and other Pakistani political parties.

The amir is the leader of JI. He is elected by JI members to a five year term of office with no term limit and is “the supreme source of authority in the Jama’at . . . demand[ing] the unwavering obedience of all members” (Nasr 2001, 53). While the amir is the supreme source of authority, his authority is not unlimited. There are checks and balances in the JI. In doctrinal issues, the shura has authority over the amir. However, if the amir disagrees with the shura’s ruling, the issue goes back to the shura. If the amir’s veto is overturned, then the amir either accepts the ruling or resigns (Nasr 2001, 53). There have been three amirs throughout the history of the JI: Mawdudi, Mian Tufayal, and Qazi Husain Ahmad.

The shura oversees the JI’s ideology and controls the working of its constitution. The central shura (the shura at the national level) meets once or twice a year to organize party activities and decide on future policies. There are sixty members of the shura who are elected and represent constituencies that are defined according to national electoral districts (Nasr 2001, 56). When issues are debated they are done so through majority vote, as well as through the Muslim ideal of consensus (ijma’), to “convince the minority of its wisdom, leaving no doubt regarding the course on which the Jama’at will embark” (Nasr 2001, 57).
Finally, the secretary general is the head of the secretariat, which is the bureaucratic arm of the JI. Members of the bureaucracy at the national level are also members at lower levels. Additionally, the secretary-general oversees the activities of affiliate organizations, such as the Islami Jami’at-I Tulabah (Islamic Society of Students-IJT), a women’s wing, and special departments, whose work changes depending upon the needs of the party (Nasr 2001, 58). Now that the JI organizational structure has been discussed, we now examine JI’s role in Pakistani politics.

Since moving to Pakistan in 1947, the JI has been active in Pakistani politics through national, municipal and provincial elections. The JI has been an opposition party challenging the military-led governments of General Ayub Khan, General Zia ul-Haq, and General Pervez Musharraf. Since its inception as a Muslim homeland, Pakistan confronted ethnic, linguistic and class conflicts. To overcome these cleavages, however, became difficult. Consequently, many of Pakistan’s founding elites used Islamic symbols to facilitate their state-building initiatives. The situation became further exacerbated due to the government’s inability to address socioeconomic issues, carry out meaningful land reform, and consolidate its power in a central government (Nasr 1997, 141). Therefore, Islamic parties, such as JI, were now able to enter Pakistani politics and portray themselves as populist and willing to work for the Pakistani people.

Although JI participated in politics, the extent to which Islamization could occur was always regulated by the state. According to Nasr (1997), the state followed two approaches in regulating Islam vis-à-vis politics: “The first was directed at incorporating Islam into the state’s discourse on sociopolitical change while simultaneously limiting the role of Islamic parities—the self-styled advocates of Islamization—in the political process….The second incorporated Islamic
politics into the state's discourse by including Islamic parties in the political process and even in the running of the state, all with the aim of establishing control over them” (142). The first approach characterizes the Ayub Khan and Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto regimes during the period 1958-1977, while the second approach characterizes the Zia ul-Haq regime from 1977-1988, the “democratic period” from 1988-1999 under Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, and the “armored democracy” from 1999-2008 of Musharraf. (see Nasr 1997 and Shah 2003).

Despite the increased role Islamists would play throughout the country, during the 1950s, Mawdudi’s only success was the introduction of Islamic principles into the 1956 constitution, most of which “define[d] ways in which the Islamic way of life and Islamic moral standards could be pursued” (Baxter 1995, 42-3). Nevertheless, the Islamists had entrenched themselves within the internecine warfare taking place between the politicians, bureaucrats, and army. In February 1956, Mirza would become the first president of the republic of Pakistan. Although, Nawaz (2008) notes that:

….by then Ayub and the army, clearly seeing the need to take charge of their own destiny and with it the destiny of the country, had set a new course for Pakistan’s foreign policy that had serious implications for its domestic policies and political structure. Seeking ‘friends not masters’, Ayub engineered the opening to Washington to build a relationship that he hoped would stand Pakistan and the army in good stead (Nawaz 2008, 89).

Furthermore, with the election of President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Pakistanis sought to solidify their relationship with the U.S.

In September-October 1953, Ayub made a visit to Washington ahead of Pakistan’s civilian head of state and foreign minister to offer the Pakistani military’s services as “the West’s eastern anchor in an Asian alliance structure” (Haqqani 2005, 33). Accordingly, Pakistan signed a Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement with the United States and became a member of the
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). The purpose of this alliance was to contain communism as Eisenhower’s administration sought to reduce U.S. involvement in military operations undertaken in Korea through the building of military capability of “Northern Tier” states such as Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, and Iraq. Ayub and Mirza saw this alliance with the United States as an opportunity to receive economic assistance for the Pakistani military. In fact, Haqqani (2005) argues, “In their eagerness to seek alliance with the United States, Pakistani officials had exaggerated their commitment to fighting communism and had even pledged that U.S. military aid would not be used against India” and going so far as telling an American official “‘Our army can be your army if you want’” (34-5).

The reality, according to Haqqani (2005), was an increase in Ayub’s standing with the Pakistani ruling elite and, most importantly, a gateway for the military to remain involved in Pakistan’s future development (36). Within a short time, “Ayub Khan had become a powerful figure. Perhaps more than any other Pakistani…” (Baxter 1995, 45). This clout earned Ayub an appointment as defense minister in 1953, in addition to his duties as commander-in-chief, and afforded him the ability to veto any policy that was anathema to the interests of the Pakistani military. In effect, he was a behind-the-scenes power broker due to his close friendship with Mirza. It was Mirza who asked the military to assist the bureaucracy in running the state in a “superordinate-subordinate relationship”, with the military being subordinate to the bureaucracy (Siddiqa 2007, 70). Between 1954 and 1958, both the bureaucracy and the military increased their influence as the country “went through seven prime ministers and several cabinets during this prolonged period of uncertainty” (Haqqani 2005, 37).

The bureaucracy “was … beset with rivalries that extended beyond normal professional competition to sectarian rifts and regional divisions. Lines were being drawn between the
insiders, the largely Punjabi ‘sons of the soil,’ and the outsiders, mostly migrants from northern India and other parts of India”. Moreover, the Pakistani Army witnessed similar ills to the bureaucracy; namely, the insider vs. outsider competition for promotions, and the sectarian divide that influenced Ayub as he began to consolidate his position; namely that he was favoring Pashtuns (or Pathans) over Punjabis (Nawaz 2008, 144). Nevertheless, with the introduction of the first constitution in 1956, Mirza became a strong president and gave his friend Ayub two extensions as commander-in-chief, ultimately setting Mirza and Ayub on a collision course to determine the true center of power in Pakistani politics.

In 1956, the first constitution introduced a parliamentary system that was weak from the outset. In West Pakistan, Sindh and the NWFP there was increasing discord at the level of political and economic authority given to Punjab, while fear and mistrust was growing vis-à-vis politicians in the Awami League within East Pakistan. Nevertheless, Mirza “continued to try his hand at running the show from his office, disregarding the parliamentary system that he had helped introduce and that had elected him president” (Nawaz 2008, 150). On October 7, 1958, President Mirza suspended the 1956 constitution and implemented martial law with support of the military and bureaucracy. According to Nawaz (2008):

Mirza characterized his actions as a ‘revolution’. He repeatedly stated that his power derived from the revolution that had become necessary to prevent the spread of the political rot in the country’s body politic….Demagoguery had swept the country. For their own tactical benefit, politicians were inciting war against India and resistance to governmental authority. Political processions and mob violence were becoming commonplace. The spectacle of the East Pakistan assembly descending into the scene of an unruly gang war and the death of the deputy speaker as one of the results, captured the attention of the president and the army (156-7).
In effect, Mirza’s implementation of martial law was used to forestall an electoral defeat in the upcoming 1959 election that analysts in the U.S. State Department argue would have seen Bengali interests win, thereby increasing demand for greater autonomy and public funds for East Pakistan (Nawaz 2008, 157).

Moreover, Mirza saw martial law as the means to rescue the country from its political drift. He wanted martial law to be of “‘the shortest duration possible’” and “promis[ed] a national council ‘to clean up the country’” (Nawaz 2008, 159). This put him in direct confrontation with his Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA), Ayub, who also articulated a separate vision for the direction martial law was to take. For Ayub, martial law was not to take “‘a minute longer than necessary’, but with a caveat that it ‘will not be lifted a minute earlier than the purpose for which it has been imposed has been fulfilled’” (Nawaz 2008, 159). To counter the growing influence of the military, Mirza attempted to have four generals in the Martial Law Administration removed and ordered the arrest of Ayub stating that “‘certain army generals were getting ‘too big for their breeches’ and that in the interests of national unity they would have to be removed from the scene’” (Nawaz 2008, 159). Upon his return from meetings in East Pakistan, Ayub confronted Mirza and Mirza denied having given the order. However, Mirza could not alter the fact that martial law had “shifted the power balance completely in favor of the military, making it untenable for Mirza to remain in charge” (Haqqani 2005, 38).

Mirza’s cabinet included three army generals, including Ayub (as CMLA and prime minister), four West Pakistanis and four East Pakistanis. In setting up this cabinet, Nawaz argues, “Mirza…further weakened his position vis-à-vis Ayub since no one with a major regional or national constituency was included who might end up supporting him against Ayub in a showdown” (Nawaz 2008, 160). Ayub then met with the other three members of the inner
cabinet, Lieutenant Generals Azam, Sheikh, and Burki, and decided that they would ask Mirza to resign and, if he refused, to dismiss him. The generals went to the presidential palace on the morning of October 26th and after some persuasion, Mirza signed a letter of resignation (Nawaz 2008, 161). The next morning, on October 27, 1958, Ayub assumed the presidency.

**Ayub Khan, 1958-1969**

Ayub Khan ruled as Pakistan’s President for 11 years. From the outset he sought to differentiate his regime from previous civilian governments. According to Nasr (2009), “Ayub Khan was a secularizer, believing that religion should be a private matter and that Pakistan must develop free of Islam’s influence…. [H]is goal was to build a national identity based not on Islam but on a vision for Pakistan’s rapid economic development” (211). Thus, Ayub worked with his fellow officers to consolidate the position of the military, remove “inefficient and rascally” politicians, and improve stability by altering economic, legal, and constitutional institutions (Baxter 1995, 45).

Between 1958 and 1962, Ayub used martial law to introduce these institutional reforms through the Basic Democracies Order. The Basic Democracies were essentially individual administrative units which were used “to educate a largely illiterate population in the working of government by giving them limited representation and associating them with decision making…in local government and rural development” (Baxter 1995, 48). Effectively, in regards to Basic Democracies, Baxter notes, “They were meant to provide a two-way channel of communication between the Ayub Khan regime and the common people and allow social change to move slowly” (48). Ayub’s plan was to allow a semblance of representation but he wanted to maintain control and the bureaucracy was there to assist him. The Basic Democracies was a multi-tired system of councils, districts, and commissioners to oversee local development issues.
Moreover, Ayub was implementing a guided democracy, but in reality, the Basic Democracies was an electoral college reaffirming Ayub, his policies, and those in society who already held power. According to Talbot (2005), “The Basic Democrats collectively formed the electoral college which affirmed Ayub Khan as President in January 1960…reelected him as President in 1964…and also chose the members of the National and Provincial Assemblies in the partyless elections of 1962, ensuring that a parliament emerged which was dominated by landowners and *biraderi* [aka clan] leaders” (156).

Ayub promised a return to democracy and the 1962 Constitution brought an end to martial law. Ayub wanted to retain certain aspects of his authority, so the constitution “created a presidential system in which the traditional powers of the chief executive were augmented by control of the legislature, the power to issue ordinances, the right of appeal to referendum, protection from impeachment, control over the budget, and special emergency powers, which included the right to suspend civil rights” (Baxter 1995, 49). As Cohen (2004) argues, “Ayub’s 1962 Constitution foresaw a disengagement of the military from politics and a transition to civilian rule by a ‘careful tailoring’ of Pakistan’s political institutions and processes, and a co-option of a section of the political elite” (124). For Ayub, this was a patron-client relationship, not a partnership, with power derived from the proximity to the president.

However, Ayub could not keep a partyless system intact forever. Ayub “viewed the re-emergence of party politics with disquiet” but conditions on the ground forced his hand (Talbot 2005, 158). There were continued rumblings from the provinces. The Bengali and Sindhi elite were dissatisfied with Ayub’s economic reforms, especially the One Unit Scheme. As Talbot notes, “This [alienation] was rooted in part in their [the Sindhi and Bengalis] historic marginalization in what were the preeminent institutions of the state, the Army and the elite
cadre of the Civil Service of Pakistan” (Talbot 2005, 161). The civil service, or bureaucracy, of Pakistan became important because of its role in the disbursement of development funds; however, “Bengalis were under-represented not only at the Central Secretariat level but in the numerous commissions of inquiry which were instituted in such varied fields as land reform, franchise and constitutional recommendations, and the press” (Talbot 2005, 161). In effect, “[t]he Bengali elite’s alienation was intensified by the fact that the economic development of the Ayub era largely passed them by….as [t]he demand for regional autonomy and for a two-economy policy became linked” (Talbot 2005, 163). Moreover, the Sindhis also felt marginalized from economic development with development funds being directed toward Punjabis, and with the replacement of the local dialect, Sindhi, by Urdu as the official language. In short, “[m]artial law shifted the balance of power in the ruling coalition firmly in the Punjabis’ favor” (Talbot 2005, 164).

For Ayub, the development of the economy was of vital importance. His system of guided democracy was justified “not just in terms of cleaning out the Augean stables of the politicians, but also maintained that it could deliver reforms which were essential for the modernization of Pakistan” (Talbot 2005, 164). The Pakistani economy improved during the Ayub regime. According to Talbot (2005), “Large scale manufacturing grew at almost 17 percent and economic growth rates averaged 5.5 percent each year. But development involves more than high rates of economic growth: wealth trickles down slowly if at all, and policy based on the ‘social utility of greed’ is likely to threaten the fabric of society” (171). In fact, the government’s emphasis on growth at the expense of income distribution exacerbated the inequalities in Pakistani society (Talbot 2005, 172). As Nawaz (2008) argues:

The alliance with bright bureaucrats, who flourished in their new found freedom of action under Ayub’s autocratic system, worked very well in the initial period
but carried within it the seeds of its own demise, as became evident when systemic continuity and sustainability were needed. Poor leadership of these institutions in later years and the susceptibility of that leadership to political pressures made the same institutions that produced stellar results during Ayub’s early rule collapse under their own bureaucratic deadweight (Nawaz 2008, 192).

Development of the Pakistani economy was only one part of Ayub’s modernization efforts. As Haqqani (2005) argues, “Ayub Khan was a firm believer in the policy tripod developed within the first few years of Pakistan’s creation: he identified India as Pakistan’s eternal enemy, Islam as the national unifier, and the United States as the country’s provider of arms and finances” (43). In other words, Ayub was combining ideology and economic development to build a Pakistani identity assisted by the United States. Ayub states in a 1960 Foreign Affairs article, “‘Till the advent of Pakistan, none of us was in fact a Pakistani….for the simple reason that there was no territorial entity bearing that name.’ Before 1947, ‘our nationalism was based more on an idea than on any territorial definition. Till then, ideologically we were Muslims; territorially we happened to be Indians; and parochially we were a conglomeration of at least eleven smaller provincialloyalties’” (Haqqani 2005, 38-9). For Ayub, the state would “exercise the function of religious interpretation and [he] wanted an Islamic ideology that would help him in the ‘defense and security and development’ and the ‘welding’ of Pakistan’s different races into a unified whole” (Haqqani 2005, 41).

While Islam was to be the glue to hold Pakistan together, Ayub’s version of Pakistani nationalism would require the assistance of the United States. Pakistan’s leaders “had been clear from the beginning that they were allying with the United States only to offset the disadvantages in resources Pakistan had inherited at the time of partition….” (Haqqani 2005, 45). According to Ayub, “‘We have proven and trusted manpower that can do the fighting; but that manpower by itself, unless married up with the necessary modern equipment, is really not much use; and the
only country that equipment can come from is America”’ (Haqqani 2005, 46). As mentioned earlier, President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles were willing to include Pakistan as part of the Northern Tier concept and supplied Ayub’s regime with military aid and materiel accordingly.

However, by the early 1960s, the combination of a new American president, John F. Kennedy, and geopolitical events involving India, China, and the Soviet Union would strain the U.S.-Pakistani relationship. U.S. foreign policy in South Asia sought to ensure the containment of communism with Pakistan’s inclusion in SEATO and CENTO. Ayub permitted the U.S. to station U-2 spy planes in Peshawar for use in missions over the Soviet Union. Moreover, U.S. policymakers “did not wish to see any cracks emerging in their wall of treaty partners around the communist world’s two major countries, the Soviet Union and China” and sought to ally with India “as a potential counterweight to the Chinese giant to the north…even while India solidified its military and economic ties with the Soviet Union (Nawaz 2008, 195).

In October 1962, China attacked India “reacting to India’s imprudent ‘forward policy’, that is, establishing military posts behind Chinese positions in the mountains” (Abbas 2005, 40-1). Although the Kennedy Administration had promised to consult Ayub on any assistance it was to provide to India, this did not occur, and the U.S. immediately provided military aid to India. The U.S. asked Pakistan “‘to make a positive gesture of sympathy and restraint’” toward India regarding Kashmir (Abbas 2005, 40). Ayub stated that he had no intention of taking advantage of India at this point, but was angered at not being consulted. His response engendered a response from President Kennedy that qualified U.S. support for India by stating, “‘Our help to India in no way diminishes or qualifies our commitment to Pakistan and we [the
U.S. have made it clear to both countries”’” (Nawaz 2008, 199). Consequently, Ayub sought to distance Pakistan from its relationship with the U.S.

During the Sino-Indian conflict, Ayub’s foreign minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, convinced Ayub to turn to China for support. The Sino-Pakistani alliance included: a border agreement in 1963, highway construction connecting the two countries through the Karakoram Pass, trade agreements, economic and military aid (Baxter 1995, 52). According to scholar and former Pakistani government official, Hassan Abbas (2005), “For Pakistan, the mortal threat to its security lay in India, which the United States saw as a country to be salvaged and indemnified against the Chinese threat, while Pakistan saw in China an insurance against India” (40). Nevertheless, Ayub still wanted “to keep the spigot open” on U.S. aid and despite the strain in the U.S.-Pakistani relationship, Pakistan received $143 million as part of a U.S. military assistance program (Nawaz 2008, 199-200). In Pakistan, U.S. aid to India was seen as helping the Indians prepare for war in Kashmir. Therefore, Ayub believed the Sino-Indian conflict offered Pakistan the opportunity to settle the issue of Kashmir militarily, because the conflict highlighted India’s relative military weakness at the time (Nawaz 2008, 200).

Ayub “wanted a larger legacy, as the general would defeat India and give Pakistan all of Kashmir” (Nasr 2009, 211). Consequently, overestimating Pakistan’s military capability, Ayub led his forces to war with India in 1965. This Indo-Pakistani war started as a series of border clashes along undemarcated territory at the Rann of Kutch in the southeast and along the ceasefire line in Kashmir. According to Baxter (1995), “The Rann of Kutch conflict was resolved by mutual consent and British sponsorship and arbitration, but the Kashmir conflict proved more dangerous and widespread” (52). The Pakistan Army, in the hopes of supporting an uprising by Kashmiris against India, trained guerillas to help foment local dissent, but “[n]o such
uprising took place, and by August India had retaken Pakistani-held positions in the north while Pakistan attacked in the Chamb sector in southwestern Kashmir” (Baxter 2005, 52-3). In fact, Nasr (2009) argues, “Underestimating India’s military capability, or perhaps overestimating Pakistan’s, … the overconfident Pakistani army soon found itself scrambling to stop the Indians from taking Lahore, the country’s second largest city and the capital of the Punjab, Pakistan’s most populous province” (211). Pakistan’s military counter-punched into the heart of Indian Punjab, but neither state was capable of sustaining a prolonged military campaign due to military supplies being cut off by the U.S. and Britain. Thus, with victory in Kashmir dwindling, “Ayub Khan had overreached and was now humiliated” (Nasr 2009, 211).

On January 10, 1966, Ayub and India’s prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, signed the Tashkent Accord ending the 1965 Indo-Pakistani War. Although the conflict ceased between these two bitter rivals, domestic conflict was heating up within Pakistan. As Nawaz (2008) notes, “Once the euphoria produced by the official propaganda during the war had died down in Pakistan, people realized that Ayub Khan and the military leadership had failed the nation militarily….Pakistan, which had been led to believe it had won the war, was feeling particularly let down and was looking for answers” (239-40). Discontent grew, not only within the Ayub regime, but in the streets as well. Bhutto distanced himself from Ayub over the next year and eventually left government in 1967 and formed the Pakistan Peoples’ Party (PPP). This new party “was initially dominated by committed socialists and other leftist intellectuals but also acquired a strong leavening of traditional feudal politicians who felt that Ayub was on the decline and wanted to take advantage of the rising star of this new transnational leader” (Nawaz 2008, 241). Bhutto’s appeal even extended towards the youth of Pakistan. Through his election slogan of “‘Roti, Kapra, aur Makan’ (bread, clothing, and housing), Bhutto appealed “to the
dispossessed masses, particularly in the western wing of the country…. [and] promised to break the powerful business interest groups whose domination of the economic scene had been in the news” (Nawaz 2008, 242).

Within the army, a split emerged between the generals and younger officers. Nawaz (2008) argues, “Although the lower ranks and younger officers showed remarkable courage, both in Pakistan and India, generalship was not of the highest caliber and the war was marked by indecision and timidity” (240). Accordingly, Musa retired as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and was replaced by General Yahya Khan, a protégé of Ayub. Yahya then began to strengthen his position by promoting his own loyalists and sending his number one challenger for Commander-in-Chief, General Akhtar Malik, to Ankara, Turkey. As Abbas (2005) notes, “This was a major step of promoting the interests of personal loyalty over those of competence and professionalism” (52).

By 1968, to try and regain support from the population for Ayub, the government sponsored a celebration called “The Decade of Development”. Instead of being a celebration, in reality, the festivities highlighted the growing income inequality of the urban poor, a result of rapid economic growth and 1965 war (Baxter 1995, 54). Pakistanis were angry and frustrated and a robust democracy movement sprang up bringing together secular and religious parties to call for free elections and the return of civilian rule (Nasr 2009, 211). Protests occurred throughout East and West Pakistan and “Ayub reacted by alternating conciliation and repression” which spread disorder. As Baxter notes, “The army moved into Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, Dhaka, and Khulna to restore order. In rural areas of East Pakistan, a curfew was ineffective; local officials sensed government control ebbing and began retreating from the incipient peasant revolt” (Baxter 1995, 54). By the end of the year, Air Marshal Asghar Khan, the respected
former Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Air Force, and Justice Murshed, of the East Pakistan judiciary came out against Ayub (Abbas 2005, 54). Nevertheless, Ayub invited the politicians to come talk with him in Rawalpindi, promised a new constitution, and said he would not stand for reelection in 1970 (Baxter 1995, 54).

At this point, Ayub Khan was in poor health and his own generals wanted him to leave office. Yahya, as army chief, “had begun to take note of the situation and feared contamination of the armed forces by the issues being raised in the streets” (Nawaz 2008, 243). As one historian described it, “The disorder which had preceded the 1958 coup appeared like Child’s play in comparison with the anarchy which now prevailed in some towns and rural areas of East Pakistan” (Talbot 2005, 183). Ayub decided that martial law should be promulgated to stem the violence; however, Yahya refused, insisting that the whole country should be under martial law or none of it (Abbas 2005, 54). On March 25, 1969, Ayub stepped down handing power over to the army’s chief of staff, Yahya Khan, so he could see to elections and the transition to democracy. In a sense, the Ayub regime “which had been expected by Western ‘neo realists’ to demonstrate a superior ability to it is civilian predecessors in initiating ‘development’, instead provided empirical support for the contention that Third World military governments are as bound by economic, social and political constraints as are democracies” (Talbot 2005, 184).

Yahya Khan, 1969-71

Yahya became Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) on March 25, 1969 and assumed the presidency of Pakistan one week later. As CMLA he was not alone; he “was the first among equals in a coterie of generals, with whom he ruled by consensus” (Abbas 2005, 56). His right-hand man was chief of staff of the Pakistan Army, Lt. Gen. Abdul Hamid Khan and his “manipulator of political ideas” was Lt. Gen S.G.M.M. Peerzada, whom Yahya named as
principal staff officer to the president and CMLA (Nawaz 2008, 249-50). In addition, the air chief, Air Marshal Nur Khan and naval chief, Admiral S.M. Ahsan were named deputy MLAs and governors of West and East Pakistan. Essentially, Yahya “…. relied on his inner circle for guidance and took decisions rapidly—or delegated them to Peerzada, who gradually became his Eminence Grise and de facto prime minister, or to Major General Ghulam Umar” (Nawaz 2008, 251). The military established a hierarchy to parallel and ultimately push out the civil bureaucracy as the army took over more and more of the decision-making with military officers and service chiefs having higher rank than civilian counterparts. Thus, Nawaz (2008) argues, “The Pakistan Army of 1969 was different from that of 1958. It had started metamorphosing from a colonial, detached, and politically distant force to an immediate post-colonial army that was involved deeply in the running of its country’s government, while retaining the social characteristics of the colonial army” (251-2).

In 1969, the Pakistani officer came largely from Punjab and NWFP and commanded troops from each of these two provinces. Most of the officer class “still retained some connection with its rural roots but was increasingly settling down in the cities and cantonments” (Nawaz 2008, 252). Interestingly, Bengalis were the most populous ethnicity in Pakistan yet within the Pakistan Army they were disproportionately represented; there were only 300 Bengali officers out of 6,000 total officers (Abbas 2005, 57). Yahya’s commanders had served for twenty years both in Pakistan and abroad, having seen action in 1965. Consequently, Nawaz (2008) argues that Yahya’s commanders “….were better trained and equipped to deal with strategic issues than their earlier counterparts, although vestiges of their formative tactical training under the British left many of them unable to think in broader terms” (252). Moreover, under martial law, promotions were sometimes circumvented by the army chief/president to
favor regimental, military branch, ethnic or tribal ties and to strengthen its hold over civil society, the army continued a policy—begun under Ayub—of placing young officers into the bureaucracy (Nawaz 2008, 252 & 254).

With his regime in place, on November 28, 1969, Yahya called for a return to a constitutional government and announced a plan for elections to be held October 1970, but a cyclone hit the coast of East Pakistan and postponed the elections until December. Additionally, the One Unit was dissolved and with the issuance of the Legal Framework Order (LFO), the four provinces in West Pakistan were re-established, Pakistan’s official name became the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, and allowed ultimate power to reside in the presidency. Specifically, Yahya retained the power “to accept, amend or reject a constitution presented to him by the assembly” (Nawaz 2008, 254). Yahya determined “that the parity of representation in the National Assembly between the East Wing and the West Wing that had existed under the 1956 and 1962 constitutions would end and that representation would be based on population” (Baxter 1995, 55). Abbas notes that Yahya conceded that Bengalis in East Pakistan had been treated unfairly, but “this was too little too late; especially when it is considered that in this he was attempting to swim against the tide—a tide swollen no less by the opinion of most of his inner circle” (Abbas 2005, 57).

Put simply, from the early days of the Ayub regime, the “humiliating” attitude of West Pakistan’s military, bureaucracy, and political elite toward Bengalis was institutionalized (Abbas 2005, 57). As Nawaz (2008) argues, “The execution of the 1965 war, a recent memory, also showed the real and imagined distance of East Pakistan from West Pakistan, as the military high command relied on war in the West as a means of defending East Pakistan against India. East Pakistanis felt vulnerable and forgotten as a result” (256-7). While Yahya was centralizing
power under his martial law regime, the East Pakistanis felt “….their share in various sectors of the economy such as revenue expenditure, the development budget, and utilization of foreign aid remained most unsatisfactory and unjust” (Abbas 2005, 57-8).

Therefore, the Bengali nationalism prevalent in East Pakistan was represented by the Awami League under Mujib ur-Rahman in the 1970 elections through the Awami League’s electoral platform known as the Six Points:

1. Pakistan should be a federation under the Pakistan or Lahore Resolution of 1940, which implied the existence of two similar entities. Any new constitution according to the Bengalis had to reflect this reality.
2. The federal government should deal solely with defense and foreign affairs.
3. There should be two separate but freely convertible currencies. East Pakistan would have a separate banking reserve as well as separate fiscal and monetary policies.
4. The federated units would have the sole power to tax. The central government should be granted funds to meet its expenditures.
5. Separate accounts from foreign exchange earnings would be maintained. The federating units would be free to establish trade links with foreign countries.
6. East Pakistan would have a separate militia (Abbas 2005, 58).

According to Nawaz (2008), “A key issue that remained unresolved was the West’s response to the articulation of East Pakistani demands that were put forward in the form of the Six Points….Ayub and then Yahya met them with a heavy hand, defining them as treasonous and inspired by India” (258).

In the run-up to the 1970 election, Yahya and Mujib engaged in tit-for-tat negotiations on each of the Six Points. However, Yahya “to the disregard of the opinions of the rest of the junta, was willing to bend over backward to meet Mujib’s demand” announcing “….that there would be no parity between East and West Pakistan, and that the future constitution would be passed by
a simple majority vote in a unicameral legislature (Abbas 2005, 59). In other words, Yahya had conceded a great deal to Mujib, but it would be too little, too late.

The 1970 National Assembly election was held on December 7th and the provincial assemblies held their election two weeks later. The Awami League won a huge landslide victory in East Pakistan taking 161 of 163 seats, thereby gaining a majority of the 300 directly elected National Assembly (Nawaz 2008, 262). In West Pakistan, the Pakistani People’s Party (PPP) won a large, especially in Punjab and Sindh, but no seats in the East Wing, while the National Awami Party won a plurality in Balochistan and the NWFP (Baxter 1995, 56). Similar results occurred in the provincial election as well. Thus, “[t]he future was in the hands of two political parties, having a mass support base in two different regions, each of whose leaders wanted to be prime minister” (Abbas 2005, 61). As Abbas (2005) argues, “This was the virtual end of Pakistan, but no one in the Western wing could have gathered the wisdom and courage to accept this” (61).

Consequently, over the ensuing months both sides became intransigent. According to Abbas (2005), “The postballot Mujib was a different man. He went back on every point of understanding he had reached with the president during their months of talks, on the basis of which Yahya had sought to accommodate him” (61). Bhutto refused to participate in discussions over the new constitution leading to a continuation of martial law (Becker 1995, 206). As the majority party in West Pakistan, Bhutto felt the PPP should share power with the Awami League. In fact, Bhutto had the support of the Pakistan Army. Gul Hassan, a member of Yahya’s inner circle stated that the army should support Bhutto because he got most of his support from the Punjab, the army’s main recruitment center, and he would not do anything to hurt the military (Nawaz 2008, 262). By February 1971, Yahya and his inner circle decided to
scrap the cabinet and replace them with “advisors” to smooth the way in dealing with the Awami League (Nawaz 2008, 263).

At the same time, however, an Air India flight was hijacked by two alleged Kashmiri militants who flew the plane to Lahore demanding the release of Muslim militants in Indian Kashmir (Nawaz 2008, 263). It was later determined that Indian intelligence had a hand in the hijacking. As Abbas (2005) notes, “India’s part in the faked hijacking and Mujib ‘s reaction to it was interpreted by the military junta as only further confirmation of their belief that he was not entirely his own master and was following a course that had been charted for him by New Delhi” (62). Also, India banned Pakistani International Airlines flights and military flights over India to East Pakistan. Tensions were high and Hassan and other members of Yahya’s inner circle—Hamid, Umar, and Peerzada—were already discussing a military solution “in case the politicians did not follow their instructions” (Nawaz 2008, 263). This “solution”, known as “Operation Blitz”, was issued four days after the elections and authorized the Pakistani Army’s Eastern Commander, Lieutenant General Yaqub Ali Khan, to crack down on dissent and restore law and order.

However, Yahya attempted one last try at a settlement. On March 15, 1971, Yahya travelled to Dhaka to visit with Mujib and over a four-day period tried to convince him to accept a constitutional arrangement (Abbas 2005, 62). Mujib was not interested in settlement. The reason for Mujib’s intransigence, in part, was a result of the U.S. consul general in Dhaka, Archer Blood, telling Mujib that the U.S. would support his confrontation with the central government in West Pakistan (Abbas 2005, 62). Although the U.S. Ambassador J. Farland “later disabused Mujib of such expectations, some damage was already done” (Abbas 2005, 62). At this point, Mujib outlined four conditions for Awami League participation in the National
Assembly: immediate withdrawal of martial law, the return of troops to their barracks, a judicial enquiry into the loss of life caused by military shootings since March 1 and an immediate transfer of power to elected representatives before the Assembly meets (Talbot 2005, 206). Mujib may have been unwilling to compromise, but Yahya “….appeared ready to recognize Mujib as the rightful prime minister” (Nawaz 2008, 267). Nevertheless, he was dissuaded by his colleagues within the army, as they believed Mujib “….might use his majority in the assembly to legally secede from Pakistan, or worse, to reduce the army’s power and influence” (267).

March 23, 1971 was the anniversary of the Lahore Resolution, which was celebrated as Independence Day in West Pakistan. In East Pakistan, Mujib renamed it “Resistance Day” with Bengalis celebrating out in the streets and student militias parading the Bangladesh flag down the streets of Dhaka (Talbot 2005, 207). Consequently, the army command recommended to Yahya that military action was now necessary to suppress this rebellion led by Mujib and the Awami League. At midnight on March 25th, “Operation Searchlight”, as it became known, commenced. However, the operation commenced without Lieutenant General Yaqub Khan, who resigned a few weeks back citing the efficacy of the operation, the need for more time and more troops, and arguing that a political solution was the only way to prevent a civil war (Nawaz 2008, 266).

A new commander, Lieutenant General Tikka Khan, was chosen by the regime because “he was seen as a commander who followed orders to the letter” and was given the nickname “‘Butcher of Balochistan’ for his vigourous prosecution of military action in 1968 against dissident tribesmen in that province….,” (Nawaz 2008, 266). The Pakistani Army had about 45,000 soldiers in East Pakistan and proceeded to crack down on the Bengali population. One author (Abbas 2005) describes what happens next as “a reign of horror—of random rape, mindless arson, and gratuitous murder of the innocents” (63). Nawaz (2008) states that the army
cracked down with full force, capturing Mujib, destroying student dormitories at Dacca University, which housed militants who underwent training there, and attacked newspaper offices and media outlets (267-8). By the end of April, the army had cleared the urban areas of rebels. According to Talbot (2005), “Yahya later justified [the operation] because of the threats to non-Bengali Muslims, the murders committed by the Awami League and its insults to the Army, the Pakistan flag and the Quaid-e-Azam” (208). The reality, in fact, was the beginning of the third Indo-Pakistani War.

As millions fled to India, the Indian government assisted the Bengali guerrilla forces, known as the Mukti Bahini (liberation forces) in campaigns against the Pakistani Army (Abbas 2005, 64). During the two-week war, Pakistan lost half of its navy, a third of its army and a quarter of its air force (Talbot 2005, 212). Yahya was pressured by the U.S. to accept the Indian cease-fire terms for geostrategic reasons. The Nixon Administration was committed to Yahya and West Pakistan, as the Yahya regime helped open a diplomatic channel to China. It was from Islamabad that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger set off to meet Chinese leaders in Beijing to pave the way for President Nixon’s historic trip. The implications for this new U.S-China relationship and Pakistan’s facilitation of it persuaded India to sign a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union (Abbas 2005, 64). Throughout the war, “the generals in Pakistan had believed that the United States and China would not allow India a free hand in Bangladesh” (Abbas 2005, 66). Abbas (2005) argues, “They [the Pakistani generals] were wrong. The United States knew that East Pakistan had to go and that China was not going to risk a confrontation with the Soviets on the basis of an assurance from the United States” (66).

At this point, General A.A.K. Niazi surrendered to the Indian Army in Dhaka on December 16, 1971. With that, East Pakistan became Bangladesh. Talbot (2005) eloquently
sums up the reason behind East Pakistan’s demise: “Pakistan had not fallen apart because of Bengali primordialism or Indian machinations. The primary responsibility lay in Islamabad—chauvinism had compounded folly in the dangerous denial of Bengali democratic urges” (212). As Nawaz (2008) argues, “The truth is … that centralized decision-making within the inner circle around Yahya—excluding even key GHQ staff—and without any civilian input or oversight, allowed the military high command to make decisions without any basis in reality….He and his inner circle of advisors came up with both political and military ideas and orders without the benefit of debate or input from relevant elements in the army, navy, and air force” (311).

Despite their defeat, Yahya and his coterie of generals still hoped to hold onto power. However, “[c]rowds spilled on to the streets of West Pakistan’s cities calling for Yahya and his advisors to be tried as traitors” (Talbot 2005, 212). The Pakistani public was not the only one expressing animosity toward the Yahya regime; in fact, a number of junior army officers were as well. In Gujranwala, approximately 150 miles, these junior officers were led by Brigadier F.B. Ali, who “was well known for his integrity, moral courage, and professionalism” (Abbas 2005, 67). Ali sent Colonels Aleem Afriki and Agha Javed Iqbal to meet with Lieutenant General Gul Hassan, the chief of the general staff, on December 19, 1971, requesting that Hassan deliver Ali’s ultimatum to Yahya. As Abbas (2005) recounts, “That evening a disgraced and dispirited president of a distraught nation addressed the people of Pakistan and surrendered his office” (68). With the loss of East Pakistan, the Army had suffered a blow to its collective pride and the hostility among the junior officers forced Hassan and air chief Air Marshal Rahim Khan to turn to PPP leader Bhutto to assume the post of President and CMLA on December 20, 1971 (Talbot 2005, 213).
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, 1971-77

Bhutto was a hugely popular leader with the people of Pakistan. The youngest child of Sir Shahnawaz Bhutto, a Sindhi feudal lord, Bhutto was a graduate of the University of California—Berkeley and also studied law at Christ Church College at Oxford (Abbas 2005, 69). He first became a politician at the age of 30 in Iskander Mirza’s cabinet due to his energy, leadership and charisma. As Abbas (2005) notes, “To those around him, he had everything—looks, elegance, wealth, education, family, and office. And those who saw him up close knew him for a sharp mind, an articulate tongue, a sense of humor, and a wit that at times was sardonic. There was also arrogance and a streak of vindictiveness in him that would show itself in times to come” (69).

Over the next six years, Bhutto introduced his own version of Islamic socialism, with a heavy dose of feudalism and autocracy; negotiated with India on the boundary lines in Kashmir and the release of more than 90,000 prisoners of war from East Pakistan; regained lost Pakistani territory; placed Pakistan in a leadership position of the Third World and the Islamic world; gave Pakistan a new constitution; and put Pakistan on the path to nuclear weapon status. His most visible success, Baxter (1995) notes “….was in the international arena, where he employed his diplomatic skills….and generally was effective in repairing Pakistan’s image in the aftermath of the war” (58). Nevertheless, Bhutto’s reign grew increasingly authoritarian as he clashed repeatedly with internal societal actors and the military, thereby sliding the state further into the unstable civil-military relationship still evident today.

Bhutto, as CMLA, “faced the same dilemmas which had defeated his predecessors, namely how to assert the authority of the elected institutions of the state over the military and bureaucracy, establish a functioning federal system and resolve the role of Islam in constitutional
theory and practice” (Talbot 2005, 217). Therefore, to address these dilemmas, Bhutto issued an “interim constitution” granting himself broad powers as President. One of his first acts was to dismiss 1,300 civil servants and to break the power of the twenty or so families who controlled Pakistan’s economy during the Ayub era (Baxter 1995, 59). Also, as part of the nationalization effort, Bhutto implemented land and labor reform. In April 1972, Bhutto lifted martial law and convened the National Assembly to reach consensus on three issues: the role of Islam; the sharing of power between the federal government and the provinces; and the division of responsibility between the president and prime minister (Baxter 1995, 59). After a year of debate, the new constitution came into effect in August 1973. Bhutto stepped down as president and became prime minister. To allay fears of the smaller provinces concerning domination by Punjab, the constitution established a bicameral legislature, providing equal provincial representation and a national assembly allocating seats according to population (Baxter 1995, 60).

Bhutto had the opportunity to resolve many of Pakistan’s political problems. Unfortunately, Bhutto lost the opportunity because of a series of repressive actions against the political opposition that made it appear he was working to establish a one party state. As Nasr (2009) aptly describes:

….Bhutto proved no democrat; no sooner was he in the prime minister’s office than he set out to grab all power, railroading any opponent that stood in his way….He was a venerable aristocrat but his politics had a leftist slant. He stood as a populist who crushed capitalism and showered government favor on to the poor. He also nationalized numerous businesses, and put Pakistan’s economy in the state’s hands, weakening the fledgling private sector and the middle class. Pakistan started to look like many other Third World authoritarian socialist states.
of the time, where politics was reduced to the cult of personality of the ruler (212).

Nasr’s characterization of Bhutto was most visible in Bhutto’s conflictual relationship with the military; namely, his repeated intrusion into military interests.

Bhutto’s first missteps occurred between him and army chief, Lt. Gen Gul Hassan Khan around the time of the provincial disturbances in Karachi and NWFP. Bhutto proposed that the army be sent in to Karachi to enforce discipline, but Gul preferred the police be used (Cloughley 2008, 8). Gul “was generally uncooperative” insisting that the police be used, saying “he could not spare troops since they were needed on the borders” (Nawaz 2008, 324). This would be the first of many instances of conflict between Gul and Bhutto: “Bhutto wanted to release National Cadet Corps members (students—PPP supporters) who had deserted and been imprisoned after court martial; Gul refused. Bhutto wanted to go with Gul on his first visit around the army; Gul was firm: ‘As of tomorrow,’ he said, ‘I begin my visits to units, and alone’” (Cloughley 2008, 8). Interestingly, when police were striking in Peshawar, Bhutto again called for military assistance. Without contacting Gul, ex-general Akbar Khan, now Bhutto’s national security advisor, ordered deployment of troops and artillery to Peshawar. Once Gul found out he reversed the order and in fact, the air force chief, Rahim Khan, refused Khan’s order (Cloughley 2008, 9; Abbas 2005, 71). In short, Bhutto and Akbar Khan were circumventing the military’s chain of command.

Given his position as CMLA, Bhutto summarily dismissed Gul and Rahim Khan on March 3, 1972 and replaced by Lt. General Tikka Khan and Air Marshal Zaffar Chaudhury. In a radio address to the nation Bhutto said, in part:

‘My dear friends, citizens, the interests of this country are supreme, and it is in the interests of the country and the interest of the armed forces of Pakistan that today we have taken the decision to replace the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Army and the commander-in-chief of the Pakistan Air Force. Both of them have
been replaced by officers who are familiar with the armed forces [sic] and who have kept working with them with devotion and with splendid records. Replacements have been made on merits and in the highest consideration of the country and the armed forces….From today we will no longer have the anachronistic and obsolete posts of commander-in-chief…so we have changed the colonial structure of the armed forces of Pakistan and injected a truly independent pattern into these vital services…” (Cloughley 2008, 10-11).

Tikka Khan, according to Abbas (2005), was not a popular choice for army chief and Bhutto was more concerned with consolidating his rule. As mentioned above, Tikka was “the hard and loyal man to whom a superior’s order was the final word and never to be questioned…..” (Cloughley 2008, 11). Additionally, a number of officers were promoted who had fled East Pakistan (Nawaz 2008, 335).

Bhutto’s consolidation of power and appointment of Tikka Khan caused disquiet among junior officers who demanded that the generals responsible for the loss of East Pakistan be held accountable (Abbas 2005, 72). More specifically, the junior officers “believed that Bhutto could have averted the surrender of Pakistani armed forces by accepting the Polish resolution in the U.N. Security Council on the eve of the fall of Dhaka, which in their view he artfully avoided” (Abbas 2005, 73). The officers were from both the army and the air force and were considered among the more promising young officers of the Pakistani military, according to the U.S. State Department (Abbas 2005, 73). The officers were led by Major Farouk Adam Khan, “….the same officer who had taken the ultimatum of the officers in Gujranwala to General Gul Hassan, which eventually forced Yahya and company out of office….” (Abbas 2005, 73). Essentially, Bhutto’s regime was viewed similar Yahya’s—one of moral degeneracy and corruption—where the conspirators believed that the military must have a role in safeguarding democracy (Abbas 2005, 74; Nawaz 2008, 336).
Although, as more junior officers were brought into the plot, the group was penetrated by Pakistan’s military intelligence, the ISI. As Nawaz (2008) recounts, “One member of the group, Lt. Col. Tariq Rafi, spilt the beans to senior army officers. The army chief, Tikka Khan became aware of the plot from a relative and fellow Janjua, Ahmed Kamal. Through the ISI, Tikka encouraged Rafi to continue participating in the dissident group” (336). Subsequently, the officers met on March 24, 1973 to discuss the necessity of recruiting senior officers for the coup plot. Major Saeed Akhtar found out through contacts that the army hierarchy was aware of the coup plot and went to Lahore to discuss this with Farouk Adam (Nawaz 2008, 336). Upon hearing that his group had been infiltrated by military intelligence, Farouk stated, “We are too deep into this to stop now. The way I look at this is, that this is a no-loss situation. If we pull it off, the chances of which are remote, we win. And if we are arrested and are put on trial, the chances of which are bright, we also win, because at the trial we can expose what has happened”” (Abbas 2005, 74). In fact, a week later, all of the co-conspirators were arrested.

Upon their arrest, the officers were held at Attock fort, and Bhutto promised to use “the ‘attempted coup’ as a means of controlling the army’s leadership by playing up the distrust of the senior officers by their younger colleagues” (Nawaz 2008, 337). The officers were tried in a military tribunal in what became known as the Attock Conspiracy Trial. Bhutto was impressed with a young armor officer in the Pakistani army who had commanded an armored division in Multan, served in Jordan with the Pakistani military advisory group in Amman that was involved in planning the Jordanian army’s actions against Black September, and who had an “obsequious manner”—Major General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq (Nawaz 2008, 337). According to Nawaz (2008), “Among other things, this action gave Zia direct access to Bhutto. It is reported that he
spoke with Bhutto regularly in the evenings to bring him up to date on the trial” (337). The officers were court-martialed and sentenced to life in prison (Abbas 2005, 77).

However, Bhutto’s efforts at inciting distrust in the army chain of command backfired. During the trial Zia allowed officers to vent their feelings in the courtroom. Rather than turning other officers against the conspirators, Nawaz (2008) argues, “[T]he actions and words of the officer under trial made them into heroes among their younger colleagues” (337). Junior officers were visited by their colleagues throughout the trial at Attock fort and Campbellpur jail (where they were being held) and “carried the message of discontent with the country’s leadership back to the rest of the army, building a reservoir of distrust of the civilian administration” (Nawaz 2008, 337). In order to quell the dissent, Bhutto moved the conspirators to cities around the country that did not have cantonments (Abbas 2005, 77). Most importantly, notes Nawaz (2008), “This trial solidified Zia ul-Haq’s rise to power. When the time came to replace Tikka Khan in April 1976, Bhutto saw in Zia a potentially quiet and pliable army chief, one who came to Pakistan as a refugee from Indian Punjab and therefore had no ostensible tribal support or another base in the army” (337).

Having dealt with dissent from the military, Bhutto still faced challenges from the provinces—especially, Baluchistan. In March 1972, the Bhutto regime reached deals with the opposition National Awami Party (NAP) and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI) to form coalition governments in Baluchistan and the NWFP. For Bhutto, this deal was meant to buy him some time as he worked to realign his political base (Nawaz 2008, 331-2). The deal, unfortunately, did not last long. Once Bhutto had consolidated power, he fixated on breaking up the hold of these coalitions. The capture of arms in a diplomatic shipment to the Iraqi embassy and the death of his right hand man in the NWFP in February 1975 gave Bhutto the justification he needed to
challenge the NAP and Baluch leadership arguing that they had failed to control disturbances in the provinces which was causing insecurity (Nawaz 2008, 333). Bhutto “saw in the efforts of the NAP a repeat of the Bangladesh issue, a fear heightened by his knowledge that NAP had supported the Awami League in East Pakistan and that NAP supporters in Balochistan were fighting the Pakistan Army in the Pat Feeder area (south of Sibi) over the control of agricultural lands” (Nawaz 2008, 333). In short, while Bhutto was able to maintain support in Sindh and Punjab, Balochi’s “…found their aspirations and traditional nomadic life frustrated by the presence of national boundaries and the extension of central administration over their lands” (Baxter 1995, 61).

Thus, a four-year insurgency began with Bhutto calling in the Pakistani army ostensibly to construct roads, provide water, and electricity to poor Baluchis (Nawaz 2008, 333). In reality, the Pakistani Army, with 30 Cobra helicopters from the Shah of Iran and flown by Iranian pilots, put down the insurgency (Baxter 1995, 61). The significance of these events for Pakistan was noted by Nawaz (2008): “While the rest of the country may not have been aware of the extent and nature of the military action in Baluchistan, large numbers of soldiers and officers of the Pakistan Army were closely involved in these operations and becoming aware of the fact that Bhutto was using the army for his own political purposes. More importantly, though, they became increasingly aware of the key role being played by the army in propping up civilian rule” (335). Also, floods and earthquakes hit Punjab, Sindh and NWFP which allowed the army to provide aid and undertake road, well and dam building projects, allowing the army to gradually regain the trust of the population (Cloughley 2008, 21).

In the NWFP, Bhutto’s efforts were met with repeated confrontation. Just over the Durand Line in Afghanistan, King Zahir Shah of Afghanistan was deposed by his cousin, Sardar
Daud, who was supported from Moscow (Abbas 2005, 80). Daud, a Pashtun, advocated for a greater Pashtunistan, since the Durand Line had been an arbitrary border drawn by the British in 1893. According to Abbas (2005), “It…did not take Bhutto long to accuse the NWFP government of planning an anti-Pakistan conspiracy with Sardar Daud’s government in Kabul, to have the province break away from Pakistan and join Afghanistan” (80). Then, with the death of Sherpao (Bhutto’s right hand man) in Peshawar, the capital of NWFP, Bhutto blamed the National Awami Party and turned to right-wing Islamic dissidents from Afghanistan, whom had taken refuge in Pakistan, to destabilize the Daud regime in Afghanistan (Abbas 2005, 81).

Although not much came of this attempt, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar and Ahmad Shah Masud would be two of the dissidents, who would soon lead mujahadeen to great effect against the Soviets when they invaded Afghanistan in the not-too distant future. Thus, a new relationship began between the Bhutto regime and the Islamists in Pakistan.

In the 1970s, the JI participated in the Pakistani National Assembly elections in 1970 and 1977 with two divergent results. The 1970 election saw the JI, JUI and JUP do poorly in both East and West Pakistan partly because they ran separately and split the Islamist vote. In fact, the JI finished behind both the JUI & JUP winning only 4 of the 151 seats (Nasr 1994, 168). The election results “dealt a severe blow to the morale of Jama’at members” (Nasr 1994, 168). At the same time, one of the major reasons for the JI’s poor finish was the rise of the PPP.

The PPP, at the time, was viewed as a socialist party by the JI, and spurred into action to challenge the PPP on religious, political, and economic issues (Nasr 1994, 172). Furthermore, throughout the 1970s, the PPP “ignored its supporters in favor of placating its opponents, substituting the party’s program for a balancing act between various Pakistani interest groups.” (Nasr 1994, 173). As a result, the left and labor unions, the very groups that brought Bhutto to
power, were ignored in favor of elites and business leaders. Bhutto’s rule became one of patronage (Nasr 1994, 174). Bhutto began to use Islamic symbols as part of his effort to address the opposition, but this only agitated the party base more and in turn drove the JI to establish a coalition of parties to oppose the Bhutto regime.

This coalition of religious and socialist parties was known as the United Democratic Front, later changing its name to the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA). With opposition mounting, Bhutto felt the only way for him to stay in power was to call for new elections. Elections were set for March 1976 and the PNA contested thirty-six seats in the National Assembly; the JI won 9 of those seats (Nasr 1994, 183-4). Nine seats, however, were a small percentage of the total seats available. The JI protested vehemently that the elections were rigged and called for Bhutto’s resignation and for new elections (Nasr 1994, 184). Bhutto disagreed and protests were organized by JI and its student movement IJT and spread across Pakistan. As a result, Bhutto resorted to repressive measures by imposing house arrest on the top leadership of JI.

On February 28, 1976, General Tikka Khan retired as army chief. Bhutto, in his search for a new chief, looked for a general that he could control. His, choice, General Zia ul-Haq, a fifty-two year old commander of II Corps in Multan, “was thought to be a reasonable fellow who, while deeply religious, was apparently not a zealot…..”(Cloughley 2008, 24). Zia inherited a disenchanted officer corps and Cloughley argues, “He did not take over a happy team, but that was not his fault, and he tried to place it back on the rails in the best way he knew: with calmness, professional integrity, a genuine religiosity that struck a favorable chord with many of the younger officers and most of the soldiers, and a middle-class pragmatism that was beyond the comprehension of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto” (25). It should also be noted, that while the army was
unhappy with Bhutto’s moves of centralizing power in his hands, he was able to temporarily maintain support from the army by increasing defense expenditures from Rs 3,725 million in 1971-2 to Rs 8,210 million in 1976-7, to account for an increase in military pay, and expansion of the army to make up for the loss of POWs with India, and the development of a nuclear weapons’ program using support from friendly Islamic nations (Nawaz 2008, 339 & 343). Moreover, an agreement was reached with the US to supply arms worth $38.6 million (Cloughley 2008, 26).

In a final step to hold onto power, Bhutto suddenly called national elections in March 1977 hoping to catch the opposition unprepared and give his party total control of the national assembly. When Bhutto and the PPP overwhelmingly won the election, the opposition PNA charged voting irregularities and launched mass protests requiring action by the army to restore law and order. Once martial law was imposed the army came into contact with the people of Pakistan, including Punjabis. The country “was becoming ungovernable and the economy had suffered greatly from the unrest, but it seemed that Bhutto did not realize that time was running out” (Cloughley 2008, 27). The PNA wanted Bhutto’s resignation, the formation of an interim government and new elections; however, negotiations became bogged down and violence was worsening throughout Pakistani cities in protest of Bhutto. Nawaz (2008) summarizes Bhutto’s predicament: “….by estranging the US, [Bhutto] was no longer able to rebuild his military base. Additionally, by using the predominantly Punjabi military, especially in the Punjab, Bhutto was affecting the public’s perception of the Pakistan Army as a savior of the country” (352).

Consequently, discussions began between Zia and his military commanders on a response to the escalating violence. The army prepared “Operation Fairplay” in case the violence
worsened. Zia, after discussing the deteriorating situation with his military commanders, called a meeting of senior General Headquarters officers and stated, “Both sides in the political struggle…had weapons” (Cloughley 2008, 27). Bhutto was having greater interaction and discussions with senior leadership and convinced the army’s leadership “that Bhutto intended to take firm action against the opposition and might even use the armed wing of the PPP for that purpose” (Nawaz 2008, 352). The army, according to Nawaz (2008), “feared that it would be forced to pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Bhutto should his use of force backfire” and Zia “may have been willing to support Bhutto to some extent, but when the discipline and integrity of the army was threatened, Zia decided to overthrow Bhutto (352-3).

**Zia ul-Haq, 1977-1988**

General Zia ul-Haq’s bloodless coup ushered in the longest period of military rule in Pakistan. As CMLA, Zia suspended the 1973 constitution and the federal and provincial governments were dissolved. The dissolution of government allowed Zia, as in previous martial law governments, to appoint “a combination of the top brass of the Army and the senior bureaucrats [to] rule the country” (Rizvi 2000, 165). During his rule, Zia would rotate like-minded generals and officers into top positions, as well as showering them with favors and creating what Ayesha Siddiqa (2007) terms as “Milbus”—the “business activities or the personal economic stakes of military personnel as a driver of the armed forces’ political ambitions” (1). Moreover, Zia was the first ruler of Pakistan who represented “the conservative values and ritualistic religiosity of the urban lower middle class” (Nawaz 2008, 361).

Zia argued that Pakistan’s survival was dependent on building an Islamic state. The Islamization of Pakistan along with the pervasiveness of the military’s role in running the country, would occasion the rise of Islamists in the military and state sponsorship of militant
Islamic (largely Sunni) sectarian groups, creating Shi’a backlash and sectarian warfare, as well as international conflict in Afghanistan (Nawaz 2008, 359). This section will highlight the domestic and international relationships during Zia’s regime that continue to influence Pakistani civil-military relations today.

Zia “projected himself as a reluctant ruler who had assumed power because the political leaders had failed to resolve the political crisis” when in reality, “he expanded the goals of the coup from elections to accountability, Islamization of the polity and induction of decency in politics” (Rizvi 2000, 166). Upon taking over, Zia stated he would hold new elections with ninety days; he chose not to ban political parties, but he had to find a way to legitimize his rule. He soon cancelled the elections “because, he said, it was his responsibility first to carry out a program of ‘accountability’…” (Baxter 1995, 64). In effect, Zia was attempting to give legal cover to his regime. Subsequently, Rizvi (2000) notes, “By an interesting coincidence, it was during these days that the military regime unearthed evidence of Bhutto’s involvement in the murder of his political opponents. The military rulers also accused Bhutto of engaging in massive corruption and decided to proceed against him” (167). Bhutto was tried and sentenced to death in 1978 on the charge of conspiring to murder a political opponent. The Supreme Court upheld the sentence and Bhutto was hanged in April 1979.

From November 1979 until August 1983, Zia promised repeatedly to hold elections at an “appropriate” time (Rizvi 2000, 169). The collapse of the Bhutto regime was a shock to the JI and other parties in the Pakistan National Alliance. Nevertheless, the Islamists were still intrigued to discover that Zia held a favorable view toward the Islamist vision of state and society (Nasr 2004, 196). Although Zia was a pious Muslim, he used Islam to serve his own purposes; namely, “to not only shore up state power by ending its war of attrition with Islamism,
but also to expand its own powers domestically as well as regionally” (Nasr 2004, 196). Put differently, Zia was justifying military rule and the suppression of democracy in the name of building an Islamic state. According to Nasr (1994), “He had incorporated the demands of the Islamic parities into state ideology, thereby offering the Islamic parties a power-sharing arrangement in which the state would act as a senior partner, but the Islamic forces would gain from state patronage and enjoy a modicum of political activity” (187). The JI used this in their effort to call for early elections.

Between 1977 and 1979, Zia promised the JI that elections would be held and a civilian government would be allowed to form. Subsequently, the JI promoted how it was cooperating with the Zia government and after months of negotiations the PNA returned and was allowed to appoint two-thirds of the cabinet ministers and Zia one-third of the ministers (Nasr: 1994, 190-191). This was an important milestone for the JI: “After thirty years of political activity in Pakistan, for the first time in its history the Jama’at had become part of the ruling establishment” (Nasr 1994, 191)!

However, JI’s time as part of the ruling establishment was short-lived. Continuous reneging on promised elections by Zia influenced the PNA to dissolve the government (Nasr 1994, 191). The JI wanted to distance itself from the Zia regime and felt that the best way to accomplish this task would be to make it known that as Islamists they were against Zia’s martial law rule. Moreover, the JI began criticizing many of Zia’s policies (Nasr 1994, 191-2). Eventually, Zia agreed to hold municipal elections, but not national assembly elections. The results of the elections saw the JI finish second to the PPP in each of the municipal elections. The JI’s political fortunes, which were once so bright, were beginning to dim. Nasr (1994) addresses the reasons for the JI’s second place finish: “The Jama’at proved unable to deliver on
the claims it had made. Aside from abstract notions about the shape and working of the ideal Islamic state, the party had little to offer in the way of suggestions for managing its machinery” (194). Therefore, the JI was unable to apply Islam to political and economic policies that Zia could use, thereby losing favor in his eyes (Nasr 1994, 194).

Ultimately, during the late 1970s and 80s, President Zia ul-Haq co-opted the JI for his own purposes and as a result dissension rose within the party over its policies and performance. Ahmad was viewed as a populist leader who was well-liked by the younger members of JI, appealing to both conservatives and liberals. According to Nasr (2001), “As the party’s liaison with the Zia regime during the Afghan war, he was favored by the pro-Zia conservative faction, while his populist style and call for the restoration of democracy endeared him to the younger generation who wanted to distance itself from Zia” (55).

It would be the 1979 invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union and subsequent U.S. support that would firmly embolden Zia vis-à-vis Pakistani domestic politics. As Haqqani (2005) argues, “Once international attention was focused on the developments in Afghanistan, Zia ul-Haq had virtually no external or internal compulsions for returning Pakistan to democracy” (140). For Pakistan, its Afghan policy “emphasized its Islamic ideology with the hope of blunting the challenge of ethnic nationalism supported by Afghanistan, tied Afghan aspirations for a Pastunistan to an Indian plan to break up Pakistan, and sought U.S. assistance in pursuing an agenda of regional influence” (Haqqani 2005, 159). In other words, Pakistan was looking for strategic depth in its confrontation with India and the Soviet invasion allowed the U.S. to work with Zia as part of its containment policy. In his Pulitzer Prize winning account of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan prior to 9/11, Ghost Wars, journalist Steve Coll (2004) notes:

He [Zia] feared that Kabul’s communists would stir up Pashtun independence activists along the disputed Afghanistan-Pakistan border. Pashtuns comprised
Afghanistan’s dominant ethnic group, but there were more Pashtuns living inside Pakistan than inside Afghanistan. A successful independence campaign might well shatter Pakistan once and for all. Within a year of the Soviet invasion, about one million Afghan refugees poured into Pakistan, threatening social unrest. Soviet and Afghan secret services had begun to run terrorist operations on Pakistani soil….If Soviet-backed communists took full control in Afghanistan, Pakistan would be sandwiched between two hostile regimes—the Soviet empire to the west and north, and India to the east. To avoid this, Zia felt he needed to carry the Afghan jihad well across the Khyber Pass, to keep the Soviets back on their heels. A war fought on Islamic principles could also help Zia shore up a political base at home and deflect appeals to Pashtun nationalism (62).

Thus, covert assistance from the CIA to the ISI began under the Carter Presidency and was ratcheted up once President Reagan took office.

The Carter Administration offered an initial $400 million in economic and military assistance to Pakistan, which Zia “described…as ‘peanuts’” (Haqqani 2005, 187). Zia, the pious officer that he was, encouraged the financing and construction of hundreds of madrassas along the Afghan-Pakistani border as “a kind of Islamic ideological picket fence between communist Afghanistan and Pakistan” (Coll 2004, 61). While the Carter Administration was concerned about Pakistan’s human rights record and its nuclear program, in the Reagan Administration, Zia found an ideological ally who would grant him the respect and legitimacy he desired “….as the military ruler of a frontline state in the struggle against Soviet expansion” (Haqqani 2005, 187).

Under Reagan, the U.S. assistance package to Pakistan was extensive—$3.2 billion in economic and military aid over a five year period, followed by an additional $4.02 billion in aid in 1986, with the U.S. also rescheduling and writing off portions of Pakistan’s debt (Haqqani 2005, 188). As part of the relationship with the U.S., “Zia sought and obtained political control over the CIA’s weapons and money. He insisted that every gun and dollar allocated for the
mujahedin pass through Pakistani hands” (Coll 2004, 63). To this end, Zia appointed a personal friend and close confidant, General Akhtar Abdul Rahman, the Pakistani intelligence chief and head of the ISI, to lead Pakistan’s efforts against the Soviets (Haqqani 2005, 184). According to Coll (2004), “No American—CIA or otherwise—would be permitted to cross the border into Afghanistan. Movements of weapons within Pakistan and distributions to Afghan commanders would be handled strictly by ISI officers. All training of mujahedin would be carried out solely by ISI in camps along the Afghan frontiers” (Coll 2004, 63). Zia’s ability to dictate the foregoing speaks volumes regarding the perceptions the Zia regime and the Americans had toward the Afghan imbroglio. For Zia, Afghanistan was the turning point in Pakistan’s quest for an Islamic identity at home and leadership of the Islamic world. Haqqani (2005) argues:

Zia-ul Haq who believed that his policies of Islamization at home would strengthen Pakistan against those conspiring to move Pakistan away from Islam. By codifying Islamic principles in the country’s constitution and legal system, Zia ul-Haq was paving the way for the day when ‘the lower rungs of society are mobilized in favor of greater Islamization.’ At the same time, the Afghan jihad would make Pakistan ‘the instrument for the creation of an Islamic ideological regional block that would be the source of a natural Islamic revolutionary movement, replacing artificial alliances such as the Baghdad Pact (193).

Alternatively, for the U.S., Afghanistan was “just the largest in a series of covert wars—others were being fought in Nicaragua and Angola—that were meant to punish the Soviet Union and inflict a heavy cost in men, money, and prestige” (Haqqani, 193). By 1988, the U.S.-assisted mujahedeen defeated the Soviets, and in victory’s wake, there was a much larger ISI, which would continue to build its relationship with Islamists and become a greater factor in Pakistani domestic and foreign policy. As Haqqani (2005) notes:

Pakistan still wanted U.S. economic and security assistance as it had since its inception, but its military leaders were more convinced than ever that they needed
to chart their own course and that the only practical basis for Pakistan’s relations with the United States would be for both sides to use each other. Pakistan’s military leadership believed the Americans would have to learn to live with Pakistan saying one thing and doing another. Pakistan would not settle for anything less than the major role it sought as a leader in its region and the Muslim world (197).

Pakistan’s support of the U.S. fight against communism was important, but with the Soviet withdrawal, Pakistan still had to confront mounting ethnic tension, sectarian strife, and civil disorder.

Therefore, the Zia regime, similar to military regimes in the past, sought “legal cover for their extra-constitutional actions, while deep down they … [understood] that the only course of their legitimacy is the power inherent in their military command” (Nawaz 2008, 379). Throughout the 1980s, Zia continued to receive protests from his continued cancellation of elections. To try and quell his opposition Zia chose to hold a referendum asking Pakistanis if they approved of Islamization. Despite receiving objections from a number of military officers in the provinces who felt shame wearing their uniforms in public because the people had associated the army with dictatorship and harsh Islamic justice, Zia held the referendum and offered Pakistanis the choice of “Yes” or “No” on his regime (Nawaz 2008, 379).

The result of the referendum emboldened Zia and in 1985 he ended martial law. National elections were then held absent political parties. All candidates were “independents” and “[c]ontrary to the government’s claim that elections held on a non-party basis would produce a new or better set of political leaders, most of the seats in these elections were bagged by members of landed-feudal class, tribal chiefs and influential religious officials with feudal backgrounds” (Siddiqa 2007, 86-7). As a result, the Pakistani Muslim League (PML) under Mohammad Khan Junejo took over government and Junejo became prime minister. As prime
minister, Junejo oversaw a parliament that was, in the words of defense analyst Ayesha Siddqa (2007), “coerced into passing the controversial Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution…. [which] allowed the president instead of the prime minister to become the supreme commander of the armed forces and to have the power to sack the parliament” (87).

Subsequently, the relationship between Zia and Junejo went from “cordiality and courtesy to coolness” as the prime minister challenged Zia as he did not to be seen as a puppet (Talbot 2005, 263). Specifically, Junejo refused to accept all of Zia’s nominees for cabinet posts, spoke up about reducing perks and privileges for senior military elites; including disapproving of the promotion of two officers to be corps commanders, disapproving over the return of officers to the Army who had served for three or more years in the bureaucracy, and the insistence on removing General Rahman as Director General of the ISI (Nawaz 2008, 380; Talbot 2005, 263; Cloughley 2008, 48). Throughout this time, argues Nawaz (2008), “[T]he army high command was kept in the dark. The VCOAS [Vice Chief of Army Staff] General Mirza Aslam Beg, was simply told by Zia that he was dismissing Junejo. Beg’s views were not sought…..Zia had truly become a one-man administration, aided only by his immediate team” (384).

Meanwhile, the JI leadership continued their criticisms of Zia’s martial law regime and championed the rule of law, an end to censorship and to hold elections (Nasr 1994, 194). At the same time, a movement called the Movement for Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a multi-party coalition organized by the PPP, sought to reach out to the IJT. Throughout the 80s the JI would debate whether or not to join the MRD coalition. In fact, “debate over the Jama’at’s relations to Zia and the possibility of cooperation with the MRD only prolonged the party’s inability to act” (Nasr 1994, 196). Consequently, the JI only won 10 of the 68 seats it contested in the 1985 election (Nasr 1994, 197). This poor performance in the election, plus the presence
of the MRD after 1981, the ban on labor unions, political parties, and student unions by Zia, brought discontent to the rank and file of JI.

The discontent mentioned above was championed by an anti-Zia faction known as the Karachi Group. Established by Ghafur Ahmad, the Karachi Group was interested in returning Pakistan to a populist government. Populism would return to Pakistan, in the Karachi Group’s opinion, if the JI broke away from the Zia regime, joined the MRD and established a working relationship with the PPP, the populist movement of Pakistan (Nasr 1994, 198). Simultaneously, the Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (MQM), was established by former members of the IJT to court, along with the MRD, the secular vote. In response to this jockeying for influence, after the election Zia gave power to the Muslim League, removing the JI, and relegating them to the opposition party (Nasr 1994, 198-199). The JI then began negotiations with the MRD while continuing to denounce Zia’s rule. The substance of these negotiations continued to be whether the MRD would consent to a role for Islam within the state (Nasr 1994, 204).

Ultimately the JI did not join the MRD and Zia was killed in a plane crash in 1988 ushering in a new phase in Pakistani politics. The decision of the military elite not to assume power after the death of Zia and leave the constitutional and democratic processes facilitated the holding of party-based elections and the subsequent transfer of power to elected civilian government. According to Rizvi (2000), “The post-Zia Army Chiefs emphasized professionalism and non-involvement of the soldiers in active politics; they supported the democratic process and governance by the civilians. Their decision to stay back was a tactical move based on a realistic assessment of the domestic and international political situations; it did not change the reality of their centrality to the political process” (190).
Accordingly, the military’s centrality to the political process expanded under the Zia regime through the proliferation of military officers throughout the bureaucracy and the expansion of Milbus. Ignoring normal rules and quotas, roughly one-fourth of 35-40 senior bureaucratic posts and ambassadorships were filled by senior military officers (Nawaz 2008, 387). In fact, the governors of the Punjab, Sindh, the NWFP, and Balochistan were all former corps commanders, and officers were placed all the way down to the district level to “dog and shadow civilians at all levels of administration” (Nawaz 2008, 387). Furthermore, Zia “took measures to establish the military’s financial autonomy and made himself popular among his main constituency, the armed forces, by empowering the senior commanders…. [with] secret ‘regimental’ funds” which they had complete control over (Siddiqa 2007, 141). Milbus also included business operations in a variety of different industries; namely, manufacturing, oil and gas, and agri-business (Siddiqa 2007, 141).

After the death of Zia, VCAS Beg consulted with MGO Niaz, General Imranullah Khan, the corp commander of X Corps in Rawalpindi (headquarters of the Pakistan Army), Imtiaz Warraich of the Joint Chief of Staff Headquarters, General Karamat, and the ISI chief Hamid Gul and concluded that they would not impose martial law and instead follow the constitution (Nawaz 2008, 396). According to the constitution, the chairman of the Senate, Ghulam Ishaq Khan was next in line to succeed Zia. Beg “….invited [Ishaq] to come to GHQ around 7:30 pm (an action that effectively established the rank of the army above the civil,) where he was told that he would take over as the next President” (Nawaz 2008, 396). Subsequently, Beg was appointed by Ishaq as Chief of the Army Staff and held a meeting with his corps commanders and reached decisions on four issues to guide the state as it moved into the “Democratic Period”:

1) Supremacy of Islam;
2) Obedience of law and justice;

3) Support for the freedom war in Afghanistan;

4) Democracy until 16 November 1988, when elections were slated, and the installation of a new government after that (Nawaz 2008, 398).

The “Democratic Period”, 1988-1999

After Zia’s death, politics in Pakistan from 1988-1999 can be characterized as power struggles between the military and civilian politicians, Islamist parties, and secular political institutions (Nasr 2004, 197). As Nasr (2004) notes, “Just as democratic forces sought to recalibrate Pakistan’s ideology, moving it away from Islamization to support development and modernization better, the coalition of military forces and Islamic parties sought to resist this trend by ever more tightly weaving Pakistan’s foreign policy and regional interests with Islam, and thus continuing to anchor domestic politics in the debate over Islamization” (197). To this end, the military established a coalition between the Pakistani Muslim League of Nawaz Sharif and the Islamist Parties (JI, JUI and JUP). The coalition’s purpose was to challenge the PPP in the 1988 elections and “provide a voice for pro-Zia forces in the democratic process, and to use that process to stymie…Benazir Bhutto’s progress” (Nasr 2004, 197).

The coalition was ultimately successful in preventing the PPP from consolidating power. Effectively, from 1998 to 1993, Pakistan faced a “crisis of governability”, according to Nasr (1994), “Divided parliaments, facing changing allegiances of party members, economic crises, corruption, and growing acrimony between Nawaz Sharif and Benazir Bhutto succumbed to paralysis” (198). All of this occurred with the hidden hand of the military interfering in the democratic process.

Although Ghulam Ishaq Khan was now president; in effect, he was merely an acting president as Beg, as army chief, along with the president and prime minister “would become the
troika that would run Pakistan’s fissiparous politics for the next eleven years” (Nawaz 2008, 411). Beg represented the new Pakistan Army—a mohajir who was the first army chief commissioned after 1948 and not possessing a military background. While he inherited corps commanders that Zia picked, they, too, were close to Beg’s age and represented a far more professional force due to a series of rigorous training courses and selection boards needed before promotion. As part of the training, officers were exposed to both military and political issues which made senior officers more prone to take action on political matters (Nawaz 2008, 418).

According to Nawaz (2008), “Beg saw his own role in those early days as that of a ‘referee’ trying to keep calm on the political playing field and ensuring that differences between the two leading parties and their leaders were resolved inside the assembly and not on the streets; otherwise, the army would be unnecessarily drawn into the squabbles” (416).

After the elections of 1988, Bhutto ran into conflict from the military almost immediately. As Nawaz (2008) notes, “From the outset the ISI and MI [Military Intelligence] both had their eyes on the Bhutto family, as did the not-so-loyal opposition in the Punjab government of Chief Minister Nawaz Sharif, which tried its utmost to topple the PPP’s central government” (423). The main areas of disagreement occurred with Bhutto’s handling of foreign policy and various domestic matters. First, Bhutto removed ISI chief Gul and chose to bring back a retired general, Lt. Gen. Shamsur Rahman Kallue, “a quiet gentleman unsuited for the rough and tumble of intelligence and politics” to be Gul’s replacement. Unfortunately, according to Nawaz (2008), “….Bhutto did not know that retired officers lose their clout and chachet and do not have a network among the new senior commanders of the army, who resent the presence of the former in policy-making roles” (425). Next, in a move she hoped would leave Beg ineffective, Bhutto involved herself in the promotion of general officers. More

A final instance of interference by Bhutto during her first term as prime minister occurred between her and Beg over the state of lawlessness developing in Sindh. The crux of the conflict concerned the PPP and the MQM, who had formed a coalition in the 1988 election, but Nawaz (2008) notes: “…[G]radually things fell apart, as the two partners tried to access scarce state resources for their own benefit. Open hostility developed between the MQM and the PPP across the province and especially in Karachi and Hyderabad” (427-8). The conflict necessitated the PPP government reaching out to the army for help in restoring order to Sindh. The army “had to restore not only law and order but also attempt to build confidence between the communities—and began to feel frustrated” with individuals being arrested multiple times because Lt. Gen Nawaz felt the PPP was harboring criminals (Nawaz 2008, 428-9). Essentially, the PPP got into an argument with Lt. Gen Nawaz “over a list of ‘terrorists’ that the PPP wanted picked up. Nawaz refused to do so, stating that the PPP government was trying to ‘use’ the army to ‘crush its political opponents’” (Nawaz 2008, 429).

At a July 21 1990 meeting of the corps commanders and Beg, the decision was made that Bhutto’s government had to go. Beg expressed his discontent with Bhutto to President Ishaq. One month later, Ishaq dismissed Bhutto’s government “….charging her with corruption, inefficiency, and misconduct…. [and] proceeded to call for new elections to be held on 24 October 1990” (Nawaz 2008, 430). In sum, Bhutto’s first term in office was one of repeated conflict with the army, whom did not want to see her establish her influence on matters of importance to their self-interests. As Nasr (2009) argues:

When Benazir Bhutto was elected prime minister in 1988, the generals told her that she would have no say over Afghan or Indian relations or the nuclear
program, and just to be sure, they chose her first foreign minister for her. No sooner had she settled in office than the powerful spies at ISI got busy cobbled together a rival political alliance under Nawaz Sharif to agitate against her and spent vast sums luring her allies to the opposition benches with bribes. The seeds of her own corruption were sown when Benazir asked her husband, Asif Ali Zardari…to build a war chest to fight back (215-6).

In October 1990, Sharif was elected with more than two-thirds majority of the National Assembly (Cloughley 2008, 70). A populist and an industrialist who had run the province of Punjab, Sharf’s tenure from 1990-1993 “saw a continuation of confrontational politics, a crisis in Sindh and claims of corruption which had dogged his predecessor” (Talbot 2005, 315). Thus, Sharif began a series of privatizations to open up Pakistan’s highly controlled bureaucrat-run economy, since his family had suffered at the hands of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s nationalization program. Ultimately, Sharf “was determined to recreate his business empire again and also to empower the new and rapidly rising urban population that had brought him to power in the 1990 elections” (Nawaz 2008, 437).

However, despite a knowledge of the powers of the prime minister, the presidency, and the chief-of-staff of the Army in the “Troika”, Sharf believed that “….if the president wants to blackmail the chief executive or the prime minister, he can do so. So [when] they are referring to that [system as a] troika it cannot be called a troika. It was a sort of understanding…a tacit understanding between two people: the president and the chief of army staff, versus the prime minister’” (Nawaz 2008, 436-7). Moreover, he believed the army wanted to retain three policy areas: Afghanistan, Kashmir, and nuclear policy. According to Nawaz (2008), General Beg and President Ishaq saw their roles in the Troika similarly:

….Beg came into his office recognizing the supremacy of the civil in his Order of the Day issued to all troops. Yet Beg believed himself to be ordained with the
power to help the civil decide political matters, and he had the military man’s
typical disdain for the politicians’ ability to take tough decisions or resolve
national issues amicably. Ishaq, a stickler for rules, understood the powers of the
president all too well and largely shared Beg’s poor opinion of politicians (Nawaz
2008, 437).

This consistently put both Beg and Ishaq in conflict with Sharif. Over the ensuing three years, Sharif and Beg “crossed swords” over Pakistani involvement in the Persian Gulf War and with the selection of a new Army chief (Nawaz 2008, 438).

The Pakistan government made 5,000 troops available to defend Saudi Arabia after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. During the run-up to war, the Pakistan government’s “clear leanings towards the US were questioned by a large number of Islamic groups and others who described the Gulf crisis as an American attempt to humble a relatively powerful and anti-Israel Muslim state” (Rizvi 2000, 210). One such dissenter was General Beg, whom argued in an address to his senior officers on January 28, 1991, that after Iraq’s demise, Iran could be next, followed by Pakistan (Rizvi 2000, 211). Therefore, Rizvi (2000) argues, “These statements were viewed as an attempt by the general to cultivate the political elements in Pakistan that were opposed to the government’s pro-America policy, and thus build pressure on the civilian government [of Sharif]” (211).

The new army chief, Asif Nawaz, was “uncompromising about aid to the civil power in that, if it was deemed necessary by the supreme commander, then it should be introduced by the parliament and implemented vigorously by the army” (Cloughley 2008, 72-3). Nawaz had strong familial roots in the army and, once in command, was thrust into conflict with Sharif. First, Sharif interceded on behalf of Lt. Gen. Hamid Gul who was being transferred from a corps command position to a staff position, which Nawaz declined to change his mind on. Second, Nawaz decided to appoint Lt. Gen. Javed Nasir, a known Islamist, as Director General of the ISI.
(a position normally chosen by the COAS). Finally, the civil-military relationship was strained as a result of violence in Sindh. The army conducted Operation Clean-Up at the request of the Sindh provincial government to round up bandits in an area along the Hyderabad-Lahore road. Nawaz insisted that the bureaucracy be consulted (Cloughley 2008, 73). Rizvi (2000), notes, “The federal and provincial governments were happy because rural Sindh was the stronghold of the PPP and thus their [Sharif and the PML’s] adversaries faced the brunt of the security operation” (211). Realizing the political implications of their operation, as well as the continued improvement of security within Sindh, the Army extended Operation Clean-Up to the cities. This brought the Army in direct confrontation with MQM activists who were allied with Sharif’s government. The MQM wanted the government to stop the operation, however Sharif could not order the Army to pull out of the urban areas. Consequently, a number of ministers within government spoke out about the army’s role and “[t]he government tried to ‘buy off’ the Army Chief and senior commanders by offering them substantial material rewards” (Rizvi 2000, 212). Effectively, this convinced Nawaz of the government’s effort to try and corrupt the Army and use troops against its political adversaries (Rizvi 2000, 212).

By 1993, the military’s coalition was crumbling and Sharif’s PML was losing an increasing percentage of the Islamist vote. Concurrently, the military was keeping an eye on the situation in Afghanistan, where the Taliban was consolidating its hold on power. The military felt that JI’s brand of Islamism was becoming ineffectual and saw the Taliban’s brand of Islamic extremism would be better suited to controlling Pakistani domestic politics (Nasr 2004, 199). The reasoning behind this decision was strategic going back to the Pashtuns and their arbitrary division by the Durand Line. The Pakistani military “has long feared a Pashtun nationalist uprising that would claim the territory, an especially troubling prospect in light of the large
Pashtun population within Pakistan itself” (Nasr 2009, 217). Thus, the Pakistani military supported the Taliban, who were Pashtun, and preferred that fighting take place in Afghanistan rather than in Pakistan. After the Soviets pulled out, the mujahedeen leader who came out on top of a struggle for power was Ahmed Shah Masoud, the Tajik, Northern Alliance commander, who was unacceptable to Pakistan’s Pashtuns. The Pakistani military wanted the “Islamabad-friendly variety” to rule Afghanistan (Nasr 2009, 217).

Moreover, the military was also concerned with government’s poor performance in foreign affairs, specifically regarding the relationship with the U.S. In response to Pakistan’s nuclear program the U.S. “….suspended military sales, military training programs and economic assistance to Pakistan from 1 October 1990 (one month before Sharif assumed power) by invoking the Pressler Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act as retaliation….” (Rizvi 2000, 212). There was also the issue of the former mujahedeen, mentioned above, who were Afghan war veterans and were threatening U.S. interests through drug trafficking occurring from and through Pakistan as well as their attempts to disrupt governments in the region who were perceived as pro-U.S. Therefore, in 1992, the U.S. placed Pakistan on the “watch list” of states that sponsor terrorism. For the military, “While agreeing that Pakistan should not unilaterally surrender its nuclear weapon option, the military expected the government to devise a diplomatic solution for weapons procurement from the US…. [and][,] concerned about Pakistan’s image abroad…, felt that the Nawaz Sharif government was not doing enough to counter these difficulties” (Rizvi 2000, 213).

At this point, Pakistan’s political and economic situation was deteriorating. As Rizvi (2000) states:

The Sharif government’s political and economic management was far from satisfactory. It had a two-thirds majority in parliament and controlled all four
Finally, the confrontation between Sharif’s IJI and Bhutto’s PPP continued unabated, specifically with corruption charges and “misuse of power” cases filed against Bhutto and her husband, Asif Ali Zardari. Consequently, the PPP tried to rally support against Sharif’s government through “street agitation, described as the ‘Long March’, to force the government to resign” (Rizvi 2000, 213).

President Ishaq would attempt to be the bridge between the government and the military, but this relationship was damaged as a result of the Long March when Sharif’s advisers suggested that Sharif go one step further and push out President Ishaq so the PML/IJI could resume control of government. As Rizvi (2000) argues, “This was an imprudent move because, given the internal weaknesses of the ruling IJI, complaints of misuse of state resources and corruption by senior figures in the government, and a virtual breakdown of relationships with the opposition, the government could not afford to alienate the constitutionally powerful president” (213-4). In effect, Sharif listened to his advisers and challenged the president, which ultimately led to his government’s dismissal.

Confrontation between Ishaq and Sharif began with the death of Gen. Nawaz from a heart attack in January 1993. As in previous cases, each side had their man. For Sharif, he wanted Lt. Gen. Muhammad Ashraf, Corps Commander of Lahore and Acting Army Chief to be their choice, while Ishaq knew of Sharif’s connections to General Ashraf and “therefore, used his discretionary powers to appoint the little known General, Abdul Waheed Kaker, to the position
instead” (Rizvi 2000, 214). Waheed’s appointment led to further conflict between Ishaq and Sharif; namely, Sharif’s efforts to strip Ishaq of the president’s discretionary powers under the 8th Amendment. The government appointed a committee to suggest changes to the constitution and issued statements saying the 8th Amendment was a threat to democracy and all powers should be entrusted to the prime minister. Ishaq countered this move by pulling strings within the bureaucracy to defend his powers (Rizvi 2000, 214). As a result, Rizvi (2000) argues:

This revived the intra-party rift in the ruling PML whose roots went back to the short-lived split after the dismissal of the Junejo government in 1988. The erstwhile supporters of Junejo in the PML sided with Ishaq Khan. The pro-Nawaz leaders who dominated the PML in the Punjab, decided to hold party elections in the Punjab in order to oust Junejo, who was seriously ill….His death on 18 March [1993] resulted in an open struggle for control of the PML between these groups….[T]he divide in the PML was formalized when, on 19 April [1993], the supporters of Nawaz Sharif elected him as its President. The press labeled this group as the PML-Nawaz or (N). Those who stayed away were described as the PML-Junejo or (J)…. (Rizvi 2000, 214-5).

Shortly thereafter, after giving a speech against Ishaq, Sharif was dismissed from office on charges of corruption, nepotism, terrorizing opponents, violation of the constitution and subversion of the authority of the armed forces and the National Assembly was dissolved and new elections called for July 14, 1993 (Rizvi 2000, 215). The conflict was far from over.

After his dismissal, Nawaz filed a petition against the dismissal with the Supreme Court and the court reversed the dismissal “by declaring in a 10-1 verdict that the dissolution was ‘not within the ambit of powers conferred’ on the President by the constitution”, thereby reinstating Sharif’s government and the National Assembly (Talbot 2005, 328). Subsequently, Sharif proceeded to involve himself in provincial Punjabi affairs, as “the struggle between President and Prime Minister for control of the province could not have illustrated more graphically the
region’s crucial position in Pakistani politics” (Talbot 2005, 328). As mentioned earlier, the Punjab is the Pakistan Army’s power base and Ishaq and Sharif’s turf wars alarmed the Army; therefore, Chief of Staff General Abdul Waheed brokered a deal where both Ishaq and Sharif would resign, a caretaker government formed, and new elections set for October and November 1993 (Nawaz 2008, 471).

Bhutto and the PPP won the October 1993 elections and the PPP candidate, Sardar Farooq Ahmad Khan Leghari, won the presidency. According to Rizvi (2000), “Benazir Bhutto…started her second term with a clear advantage of having two (later three) provincial governments under her control and the party nominee was holding the presidency; the military was also willing to extend the necessary support to the newly elected government” (220). Unlike her first term, Bhutto did not interfere in the internal affairs of the military and generally respected their autonomy (Rizvi 2000, 220). Immediately upon taking office, Bhutto had to deal with foreign policy and work toward rebuilding the relationship with the U.S. More specifically, she worked toward re-opening Pakistan’s access to U.S. weapons systems, especially the F-16 fighters Pakistan had paid for but were still being held by the U.S. (Nawaz 2008, 474). The Army was supportive of Bhutto’s efforts to ease sanctions against Pakistan, however nuclear proliferation was a sticking point. According to Nawaz (2008):

Bhutto’s ISI chief, General Qazi…recalls that Bhutto kept the Army Chief and the ISI chief fully in the picture on dealings with the United States, and thus the three had a ‘uniform’ view and response to efforts by the US to halt and roll back Pakistan’s nuclear efforts. None of them trusted the United States explicitly…[and] [COAS] Waheed had decided that the nuclear program was none of the U.S.’s business and that Pakistan would press ahead with its enrichment program regardless (475).
Nevertheless, Bhutto was able to regain US support on her visit to Washington. Her diplomatic efforts resulted in Pakistan being removed from the US State Department’s list of state sponsors of terrorism. Her visit also garnered the release of the F-16s and other military equipment blocked by the Pressler Amendment with the U.S. also agreeing to return the money used to purchase the F-16s by selling the aircraft to other states (Rizvi 2000, 221).

By 1996, General Waheed was due to retire and discussions began between Bhutto and President Leghari around who would succeed Waheed. The relationship between Bhutto and Waheed was so cordial that Bhutto offered a one-year extension of service to Waheed, but he declined (Rizvi 2000, 220). Bhutto initially favored Lt. Gen. Javed Ashraf Qazi, a former chief of ISI and current corps commander, but Leghari opposed him and favored a Gen. Tariq who was further down the seniority list at number five. Bhutto summarizes the exchange between her and Leghari over the selection of an army chief in an interview with Nawaz (2008):

‘….I liked General Tariq, but when I looked at the list of seniority, and we had had all that [to worry about]….I didn’t like to go down so deep, although I personally liked Tariq and would have been happy with him, but I thought superseding so many generals and then retiring them was not right. And so then I said that ‘well, we should go for Karamat.’

Farooq said, ‘No…he’s retiring.’ And I said, ‘No, Farooq. You’ve said, ‘no’ to Javed Ashraf Qazi. You said, ‘no’ to General Naseer Akhtar. If…General Tariq was [ranked number] two or three, I’d happily make him. But he’s number five’. And I said, ‘The army already has difficult perceptions about us. Let’s not worsen it’. So then I moved a file promoting General Karamat. And Farooq agreed to make him chief’ (481-2).

The selection of General Karamat highlighted the personalized decision-making style that was taking place behind the scenes, “but also magnified the growing differences between Leghari and Bhutto, as reports of corruption in the government mounted” (Nawaz 2008, 482).
Bhutto’s government initially adopted measures for socio-economic development, projects for health care, the advancement of women and environmental improvements. There were also new projects approved for power generation and infrastructure improvements. However, according to Rizvi (2000), “[I]t was not long before these programs lost their momentum due to defective planning, poor management and resource constraints” from inflation, price hikes, and a devaluation of the Pakistani rupee putting increased pressure on the middle and lower classes (221). Also, ethnic violence intensified in Karachi and Hyderabad throughout 1995-6 between MQM activists and law enforcement. Unable to find a political solution, “the government gave a relatively free hand to the police and Rangers, who used excessive force to control the situation” (Rizvi 2000, 222).

The spiraling violence and deteriorating economic situation was occurring at the same time as charges of corruption were leveled at Bhutto and her husband, Zardari. In The New York Times there was an expose done on the Bhutto family fortune and “Leghari says he also ‘found to [his] horror’ that the PPP government was misstating Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves at that time, some $300 million less than the official figure of some $625 million and the economy was ‘bleeding $40-45 million a day’” (Nawaz 2008, 486). Bhutto also created problems by appointing justices to the court, whom were seen as Bhutto loyalists. This irked the judiciary and, according to Rizvi (2000), “Instead of allaying their concerns, the government built pressures on Chief Justice Sajjad Ali Shah (appointed to this post by the Benazir government) to dissade him from taking up an appeal filed against the appointment of new judges” (223). Consequently, the Supreme Court’s judgment drastically curtailed the power of the executive to appoint and transfer the judges of the judiciary. Subsequently, a number of Chief Justices of provincial High Courts did not recommend confirmation of previous judicial appointments of
Bhutto and Sharif’s. In response, Bhutto refused to implement the Supreme Court judgment on judicial appointments. Finally, the Chief Justice turned to President Leghari who tried to persuade Bhutto to endorse the judges recommended by the Chief Justice to no avail; their differences continued to widen (Rizvi 2000, 223).

Against this background and deteriorating situation, Nawaz (2008) notes, “Leghari and Karamat began to see eye to eye (but separately) on the case against Bhutto. Leghari states that Karamat never directly complained against Bhutto. Karamat tried to get Bhutto to meet Leghari and resolve their differences, but she refused, deriding Lehari….” (485). In fact, after raising the issue of illicit money-making by senior members of the Bhutto government, including Zardari’s involvement in various kickback scandals (his nickname, famously, being 2% Ali), Leghari told Karamat he was planning to dismiss Bhutto’s government because “We had reached the point of no return” (Nawaz 2008, 486).

Bhutto’s dismissal on November 5, 1996, “was carried out in coup style” (Rizvi 2000, 224). Essentially, President Leghari appointed a caretaker government until elections could be held February 3, 1997, with the Army taking control of the Prime Minister’s house and government offices, arresting Zardari and handing him over to the police, and placing more senior military officers into the bureaucracy and civilian intelligence agency (IB) to minimize its autonomy (Rizvi 2000, 225). President Leghari’s reasons for dismissing Bhutto included: 1. Non-implementation of the judgment of the Supreme Court; 2. Attempts to destroy the independence of the judiciary through the accountability law; 3. The bugging of telephones of senior officials and judges, and “extra-judicial” killings; and 4. Imminent economic collapse (Rizvi 2000, 225).
After the 1997 elections and the PML’s win of 63% of the National Assembly seats, Sharif championed the PML as a “modern democratic party” that would work on issues of development while simultaneously following a mandate of Islamization. In essence, the PML was claiming that it would be the center-right party to speak for Islamist interests in Pakistan. The new government “started with the popular support and goodwill of the military and the President” (Rizvi 2000, 226). Sharif’s first order of business was to get rid of the 8th Amendment by putting forward the 13th Amendment, after discussing the move with Karamat and Leghari, which annulled the 8th Amendment and gave the prime minister the power to appoint the heads of the armed services instead of the president (Nawaz 2008, 487). Next, Sharif introduced a number of socio-economic measures and secured a low-interest $1.6 billion IMF loan. However, according to Rizvi (2000), “[T]hese efforts did not produce the desired results because the government lacked the political will to pursue the policy measures, especially tax collection and recovery of overdue bank loans from the politically influential people” (226). In effect, Sharif was attempting to use the PML’s new parliamentary majority to acquire power at the expense of other state institutions. It would be his next move, which would bring to fruition his ultimate fear—another dismissal.

As Sharif attempted his power-grab, he ran into opposition from Karamat. For instance, Karamat, according to Nawaz (2008), “…[W]as bombarded with new ideas of army involvement in civilian administration at almost every meeting he held with Sharif. He says that he would agree to ‘think about’ the individual issues and then put them on the back burner since Sharif would no doubt have new ideas to launch at the next meeting and was unlikely to follow up on the earlier ones” (497). Additionally, Sharif said he felt Karamat had intruded into the affairs of his government by suggesting, in a speech in October 1998 at the Naval Staff College
in Lahore, that the formation of a National Security Council (hereafter NSC) would provide stability to the political system (Nawaz 2008, 498). In fact, the military high command, at this point, was upset by Sharif, especially “the growing alienation in the smaller provinces and polarization along regional lines….and the deteriorating economic conditions [that] had started adversely affecting the professional and corporate interests of the military” (Rizvi 2000, 231). Karamat decided to step down three months ahead of retirement rather than withdraw his remarks. Sharif then sought to appoint an Army Chief he thought would be pliable (Nawaz 2008, 499). His choice was General Pervez Musharraf, an Urdu-speaking mohajir from Karachi over two senior Pashtuns and Punjabi generals (Rizvi 2000, 232; Musharraf 2006).

After becoming COAS, Musharraf favored the use of Islamist extremist groups “by encouraging increasing radicalization of the Islamist discourse, and [by] supporting extremist forces, the military sought to destabilize the relations between the PML and its constituency, and more generally radicalize Islam to the extent that a viable center-right coalition would not be feasible” (Nasr 2004, 200-01). Thus, the confrontation between the military and the PML exacerbated conditions in Pakistan. For instance, Musharraf pressured Sharif to sign on to war with India, by sending jihadi fighters into Kargil, an Indian held part of Kashmir, which nearly precipitated a nuclear crisis (Nasr 2009, 236).

The U.S. stepped in to negotiate a cease-fire, however time was running out for Sharif. At this point, according to Nasr (2009), “Pakistan’s economy was then in a bad state, there was growing unhappiness with government corruption, and more so with Sharif’s attempt to manage the situation by strong-arming his opponents into submission” (216). The economic situation derived in part from Sharif’s decision to go ahead with nuclear tests following those by India, resulting in embargoes and sanctions (Cloughley 2008, 120). Moreover, Sharif relied heavily on
the army to improve administrative efficiency and economic management with several civilian institutions handed over to the Army. As Rizvi (2000) notes, “This may temporarily save the polity from collapsing but it erodes the credibility of the civilian institutions and leaders” (232).

By October 1999, Pakistan was heading toward economic and political collapse:

We stood at the brink of being declared a failed state, a defaulted state, or even a terrorist state. Economic growth had come to a standstill. The central bank was bankrupt with only ten days’ worth of imports in foreign exchange remaining….Over one trillion rupees, around $20 billion, had been invested in development over eleven years, but there was almost nothing to show for it except a solitary 230-mile highway. Sectarian terrorism was on the rise, with Shias and Sunnis being killed regularly. The police were totally demoralized, lawlessness was rampant, and the law courts were overwhelmed. The public was also demoralized and beginning to display signs of hopelessness in the future of the country. The people had lost their honor and their pride in being Pakistanis. They were yearning for change. With the fifteenth constitutional amendment Nawaz Sharif wanted to usurp all power and become Ameer ul Momineen, “commander of the faithful” with dictatorial temporal and religious powers (Musharraf 2006, 139).

Thus, with his opponents railing against him, Sharif decided to remove Musharraf while he was out of the country and replace him with Lt. Gen. Ziauddin of the ISI, who was loyal to Sharif. Musharraf was on a Pakistani Airlines flight returning from Sri Lanka when his plane was told not to land. At 5pm on October 12, 1999, Lt. Gen. Mohammad Aziz Khan, Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, and Maj. Gen. Shahid Aziz (Director General of Military Operations) would conduct a counter-coup against Sharif removing him from office (Musharraf 2006, Chpts 12 & 13).

In a speech to the nation, Musharraf outlined the rationale behind the army’s coup stating, “The choice before us on 12th October [sic] was between saving the body—that is the nation, at the cost of losing a limb—which is the Constitution, or saving the limb and losing the whole
body. The Constitution is but a part of the nation therefore I chose to save the nation and yet took care not to sacrifice the Constitution”’ (Nawaz 2008, 528). Sharif was the most powerful prime minister in Pakistan’s history, but similar to previous coups, “The inability of politicians to accept probity as a requirement of governance contributed directly to the 1999 takeover, and the country’s poor economic situation had been worsened by the Sharif government’s terminal corruption” (Cloughley 2008, 120). Therefore, Musharraf took over as “Chief Executive”, a title he chose to befit what he believed at the time would be the temporary nature of his new regime (Musharraf 2006, 144).

**Pervez Musharraf, 1999-2008**

The Pakistani military under Musharraf “saw no point in continuing to anchor the military’s strategy in a political and ideological position over which it could not have direct control” (Nasr 2004, 201). In essence, Musharraf’s most important accomplishment in the eyes of his fellow generals was “to convince Washington that all this was not happening, and that he was a reliable ally safeguarding Western interests” (Nasr 2009, 221). Although, the events of September 11, 2001, forced Musharraf to go from supporting Islamists to clamping down on extremist jihadi groups whom the military had once used in Afghanistan and in Kashmir (Nasr 2004, 202). By allying with the U.S. in its War on Terror, Musharraf put Pakistan into a precarious political situation. Essentially, Nasr (2009) argues:

> After 9/11 nothing had changed in how they [the Pakistan military] assessed their strategic interests and in the value they found in using the Taliban to win territory in Afghanistan and jihadis to keep Kashmir on the boil. Pakistan had only to wait until the United States left Afghanistan, and then it could redeploy its jihadi assets to achieve its foreign policy aims (217).

> Domestically, Musharraf was attempting to cloak his regime in legitimacy through a Presidential Referendum and the issuance of the Legal Framework Order. The referendum on
April 30th was used by Musharraf to secure a further five years in office prior to the October 2002 provincial elections. The Legal Framework Order established a National Security Council chaired by the President and restored the president’s power to dismiss a prime minister. For Musharraf, these measures were a way of preventing further coups: “‘If you want to keep the army out’, he declared, ‘you bring them in’” (Talbot 2005, 401). This was Musharraf’s “guided democracy”, “presuppos[ing] that the army was the savior rather than the cause of Pakistan’s political travail” (Talbot 2005, 401).

To further legitimize his rule, Musharraf called elections for October 2002. These were elections for the National Assembly (342 seats) and Provincial Assemblies of Sindh, Baluchistan, Punjab and NWFP (728 seats total) (Ansari & Moten 2003, 377). The main contestants in this election were: the PML, the PPP, the National Alliance, and the MMA, with the major issues being socioeconomic conditions, civilian vs. military rule, and foreign policy. The MMA, or Mutahhidah Majlis Amal, is an alliance formed by the Islamist parties in response to Musharraf’s rule, the fall of the Taliban, and the War on Terror (Nasr 2004, 203). The two largest partners in the alliance are the JUI and the JI with the JUI being the muscle and the JI the brains. Qazi Husayn Ahmad wanted to ensure Islamism remained the purview of Islamist parties. Or, as Nasr (2004) so aptly puts it, “Qazi [Husayn Ahmad] conceived of the MMA as the means to use the tug-of-war between the military, the PML, and the PPP to Islamist parties’ advantage” (203). Interestingly, the military supported the MMA, however this alliance “. . . was surreptitious and was characterized by mutual distrust between the two sides” (Nasr 2004, 203).

Due to the increasing distrust of the military, the 2002 elections became the MMA’s most successful elections to date. The MMA won 11% of the total vote in the National Assembly
finishing fourth in the final vote. This caused Musharraf to view the PPP and PML as the real threats to the military’s position (Nasr 2004, 205). In provincial elections, the MMA did well in the NWFP (51 of 101 seats) and Baluchistan (14 of 51 seats) and did poorly in Punjab (8 of 297 seats) and Sind (11 out of 130 seats) (Nasr 2004, 205). Essentially, voting became split along ethnic lines. As Nasr (2004) argues, “Pathans voted overwhelmingly for Islamism and the MMA, and the rest of Pakistan shied away from the MMA” (205). In the end, the MMA will continue to be an important presence in Pakistani politics because of a modus vivendi created between the Islamists and the military: “It is through the military’s assault on the political process, and as an intended or unintended consequence of the struggle for power between the military and democratic forces, that Islamism has gained ground” (Nasr 2004, 207).

In fact, in 2002, under pressure from the U.S., Musharraf agreed to round up extremists and members of Al-Qaeda. Musharraf states that the benefits of supporting the U.S. were many:

“First, we would be able to eliminate extremism from our society and flush out the foreign terrorists in our midst. We could not do this alone; we needed the technical and financial support of the United States to be able to find and defeat these terrorists….Second, even though being a frontline state fighting terrorism would deter foreign investment, there were certain obvious economic advantages, like lossening the stranglehold of our debt and lifting economic sanctions. Third, after being an outcast nation following our nuclear tests, we would come center stage” (Musharraf 2006, 203).

However, many of the militants were released a few weeks later in Azad Kasmir—Pakistan’s part of Kashmir—or in the FATA region in the Northwest, where they have since associated themselves with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda (Nasr 2009, 220).

By 2004, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were in the FATA, specifically North and South Waziristan, and were reconstituting themselves. This reconstituted group of militants is known as
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), or “Pakistani Taliban”, and “have successfully established an archipelago of micro-emirates of Shariah within large swathes of the Pashtun belt inclusive of the FATA and the NWFP” (Fair 2009, 41). The Pakistani Taliban are Pashtun Salafists who are a loose alliance of tribal and ethnic affiliated militant extremist groups who share “a determination to implement a strict Islamic agenda and oppose an international military presence in Afghanistan” (Weinbaum 2009, 75). Their leader was Baitullah Mehsud (killed in a U.S. drone strike in August 2009) and he directed attacks against the Pakistani military conducting operations against these militants with varying degrees of success. Former State Department official Marvin G. Weinbaum (2009) succinctly describes local motivations for joining the Pakistani Taliban:

As a movement that intertwined political objectives and religious objectives, the Taliban drew the support of these local populations in the tribal agencies feeling deprived by the federal government of expected economic and infrastructure improvements. Local anger in districts in the NWFP was especially directed at the incompetence and corruption of police and provincial officials. Many residents held strong resentments toward predatory local landowners and moneylenders. An Islamic judicial system that promised to be more just and timely also attracted many locals toward the TTP. Young men in both the tribal agencies and the NWFP, with little interest in or knowledge of the Taliban’s ideology, could be lured into the TTP by money and increased stature among their peers (75).

Additionally, there are four other militant jihadi groups operating within Pakistan: Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Jaish-e-Mohammad (JM), and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The SSP was founded in September 1985, “with the backing of the military authorities, to counter the rise in the influence of Shi’ism [in Pakistan], and apparently had the financial support of Saudi Arabia and Iraq….to transform Pakistan into a Sunni Muslim state
applying the Shari’a” (Zahab & Roy, 23). LeJ, is a terrorist group that split off from the SSP in 1994, led by Riaz Basra, after disagreements arose over the SSP agenda and have subsequently been implicated in a number of assassinations against Shi’a. Jaish-e-Mohammad is a Punjabi group, led by Masood Azhar, which is the jihadi wing of the SSP, and seeks the Islamization of Pakistani society. JM “…was one of the first jihadist groups in South Asia to import the technique of suicide missions from the Middle East” (Zahab & Roy, 31).

Finally, LeT is a Wahabi jihadist group created during 1989 and 1990 in Afghanistan (Siddiqa 2009, 64). LeT was created, in part, with help from the Pakistani army and ISI, who were looking to control Kashmiri Muslim separatists in Indian controlled Kashmir. LeT’s ideology ultimately seeks the establishment of a Muslim caliphate over the subcontinent and has committed a number of attacks on Indian targets in Kashmir since the late 1980s as well as the most recent attack in November 2008, known as the “Mumbai Massacre” (Reidel 2009, 115-6). The LeT “has a wide popularity in Pakistan, especially in the Punjab”, which has made it less vulnerable to crackdowns by the Pakistani army (Reidel 2009, 117). Moreover, each of these groups has close links with the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda, as well as with each other. For example, LeT has provided safe haven for Al-Qaeda fighters being driven out of Afghanistan by the U.S., as well as Osama Bin Laden, an early funder of LeT (Riedel 2009, 118).

The Pakistani military’s schizophrenic policies of fighting the Pakistani Taliban created a tremendous amount of blowback. The army sought to retain influence across the Tribal areas by using tribal and personal rivalries to divide the Taliban. However, historian Juan Cole (2009) notes, “The FATA tribes began inflicting significant casualties on Pakistani troops who were attempting to bring them under control of the central government” (235). Consequently, attacks and counterattacks went back and forth between the militants and the military. The operations
were often short-lived and agreements with local militants to cede local control in exchange for a promise to not attack army personnel and bases, while also refraining from spreading their influence into Pakistan’s more populated areas. However, no enforcement mechanism was established to monitor the deal and the Pakistani government took the militants at their word that they would limit their assistance to the Afghan insurgency. Therefore, according to Weinbaum (2009), “Pakistan’s approach to finding a political solution had one basic fallacy: all the agreements were reached from a position of government weakness rather than strength” (76). Weinbaum (2009) goes on to note that part of the Pakistani army’s difficulty in its counterinsurgency effort was attributed to the fact that the army is “largely trained and equipped for a conventional ground war in the Punjab….but reluctant to remain and provide continuing security or address the complaints that left the area vulnerable to insurgent penetration in the first place” (77).

The inability of the government and army to maintain security in the NWFP emboldened the militants to challenge Musharraf in the cities, especially Islamabad. Thousands of extremists based in Islamabad’s Red Mosque sought “to purge Pakistan’s debonair capital of all vice and un-Islamic behavior by imposing draconian Islamic laws on its citizens” (Nasr 2009, 221-2). By May 2007, these self-styled Taliban-like extremists eventually turned violent, attacking video stores and barbershops, and kidnapping a number of Chinese nationalists (Cole 2009, 235). The capture of the Chinese nationalists caused an international incident, as Pakistan is a close ally of Beijing. This forced Musharraf’s hand. In July 2007, elite troops of the Pakistani army stormed the Red Mosque complex killing one cleric and numerous extremists. In retaliation, there was a wave of urban suicide bombings targeting police stations and military facilities in the north. Subsequently, tribal leaders who were angered by the massacre at the Red
Mosque and the military crackdown, cancelled their truce with Islamabad (Cole 2009, 235). In effect, “The twin urban and rural crises profoundly weakened the Musharraf regime, raising questions about its ability to survive” (Cole 2009, 236).

Musharraf ruled by decree from 2002-2007 through “enhanced presidential power via constitutional amendments and ordinances…constricting the role of the legislature to that of a decree-stamping institution” (Shafqat 2009, 93). The beginning of the end of Musharraf’s regime began in 2007. Nawaz (2008) contends, “Increasingly, Musharraf, who liked to cast himself as aloof from and allergic to politics, seemed to be caught up in the machinations of his political party supporters, as they orchestrated huge rallies and used official resources and connections to produce large gatherings whenever he appeared” (558). Moreover, politically, Musharraf could have allowed a technocratic prime minister to emerge to follow in his footsteps. In reality, Musharraf, who did not have a deputy, kept his Vice Chief and other military officers on a tight leash (Nawaz 2008, 558).

Thus, with domestic political unrest and ethnic tension increasing, Musharraf had to make a number of decisions that would ultimately force him from office. One of the first decisions was whether to relinquish his military uniform by the end of 2007 as required by the 17th Amendment in the Pakistani Constitution (Nawaz 2008, 558). Musharraf wanted to remain both president and army chief and the judiciary would be the last hurdle for him to overcome in his bid to consolidate his power. Accused of being soft on terrorism and of misconduct, Chief Justice of the Pakistan Supreme Court, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, was dismissed because his “greatest sin was challenging the legality of General Musharraf’s government, and in particular taking on…the issue of whether the general could be both president and army chief” (Nasr 2009, 225).
Musharraf’s dismissal of the chief justice brought the pro-democracy movement out in force. In particular, thousands of lawyers took to the streets to protest Musharraf’s abuse of power. As Nasr argues, “Pakistan had not seen anything like this before; never had the people come in such numbers to cheer for a judge and defend the judiciary. It was as strong an expression of belief in liberal democracy and rejection of dictatorship at the grassroots level as has ever been witnessed in the Muslim world, and it came where least expected” (Nasr 2009, 226). Emboldened by the public support, the Supreme Court, now headed by Khalilur Rehman Ramday overturned Musharraf’s decision reinstating Chaudhry as chief justice (Nawaz 2008, 560).

Next, in response to the Supreme Court’s decision, Musharraf launched a “second coup” on November 3, 2007, to remove the Supreme Court and set aside the constitution. Also, there were restrictions placed on broadcast news media and large numbers of supporters of the various political parties were jailed (Nawaz 2008, 560). Musharraf “remained super-confident and focused on what he saw as his role in Pakistan’s history: to restore democracy, with whatever military force he could muster” (Nawaz 2008, 561). At this point, however, according to Cole (2009), Musharraf’s “refusal to resign from the military and rule as a civilian president had long been an embarrassment to Washington, which had…strongly supported him despite its rhetoric about democratizing the Muslim world” (Cole 2009, 238). The increasing domestic and international pressure would force his hand. New elections were called for January 2008 with the political parities responding by demanding the return of their exiled leaders, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Musharraf also resigned from the military and installed General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani as army chief and would run for president as a civilian (Nawaz 2008, 561).
Bhutto and Sharif initiated a consultative process, which led to the signing of the Charter of Democracy, an agreement calling for the PPP and PML-N to work together to restore democracy, an independent judiciary, and seek the disengagement of the military from politics (Shafqat 2009, 93). Seeing that the democracy movement was gaining momentum, on October 5, 2007, Musharraf issued the National Reconciliation Order to “exonerate political leaders from charges in cases of corruption and paved the way for the return of these leaders, particularly Bhutto” (Shafqat 2009, 93). The electoral campaign was now underway with Bhutto returning and campaigning in every province.

December 27, 2007, however, became a date that Pakistanis would not soon forget. During campaigning in Rawalpindi, Bhutto was assassinated by members of Baitullah Mahsud’s Tehrik-I Taliban (Cole 2009, 238). Her death “roused anger, passion and a wave of sympathy not only for her party, the PPP, but also for other political leaders” (Shafqat 2009, 93). After the assassination, Musharraf sought to postpone the elections for a year, but with the security situation as it was with massive protests and violence, Cole (2009) argues that Washington “appears to have convinced him [Musharraf] behind the scenes that the elections needed to be held” (238). The elections were rescheduled for February 2008 and the PPP won a decisive victory with the PML-N coming in a close second. It would now be up to Zardari as interim head of the PPP (Zardari and Bhutto’s son, Bilawal, was appointed leader of the party, but would not be taking over until after completing his studies at Oxford) and Sharif to form a ruling coalition (Cole 2009, 239).

Asif Ali Zardari, 2008-Present

The coalition of PPP and PML-N has “raised expectations that Pakistan may be moving away from a dominant party system to a multi-party system” (Shafqat 2009, 94). The three
dominant parties in the ruling coalition, the PPP, PML, and ANP, were joined in their disdain for the rule of Musharraf and each differed on how he should be removed from office. The PML-N was the most vocal about Musharraf’s removal and the reinstatement of the judges, while the PPP initially tried to work with Musharraf (Shafqat 2009, 95). According to Saeed Shafqat (2009), “The PPP also wished to dilute the issue of the restoration of the judges, which strained the coalition as the PML-N’s expectation was the judges would be restored by 12 May 2008. When that did not happen, the PML-N’s cabinet ministers submitted their resignation to the prime minister, and the party subsequently withdrew from the coalition” (95). The PML-N is now the opposition party in the National Assembly. In August 2008, Musharraf resigned and one month later Zardari became President of Pakistan.

President Zardari’s rule has been tenuous up to this point. Despite $11 billion in American aid during Musharraf’s tenure, Pakistan remains a poor country (Cole 2009, 240). The country “has been wracked by the effects of rising oil prices and increased instability—manifested in political wrangling in the midst of as yet uncertain civilian rule, a slate of suicide bombings, and a war to break extremist hold over territory in the country’s northwest” (Nasr 2009, 229). These events notwithstanding, the military under Gen. Kayani has chosen to remain behind-the-scenes. He ordered serving officers to withdraw from civilian positions and acted as an arbiter to help end the political stand-off between Sharif and Zardari in 2009 (BBC News, June 17, 2009). As Shafqat (2009) notes, “The present army chief seems earnest to disengage the military from its hegemonic position” (106).

Furthermore, the Pakistani military has developed a strategy to tackle the tribal elements, the Pakistani Taliban, and Al-Qaeda within the tribal areas. The Pakistani military will not be alone in this endeavor, as the U.S. has committed under the Obama Administration, to continue
working with the Pakistan army and train them in counterinsurgency. The passage of the 2009 Kerry-Lugar Bill provided for $7.5 billion of nonmilitary funding over five years, whereby the U.S. sought to demonstrate that Pakistan’s people matter just as much as the military (Weinbaum 2009, 84).

Continued U.S. assistance to Pakistan will be of great importance as the Zardari government moves forward to combat domestic extremism and the U.S. continues the War in Afghanistan. The difficulty ahead for Pakistan is best explained by former State Department official Marvin Weinbaum (2009):

Pakistan’s inability to make decisions that would allow it to pursue clearer, more consistent and better communicated policies in its borderlands with Afghanistan reveals an historical narrative steeped in a sense of national insecurity and unsure identity. Pakistan seems unlikely to reshape that narrative and is thus unable to align its strategic interests with those its neighbors and international partners without a more decisive, inspired leadership and a recommitment to its constitutional institutions (87).

Conclusion

Pakistan’s civil-military relationship can be defined as a relationship lacking in trust. Since the founding of Pakistan, ethnic and sectarian tensions have been centrifugal forces pulling the political and military elites further and further apart regarding Pakistani identity. Consequently, the military, the state’s strongest institution, took advantage of these tensions, especially those tensions between political elites, to intervene in 1958 to ensure the survival of the Pakistani state. Once in power, however, military elite self-interests grew along with their disdain for politicians, whom they felt were corrupt. After 1958, military rule has dominated Pakistan’s history with further interventions in 1969, 1977, and 1999.
Furthermore, in the few times when the military has withdrawn from politics, political elites have taken this as carte blanche to attempt any number of reforms. Often, the PPP and PML will be in conflict with one another or with the military and cause the military to view politicians’ actions as encroaching on their interests and halt the brief periods of democracy that occurred from 1956-8, 1988-1999, and 2008-Present. What makes the Pakistani case even more unsettling is the ongoing fight against Islamist extremists and Pakistan’s on-going relationship with the U.S. While Pakistani-U.S. strategic interests were not always similar, Pakistan has always been of geo-strategic importance for U.S. policymakers. The Pakistanis knew this and exploited this fact, often saying one thing for domestic consumption and another for those in Washington. Thus, Pakistani civil-military relations are still a work in-progress; namely, both sides working to build trust in the state’s political institutions to limit the military’s role in politics.

One example of a civil-military relationship where trust in state political institutions has occurred is Turkey. Chapter Six, the final case study, examines civil-military relations in Turkey to highlight the domestic and international factors that contributed to military involvement in politics and the factors contributing to Turkey being held up as an example of how democracy can function in the Middle East.
Sovereignty should not be built on fear. Sovereignty that rests on guns cannot endure. Such a sovereignty, or dictatorship, must only be a temporary expedient in a time of upheaval.—Mustafa Kemal, 1930 (Lewis 2002, 239).

The young student indeed wears a shirt of steel—a combination of the heavy workload imposed by the Military Academy, his special training and the restrictions inseparable from his uniform. Some suffer, but others actually enjoy wearing it. The uniform is the symbol that reveals the wearer as a man apart from the world outside. It distinguishes him from the millions and raises him above them. For...those who take up soldiering as a ‘profession’, the uniform is a restriction; for those who following soldiering as a ‘way of life’, the uniform attracts respect from the Turkish public and confers superiority on the wearer....It is his distinguishing symbol, a banner that proclaims his status without any word or introduction from him; it shows he is not an ordinary man in the street; it enables his word to be heard, and even, when he is above a certain rank, causes people to rise when he enters a gathering. As a result of all this, he is very careful not to disgrace his uniform and hates anyone who does so—Mehmet Ali Birand, Shirts of Steel: An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces (1991, 50-1).

The Ottoman Empire’s collapse left remnants of the Ottoman army to move forward and forge a national identity for Turks in Anatolia. The culmination of these efforts resulted in the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923. Led by a hero of World War I, Mustafa Kemal, later known as Atatürk, Turkey developed as a modern nation-state. Kemalism was a top-down modernization effort designed to forge a new identity of what it meant to be a Turk. As one of the strongest institutions of the former Ottoman Empire, the Turkish Armed Forces became the guardian of Turkish identity.

In 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997 the Turkish Armed Forces “rescued” the Turkish nation from politicians who were deemed to be harming Atatürk’s vision. After the founding of the Turkish state, Atatürk ruled under a single party, the Republican People’s Party, until his death in 1938. Turkey was then led by Atatürk’s deputy, and later Turkey’s prime minister, Ismet Inonu, who continued Atatürk’s vision and installed multi-party elections in 1945, resulting in the election of the Democrat Party in 1950. Subsequently, from 1950-1960, discontent and violence
increased throughout Turkish society. The military took notice and intervened for the first time in 1960 and ruled the country for three years, withdrawing in 1963. At this point, Turkey saw a rise in social movements on the left and the right—Kurdish separatists who latched on to communism and political Islam. Both movements were seen as a threat to Kemalism and led to the military interventions of 1971 and 1980. Under General Kenan Evran, the Turkish military and society would confront the ideological forces of secularism, communism, and Islamism, as well as economic turmoil and systemic corruption which led to the rise of the Refah (or Welfare) Party. Refah’s election resulted in the 1997 “coup by memorandum”.

After negotiations to ensure the protection of Kemalism, parliamentary elections were held in 2002 with a new party the Justice and Development Party (or AKP) being swept into power. Since then, the military, initially threatened by this moderate Islamist party, challenged the AKP, but recently has sought to stay behind-the-scenes and let the politicians govern. The progression in this civil-military relationship is the subject of this chapter, as we examine the domestic and international influences that affected the conflicts between the Turkish Armed Forces, politicians, and society.

**Founding of the Turkish Republic & Kemalism**

At the end of World War I, with the Ottoman Empire in ruins, “….the Entente powers had written themselves post-dated checks on the territory of the empire” (Hale 1994, 59). As part of their partition plan, Turkey was to be divided up and reduced to a size of about a third of what it is today (Hale 1994, 59). The Allies were meeting in Paris in 1919 to divide up the spoils of war and decided that the Italians and Greeks could occupy Anatolia. In particular, Lloyd George “sketched out an Italian mandate in southern Anatolia in glowing terms: ‘Where the Turks made a wilderness, the Italians can build roads, railways, irrigate the soil and cultivate it.’
The French could take the north of Anatolia and the Greeks would have Smyrna and its surroundings, as well as the Dodecanese islands…and he would give them Cyprus as well” (MacMillan 2001, 435). Arthur Balfour, however, objected to the partitioning of Turkey citing the danger: “‘I conclude,’ he told the other leaders when they met on May 19, ‘that it is impossible to divide Turkey proper. We would run too great a risk of throwing disorder into the Mohammedan world’” (MacMillan 2001, 436). In sum, according to historian Margaret MacMillan (2001), “Allied policies were confused, inept and risky—and created the ideal conditions for Turkish nationalism to flourish” (434).

Consequently, from 1919-22, Turkish nationalists would fight a war of independence against the Allies, as well as Greece. Atatürk “gather[ed] like-minded officers about him and weaving independent groups that had sprung up to protest Allied occupation into the basis of a nationalist movement….against the Greeks in Smyrna, the French in the south and the Armenians in the east” (MacMillan 2001, 434). While the terms of a peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Allies was presented at San Remo, it was never implemented. Atatürk had been sent to eastern Anatolia as inspector general to supervise the Ottoman demobilization but, in reality, he was being kept away from Istanbul for speaking against the Allied occupation (Glazer 1996, 33). Atatürk organized cadres of a nationalist army, which found fight against the Greek army. Also, a telegram from Atatürk was sent to a number of civilian and military authorities throughout the country detailing the nationalists’ program and calling for a conference to assert the rights of the Turkish nation.

In July 1919, the nationalists met in Erzurum, in eastern Turkey, and met in a congress “voic[ing] their loyalty to the sultan-caliph, [but] they also pledged to maintain the integrity of

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4 For an excellent historical account of the Paris peace conference, and all the major participants’ views see Margaret MacMillan’s Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World.
the Turkish nation” (Glazer 1996, 33). The most important achievement of the congress was the drafting of the National Pact which stated “the renunciation of claims to the Arab provinces, the principle of the absolute integrity of all remaining Ottoman territory inhabited by a Turkish Muslim majority, a guarantee of minority rights, the retention of Istanbul and the straits, and rejection of any restriction on the political, judicial, and financial rights of the nation” (Glazer 1996, 33; Lewis 2002, 248).

The ensuing months saw negotiations continue between the nationalist congress and the Ottoman government, but were ineffective. By March 1920, the Grand Vizier resigned under pressure from the Allies and Istanbul was placed under military occupation. According to political scientist William Hale (1994), “Many prominent members of the nationalist movement who were then in Istanbul were deported….and [t]hose deputies who managed to evade arrest assembled in Ankara, by now the nationalist headquarters, where they reconstituted themselves as the Grand National Assembly of Turkey” (61). In defiance of the Ottoman’s, Atatürk was elected president of the Grand National Assembly and a proclamation was issued called the Law of Fundamental Organization (or Organic Law) proclaiming sovereignty, legislative and executive power belonged to the nation (Glazer 1996, 33). On June 10, 1920, the Allies presented the Sultan’s government the full partition plan in the Treaty of Sèvres. At this point, despite protests from the Sultan, the Ottoman state dissolved and the Greek army “broke out from the Aegean coast and began to advance into Anatolia. The war of national resistance had begun” (Hale 1994, 62).

From 1920-1922, the nationalists battled the Greeks in their War of Independence. Initially the Turks were outmatched in numbers and material and were badly defeated. However, in January 1922, “a Turkish force under Colonel Ismet halted the Greeks in a valley near İnönü.
In a second, more important battle, fought in Inönü on 31 March-April 1,….Ismet again repelled the invaders” (Lewis 2002, 253). Ismet would later take the town of this victory as his surname and became Ismet Inönü. The Greeks did not give up and clashed with the Turks on the Sakarya river. It was here that “a great battle took place, and the Turkish forces, under the personal command of Mustafa Kemal, won a decisive victory” (Lewis 2002, 253). The significance of the battle is summed up by historian Bernard Lewis in The Emergence of Modern Turkey (2002):

The effects of the victory by the Sakarya were considerable. The nationalists were now internationally recognized as a powerful factor; by some as the real government of Turkey. The Soviets had already signed an agreement with them in March 1921, fixing the frontier and establishing friendly relations. The French now did the same. In October, a new Franco-Turkish treaty was signed with the nationalists, drawing up a new Turco-Syrian frontier far more favorable to Turkey than that laid down in the treaty of Sèvres, and providing for the French evacuation of Cilicia. The Italians too withdrew from their zone in southern Anatolia, stipulating only the retention of the Dodecanese islands. These withdrawals and agreements greatly strengthened the military position of the nationalist forces, who now in addition began to acquire large quantities of arms (253-4).

Ataturk quickly worked to consolidate the Turks’ position. He moved west beginning in August 1922, and drove the Greeks out of Izmir and eastern Thrace. This campaign “….threatened to put the Turks in direct confrontation with Allied contingents defending access to the straits and holding Istanbul, where they were protecting the Ottoman government” (Glazer 1996, 35). By October 1922, an armistice was signed between the nationalists and the British, who were the only remaining Allied force in Anatolia. This armistice led to a peace conference in Lausanne in November 1922 and over the next eight months negotiations ensued, which resulted in the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and the creation of the Turkish Republic. According to Lewis
(2002), “….Turkey, alone among the defeated powers of the First World War, succeeded in rising from her own ruins and, rejecting the dictated peace imposed on her by the victors, secured the acceptance of her own terms. For the Treaty of Lausanne was substantially an international recognition of the demands formulated in the Turkish National Pact” (254-5).

On October 29, 1923, the Grand National Assembly proclaimed the Republic of Turkey and Atatürk became the first president of the republic and Ankara its capital (Glazer 1996, 36). At this point, Atatürk sought to modernize Turkey by initiating a series of political, social, and economic reforms. Although, before discussing Atatürk’s efforts, it is useful to consider what could have happened; this makes his efforts that much more remarkable. Lewis (2002) notes:

There were indeed many distractions, which at that time might have enticed a warrior-hero. There were the lost Ottoman provinces in Europe and Asia, where the growing difficulties of the successor regimes might have favored a reassertion of Turkish claims. Nearer to the heart of Turkish nationalists, there were the 20 odd million Turkish-speaking Muslims of the fallen Russian Empire, which, in the throes of revolution, intervention, and civil war, might have offered a tempting field for political adventure (Lewis 2002, 255). Instead, Atatürk chose to make peace with the Greeks, demilitarized the Straits, renounced foreign ambitions and all pan-Turkish, pan-Ottoman, or pan-Islamic ideologies (Lewis 2002, 255). Atatürk urged his fellow citizens to “look and act like Europeans” (Glazer 1996, 36). Accordingly, a secular legal code was established along European lines introducing laws that affected women, marriage and family relations. The ideological foundation of these reforms became Kemalism.

The six basic principles of Kemalism were set forth in the Republican People Party’s 1931 party program: republicanism, secularism, nationalism, populism, statism, and revolutionism (reformism) (Zürcher 1997, 189). Republicanism “was contained in the
constitutional declaration that ‘sovereignty is vested in the nation’ and not in a single ruler.”

Secularism and nationalism were not new phenomenon, as they were distinctive characteristics of the Young Turk ideology since prior to World War I. During the 1930s, however, secularism and nationalism “were carried to extremes, secularism being interpreted not only as a separation of state and religion, but as the removal of religion from public life and the establishment of a complete state control over remaining religious institutions” (Zürcher 1997, 189). In effect, according to Erik Zürcher (1997), “An extreme form of nationalism, with the attendant creation of historical myths, was used as the prime instrument in the building of a new national identity, and as such was intended to take the place of religion in many respects” (189). Populism meant the furtherance of national solidarity by putting the interests of the nation ahead of any group or class, which entailed “a denial of class interests (according to Kemalism, Turkey did not have classes in the European sense) and a prohibition of political activity based on class (and thus of all socialist or communist activity)” (Zürcher 1997, 189). Statism “emphasized the central role reserved to the state in directing the nation’s economic activities” to justify state planning of Turkey’s mixed economy and large-scale investment in state-owned enterprises undertaken by Ataturk to prevent undue foreign influence on the Turkish economy (Glazer 1996, 38). Finally, Revolutionism or Reformism was a means to codify “a commitment to ongoing change and support for the Kemalist reform program” (Zürcher 1997, 190).

These six principles were incorporated into the Turkish constitution in 1937 and “[t]ogether they formed the state ideology of Kemalism and the basis for indoctrination in schools, the media and the army” (190). The defeat of the Ottomans had given the army its stature as defender of the nation. According to Hale (1991), the army was in an ambiguous position: “On the one hand, Ataturk was determined to keep the army out of the political system,
to make sure that the army itself was not divided by politics, and that ambitious officers could not challenge his leadership. On the other hand, he continued to look to the army as the ultimate guardian of his achievements” (ix). Put differently, the Turkish army’s *raison d’être* is to preserve the integrity of Turkey and its secular and democratic order.

**Turkish Military in Society**

The Turkish military’s role in society came from its role in the war of independence as the first institution to mobilize the population against foreign occupation. From its inception, the Turkish military was faced with challenges that included: a lack of a democratic culture, the strong influence of Islam and a Kurdish minority opposed to assimilation. Consequently, as Aylin Güney (2002) argues, “At the end of the independence war the new state was left with the generals, lieutenants and other army officers, on one side, and a highly illiterate, leaderless, devastated and extremely poor society on the other” (162). Thus, this section will discuss who these military officers are who had an important role in the process of transforming Ottoman identity to Turkish identity (Güney 2002, 163).

An officer in the Turkish Armed Forces takes an oath upon entering the military academy swearing they “‘will eagerly sacrifice my life for my country’ and are told that: ‘A land is a country if there is someone dying for its sake’” (Jenkins 2001, 31). Moreover, officers are told they are joining an elite group within society. In essence, Kemalism is an ideology whereby officers are sworn to protect Turkey against both internal and external enemies of the state. Beginning at the military academies, “….the social isolation of the academies and the inculcation of a sense of being distinct from society at large inevitably combine to produce an increasing identification with their fellow cadets and the armed forces as an institution” (Jenkins 2001, 31). Gareth Jenkins (2001) argues, “Turkish officers are expected to be model citizens….and are
encouraged to regard Ataturk as having an almost physical presence in their lives” (31-2). Accordingly, future officers study Ataturk’s speeches containing directives on a number of different areas, from the importance of the Turkish state, to the functioning of the economy and democracy. Therefore, as Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand (1991) notes, “…. [Kemalism] is not a static ideology but one that undergoes a ‘dynamic’ development according to the conditions of the time. Hence it is not inflexible like other ideologies, but keeps changing in the light of previous experience and progressing towards the ‘ideal’. This is emphasized as the ‘Dynamic Ideal’” (58). The “Dynamic Ideal” is the driving force in Turkish civil-military relations.

From the beginning of the 20th Century, the army has been the guarantor of the state and the academies place considerable emphasis on the foundation of the Turkish Republic (Birand 1991; Jenkins 2001). Officers “are taught that the Ottoman Empire was eroded by a combination of foreign avarice and a paucity of patriots prepared to defend the homeland” (Jenkins 2001, 32). Ataturk’s military battles, both his struggles and his victories—Gallipoli, the War of Liberation, and the crushing of Islamist and Kurdish revolts in the 1920s—are used to depict Ataturk as “‘the bright sun which tore apart the dark clouds’ and ‘a soldier turned reformer who demonstrated his genius by sustaining….a brand new republic on Turkish soil, its borders drawn in blood’” (Jenkins 2001, 33). Jenkins (2001) argues “Indeed, cadets are explicitly taught that, although circumstances and methods may change, the external and internal threats to the country—threats which they are legally as well as morally obliged to repulse—are fundamentally the same as in Ataturk’s lifetime” (33). Therefore, in an ethnically and ideologically heterogeneous state such as Turkey, the army must continually be wary of societal conflicts, which could destroy the army as an institution.
The teaching of history, as just described, allows the army to control the indoctrination process and make it “….not the army of the elite, but…rather an elite-making institution” (Aydinli 2009, 586). Professor Ersel Aydinli (2009) defines the Turkish army’s elite-making process as follows:

It recruits cadets largely from rural Anatolian towns, but with its carefully crafted and closed institutions, turns these Anatolian kids into a unique new societal elite—a group neither completely inside nor outside of society. In many cases, while the immediate relatives of this new elite carry socially common ethnic and religious identities, the officers themselves become stripped of these identities through the military’s own “eliticization” process and absorb the institutional identity. Interestingly, they still feel a part of society and believe that they are the true representatives of the society (586).

This “eliticization” process drew the army into conflict with society, especially politicians. Consequently, the Turkish army “built up insulating practices and mechanisms to both maintain its symbiotic relationship with society while keeping itself immune from society’s fragmentative potential and ‘weaknesses’” (Aydinli 2009, 586).

For the army, politicians “are contemptuous” (Jenkins 2001, 33). Due to the professionalization process of the Military Academy, officers’ problem with politicians results from “….dissatisfaction and annoyance with the lack of discipline and organization in civilian society” (Birand 1991, 75). Thus, Birand (1991) argues, “He [officers] loses the little tolerance he has when he observes such deficiencies compounded by the question of political responsibility. Because of the difference in education background, his conception of ‘the state’ is very different from that of the civilian. He has a far greater respect for the state and cannot accept the politician’s failure to conform to the rules taught at the Military Academy” (75). While in the Academy, the officer is taught how democracy “should” function, but discovers
once he leaves the barracks that his actual experience with democracy changes as he finds out “….that it takes a long time for society to absorb certain issues, that it is natural for political parties to struggle for power, that it is inevitable for social classes to engage in conflict for a share of the national cake” (Birand 1991, 77). Birand (1991) states that the general conviction of the Armed Forces can be summed up as follows: “what we do, the politicians undo” (75).

Nevertheless, despite their disdain for politicians, the military prefers to not become involved in the day-to-day governing of the country. Traditionally, it has taken action “only when it believed that the machinery of government was unable to cope with critical problems or when it feared a deviation from Kemalist principles….” (Jenkins 2001, 34). Coups were always seen as temporary measures, because “….the Turkish military has learned from experience that, although it can successfully topple a government, none of its interventions to date have been able to install an administration or system capable of ensuring domestic stability or good governance” (Jenkins 2001, 34).

In fact, despite four military interventions, Aydinli (2009) argues, “….there is a distinguishing characteristic of civil-military relations in Turkey that is marked by broad societal support of the military and, ultimately, a widespread view of the military as the ultimate protector of the nation—even, if necessary, against its own political representatives” (585). After experiencing its first taste of multi-party politics, in 1960 there was a growing fear that politicians were becoming totalitarian in pursuing their agenda. Backed by public mass demonstrations of academics, bureaucratic elites, and student leaders, the military stepped in and overthrew Prime Minister Menderes. Moreover, with the country in the midst of “a virtual civil war” between pro-communist groups and right-wing nationalists, “there was an understanding of popular acceptance for a military takeover to restore order, later verified by societal approval of
the militaristic Constitution and of the long-standing ban on former politicians from participating in politics that was instituted in 1980 (Aydinli 2009, 585). The “post-modern” coup of 1997 where Erbakan’s Islamist government was ousted was influenced by a call from NGOs and civil society groups advocating for state intervention against the government. Most recently, in 2007, “the government’s call to place Abdullah Gül, an Islamist sympathizer, in the Turkish presidency was met with broad protests across Turkey, in which slogans such as ‘We have the army’ were among the most flaunted” (Aydinli 2009, 586). In sum, over the last fifty years the Turkish military has implemented two full-blooded coups (1960 and 1980) and twice (1971 and 1997) put pressure on politicians from behind the scenes (Jenkins 2001, 35). What explains this evolution in the military’s relationship with society?

Put simply, there are two factors explaining the new dynamic in the military’s relationship with society: 1. The role of the West, specifically the European Union; and 2. The Paradigmatic Divide of the “Pashas” (Cook 2007; Aydinli 2009). According to Aydinli (2009), “Starting in the 1990s, particularly with the advance of the European Union accession process, but also in the more recent years of relative political stability and strong political leadership, society’s confidence in its politicians has strengthened and signs of growing dissonance in societal expectations from the military have grown” (586-7). In the five years between 1997 and 2002, the EU offered Turkey an invitation to become an applicant for succession. Political scientist Steven Cook (2007) notes, “While the European Union has often been duplicitous in its relations with Turkey,…the requirements for EU membership offer great hope for the consolidation of liberal democracy in Anatolia. The combination of material and political benefits associated with EU membership created a vast constituency in support of the reforms Europe demands” (130).
Consequently, the relationship between the Islamists and the military was affected by Turkey’s EU candidacy. The Islamists, who have railed against the West since they first became active politically in 1969, saw membership in the EU as critical component of Turkish political development (Cook 2007, 131). As Cook (2007) states, “…[T]he promised benefits of EU membership encouraged Gül, Erdogan, and their followers in AK to discard the anti-Western shibboleths of the past and portray themselves as the Islamic analogue to Europe’s Christian Democrats” (131). Effectively, becoming a member of the EU would force the state to deal with the religion issue and move toward a system that guarantees freedom of religion; namely, by having to do away with its laïcité system, which governs the state’s role in religious affairs and places restrictions on various aspects of religious practice (Cook 2007, 131).

Naturally, this placed the Islamists in direct conflict with the military, specifically the General Staff. As part of the Copenhagen criteria for joining the EU, the Turkish military would need to reform its civil-military relationship whereby military officers would defer to politicians and resemble the civil-military relationship inherent in western, liberal democracies. Consequently, Cook (2007) argues:

[T]he military establishment found itself in a decidedly awkward position. If the officers had opted to oppose the EU reform program, it would have exposed their devotion to central Kemalist tenets such as modernization and democracy as a fraud and confirmed what the Islamists had been saying for the better part of the previous decade, that they were the appropriate stewards of a democratic, modern, and secular Turkey (131-2).

Ultimately, the military consented to certain aspects of the EU reforms, because if the Islamists became the agents of modernization in Turkey, “[t]he result would be a significant diminution of the prestige of the officer corps, which would simultaneously enhance that of the civilian leadership, rendering it more difficult for the officers to act autonomously, influence the political
arena, or defend the political order” (Cook 2007, 132). Therefore, since 2002, a divide has begun to emerge between the officer corps of the Turkish army.

Today, there are two groups of “Pashas” in Turkey.5 The first group “…is a traditional conservative majority group that views the Turkish military as the ultimate guard of the status quo—the Republican regime, its territorial integrity, and its political parameters as established at the beginning of the Republic” (Aydinli 2009, 587). The origins of this group derive from the army’s institutional strength at the end of the Ottoman Empire. Today, the conservatives within the military establishment “emphasize Turkish society’s ideological and social fragmentation, and argue that revolutionary and risky moves—foregoing the watchful eye of the guardian army—would be disastrous” (Aydinli 2009, 589). In other words, the army is guarding the state more from challenges within rather than without.

In upholding Kemalism, conservative Turkish army generals “would like to see the transformation that most of them personally went through (from Anatolian boy to elite general) take place in greater society, making Turkey more secular and Western, and more advanced economically and educationally” (Aydinli 2009, 589). Consequently, when the military sees that secularization and modernization are not occurring in large numbers or quickly enough, they conclude that there is a need for more time for that transformation to take place at the national level. For general officers, Aydinli (2009) notes, “Such conservativeness naturally grows because their transformation takes place quickly in a carefully isolated vacuum, but society’s transformation takes place very slowly in an open field, exposed to all kinds of winds and influences both local and international” (589).

The second group “…is a smaller, more progressive group that views the army’s mission as one of guarding the ongoing transformation and modernization of the nation, without stalling

5 Pasha is an honorific title given to all Turkish army officers who reach the rank of General.
this forward movement in the name of protecting the status quo—even if this means change within the army itself and its relationship with politics” (Aydinli 2009, 587). Turkey’s integration with transnational organizations, global markets and the EU, as well as its membership in NATO have greatly influenced the proponents of this view within the officer corps. The progressive’s position is closely associated with Hilmi Özkök, the Turkish Chief of Staff between 2002 and 2006, who sought “….to preserve the essence of Ataturk’s revolutions via forward movement rather than an emphasis on the status quo” (Aydinli 2009, 588). The progressives agree with the conservatives on the need for Turkey to be a modern, Westernized, Europeanized country. Where they differ is in their degree of cautiousness, as described in an apt mutual fund analogy:

….[T]he conservatives in the army represent a more risk-averse, long term investment, while the progressives can be seen as a riskier, speedier, growth fund. The growth fund types feel that the Turkish nation is ready for the completion of the modernization and democratization process, which requires putting its ultimate trust in the political realm, with the army’s job being, at a maximum, one of protecting this transformation in support of the civilian leaders. The risk-averse conservatives remain cautious about the political realm’s capacity to deal on its own with the country’s many problems, and see the need for a continued military presence in politics to guide the nation through a difficult transformation to modernity (Aydinli 2009, 588).

The remainder of this chapter will highlight the domestic and international factors influencing the role of the military in Turkish politics. Today’s divide between conservative and progressive officers is an outcome of the trust Turkish society has for the army’s role as guardian of the state.

**One Party Rule: The Republican People’s Party, 1925-1945**

The Republican People’s Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*, hereafter CHP) was founded by Ataturk and from March 1925, following the promulgation of the Law on the Maintenance of
Order. Turkey’s government became an authoritarian one-party regime (Zürcher 1997, 184). According to Zürcher (1997), “The monolithic political system established after 1925 left very little room for the ventilation of competing ideas within the leadership, and none at all for the expression of social discontent from without” (185-6). Atatürk was careful not to repeat the mistakes of the Young Turks “when party officials compromised orderly public administration by interfering in day-to-day work” (Mango 2006, 26). Thus, the state was in charge of the party. More specifically, the party served the state as “….an instrument of popular mobilization through the dissemination of the ideas and ideals of the modernizers, and also as a weak mechanism of control over the administration—weak because the interior minister and, under him, provincial governors doubled as party leaders” (Mango 2006, 26).

Consequently, the CHP never developed “an independent ideological or organizational ‘personality’”, becoming heavily bureaucratized (Zürcher 1997, 185). By the end of the 1920s, there was increasing favoritism and corruption, a lack of civil liberties, which created widespread resentment of the state (Zürcher 1997, 186). There were parliamentary elections held throughout this era, but were mainly ceremonial, as candidates were chosen by the party. Moreover, the world was in the midst of the Great Depression and social discontent was building throughout Turkey. Thus, the amalgam of French republicanism and Ottoman authoritarianism inherent in the Turkish state allowed for Muslim inhabitants of Turkey to be “….molded into a Turkish nation made up of citizens equal before the law, but manifestly unequal in wealth, educational attainment, lifestyle and access to power” (Mango 2006, 26).

In fact, Atatürk asked his friend, Fethi Okyar, to found a new party, the Free Republican Party. Atatürk was aware of discontent in the population, but the CHP “had no real means of managing this discontent (other than suppressing its expression) since its authoritarian structure
left it without the means of communication with the mass of the population” (Zürcher 1997, 186). So, in an attempt to counter this discontent, Ataturk decided that a new opposition party would serve two purposes: channeling social discontent and shake up the lethargic CHP. Okyar would insist in their discussions that the government allow his party to function and Ataturk would remain impartial. However, the key point to remember is that Ataturk wanted this party to be loyal to his nation-building endeavor, specifically to the ideals of republicanism and secularism (Zürcher 1997, 186).

The Free Republican Party (FRP) was met with widespread enthusiasm advocating a 11-point manifesto calling for a liberal economic policy, and freedom of speech and direct elections. In October 1930, local elections were held and the FRP won 30 of the 512 councils. According to Zürcher (1997), “Even though this was only a small minority of seats, the governing party was surprised and alarmed” (187). After barely a month in existence, the FRP was forced to close its doors, as “the president decided that, irrespective of the wishes of opposition leaders, their parties were bound to become a focus of ‘reaction’, in other words of hostility to his reforms” (Mango 2006, 26).

During this period, there were a number of legal, cultural and educational reforms adopted by Ataturk. These reforms were incorporated in the 1924 & 1937 Constitutions from a number of disparate sources—a civil code from Switzerland, a commercial code from Weimar Germany, and a penal code from Mussolini’s Italy (Birand 1987, 9). Some of the more noteworthy reforms included “laws which banned Ottoman-style clothing (including headgear), the unveiling of women and legislation enabling the formal equality of the sexes as well as the adoption of the Latin Alphabet” (Birand 1987, 9). Put differently, Ataturk was using these
western influences as the basis for his modernization effort, which would later be called Kemalism.

An important tenet of Kemalism “was the strict separation between the political elite and the armed forces” (Birand 1987, 8). Although Ataturk was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, as President of the Republic, he often appeared in civilian dress and a civilian chain-of-command was established. More specifically, there was a Ministry of Defense, which was regarded “as primus inter pares in matters of national security” (Birand 1987, 8). The Minister of Defense was responsible for three army Inspectorates in Ankara, Konya and Erzincan consisting of ten Army corps. An institution called the Supreme War Council was established as an advisory body, chaired by the president and included the Minister of Defense, the three Army Inspectors and the Chief of the General Staff (Hale 1994, 79). The Chief of the General Staff during the founding of Turkey was Fevzi Çakmak. As Hale (1994) notes, “His term as Chief of the General Staff lasted so long—almost twenty-two years—that his name became virtually synonymous with that of the officer, rather like that of J. Edgar Hoover and the directorship of the FBI” (78). Çakmak’s association with Ataturk and İnönü afforded him wide latitude in military affairs principally because his main assets were “his experience and political reliability (or, perhaps, lack of ambition)….” (Hale 1994, 78).

Although, from 1925-1937, tension was building between Ataturk and İnönü. During those twelve years, İnönü served as Turkey’s prime minister and Ataturk withdrew from politics and left the day-to-day running of the country to İnönü (Zürcher 1997, 190). Ataturk then surrounded himself with a small coterie of supporters and friends with whom he discussed the future of the country. Therefore, Ataturk’s isolation from the daily operations of government resulted in “[h]is plans and decisions…becom[ing] increasingly ill-coordinated with those of the
prime minister, Ismet [Inonu]” (Zürcher 1997, 191). Internal, economic and foreign affairs were affected and according to Zürcher (1997), “Twice the president forced a cabinet minister to resign without consulting Ismet. His interference irritated Ismet, who became increasingly wary of what he saw as the president’s kitchen cabinet in Çankaya” (191). The conflict came to a head in September 1937 with Atatürk demanding Inonu’s resignation. Inonu resigned and was replaced by Mahmut Celal Bayar. Atatürk’s behavior, according to Zürcher (1997), can be explained by his deteriorating health:

Apart from two heart attacks in 1923 and 1927, which seem to have left no permanent damage, he was generally healthy until 1937, when the symptoms of advanced cyrrhosis of the liver, due to excessive consumption of alcohol over many years, began to make themselves felt. The illness was officially diagnosed only at the beginning of 1938 and from March onwards his condition started to deteriorate quickly (191).

On November 10, 1938, Atatürk passed away and the next day Inonu was elected by the Grand National Assembly as Turkey’s second president. Inonu’s accession was anything but preordained. Although he was the leading candidate to succeed Atatürk, the “kitchen cabinet” worked hard for his removal. Specifically, Inonu had a number of supporters in the assembly, but the “kitchen cabinet” wanted him appointed ambassador to Washington and were going to engineer new elections (Zürcher 1997, 192). Ultimately, Inonu’s succession was a result of four factors:

1) The refusal of Prime Minister Bayer to cooperate with his adversaries (He was keeping in touch with Inonu throughout this period);
2) Inonu’s adversaries’ inability to come up with a credible candidate;
3) The parliamentary deputies and party bureaucrats were hand-picked by Inonu years earlier; and,
4) The decision of the military to support İnönü and the Chief of the General Staff, Çakmak, did not stand as a candidate, even though his candidacy would have had considerable support in the assembly (Zürcher 1997, 192). At this point, İnönü sought to maintain the policies of Atatürk, but this period was dominated by World War II. Nevertheless, İnönü “was in complete control and his prime ministers…executed the policies determined by the president” (Zürcher 1997, 191).

During World War II, İnönü wanted to maintain Turkish neutrality. Accordingly, upon the Nazis and Soviets signing a nonaggression pact in August 1939, Turkey signed a mutual assistance treaty with Britain and France. Moreover, four days before the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union, Turkey concluded a non-aggression treaty with Nazi Germany (Glazer 1996, 40). Interestingly, Glazer (1996) argues, “….İnönü seems never to have wavered from his position that the Axis powers could not win the war. Despite German pressure, Turkey at no time permitted the passage of Axis troops, ships, or aircraft through or over Turkey and its waters, and the Montreux Convention was scrupulously enforced in the straits. Turkey broke diplomatic relations with Adolf Hitler’s government in August 1944, and, in February 1945, declared war on Germany” (40). In short, İnönü saw the writing on the wall; namely, Germany was going to lose to the Allies and Turkey needed to be on the right side of history in order for Atatürk’s revolution to continue. More specifically, by declaring war on Germany, Turkey was invited to participate in the Conference on International Organization held in San Francisco in April 1945. The result of this conference was the establishment of the United Nations. Turkey became one of the fifty-one original members and İnönü had succeeded in aligning Turkey permanently within the western sphere of influence.
The Transition to Democracy, 1945-50

At the end of World War II, İnönü’s regime “had become deeply unpopular, even hated, among the large majority of the Turkish population” (Zürcher 1997, 215). At this point, a distinction must be made between two distinct aspects of the Turkish population. On the one hand, there is the “the mass of the population” (peasants, the industrial workers) and, on the other hand, there is the Kemalist regime (the officers and bureaucrats, the Muslim traders in the towns and the landowners in the countryside) (Zürcher 1997, 215). Peasants and industrial workers made up approximately 80 percent of the population and were unhappy that there had not been any improvement in their standard of living, while large landowners (who had been an essential element of the Young Turk coalition since World War I), were alienated by two government policies: the Tax on Agricultural Produce and a land distribution bill entitled “Law on giving land to the farmer”. According to Zürcher (1997), “Discontent among the mass of the population was not new and in itself would probably not have led to political change. More immediately important in this respect was the fact that İnönü’s government lost the support of important elements of the ‘Young Turk coalition’ on which the Kemalist movement had been built” (Zürcher 1997, 216). Aware of this discontent, İnönü remembered Atatürk’s experiment with the Free Party in 1930, and allowed the formation of another political party because “….the republic had always had a ‘democratic character’ and had never accepted dictatorship” (Hale 1994, 88).

İnönü’s speech opened the door for four dissident members of the CHP—Celal Bayar, Adnan Menderes, Fuat Köprülü and Refik Koraltan—to demand the withdrawal of government restrictions on the economy and the right to establish an opposition party (Hale 1994, 88). Bayar
and Menderes were the two leaders out of the party’s founders to distinguish themselves. As Hale (1994) notes:

He [Bayar] had been a close colleague of Ataturk, had been the regime’s main architect of economic policy during the inter-war years and had served in several cabinet posts, including that of prime minister between November 1937 and January 1939. Adnan Menderes, who came from a large landowning family in the Aegean region, was still a comparatively unknown backbencher in 1946, but he rapidly established himself as the party’s most popular and effective leader.

On January 7, 1946, these four dissidents established the Democrat Party (DP) as the first serious challenger to the CHP. The DP represented a diverse range of people who resented the CHP’s monopoly of power—“farmers who felt neglected by the regime’s concentration on industrialization, businessmen who hoped to end the dominant role of the state in industry, urban workers and clerks who had suffered severely from wartime inflation, and some religious conservatives who wished to soften the official emphasis on secularism” (Hale 1994, 89).

 Concurrently, the move to multi-party democracy was also influenced by the international community. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey and the Soviet Union had a close relationship; however, the signing of a non-aggression pact (the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact) and Turkish neutrality during World War II soured the relationship (Zürcher 1997, 217). In 1945-6, “Turkey became the victim of an aggressive diplomatic campaign by Stalin, who tried to achieve the old Tsarist dream of a Russian takeover at the Straits, as well as territorial advances in Turkey’s eastern frontier regions” (Hale 1994, 90). In particular, President Harry Truman took notice of Stalin’s foreign policy efforts in Eastern Europe and the U.S. encouraged Turkey to stand up to the Soviets; this reaction forced the Soviets to drop their demands (Zurcher 1997, 218). The U.S. reevaluated the strategic importance of Turkey and on March 12, 1947, President Truman issued the “Truman Doctrine”, which stated that the U.S. “should and would help defend
‘free nations’ whose existence was threatened by foreign pressure or by militant minorities inside their borders” (Zurcher 1997, 218). Shortly thereafter, in June 1947, the Marshall Plan provided financial support to Europe: “to help the Europeans help themselves; to sustain lucrative export markets for U.S. industry; and to eliminate poverty as a breeding ground for communism” (Zurcher 1997, 218). In other words, American political, economic, and military support was contingent upon Turkey’s conformity to political and economic ideals of democracy and free enterprise.

The first general election in the new multi-party system occurred in July 1946. Nevertheless, tension was building between the DP and CHP. The CHP knew of the discontent that the population had for CHP one-party rule and subsequently moved up the election to July 1946 from its original date in 1947. In the end, the CHP won the election with 395 seats to the DP’s 62 seats (Glazer 1996, 41). The vote was rigged. As Zurcher (1997) explains:

The electoral procedures were far from perfect: there was no guarantee of secrecy during the actual voting, there was no impartial supervision of the elections and as soon as the results were declared the actual ballots were destroyed….It has to be remembered that at this time all local and provincial administrators were [CHP] party members, who had great difficulty in discriminating between political opposition and high treason (222). Inonu selected Recep Peker as prime minister and he “tried to intimidate the opposition into conducting itself as junior partner of the government and refraining from the constant attacks it launched against the [CHP]….” (Zurcher 1997, 222). The DP were understandably upset over the outcome of the election and sought to mobilize public opinion in its favor.

By 1947, the CHP and DP conflict came to a head. New complaints were introduced in the assembly almost on a daily basis. The DP and CHP “now started mudslinging campaigns in which they accused each other of being soft on communism” (Zurcher 1997, 223).
point of contention between both sides was the election law, which was one of a number of laws that the DP felt was undemocratic. The DP, according to Zurcher (1997), saw itself as the rightful party to continue what Ataturk had begun. Through the “Freedom Pact”, DP members of parliament were authorized to leave and boycott the national assembly if the government would not withdraw undemocratic laws (223). Not until Inonu stepped in and issued the “Twelfth of July Declaration” were DP and the multi-party electoral process legitimized. As a result, Peker was forced to resign and was replaced by a more liberal cabinet of Hasan Saka (Zurcher 1997, 224). Therefore, with the path now cleared for multi-party politics, the elections held in May 1950 resulted in a landslide win for the Democrat Party.

At this point, it is important to ask: Why did the military not intervene in the dispute between the CHP and DP? Hale (1994) argues, “On the central issue of the time—the transition to a multi-party system—army opinions were divided. While many officers were evidently worried by the demise of the single-party state, with which they had grown up, there were others who were determined to see that liberalization was not abandoned” (91-2). In the summer of 1946 there were two groups of officers who formed, one led by Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek and the other by Major Cemal Yildirim. Both groups were fearful that the 1950 elections would be rigged against the Democrats and said they would force the regime to hold new elections. In fact, Yildirim’s group, needing a serving general to give his group of officers credibility and authority within the army, reached out to General Fahri Belen, the Army Corps Commander in Gallipoli. Belen met with Bayar to assure him that if the government were to rig the elections then the army would oppose it (Hale 1994, 92). In fact, these juntas were not in positions of influence within the army to influence the political debate at the time, because shortly after the election both resigned from the army to run as Democrat Party candidates. Their loyalty to the
Democrats was subsequently rewarded; Belen was appointed Minister of Public Works and Kurtbek became Minister of Transport (Hale 1994, 92). Moreover, one officer who was in a position of influence was the Chief of the General Staff, General Abdürrahman Gürman, who told the DP leaders that the army would respect the election results.

*The Democrat Government and the Army, 1950-1960*

Once the DP was sworn in, on June 6, 1950, the Chief of the General Staff, the commanders of the army, navy, and air force, and a number of other generals were all purged. According to Hale (1994), “Whether this purge was designed to head off a coup by anti-Democrat officers, as had apparently been reported, or as a matter of principle is unclear. Its effect, certainly, was to continue the Ataturk tradition that the army should be loyal to the civilian regime—at least so far as its top commanders were concerned” (93). To this end, the CHP began legislative changes between 1946 and 1950 to the electoral law to disenfranchise all officers, soldiers and cadets. The status of the Chief of the General Staff was also changed in 1949 making the Chief of Staff responsible to the Ministry of Defense rather than the prime minister with the Defense Minister able to advise the prime minister on the selection of the Chief of Staff. With Inonu in charge, this new legislation “…probably made little practical difference to the army’s political situation, since most of the military chiefs, as well as the middle-ranking officers, probably felt an overriding personal loyalty to head of state, as Ataturk’s old comrade-in-arms” (Hale 1994, 93-4). However, after the Democrat victory, there was a feeling among the commanders that their status had been downgraded, which created a general malaise within the army (Hale 1994, 93-4).

The DP era “began in a spirit of optimism and with great expectations” as President Bayar and Prime Minister Menderes focused all their efforts on economic development (Aksin
Menderes’ economic policy attempted to reduce the influence of the state and instead encouraged private enterprise and foreign investment in industrial development. The prices of raw material and agricultural produce rose with an increase in arable land. Through funds from the U.S. an extensive motorway system was created opening up markets like never before; national income increased by 40 percent (Aksin 2007, 253; Hale 1994, 94). Moreover, Turkey’s participation in the Korean War boosted the military’s self-esteem. In February 1952, Turkey joined NATO and younger officers “….began to travel more widely, to become familiar with new technology and to contrast the equipment and methodologies used by foreign militaries with those used by their own forces….” (Jenkins 2001, 35). Once in power, the DP’s popularity was rising. Although, similar to democracies everywhere, electoral promises soon met up with the realities of governance.

Opposition to the DP gained momentum in 1954 as economic indicators turned against the government as “economic growth slowed to a crawl, while both the inflation rate and the balance-of-payments deficit rose rapidly” (Hale 1994, 94). Menderes reaction to the growing discontent was political repression. The DP’s “earlier democratic rhetoric of the ‘unconditional sovereignty of the nation’—as enshrined in the 1924 Constitution—gave way to a de facto ‘authoritarianism of the majority’ which was periodically confirmed in dubiously conducted elections” (Birand 1987, 10). In effect, Professor Sina Aksin (2007) argues, “….[T]here was a sense of unease and vexation emanating from the DP and more specifically from Menderes and Bayar. Possibly they felt their position was insecure, although the 1954 elections resulted in an even greater victory for the DP than those held in 1950. For this reason, some historians have concluded that Bayar and Menderes suffered from ‘Inonu phobia’, i.e. fear of Inonu’s prestige” (254).
Consequently, the DP implemented a number of laws to counter the influence of the CHP. First, as the 1954 elections approached, journalists came under the purview of a law imposing heavy penalties for openly criticizing the government, which included imprisonment. Second, in 1955, the DP invoked the National Protection law “instituting police and judicial measures, price controls and rationing”; effectively, this meant that government officials who had served twenty-five years could be relieved of their duties “when necessary” and sent into retirement (Aksin 2007, 255). Third, academic freedom was restricted. Each of these laws were taken against groups in society who the DP felt were loyal to Inonu and the RPP. As such, “[w]hile the DP, almost from its inception, had been a broad coalition, with supporters in every conceivable section of society, parts of the coalition gradually became estranged from the party over its authoritarian policies vis-à-vis the press, the universities and the judiciary” (Zurcher 1997, 241).

At this point, Turkey was also faced with the issue of Cyprus. Greece had been suing for control of Cyprus, a British colony, and Turkey also made its own claim. According to Aksin (2007), “Turkey had initially laid claim to the whole of Cyprus (with the slogan ‘Cyprus is Turkish and will stay Turkish’), but after reassessment it was decided that this was unrealistic and a new demand arose for the island to be partitioned between Greece and Turkey (the new slogan being ‘Partition or death!’) (256-7). Subsequently, the Greek Cypriots staged demonstrations and conducted terrorist acts on Cyprus and in Istanbul Turks attacked thousands of Greek houses, businesses, churches and cemeteries were attacked, pillaged and destroyed. Aksin (2007) notes:

Because these incidents had taken place simultaneously, the suspicion arose that they had been premeditated. At first the police did not interfere, but later they were helpless to stop the violence. The incidents were finally brought to a
halt…by army intervention. Martial law was declared, and because the outbreak was construed as a communist plot many leftists were arrested and were only able to prove their innocence after being held in prison for many months (256).

In fact, it would be discovered later that the DP had utilized these disturbances for its own gain. Menderes and his foreign minister, Fatin Rüştü Zorlu, “decided to have a limited ‘spontaneous’ demonstration by students in Istanbul staged to demonstrate public feeling on the Cyprus issue in Turkey, but the demonstrations got completely out of hand and developed into a pogrom against Greek businesses” forcing the implementation of marital law (Zurcher 1997, 242).

By the 1957 elections, the DP was confronting increased opposition among “city-dwellers and the more educated”, a worsening economic crisis, and “sometimes resorted to an appeal to religious sentiments, describing the Republicans as communists and unbelievers and boasting about the number of mosques an religious schools opened under the Democrats” (Zurcher 1997, 243). Dissent was so great within the DP that the liberal wing of the party was protesting the press law against journalists. Consequently, the liberal wing, under the leadership of Fevzi Lütfi Karaosmanoglu, broke away from the DP and formed the Hürriyet Partisi (Freedom Party). According to Zurcher (1997), “The Freedom Party seems to have had the support of big business, which by now wanted a more sophisticated economic policy with a degree of planning which Menderes would not provide” (242). The DP won the 1957 election, but lost seats to the opposition—the CHP, the Republican National Party, and the Freedom party. Nevertheless, criticism continued unabated against the Menderes government.

In 1958, the DP government was forced to accept the conditions set forth by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. Specifically, measures were implemented to increase the value of the Turkish lira vis-à-vis the U.S. dollar, as well as expanding the sphere of state-owned enterprises, and ending the National Protection measures
(Aksin 2007, 257). Ultimately, the acceptance of the IMF stabilization program led to $359 million in aid sent to Turkey (Zurcher 1997, 251). In the fall of 1958, the DP adopted a new series of repressive measures. The DP government “seemed to have come to a point where it could no longer bear the idea of opposition leaders circulating freely throughout the country” (Askin 2007, 261).

The spring of 1960 witnessed tensions between the DP and the opposition, particularly the CHP, reach its zenith. The DP accused the CHP of “plotting armed insurgency against the government’ and certain organs of the press supporting these plots by publishing false and distorted news reports” (Aksin 2007, 262). Consequently, the DP formed the Investigation Commission, consisting of fifteen members, all of whom were from the DP, and the TGNA granted the Commission extraordinary power to “suppress any published material, to close down printing offices and periodicals, to take precautions and make decisions concerning all political activities for the furtherance of the investigation and, in order for it to realize this aim, to make use of all the agencies of the state” (Aksin 2007, 263). There were a number of newspapers that defied the prohibition against publishing by continuing to publish Inonu’s speeches. One speech of note by Inonu, presaging future events, stated, “It is a dangerous undertaking to deflect this democratic regime from its true course, turning it into a regime of oppression. If you persist on this path, even I will not be able to save you…When conditions demand it, revolution is the lawful right of nations.” (Aksin 2007, 263). At this point, demonstrations by university students at the University of Istanbul on April 28, 1960 forced the DP government to impose martial law and suspend classes. The army took notice and forced senior commanders “to decide whether they were prepared to bail Menderes out and, if not, what alternative action they could take” (Hale 1994, 107).
The 1960 Coup & Interim Rule, 1960-1

On May 27, 1960, the DP government was overthrown and its leaders arrested in a military coup led by a group of middle-ranking officers who had opposed the Democrat regime for some time and were convinced that Menderes was undermining Kemalism. The officers’ junta was known as the National Unity Committee (NUC) and was led by General Cemal Gürsel. The NUC would rule Turkey from 1960-1 and was beset with divisions between “those officers—mostly at the upper end of the age/rank scale—who favored a return to elected civilian government, and a group of younger radicals, who wished to set up a long-term authoritarian reformist regime” (Hale 1991, x). This section will explore the conflict between both groups of officers to highlight how the first group won the debate and saw the Turkish army return to the barracks in 1961 because of its strong sense of professionalism and the conviction that a long-term involvement in politics would harm the army’s homogeneity (Birand 1991).

The origins of the NUC date back to 1955. Two young officers who were studying at the Staff College in Istanbul, Dündar Seyhan and Faruk Güventürk, and were upset about army policies and initially sought reforms within the army. By 1956, their group had fourteen members and called themselves “the Committee” (Hale 1994, 100). Meanwhile, in Ankara two additional groups of young officers formed; the first included then Majors Osman Köksal, Sezi O’kan and Talat Aydemir, and the second around Majors Sadi Kocas and Kenan Esengin. In 1957, Aydemir, O’kan and Adnan Celikoglu, were assigned to the Command School at the Staff College where they met Seyhan. Shortly thereafter the two groups merged and “….they decided to restrict their central organization to twenty-five members….with] [a]dditional…members recruited on a cell basis, so as to restrict the potential damage if any part of the network were uncovered” (101). At this point, there was a disagreement between the officers on the basic aims
of the organization. Aydemir and Seyhan, who were considered radicals, were advocating an immediate revolution, while the others saw a coup as a last resort and instead preferred the idea of promoting reforms from within the army first (Hale 1994, 101).

With their training at the Staff College completed, the officers dispersed to assignments throughout Turkey. Aydemir then recruited Colonel Alparslan Türkes. There was still conflict between both groups over when and whether to proceed. Two members of the group, Captain Suphi Gürsoytrak and Güventürk, attempted to recruit Inonu, but “[t]he veteran [CHP] leader had no desire to give Menderes any excuse for closing down his party, and bluntly told the conspirators not to make any contacts with it [the CHP]” (Hale 1994, 101). In fact, Güventürk also sought out Semi Ergin of the DP who was serving as Menderes’ Defense Minister and asked him “to be ‘the leader of the revolution’, dramatically proclaiming, ‘I have a pistol—it is at your orders’” (Hale 1994, 101). Ergin turned down the offer, but was later arrested after one of the officers leaked information about the plan to a senior officer. This resulted in a major setback for the Committee with the arrest of nine officers. Hale (1994) argues that the “Nine Officers Incident” had two important effects: “In the first place, they may have convinced Adnan Menderes that the dissident officers had all been rooted out and that there was not further danger of a coup. More obviously, the arrests also forced the conspirators to retire, regroup and then proceed more cautiously than they had before 1958” (102).

Another officer, Sadi Koças, was more successful in his recruitment efforts. He realized that he would need at least one senior general to act as the formal leader of the group to get the support of the majority of army officers. Therefore, Koças approached the new commander of the Turkish Land Forces, General Cemal Gürsel, who “seemed to be the ideal candidate: he was well liked in the army, where he had acquired the nickname ‘gentleman Cemal’…and was
known to be critical of the Democrat government’s policies” (Hale 1994, 102-3). Gürsel agreed to lead, but he warned that the coup should only be attempted as a last resort.

Now that a supportive general officer was secured, Koças next step was to reconstitute the Committee and secure appointments for its members in key points throughout the army. To this end, fortune struck the group with Gürsel’s appointment of Osman Köksal, one of the original Aydemir group members, as the Head of the Personnel Section of the General Staff, where “he could exercise critical influence over all other appointments” (Hale 1994, 103). Next, a new twelve man Central Committee was established and ten junior officers were recruited from the First Army in Istanbul. This was important and overcame a major problem faced by potential coup-makers in Turkey, because “….Istanbul is still the country’s biggest city, and a successful putsch thus depends on close collaboration between the main strike force in Ankara and collaborators in Istanbul” (Hale 1994, 104).

However, the Committee’s reestablishment notwithstanding, serious conflict began anew. This time, the conflict was between Türkes and more liberal officers within the Committee. In effect, the disagreements were over governance; specifically, who would rule and what role the army would have in politics?:

A radical group around Alparslan Turkes urged that once Menderes was overthrown Turkey would need a prolonged period of military rule. His argument was that Turkey was still a backward country, that Atatürk’s revolution was still uncompleted and that the country’s social and economic problems could only be solved by a radical regime which was not answerable to a conservative peasant electorate. Against this, the more liberal officers argued that what Turkes was proposing would be nothing short of a totalitarian military dictatorship. Their main complaint against Menderes was that he was trying to set himself up as a sort of civilian dictator, so they could hardly accept the idea of replacing his regime with another type of autocracy. However, the liberals were themselves
deeply divided. Some thought that they should simply remove Menderes and hand over power to the Republican People’s Party. Others favored the idea of an interim period of military rule, during which a new constitution could be drawn-up, elections held and power transferred to the winning party, whichever that might be (Hale 1994, 104).

Unfortunately, this conflict over the groups’ aims would ultimately affect the military government after the coup.

By this point, throughout 1959 and into 1960, demonstrations were erupting in Istanbul and Ankara. Students were clashing with police and the army was called in to help quell the protests. The army, however, was not necessarily willing to support Menderes. On April 2, 1960, Inonu was visiting Kayseri for an RPP rally and on orders from Menderes the governor of the province stopped Inonu’s train at the provincial border. What happens next highlights the extent to which Menderes “was prepared to go to chain down the opposition, but also indicated that he might not be able to count on the support of the army, if he needed it” (Hale 1994, 105).

As Hale (1994) recounts:

In a three-hour confrontation at a wayside station, the old general insisted on his right to free passage; eventually, the governor backed down and allowed his train through. The next day, as Inonu was returning to Ankara by car…he was again stopped at a roadblock not far from Kayseri. Inonu resolutely stepped out of his car and walked through the barricade, to the salutes of the soldiers….Inonu himself was not above encouraging this attitude on the part of the army. The [CHP’s] newspaper, Ulus,…quoted him as telling the commander of the gendarmerie at the Kayserie roadblock, ‘the order is illegitimate. The governor of Usak ordered civil servants like yourselves to kill me. They were honorable and patriotic officers and they did not obey the order’” (105).

In effect, this incident was the first of a number of violent confrontations occurring along Inonu’s route throughout the countryside. Menderes used the incidences of violence to suspend all
political activity, impose martial law, and establish a “Committee to Investigate the Activities of the Republican People’s Party and a Section of the Press” which would have “draconian powers of search and arrest” (Glazer 1996, 42; Hale 1994, 106). These developments, ultimately, forced the coup conspirators to move their plan forward.

On May 3, 1960, Gürsel retired from the army and wrote letters to A. Menderes and Bayar suggesting that they resign and the Investigating Committee’s activities cease. Gürsel’s departure forced the conspirators (the junior officers, at this point) to find another leader for the coup. After careful consideration, the conspirators successfully recruited Major General Cemal Madanoglu, head of the logistics branch of the army high command, as well as Brigadier General Sitki Ulay, the commander of the War College in Ankara and Brigadier General Irfan Bastug, assistant chief of personnel in the General Staff. Of these three new recruits, Hale (1994) argues, “Mandanoglu was the most politically ambitious, and seems to have been the most active in planning the operational details of the takeover. At the same time, the generals were still heavily dependent on the cooperation of their junior colleagues, on whom the revolutionary network and most of their planning depended” (108).

Despite the addition of these few senior officers, there was not complete agreement in the army’s ranks that a coup was necessary. The Chief of the General Staff Rüstü Erdelhun opposed intervention against Menderes and the views of the Force Commanders (other than Gürsel) were unknown (Hale 1994, 108). At this point, in Ankara, the conspirators “knew they would face the opposition of the martial law commander, but could count on the support of some essential units—notably the 28th Division, which was stationed in the capital, a cavalry regiment and a tank battalion, besides the Military College and the Guards Battalion at the General Staff”; while, in Istanbul, “the conspirators had sufficient support in the First Army and the Martial Law
Command to be reasonably confident of being able to take over the city” (Hale 1994, 108-9). The conspirators set the morning of May 27, 1960 as the day. All principal government and communication buildings were captured without resistance. As Hale (1994) recounts:

In Ankara, the city was swiftly taken over, and Bayar, Erdelhun and other leading supporters of the regime were arrested….Later on the same morning, Menderes left Eskisehir for the city of Kütahya. He was followed from the air, and taken into custody in Kütahya by Colonel Muhsin Batur of the air force, to be sent back to Ankara. Meanwhile, Gürsel returned from Izmir to the capital, to suddenly find himself the leader of the revolution (110).

Upon assuming control, Gürsel and the National Unity Committee appointed a cabinet consisting of five officers and thirteen civilians (later reduced to three) to act as an executive body (Glazer 1996, 42). In fact, Gürsel envisioned the NUC only as a temporary military regime that would establish a new constitution, hold elections and hand over power within three months (Hale 1994, 113). Within the next few weeks the generals would discover that this task would not be as easy as once thought, because Gürsel’s retirement put him out of the loop as far the May 3-27th planning phase was concerned. Essentially, the conspirators had no agreed program of action for the post-coup period (Hale 1994, 113). Consequently, according to Hale (1994), the coup:

had been initiated by relatively junior officers, who naturally expected that they would be given a share of power in whatever regime was established. To carry the rest of the army with them, they had been obliged to recruit several senior commanders. However, the generals were anxious to avoid any dispersal of power, which could do serious damage to the hierarchical command structure of the army. To allow relatively junior officers to share power with the generals could, they feared, undermine the pyramid of authority which any army needs if it is to carry out its professional military functions (112-3).
Put simply, Gürsel, out of touch with the junior officers, was unaware that the younger officers’ ideas “were vague and only half-digested” with “….the far more ambitious aim of seizing the opportunity for radical, social, economic and political reforms” (Hale 1994, 121).

The first few months with the NUC in power was a time of conflict between the NUC and the remaining politicians of the DP and CHP. President Bayar, Prime Minister Menderes, and most of the DP representatives in the TGNA were arrested and charged with “abrogating the constitution and instituting a dictatorship” (Glazer 1996, 42). The NUC then spent the next few months purging members of the armed forces (35,000 officers) to restore the pyramid structure of the ranks (Hale 1994, 125). One of the more pressing problems faced by the NUC was the economy. According to Glazer (1996), “The ousted regime had been responsible for inflation and heavy debt, and emergency austerity measures had to be taken to stabilize the economy. An economic planning agency, the State Planning Organization, was established to study social and economic conditions and to draw up the country’s five-year development plans” (43). Most importantly a constituent assembly was created in January 1961 and produced a new constitution. As Birand (1987) notes, “Out of an alliance of the secular intelligentsia, ‘Kemalist’ civil servants, the … [CHP] politicians and a pliable military junta comprised mainly middle-ranking officers, there emerged a new and remarkably liberal constitution prepared by a Constitutive Assembly dominated by the [CHP]” (11).

The constitution created Turkey’s Second Republic underpinned by the principles of Kemalism. A number of reforms were undertaken. In particular, the TGNA was divided into a bicameral body with the same powers as elaborated in the 1924 constitution with multipartyism institutionalized (Cook 2007, 98). Further, the judiciary was tasked with overseeing elections through a body called the Supreme Election Board. Most importantly, according to Cook
the constitution of 1961 established a Constitutional Court with the power of judicial review—a critical check in the balance of power between the different branches of government” (98). As discussed above, the Menderes government was moving Turkey away from the Kemalist principles as established by Ataturk and the CHP. Thus, the 1961 Constitution was “intended to limit the potential power of any political formation that might, like the Democrats, endeavor to alter the way in which state resources were distributed and/or offer a seemingly viable counter-narrative to Kemalism” (Cook 2007, 101). Ultimately, the constitution was approved by sixty percent of the Turkish electorate (Glazer 1996, 43).

Scholars (Hale 1994; Zurcher 1997) have identified the creation of the Constituent Assembly and the 1961 Constitution as the beginning of the military’s effort to return political power to civilians. This process, though, Hale (1994) notes, “….opened up the first really serious internal crisis in the NUC’s career, and ended with the expulsion of Alparslan Turkes and thirteen other radicals from the committee on 13 November 1960” (131). The source of the crisis within the NUC, boiled down, was a continuation of the rivalry between the junior officers and the generals and the speed at which the return to democracy was being carried out, as well as the extent to which the NUC would involve itself in purely military matters (Zurcher 1997, 256).

To prevent further action by the junior officers, senior officers founded the Armed Forces Union (hereafter AFU). The AFU “interfered in politics repeatedly during 1961 and 1962 with memoranda warning the civilian politicians not to return to the politics of before 27 May. They did this in order to keep the initiative and forestall independent action by radical officers who opposed a return to civilian politics” (Zurcher 1997, 256). Gürsel and Madanoglu decided to expel “The Fourteen” and sent them each a letter stating that the NUC had been dissolved, retiring them from the armed forces, and stationing them overseas to Turkish embassies. The
NUC was then reestablished with the remaining twenty-three members. Thus, the purge “‘cleared the road toward early elections, but it did not resolve the fundamental conflict within the armed forces on the future role of the military in the Turkish political system’” (Hale 1994, 136).

Accordingly, throughout the next few years (1961-3), there were repeated rumors of unrest and plotting within the Turkish armed forces, but the democratic transition still went forward. The NUC executed Menderes and shut down the DP. There was debate about whether the execution of Menderes was justified. Hale (1994) contends the NUC “…was under strong pressure from the AFU to confirm the sentences….In fact, it seems likely that two factors impelled the majority of the committee to take the decision they did. Firstly, there was a danger of serious unrest in the army, especially from the middle ranks of the AFU, if Menderes were not executed. Secondly, if he were merely imprisoned or sent into exile, there was always the possibility that he would eventually make a triumphant return to the political stage…” (145). In short, by executing Menderes, the NUC could forestall a return to politics by Menderes and retribution against the NUC officers.

Elections held on October 15 would bring further challenges to the NUC. The CHP failed to win a majority of seats, winning 173 of the 450 seats in the lower House of Representatives and thirty-six in the Senate. A new party, the Justice Party, led by General Gümüşpala, representing the interests of DP supporters, came in second winning 158 seats in the House and won a majority of seats (70) in the Senate (Hale 1994, 145). According to Zürcher (1997), “Parts of the army wanted to intervene after the disappointing election result…but the army’s most senior officers and the AFU prevented it” (261). The AFU, specifically the hawks led by Aydemir, “decided that the results had ‘not completely realized the national will’ (which
presumably meant their own will) and that they would have to intervene” (Hale 1994, 145).

Consequently, seven generals, four admirals and twenty-seven colonels met in Istanbul to sign the 21 October Protocol. This protocol was “the manifesto of a coup which was otherwise unprepared”, which meant that “the authors of the protocol only seem to have had the vaguest idea of what sort of regime they wanted to install” (Hale 1994, 146).

Ultimately, the protocol called for the annulment of the election results with new elections to be held at the end of October. According to Hale (1994), “The top commanders, like the NUC, were on the horns of a dilemma. On the one hand, they wished to prevent Menderes’s supporters from taking over power outright. On the other hand, they realized that the abrupt annulment of the election results, as demanded in the protocol, would leave them in an untenable position, both domestically and internationally” (146). Subsequently, negotiations began between the JP and CHP to form a coalition government. Gümüspala and Inonu agreed that Inonu would become prime minister and both would support Gürsel as president. On November 29, 1961, Inonu’s government was sworn in and the NUC was dissolved (Hale 1994, 147).

Inonu’s government, however, was in a very untenable situation. Internal strife continued within the JP and the military. Gümüspala, as a former general, was encouraged by the previous military regime to head the party, since his stature as a general could keep extremists elements within the party in line. In reality, “….within his party there were many unrepentant supporters of the old Democrat Party, who were bent on undoing the 27 May coup—in particular, by achieving an amnesty for those ex-Democrats who had been convicted, but not executed after the Yassiada trials” (Hale 1994, 153). For the military, a majority of the senior commanders were in agreement with Chief of the General Staff Sunay, who believed that
another coup would not be justified. Their main concern would be to prevent the junior officers from subverting the normal chain-of-command (Hale 1994, 154).

One junior officer of note was Aydemir, who was now the commandant of the Military Academy. The Academy’s junior officers were major supporters of the May 27th coup. Aydemir and the radicals, which included fifty-nine junior and mid-ranking officers (colonel and above), met on February 9, 1962 to discuss a new protocol (Hale 1994, 155). In effect, they were arguing that the government, which emerged from the May 27th coup, “was not sufficiently ‘revolutionary’” (Aksin 2007, 269). Consequently, Aydemir and his co-conspirators would attempt two coups, the first on February 22, 1962 and the second on May 20, 1963. Both coups were put down by senior officers in the chain of command with the help of Inönü. As Hale (1994) argues, “The top commanders opposed the idea of a second coup and the bulk of the army remained loyal to them. The fact that Inonu, an honored old soldier, headed the government, helped to secure the loyalty of the majority of officers and to ensure that, as on previous occasions, the generals carried the day over the rebel colonels” (160).

Not deterred by the events of February 22nd, Aydemir continued his protests against the government. He even boasted to foreign journalists that he would launch another coup and issued lists of those whom he would appoint as ministers (Hale 1994, 164). For the next year, Aydemir would meet with a variety of different military officers with negotiations being carried out among a number of disparate conspirators. At this point, disagreements formed with former allies, such as Türkes. A group consisting of Kabibay, Erkanli, Syhan, Unsalan, and Mentes decided to launch a coup before the next elections in 1965 and would exclude both Aydemir and Türkes from their plans. When Aydemir found out about this plot he decided to organize his own coup attempt to preempt his rivals (Hale 1994, 166). Aydemir’s behavior is best summed
up by his namesake, the writer Sevket Sureyya Aydemir, “[H]e was ‘not just a revolutionary, but
an addict of revolutions’, convinced that he had been robbed of his rightful share of power by the
chance of his absence abroad on 27 May 1960” (Hale 1994, 167). On the second occasion, Aydemir’s sole support came from the cadets of the Ankara Military Academy (Hale 1991, x). Therefore, Aydemir did not have the requisite support to execute the coup, as members of the
army subverted Aydemir’s radio proclamations and the government, warned about the
impending coup by Turkes, took to the airwaves to reassure citizens that the armed forces were
still under control of the Turkish government (Hale 1994, 168).

After 1963, the generals and politicians settled into a period of cohabitation that lasted
until 1971. Despite the two coup attempts, multi-party politics moved forward, albeit with
continued shaky coalitions. In October 1965, the JP won a landslide victory under new leader
Suleyman Demirel, who became prime minister. Demirel was a self-made man from a small
village in the province of Isparta and his emergence on the scene symbolized the emergence of a
new elite in Turkey. As Zurcher (1997) notes, “The DP had managed to capture the vote in the
more developed parts of the countryside, but it had its origins in a split within the
Unionist/Kemalist elite, which had, it is true, always coopted members of the traditional
landowning elite, but was itself city-based. The JP by contrast was a party in which, and through
which, self-made men from the countryside and from the smaller (but fast-growing) provincial
towns became a dominant force” (263).

The mid- & late 1960s in Turkey saw an increase in both economic growth and the
average income of Turkish citizens by an average of twenty percent (Zurcher 1997, 263). For
many Turks, Demirel “was an orator[] who could speak the language of the mass of the people—
something Inonu and the other Kemalist political leaders, or for that matter socialists such as
Aybar, had never been able to do” (Zurcher 1997, 263). Owing to this popularity, Demirel sought to reconcile with the army. One of the first issues on the table was the issue of limited amnesty for the former Democrat leaders. Commander of the Land Forces, General Cemal Tural wrote a letter to the Defense Minister, Ahmet Topaloglu, adamantly opposing amnesty. Demirel stated that the decision on amnesty rested with the TGNA not with the army. After discussions between President Gürsel and three former members of the NUC, the army decided it would not intervene further and parliamentary procedures should run their course. Accordingly, an amnesty bill was passed pardoning over 20,000 people including Bayar (Hale 1994, 172-3).

A second step on the road to reconciliation between the army and government occurred on March 1966 when Gürsel became ill after suffering several strokes and resigned the presidency (Hale 1994, 173). At this point, his successor was to be chosen by the TGNA in an election, but the election never occurred. Instead, the TGNA accepted the army’s choice, Cevdet Sunay, the Chief of the General Staff. Sunay retired from the army and was elected to the TGNA. He won the required two-thirds majority over his only competitor, Alparslan Türkes, with Cemal Tural becoming Chief of the General Staff (Hale 1994, 173). Sunay’s presidency was important for civilian-military rapprochement, according to Hale (1994), “since it gave the army a recognized voice at the top of the political establishment and inclined both sides towards preservation of the status quo” (173). For Demirel, Hale (1994) continues, “Not only did it [the rapprochement] help to stabilize his relations with the armed forces, it also meant that the NSC could act as a sort of substitute cabinet, which could bypass the normal constitutional machinery and thus, it is alleged, overcome opposition from his party colleagues” (173-4). In effect, Demirel was trying to appeal to two constituencies—Democrat supporters whom the JP needed
to stay in office and the army—a position that was not sustainable, as the events of 1968-1971 will demonstrate.

Before discussing the events of 1968-1971, a third step in civil-military reconciliation during the 1960s concerned economics. Specifically, throughout the 1960s, the government “was anxious to ensure that army officers received good pay and conditions, so that some of the economic discontents which had fuelled the coup of 27 May would be removed” (Hale 1994, 174). Accordingly, Demirel encouraged private enterprise to rival the state sector. The army participated in this process through the establishment of the Armed Forces Mutual Assistance Fund (or OYAK) by the NUC. OYAK took ten percent of salaries from serving military officers and civilian employees of the Ministry of Defense, deposited the funds into OYAK, and then invested the money into various enterprises. The proceeds were used to provide benefits to subscribers, which included pensions, low-cost mortgages, and subsidized consumer goods (Hale 1994, 174). The presence of OYAK, Hale (1994) argues, allows “the armed forces...[to] becom[e] conservative supporters of the capitalist system which Demirel and his party espoused....[Also], among most of the senior officers, there was now a degree of acceptance of the economic status quo which had been absent during the 1950s” (175).

Despite the efforts mentioned above, Demirel would face repeated opposition from a number of different sources. According to Glazer (1996), “He was opposed on some issues and prodded on others by a traditionalist wing that was socially conservative, more agrarian in its orientation, and had ties to the Islamic movement” (45). Consequently, Demirel tried to emphasize the Islamic character of his party and its stand for traditional values, as well as continuing to attack parties on the left with anti-communist propaganda (Zurcher 1997, 264). In contrast, the CHP, under its new leader, Bülent Ecevit, sought to identify the CHP as a left-of-
center party similar to social democrats in Western Europe (Zurcher 1997, 265). The CHP party platform “favored state-directed investment over private investment and recommended limits on foreign participation in the Turkish economy” (Glazer 1996, 45). Glazer (1996) notes, “As a party leader, Ecevit attempted to transform the CHP from an elitist party seeking to guide the nation from above into a mass movement involving a broadly based constituency in the political process. Ecevit’s socialist rhetoric was compatible with the Kemalist principles of state direction of the economy, but the shift to the left…caused dissention in the party (46).

In 1967, dissension within the CHP resulted in sixty-seven party members leaving the party as well as the rise of extreme left and extreme right parties. Ideologically, during the 1960s, the extreme left in Turkey represented a small number of trade unionists and leftist intellectuals who were a part of the Turkish Workers’ Party (TWP). Its platform “called for the redistribution of land, nationalization of industry and financial institutions, and the expansion of foreign capital, and urged closer cooperation with the Soviet Union” (Glazer 1996, 46). On the extreme right was the Republican Peasants’ Nation Party led by Türkes (changing its name in 1969 to the Nationalist Action Party, hereafter MHP). The MHP “demanded strong state action to maintain order and manage the economy. Although sympathetic to private ownership, the party was hostile toward capitalism and foreign investment” (Glazer 1996, 46). More importantly, Türkes incorporated Islam as part of his ultra-nationalist platform; this was an attempt to garner votes, but Türkes also formed a youth organization called the “Grey Wolves”. After receiving paramilitary training the Grey Wolves ran an intimidation campaign against leftist students, teachers, publicists, booksellers, and, finally, politicians, with the expressed mission “to conquer the streets (and the campuses) on the left” (Zurcher 1997, 270). One other conservative party of note was Professor Necmettin Erbakan’s National Order Party (NOP). The
NOP believed that the JP had moved away from Islam and was an instrument of freemasons and Zionists. Ultimately, the appearance of these extreme political parties on the fringes of the Turkish political spectrum would incite conflict between politicians and the army necessitating the army’s intervention once again into politics in March 1971.

1971 Coup by Memorandum

Beginning in February 1968 on a university campus in Ankara and continuing off-and-on throughout 1968, 1969, and 1970, the civil unrest and clashes between armed militants of the left and the right continued unabated with bombings, robberies, and kidnappings. According to Glazer (1996), “Unrest was fueled in part by economic distress, perceptions of social inequalities, and the slowness of reform, but protest was increasingly directed at Turkey’s military and economic ties to the West” (49). After the 1969 elections, the presence of the extreme parties resulted in Demirel’s government losing its parliamentary majority. Effectively, by 1970, there was a crisis of governance; namely, the JP complained that the country was ungovernable due to the 1961 Constitution and the CHP accused the Demirel government “of reneging on the principles of social justice and reform enshrined in the same constitution” (Birand 1987, 12).

Consequently, on March 12, 1971, the Turkish Armed Forces intervened to overthrow the Demirel government. Effectively, the Chiefs of the Land Forces, Navy, Air Force and the Chief of Staff Memduh Tagmac laid out their reasons for the coup in a three-point memorandum:

1. The Parliament and the Government, through their sustained policies, views and actions, have driven our country into anarchy, fratricidal strife, and social and economic unrest. They have caused the public to lose all hope of rising to the level of contemporary civilization which was set for us by Ataturk as a goal, and have failed to realize the reforms stipulated by the Constitution. The future of the Turkish Republic is therefore, seriously threatened.
2. The assessment by the Parliament, in a spirit above partisan considerations, of the solutions needed to eliminate the concern and disillusionment of the Turkish Armed Forces, which have sprung from the bosom of the Turkish nation over this grave situation; and the formation, within the context of democratic principles, of a strong and credible government, which will neutralize the current anarchical situation and which, inspired by Ataturk’s views, will implement the reformist laws envisaged by the Constitution, are considered essential.

3. Unless this is done quickly, the Turkish Armed Forces are determined to take over the administration of the State in accordance with the powers vested in them by the laws to protect and preserve the Turkish Republic. Please be informed (Birand 1987, 13-4).

In other words, the 1971 coup came together due to three elements: First, senior, conservative generals believed Demirel had lost grip on power and his government was unable to deal with violence and the rise in political terrorism so law and order had to be restored; Second, officers appeared to be unwilling to “carry the can” for perceived government misdeeds; Third, a new group of reformist officers believed that progress was not possible within a liberal democratic system of government and advocated an “egalitarian, more independent and more ‘modern’” authoritarian regime (Hale 1994, 185-6).

Effectively, the coup was planned by the senior, conservative generals in an ad hoc group known as the Enlarged Council of Commanders. The generals in the Council wanted to ensure that they carried their subordinates with them and, rumor was, to prevent a “leftist” coup by the younger reformist officers (Aksin 2007, 272). According to Aksin (2007), “This rumor was substantiated by the fact that immediately after the coup took place, the officers had prepared the leftist coup—five generals, one admiral, and thirty-five colonels—were relieved from duty” (272-3). Ultimately, both groups compromised by issuing the memorandum which forced
Demirel’s government to resign, putting in its place “a supposedly supra-party administration, which followed the off-stage directions of the military chiefs” (Hale 1991, x).

The Coup by memorandum imposed national government under Nihat Erim, who was a member of the CHP and a former professor of constitutional law. Martial law was declared and the generals focused on the 1961 Constitution “which was perceived to be ‘tailored too loose to fit Turkish society’” (Birand 1987, 14). However, Hale (1994) argues:

…. [T]he 12 March regime rested on an unstable balance of power between civilian politicians and the military. Although Erim himself was certainly well intentioned, his government was based on an unworkable compromise. It was not a normal elected government, nor an outright military dictatorship which could entirely ignore parliamentary opposition. The commitment to restore law and order was interpreted by the conservatives, both in the army and outside, as a carte blanche for the drastic restriction of civil rights. This was hardly consistent with the undertaking to stay ‘within the democratic rules’ which was contained in the memorandum. Similarly, the government could not ‘take up the reforms envisaged in the Constitution’ without parliamentary support for them, which was lacking (195).

This relationship would continue long after March 12th. Within Erim’s cabinet there were divisions between progressives, such as Kocas and Karaosmanoglu, and conservatives within the JP.

Consequently, Erim’s efforts at implementing land reform, financial reforms, and a reorganization of the public sector would be difficult to achieve (Hale 1994, 199). Throughout the first year of the military-backed Erim government, debate continued on what reforms should be a priority. Protest came from both the reformist and conservative members of parliament, as well as within the “Brain Trust” who were created to implement reforms. As a result, Erim “was in the position of having to satisfy the left while catering to the right, since the government still
had to answer to and have laws passed by the National Assembly in which the Justice Party was the majority” (Askin 2007, 273). By October 1971, Erim’s government was breaking down. He submitted his resignation to President Sunay, who refused to accept it, but eventually accepted the resignation. In effect, both conservative and reformist members of parliament at different points resigned from government due to Erim’s inability to implement reforms.

Additionally, Hale (1994) notes that the collapse of the first Erim government “caused profound disillusionment for…those members of the armed forces who had hoped that the post-memorandum administration could implement egalitarian reforms” (200). At this point, President Sunay called a meeting, attended by Erim, Tagmac and the force commanders, whereby the president proposed that Erim be invited to form a new government. One of the reformists, Muhsin Batur, protested that this would be handing power to the JP, which had the majority, and he urged the inclusion of more reformist ministers, but was overruled by the President Sunay and the other commanders (Hale 1994, 201). Erim’s second government would be the caretaker government until elections could be held in October 1973.

Prior to the October 1973 election, however, there were two important events worth mentioning: 1) Ecevit succeeding Inonu as chairman of the CHP; and 2) the conflict between the military and politicians over the election of Turkey’s next president. Inonu was not supportive of the March 1971 coup; but when Erim became prime minister he decided to support the government. Askin (2007) notes, “This led Inonu and Ecevit to part ways, because Ecevit viewed the 12 March coup as a blow against the RPP ‘left of centre’, then on the verge of power, rather than against the Demirel administration” (276). In protest, Inonu resigned and sided with a conservative faction in the CHP led by Kemal Satir. On May 5, 1972, Inonu called a special CHP party congress challenging Ecevit and asking the congress to change membership of the
party council in his own favor (Askin 2007, 274). In a vote of 709 to 408, Ecevit beat Inonu and became chairman of the CHP forcing Inonu’s retirement from politics. Evecit’s victory occurred because “[d]uring 1971-2 Ecevit and his friends were hard at work in the party’s provincial organization, winning a high proportion of grass-roots membership over to their side and capturing majority support in the party council…which broadly determined party policy” (Hale 1994, 203).

Next, President Sunay’s seven-year term was set to expire on March 28, 1973. Because each of the previous presidents had been former military men (with the exception of Bayar), many of the senior officers wanted another of their ranks to become the next president. In fact, the military chiefs “tended to regard the presidency as being almost within their gift and as representing the military within the civilian political system” (Hale 1994, 204). In February 1973, the Supreme Command Council (the Chief of the General Staff, and the commanders of the army, navy, and air force) met with all the party leaders, except Demirel (who refused to attend) and put forth General Faruk Gürler, the Chief of the General Staff. Gürler subsequently resigned and was appointed to the Senate by Sunay. Askin (2007) notes, “Ecevit and Demirel joined forces to ensure that retired Admiral Fahri Korutürk was elected rather than Gürler, signaling the end of the 12 March regime” (274). The Generals realized “that this kind of quasi-military regime was an unworkable alternative to either outright military rule, or freely elected civilian government. Unwilling to take over power openly, they retired to their barracks in October 1973, to give way to a series of weak, but at least elected, coalition governments” (Hale 1991, xi).

In the 1973 election, the CHP won 33% of the votes and the JP won 29.8% (Aksin 2007, 274). This outcome meant that in order to govern the CHP had to form coalitions; in this case,
with the far right party, the National Salvation Party (MSP), after drawn out negotiations. Led by Erbakan, the MSP’s platform sought the restoration of Islamic law and practice in Turkey with improved relations with Muslim states. Also, this coalition has been described as “a marriage of convenience which...had some common basis in a distrust of European and American influence” (Zurcher 1997, 274).

The coalition government was in power for only a few months when, in July 1974, a crisis erupted in Cyprus. Cyprus president Makarios was ousted on July 15th in a coup organized by the ruling Greek junta in Athens. Prime Minister Ecevit condemned the coup, stating it was a direct threat to Turkish Cypriots. According to Hale (1994), “Fearing for the safety of the Turkish Cypriots, and exercising her rights under the Treaty of Guarantee which had established the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, Turkey invaded the island on 20 July” (217). Turkey then held meetings with Greek, British, and U.S. representatives to try and find a peaceful resolution to the crisis. Unfortunately, the talks collapsed after Turkey issued an ultimatum that each side felt unacceptable. Thereafter, the Turkish army conducted a second operation and occupied over a third of the island by mid-August, establishing the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus on February 13, 1975 (Askin 2007, 275). Events in Cyprus would continue to affect the relationship between Turkey and Greece well into the 1980s.

In the short term, the Cyprus conflict had an impact on Turkey’s foreign policy and on domestic policy in terms of inter-party relations. Both Greece and Turkey were members of NATO, and the conflict between these two continued to be strained over territorial claims in the Aegean Sea (Glazer 1996, 55). Moreover, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus complicated Turkey’s relationship with the U.S. Following the Ecevit-Erbakan government’s decision to invade Cyprus, the U.S. imposed an arms embargo on Turkey in February 1975. President Gerald Ford
tried to persuade Congress to lift the embargo to no avail. In response, Turkey abrogated the 1969 defense cooperation treaty with the U.S. and placed U.S. military bases under Turkish control (The only U.S. combat unit at Incirlik Air Base was not affected) (Glazer 1996, 56). Congress stated that military equipment supplied by the U.S. was used illegally during the operation. In effect, the embargo cost Turkey multi-millions of dollars in military and domestic aid from the U.S (Hale 1994, 218). In 1978, President Jimmy Carter persuaded Congress to end the embargo, subject to periods of review, and Turkey allowed U.S. military bases to reopen while a new defense cooperation pact was negotiated. By 1980, U.S. military assistance to Turkey was $250 million and economic assistance was $200 million (Glazer 1996, 56).

The effect of Cyprus on Turkey’s inter-party relations concern Ecevit’s relationship with Erbakan. During the invasion, Hale (1994) notes, “Erbakan, who was determined not to permit Ecevit to capture all the credit for the Cyprus operation,… banged the chauvinist drum by urging that Turkish troops should take the whole island. For his part, Ecevit seems to have been genuinely reluctant to have himself presented as a war hero, since it went against his humanitarian instincts. On the other hand, he could hardly ignore the fact that the Cyprus invasion had vastly increased his popularity…. ” (219). Ecevit believed his increased popularity would bode well for the CHP if early elections were held. Therefore, Ecevit resigned, and the CHP was unable to find a partner that would agree to early elections knowing that the CHP would surely win (Aksin 2007, 276). Turkey was, thus, left in a state of political paralysis, which “….was a scenario…to be repeated time and again in the succeeding years, and which played a major role in fatally debilitating the whole democratic process” (Hale 1994, 220).

From September 1974 until March 1975, a transitional government formed by Sadi Irmak took over. After continued negotiations, the first Nationalist Front coalition formed under
Demirel of the JP and the Nationalist Action Party led by Türkes. The Nationalist Front Coalition was a center-right coalition and its win was “a turning point in the left-right polarization of Turkish politics characteristic of the 1975-1980 period” (Birand 1987, 19). In particular, Birand (1987) argues, “In the run up to 1980, government crises would increasingly come to be interpreted as crises of the regime. That Nationalist Front, with its hard-right rhetoric and unstable amalgam of extremist parties, added to the polarization and the growing crisis of legitimacy” (19).

The June 5, 1977 elections resulted in a victory for the CHP with 41.4% of the vote; however, this was not enough to form a government on its own (Aksin 2007, 277). Ecevit formed a minority administration with independents, but this government failed after one month in office and was succeeded by a second Nationalist Front Coalition under Demirel. The second Nationalist Front lasted approximately seven months and was replaced in January 1978. At this point, Ecevit formed a government of CHP and independents, but was not able to accomplish much due to “savage attacks by the opposition, notably Demirel,” and the purging of ministries by previous Nationalist Front governments (Zurcher 1997, 275). In October 1979, senate elections saw a drop in CHP support resulting in Demirel’s return to power, albeit just with support from JP and without the NSP and NAP (Zurcher 1997, 275). In sum, the paralysis described above can be explained by the fact that the JP and CHP were unable to cooperate after 1973, giving the extremist parties, especially those within the Nationalist Front, more influence. Uncooperativeness within the major parties was a result of differences in ideology and personal rivalry between the leaders, which meant “that no government was able to take effective measures (and even more importantly seem carried out) to combat the two overwhelming problems Turkey faced in the 1970s, political violence and economic crisis” (Zurcher 1997,
276). The rising tide of violence and economic crisis would bring Turkey almost to the point of total collapse necessitating the third intervention of the Turkish military into politics on September 12, 1980.

1980 Coup

By 1980, the renewed surge of politically inspired violence threatened to drag Turkey down into a Lebanese-style collapse of the state. During the first seven months of 1980, “over 1,250 people were killed by politically inspired desperadoes of either right or left. The economy was in chaos, with triple-digit inflation, a huge foreign trade deficit, and a rampant black market in essential commodities” (Hale 1991, xi). The civilian political elite had failed to heed repeated warnings by the military to drop their mutual rivalries by forming a national unity government. As a result, when the army struck, the coup was greeted with general relief. Under General Kenan Evren, the army established a five-man junta, which restored law and order and successfully tackled the country’s economic problems by bringing down inflation and the foreign trade deficit. (Hale 1991, xi). This section will discuss the effect of the deterioration within Turkish society on military decision-making and how it influenced the decision to intervene, before discussing safeguards put in place to shore up Turkish democracy.

Violence, as mentioned above, was occurring from groups on the left and right of the political spectrum since the late 1960s and early 1970s. Although the violence was suppressed during the martial law administration after the 71 coup, incidences of armed robbery, kidnapping, and bombings increased to the point that the public was in a state of fear (Hale 1994, 224). The perpetrators are divided into three broad categories: ideological, sectarian and ethnic. Groups on the left included the Turkish People’s Liberation Front and the Maoist-inspired Turkish Workers & Peasants Liberation Army “who carried out selected assassinations of
prominent victims, particularly high-level university administrators and professors” while members of the extreme-left teachers association (TÖB-DER) and the Federation of Revolutionary Youth (Dev-Genç) conducted armed clashes as “soldiers in a war rather than specifically selected targets” against groups on the right, such as the Grey Wolves and the Association of Idealist Youth (Hale 1994, 225).

The second cause of the violence was sectarianism, specifically between Sunni & Shi’a Islam. A majority of the population are Sunni Muslims, while approximately 15 percent are Shi’ites, known in Turkey as Alevi (Hale 1994, 225). Describing their political allegiances, Hale (1994) argues, “In normal times, relations between people of the two sects are good, and clashes between them are rare. However, as in the case of…Lebanon, the collapse of state power removed the social cement and brought latent tensions to the point of violent confrontation. In parts of the country where the Alevi constitute a substantial proportion of the total population, they tended to gravitate towards the left politically, while the traditionally dominant Sunnis sided with the extreme right” (225). Alevi Muslims are either Arabs or Turks and are concentrated along the Syrian Border in Southeastern Turkey in isolated mountain communities (Hooglund 1996, 101). Additionally, there is also a small minority of Shi’a who are Kurdish and “the competition between Alevi and Sunni Turks for urban jobs led to a revival of traditional sectarian tensions by the mid-1970s” (Hooglund 1996, 101).

The most well known example of ethnic conflict in Turkey is the conflict between the Kurds and the state. Although the Kurds are a distinct ethnic group, according to Eric Hooglund (1996), “[T]hey are divided by class, regional, and sectarian differences similar to those affecting ethnic Turks….Although the government of Turkey does not compile official data on religious affiliation, scholars estimate that at least two-thirds of the Kurds in Turkey nominally are Sunni
Muslims, and that as many as one-third are Shi’a Muslims of the Alevi sect” (100). Prior to 1980, the state’s policy vis-à-vis the Kurds included the banning of the Kurdish language in all government institutions, including courts and schools (Hooglund 1996, 98). Consequently, from as far back as 1925, organizations have emerged to challenge the state. The most militant was the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), led by Abdullah Öçalan, which subscribes to both Marxist-Leninism and nationalism (Hale 1994, 226).

Concomitantly with the political violence described above, the economic crisis came to a head during the three years prior to the 1980 coup. Beginning in 1973 with an increase in oil prices, Turkey was beset with cascading economic difficulties into the early 1980s. As Birand (1987) notes, “There is no doubt that the crisis was structural and represented the accumulation over a period of many years of all the problems associated with rapid economic growth and unequal social distribution in a developing country” (45). More specifically, a combination of loans coming due, industry that depended on foreign investment, and the availability of foreign reserves made Turkey especially vulnerable (Zurcher 1997, 280). The National Front governments continually met the economic crisis by working out loans first with Europe and then the IMF and World Bank. In fact, after prolonged negotiations with these creditors due to demands placed on Turkey, in July 1979 an agreement was reached to provide $1.8 billion in new credits, “dependent on the Turkish government introducing a reform package including: abolishing import and export controls; cutting subsidies; freeing interest rates; raising prices; and cutting government expenditure” (Zurcher 1997, 281). The delay in working out the loan package by the West is best explained by Birand (1987):

The Americans had sensed that a number of Third World countries, particularly Latin American ones, were, like Turkey, teetering on the brink of defaulting on their massive loans. The Guadeloupe Summit’s decision to ‘bail Turkey out’ had,
in fact, wider connotations and was intended for countries in a similar position to that of Turkey. What emerged therefore was an agreement on how to deal with the possible defaulters. And...to refer such cases to the IMF which, in turn, would impose its own ‘stabilization’ and ‘austerity’ measures. This was, in other words, the beginning of the ‘new economic order’ of the IMF which would be put to effective practice throughout the 1980s (46).

Consequently, with Demirel returning to office in November 1979, a new economic stabilization plan was approved by parliament after consultation with international banks and led by an economist, Turgut Özal (more on his efforts later).

Despite the effort to meet their international economic obligations, the increasing violence caused the imposition of martial law. The military “became increasingly uneasy over the continued criticism of the armed force in the Grand National Assembly” and “[t]he apparent inability of successive governments to deal with problems of the economy and public order led many in the military to conclude that the 1961 constitution was defective” (Hooglund 1996, 60). In fact, by the summer of 1979, General Evren was receiving messages from several MPs and Senators that military intervention would be the only way to end the crisis (Hale 1994, 233). General Evren, however, decided that the situation had not reached the point where the army would need to intervene. Nevertheless, a “Special Planning Group” had already been set up by General Evren in 1978 and was under the direction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Haydar Saltik (Birand 1987, 137). Saltik and two staff officers were tasked by Evren to investigate whether the time for intervention had come or whether a warning to government would be sufficient. Accordingly, Saltik reported back “suggesting that it would be impossible to defeat anarchy and terrorism under the present regime. Hence, the army should take over the government and dissolve the Grand National Assembly” (Hale 1994, 234).
The repeated turnover in power between Ecevit and Demirel convinced General Evren that the time was not ripe for intervention in 1979 so shortly after Senate elections were held. As Hale (1994) argues, “It would have been difficult to intervene just before or after the partial Senate elections, since this would have been treated as too blatant an interference with democratic processes. The subsequent hand-over of power from Ecevit to Demirel strengthened this decision. Having failed to act against Ecevit, the army could hardly overthrow Demirel without giving him at least a chance to prove the efficacy (if any) of his new government” (234).

Although Özal’s efforts were done to forestall economic collapse, the military high command met on December 21, 1979 in Istanbul. At the meeting, “the idea of a full-scale takeover, as in 1960 was apparently rejected by the generals”, instead, the generals decided to send a “warning letter” to President Korutürk signed by General Evren and the force commanders calling for politicians to cooperate in restoring order (Hale 1994, 234). Unfortunately for the politicians, in the spring of 1980, they were unable to come to agreement on a successor to President Korutürk when his term expired. Accordingly, “…parliament’s failure to elect any permanent successor to Korutürk served as a sharp and bitter reminder [to the army] of the effective paralysis of government” (Hale 1994, 236).

By the summer of 1980, Ecevit and Demirel attempted to form a grand coalition government to placate General Evren and the General Staff. Talks continued throughout July and resulted in a summit at the end of July where the two leaders attempted to work through their differences as violence and sectarian unrest continued to build in the cities and spread to the countryside (Glazer 1996, 60). Accordingly, on August 9, 1980, General Evren convened a meeting of the Supreme Military Council, which included the General Staff plus the force commanders, and the date of the coup was set to September 12, 1980. There was some debate
about what the coup should look like, considering that the operation had already been canceled once before. Hale (1994) notes:

Apparently, there was some discussion between what could be called a minimalist school of thought, which argued that the post-coup regime should restrict its actions to reforming the constitution and strengthening laws affecting state security before handing power back to an elected civilian government, and a maximalist school, which argued that the army should seize the chance to enact much more far reaching social and economic reforms. Backed by Evren, the minimalists won the argument (236-7).

Confident that a coup was not imminent, Ecevit aligned the CHP with Erbakan and the NSP to force the resignation of Demirel’s foreign minister, Hayrettin Erkman. The next day, the NSP sponsored a massive rally at Konya, “where Islamists...demonstrated to demand the reinstatement of Islamic law in Turkey, reportedly showing disrespect for the flag and the national anthem” (Glazer 1996, 60). As a result, the generals were “particularly incensed by the open defiance of secularism now being shown by Erbakan” (Hale 1994, 237). Moreover, Hale (1994) notes, “On August 31, 1980, the NSP leader refused to appear at the annual Victory Day parade (which includes a ritual homage at Ataturk’s mausoleum). This was taken as a grave insult to the army and to Ataturk’s memory” (237). Finally, on September 6th, Ecevit delivered a speech to a meeting of the petroleum worker’s union comparing the political struggle to a soccer match by appealing to the workers to “‘come down from the stands and onto the pitch’” (Hale 1994, 238). Thus, on September 7, 1980, General Evren met secretly with the armed forces and police commanders and gave the go-ahead for the September 12th coup (Birand 1987, 171).

The September 12th coup occurred in the early morning hours. According to Glazer (1996), “There was no organized resistance to the coup; indeed, many Turks welcomed it as the only alternative to anarchy” (60). Whereas the 1960 and 1971 military coups had institutional
reform as their objective, the small group of officers who took over in 1980, had straightforward aims: “to end the appalling terrorist bloodshed, right the economy and return Turkey to elected civilian government in conditions which, they hoped, would make yet another intervention” (Hale 1994, 246).

General Evren and the Chiefs of Staff of the army, navy, air force, and gendarmerie formed the National Security Council (NSC) to be the executive and legislative authority, enacting 268 laws and abolishing the government and legislature (Aksin 2007, 280). Since one of the main tasks of the generals was to “save democracy”, all political parties were banned, with all four leaders of the main political parties except Turkes (who evaded arrest for two days) arrested, and mayors and municipal councils were all dismissed (Zurcher 1997, 293). Under the Law on Constitutional Order, all executive and legislative power was vested in the NSC and General Evren was officially declared head of state on September 14, 1980. To assist the NSC in running the country, a 27-member cabinet composed of retired officers and bureaucrats led by retired admiral Bulent Ulusu, offered advice to the NSC and executed decisions. One member of the cabinet—Turgut Özal—was retained as deputy prime minister to continue with his responsibility for fixing the economy (Hale 1994, 248). In addition, regional and local commanders were used under martial law and given wide-ranging powers, to include decision-making over education policy, the press, chambers of commerce and trade unions (Zurcher 1997, 293).

The military’s first task was to re-establish law and order. The martial law commanders were given enhanced powers, specifically the right to ban strikes, public meetings and demonstrations, suspend newspapers and other publications, and to dismiss local and central government staff whose employment was deemed undesirable (Hale 1994, 251). In effect, as
Hale (1994) notes: “According to the official figures the number of political killings during the twelve months following the coup fell to 282, or one-tenth of that recorded during the previous twelve months….With the resurrection of the power of the state, the terrorist networks appear to have collapsed, and ….the scourge of political violence had been virtually ended by 1982” (252).

Although the violence was quelled, there were costs; namely, that anyone who expressed leftist or Islamist views before 1980 could be arrested. The generals created an enemies list which included trade unionists, legal politicians, university professors, teachers, journalists and lawyers (Aksin 2007, 283). The actions described above can be explained by an important ideological dimension to the regime, according to Aksin (2007):

We saw earlier that during the 12 March 1971 coup there had been a left-right struggle within the army, with the right gaining preponderance. Apparently this swing had continued in the 1970s, with the result that Evren and most of the army were now thinking, probably with encouragement from the United States, that Islam was the best remedy for communism. Thus, the suppression of the left was accompanied by an effort to fabricate a new ideology, the so-called ‘Turkish-Islamic’ synthesis (283).

The “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” was an ideology introduced by the group, Aydinlar Ocagi (Hearths of the Enlightened), whose membership counted influential people from the business world, universities, and politics; its purpose was to counter a perceived monopoly of the social, political and cultural debate by left-wing intellectuals (Zurcher 1997, 303). According to Zurcher (1997), “The basic tenet was that Islam held a special attraction for the Turks because of a number of (supposedly) striking similarities between their pre-Islamic culture and Islamic civilization. They shared a deep sense of justice, monotheism and a belief in the immortal soul, and a strong emphasis on family life and morality. The mission of the Turks was a special one, to be the ‘soldiers of Islam’” (303).
Support for the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, in the late 1970s, came most prominently from the Nationalist Salvation Party and Nationalist Action Party of Türkes. Interestingly, support also came from prominent military leaders, including General Kenan Evren. It must be remembered that during this period the Cold War was in full swing and the military was trained to view socialism and communism “as Turkey’s most deadly foes and it saw indoctrination with a mixture of fierce nationalism and a version of Islam friendly to the state as an effective antidote” (Zurcher 1997, 303). Thus, under Evren and the NSC’s military rule from 1980-83, religion and ethics became a part of the basic curriculum in schools that was “….exclusively Sunni in content and patriotism and love for parents, the state and the army…was presented as a religious duty” (Zurcher 1997, 303). After 1983, Özal would use the Synthesis as a driving force behind his Motherland Party (MP). Essentially, at this point in Turkey’s development, Islam gained traction as a political force that spoke for the poor and would continue as an influential force within society into the 1990s and 2000s.

Before returning power to the civilians, the military regime also drew up a new constitution, which aimed to install a more restricted version of democracy than had been sanctioned since 1961. To accomplish this task, a Constituent Assembly was convened consisting of a Consultative Assembly and the NSC. As Hale (1994) notes, “In theory, the Consultative Assembly shared legislative powers with the NSC, though in practice the final say rested with Evren and his colleagues. Moreover, the 160 members of the Assembly were either handpicked by the junta or else nominated by the provincial governors” (256). The Assembly then elected a 15-member committee to draft the new constitution. The constitution placed power in the hand of the NSC and restricted civil liberties; namely, freedom of the press, freedom of trade unions (effectively banning political strikes), as well as individual rights such
as freedom of speech and freedom of association (Zurcher 1997, 295). In fact, “[t]he[se] usual rights and liberties…were included in the constitution, but it was stipulated that they could be annulled, suspended or limited on the grounds of a whole series of considerations, including the national interest, public order, national security, danger to the republican order and public health” (Zurcher 1997, 295).

Next, the constitution was put to a referendum on November 7, 1982, with the vote tied to Evren becoming president for seven years after the constitution’s adoption. The vote was also made compulsory and “anyone who chose not to—or neglected to—vote, not only had to pay a fine, but also lost his or her right to vote for five years” (Zurcher 1997, 295-6). While the constitution passed with 91.4 percent, there were, not surprisingly, “no” votes from Kurds in southeast Turkey. In sum, Hale (1994) argues, “Whatever the defects of the constitution and associated laws which the generals introduced, their ability to fulfil [sic] their pledge to return Turkey to elected democratic government depended on whether they could work out a modus Vivendi with the civilian politicians and political parties to whom they were bound to hand over. This was the part of…their task which they seem to have found most difficult” (259-60).

As mentioned earlier, the NSC banned all politicians who had been active in politics prior to September 1980 for ten years. Now that the military had essentially re-written the rules with the Political Parties Law, political elites found it difficult to establish new political parties. New parties “were…subjected to a mass of bureaucratic restrictions” (Hale 1994, 262). Effectively this meant that of the fifteen parties founded, twelve were deemed unacceptable by the military. The three parties who participated in the November 6, 1983 election were:

The Milliyetçi Demokrasi Partisi (Party of Nationalist Democracy [PND]), a party closely identified with and supported by the generals and led by retired general Turgut Sunalp;
The *Halkçı Parti* (Populist Party [PP]), led by Necdet Calp, the party which came closest to the traditional Kemalist wing of the [CHP]; and

The *Anavatan Partisi* (Motherland Party [ANAP]), led by Turgut Özal, the man behind the economic reform program launched in 1979-80, who had served also as ‘superminister’ in charge of the economy under the military regime until he was forced out of office as a result of financial scandals (Zurcher 1997, 296).

From the outset, the NSC came out in favor of the PND and, in fact, according to Hale (1994), “It was apparently part of the junta’s design that a moderate leftist party should be encouraged to run against the NDP, to give legitimacy to the elections….The [PP] put forward a program of pastel pink socialism, and had been founded only after Calp had received preliminary permission from Evren and Ulusu” (263). Evren “observed that while the civilian authority had to act responsibly to the people, the military should also act in that manner….Evren] and his co-intervenors wanted…Ulusu to found a political party because they thought Ulusu was liked and respected by the people” (Heper and Güney 1996, 626).

In effect, the military’s overt support for the PP allowed Özal to campaign “as the only genuine democrat and thus to attract the votes of those who, after three years, wanted the military out of politics” (Zurcher 1997, 297). These developments left Turkey with a host of unanswered questions: Would the return to civilian government under Prime Minister Turgut Özal in 1983 be a genuine one, or would the military continue to control the country’s political destinies from behind the scenes? (Hale 1991, xi).

**The Third Turkish Republic, 1983-1997**

The November 1983 election saw the ANAP win 45.2 percent of the votes, which gave the party 212 seats in the TGNA and an overall majority (Hale 1994, 269). Özal’s ANAP was a “somewhat eclectic” party “drawing its membership and policies from the three main strands of the right and center-right of Turkish politics—that is, the liberal conservatives…the Islamicists
[sic]...and the ultra-nationalists together with others who had no background in party politics” (Hale 1994, 277). From the outset, the ANAP relied on Özal’s personality to keep the broad ideological currents under the ANAP banner. Özal emphasized his ability to deliver benefits for the population and worked to establish a modus operandi with President Evren (Evin 1994, 26).

At this point, Evren took responsibility over “all matters relating to internal and external security, as well as foreign affairs and higher education—matters about which the military commanders were highly sensitive”, while Özal conceded these policy areas and, in return, was given control over the economy (Evin 1994, 26-7). To explain his decision, President Evren often deflected questions about the economy by stating, “the economy is the government’s problem” (Evin 1994, 27). Although there seemed to be cooperation between the President and Özal government, Zurcher (1997) contends that Özal was determined to re-establish civilian politics over the military (298). The military, however, was returning to the barracks on its own terms. Specifically, Evin (1994) notes, “Beginning in 1984, martial law was gradually lifted, province by province, but the military presence in public life remained strong. Those indicted under martial law continued to be prosecuted in military courts, and the trials, which were reported in the press, increased public awareness of military authority” (27).

Before the March 1984 municipal election, the ANAP was facing growing criticism from opposition parties that were excluded from the 1983 election. Consequently, the ANAP-controlled TGNA voted to allow these opposition parties to participate in the 1984 municipal election. The Social Democratic Party (SDP) led by Professor Erdal Inonu, the son of the late Ismet Inonu, the True Path Party (DYP), led by political cronies of Demirel, and the Refah Party, a reincarnation of Erbakan’s NSP, were allowed to participate, essentially, to divide the votes of the opposition parties and thereby improve ANAP’s majority in the assembly (Zurcher 1997,
Accordingly, the ANAP won 41.5 percent, followed by the SDP with 23.5 percent and the DYP with 13.5 percent and the Welfare (Refah) Party with 4.5 percent (Zurcher 1997, 298). Thus, the elections created conditions whereby the opposition parties had lost their legitimacy. As a result, in November 1985, the PP merged with the SDP and the NDP voted to dissolve itself (Glazer 1996, 63). Furthermore, in national elections for local government officials on September 28, 1986, ANAP received 32 percent of the votes, the DYP won 23.7 percent, and the new Social Democratic Populist Party (Sosyal Demokrat Halkçi Parti—SHP) won 22.7 percent of the votes (Glazer 1996, 63). At this point, pressure was building against the army to restore the pre-1980 political leaders, whom the army had tried to exclude from the system.

Following a national referendum on September 6, 1987, these leaders regained their political rights “since it had been impossible to prevent them from forming and controlling their own proxy parties” (Hale 1991, xii; Hale 1994, 279). Demirel became head of True Path Party (DYP); Bulent Ecevit refused to cooperate with Inonu and formed the Democratic Left Party (DSP); Necmettin Erbakan assumed leadership of the Refah Party; Türkes resumed control of his party which, after an interval, reverted to the name of MHP. The result of the above moved Özal to announce early national elections for November 1987. Özal’s campaign focused on the government’s economic achievements. In particular, Turkey “resumed a healthy rate of economic growth, with the growth rate of GNP running at an average of 6.6 percent per year between 1984 and 1987” (Hale 1994, 280). This success rested on policies implemented by Özal during the Demirel government—opening the economy to foreign markets, the application of market principles internally and reducing the role of the state sector—however, he was unable to control public expenditure and inflation (Hale 1994, 280). Nevertheless, the November 1987 elections saw the ANAP get 36 percent, the SDPP 25 percent, and the DYP 19 percent of the
vote (Aksin 2007, 288). The next four years would see a number of domestic and international events impact on civil-military relations in Turkey: concessions to Islamists, ethnic conflict, economics, EC application, the Gulf War, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

From 1987-1991, within Özal’s ANAP, there was dissension over the role of Islam in politics. According to Hale (1994), “To retain the support of its own grass roots, the government made some important concessions to the fundamentalists. These included the expansion of religious education and Friday noon-time prayer meetings for civil servants and, most controversially, permission to female students to wear ‘Islamic’ headscarves in classes at the universities” (281). The headscarf issue would become the “hot-button” issue in the debate on secularism that would continue into the 90s and 2000s with the electoral wins of Refah and the Justice & Development Party.

Next, ethnic conflict was continuing in southeastern Turkey. Between 1984 and 1994, attacks by the PKK on security forces and pro-government Kurdish villages challenged government authority. Banned by the Turkish government, the PKK began a sustained guerrilla war against the state. The PKK attacked a variety of government installations throughout the southeast of Turkey from their training camps in the mountains separating Northern Iraq from Turkey (the same mountains where Operation Provide Comfort would take place after the 1990 Persian Gulf War). The violence of the PKK could be described as “…the use of indiscriminate violence, and PKK guerrillas did not hesitate to kill Kurds whom they considered collaborators. Targeted in particular were the government’s paid militia, known as village guards, and school teachers accused of promoting assimilation” (Hooglund 1996, 281). As a result, the PKK was declared a terrorist organization by the government “….to justify its own policies, which
included the destruction of about 850 border villages and the forced removal of their populations to western Turkey” (Hooglund 1996, 281).

Third, the economy played a major role in the ANAP electoral campaign, but would just as easily bring about its decline between 1987 and 1991. Özal had campaigned on his efforts to implement a “neo-liberal” restructuring of the economy emphasizing decentralization, privatization, export-led growth, and a redistribution of power away from the state toward a market economy (Nasr 2009, 237). The restructuring required loans from the World Bank and IMF as well as a new emphasis on social openness and citizen participation (Nasr 2009, 237). However, the effects of Özal’s effort would not become apparent for some time. As Nasr (2009) notes, “The economic transformation ran wide and deep as globalization transformed Turkish economic and social life. Economic power shifted to small and medium-sized businesses and the Anatolian heartland overshadowed Istanbul as engine of growth. These changes over time produced both a new business elite and a new middle class, of the same basic persuasion as that of the rising middle class all over the region” (Nasr 2009, 238).

Although, in the short term, Hale (1994) notes, “[T]he government…fuelled a pre-election boom by increasing public expenditure. This had the predictable effect of giving a further boost to inflation, which rose to 74 percent in 1988, continuing at 63 percent during the following year. At the same time, the GNP growth rate fell to 3.6 percent in 1988 and 1.9 percent in 1989” (281). Put differently, the decline in Özal’s and ANAP’s popularity was due to “continuing high inflation…and the erosion in purchasing power it had caused” (Zurcher 1997, 301). Moreover, Özal’s economic policies were accompanied by nepotism and corruption. As Zurcher (1997) explains, “The new men Özal had brought in, often with a background in business, many of them with American or German management degrees, had gained a reputation
for ‘getting things done’ which contrasted sharply with the almost total paralysis of the governments of the later 1970s” (Zurcher 1997, 301). Consequently, a number of business scandals developed involving ANAP ministers and party leaders. For instance, the Özal family was criticized for nepotism and corruption in their business activities: “When one of the president’s sons made vast sums of money on the Istanbul stock exchange, dealing in stocks of firms which were given government contracts soon afterwards, there was a suspicion that more than just foresight was involved. After the 1989 elections, Özal countered some of the criticism by removing his family members from the cabinet” (Zurcher 1997, 301).

On April 14, 1987, Özal applied for membership in the European Community (EC). The EC report, which came out at the end of 1989, and adopted by the EC Council of Ministers, advised that neither party was ready for EC membership stressing the problems of the Turkish economy (inflation, unemployment, structural differences, etc.) and the political problems (human rights, problems of democracy, unresolved issues with Greece) (Aksin 2007, 292-3). Aksin (2007) notes, “The sheer size of Turkey and the great cultural and religious differences from the European norm which it represented also probably played an important part in the European decision” (293). Instead, Turkey would be allowed to take part in a custom union to establish further economic ties with Europe.

Not to be deterred, after Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, Özal “hoped that Turkey’s willing participation in the United States-led coalition would strengthen the country’s image abroad as a crucial ally, a particular concern in the post-Cold War world” (Glazer 1996, 65). The government authorized the use of Incirlik air base for the bombing campaign against Iraq and deployed troops along the Turkish-Iraqi border. Glazer (1996) notes that after the Persian Gulf War, “The Turkish government was unable or unwilling to permit several hundred thousand
refugees to enter the country. The coalition allies, together with Turkey, proposed the creation of a ‘security zone’ in northern Iraq. By mid-May 1991, some 200,000 Kurdish refugees had been persuaded to return to Iraq” (65-6).

The collapse of the Soviet Union and its East European bloc was significant for Turkish foreign policy. As Aksin (2007) adroitly states, “In the first place it freed the Turkish psyche from an almost pathological obsession, the danger of Communism, which had been the result of intense internal and external ‘cultivation’. In the second place, it opened up the perspective of warm and mutually beneficial relations with Russia in all areas. Thirdly, it opened the door of close cooperation with the Turkic Republics of the former Soviet Union” (293). Essentially, the end of the Cold War would force Turkey to alter its defense planning. Hale (1994) notes, “Previous defense planning had been based on the maintenance of very large conventional forces in the First and Third Armies, which had been designed to block any attempt by the Warsaw Pact to take over the straits or eastern Anatolia, and hence the Middle East” (293). The U.S. and Turkey were both aware of Turkey’s strategic position next to areas of potential and actual conflict—the Balkans, Central Asia, and the Middle East. Therefore, Turkey participated in the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe and “agreed to reductions in her conventional forces facing the former Warsaw Pact powers…. [and] in recognition of her important strategic position in the Middle East, a wide strip of territory along the border with Syria and Iraq was excluded from the area of troop reductions—an exclusion which allowed the army flexibility in facing the PKK” (Hale 1994, 293).

A watershed moment in Turkish politics occurred in the fall of 1989. President Evren was about to retire as president. Since 1961, “all the occupants of the presidency had been retired senior commanders, and the tradition had grown up that the president should be a neutral,
non-partisan figure” (Hale 1994, 282). However, upon President Evren’s retirement, Özal became Turkey’s first fully civilian head of state since 1960. Under the 1982 Constitution, the TGNA can elect whomever it likes, as long as he or she meets certain minimum qualifications, and receives two-thirds majority in the Assembly on the first two ballots (Hale 1994, 282). Hale (1994) argues:

Turgut Özal’s election to the presidency created an important shift in the balance of power between president and prime minister. In spite of the constitutional restrictions on his position, Özal’s role as founder of the ruling party and his experience as premier—advantages which no president since Bayar had possessed—allowed him to control both the cabinet and the party from behind the scenes without breaking the letter of the constitution. There was thus an effective transition to an active, dominating presidency, in place of the neutral and more purely regulatory role which previous presidents had played (282).

An example of this new presidential role occurred with the selection of a new prime minister and chairman of ANAP. Özal nominated Yildirim Akbulut, the Speaker of the Assembly, who served in this role for approximately seven months before conflict within the party ousted him. Within ANAP there was a conflict between factions of liberals on the left and the ‘Holy Alliance’ on the right. Akbulut was “an anodyne and conciliatory figure”, but “[h]is main disadvantage was that he was little known outside the corridors of parliament, appeared to lack the required qualities of leadership and failed to cut much of a figure with the public” (Hale 1994, 283).

As a result, in June 1991, at the party convention, a challenge for the party’s leadership came from Mesut Yilmaz, a former foreign minister who had resigned from government the previous year. Yilmaz “emerged as the leader of the liberal wing of the party, Akbulut became increasingly identified with the Islamic conservatives on the other” (Hale 1994, 283). Özal then gave discreet support to Yilmaz through Semra Özal, his wife, who was elected head of the
Istanbul delegation. According to Hale (1994), “With this support, Yılmaz won the leadership on the second ballot, by a margin of 631 delegate votes to 523. He was appointed prime minister on 17 June and announced his new cabinet, which excluded virtually all the prominent figures from the conservative wing of the party….” (284).

In sum, the events of 1987-1991 took their toll on the popularity of Özal. Aksin (2007) argues, “His unconstitutional, high-handed and adventurous conduct was causing an uproar. The opposition and many newspapers were criticizing him. There was unrest not only in the cabinet, but also in the [ANAP]. Last but not least, the army was against him” (295). General Necip Torumtay, who became chief of the general staff on August 31, 1987, believed Özal and other civilians did not pay much attention to matters pertaining to the military: “His [Torumtay’s] perception of the military’s display of professional traits and civilian’s lack of them led him to think that the military (1) should have as much autonomy as possible from the civilian authority; (2) should be consulted on matters that also have military aspects; and (3) should have the last word on solely military issues” (Heper and Güney 1996, 627-8).

Torumtay was upset from the moment he became Chief of the General Staff. For him, the military was a professional organization “through constant and careful training” (Heper and Güney 1996, 627). During the Gulf War, Torumtay “complained that for four months the military could not obtain from the government any guidelines on the basis of which to determine military strategy. He thought, however, that the military had the sole responsibility for formulating military strategy, and added that the Turkish Armed Forces are led by highly qualified generals and admirals who were promoted to those ranks after proving their competence in previous ranks” (Heper and Güney 1996, 628-9). In effect, Torumtay was upset
that Özal did not consult others when making decisions; in this case, regarding foreign policy.

Heper and Güney (1996) provide a telling illustration from Torumay’s memoirs:

‘At the crisis management meetings…the president came up with novel ideas based on his frequent telephone conversations with political leaders of other countries and his constant watching of the CNN. Even on military issues outside of his expertise and experience, the president persistently made suggestions and demands, including a military operation against Iraq, which conformed to neither the basic principles of the military warfare nor the military strategy’ (629).

Consequently, Torumtay believed that Özal and other civilian politicians were violating the rule of law by not respecting their posts and the “sublimity of the nation” and chose to retire in December 1990 (Heper and Güney 1996, 629). His retirement did not cause any discussion of coup; instead, General Dogan Gures, a former commander of the land forces, took over as Chief of the General Staff and made several statements about the Turkish military not intervening in politics and respecting democracy: “‘The Turkish Armed Forces is an admirer of democracy; ‘the military is a democratic-constitutional institution; it holds in high esteem democratic principles; it is in a subordinate position to the civilian government; ‘the chief commander of the Turkish Armed Forces is the Turkish Grand National Assembly; the military has great respect for the Assembly’” (Heper and Güney 1996, 630). Although these statements might reflect his belief in the democratic process, Gures’ faith in politicians would be tested following the 1991 general election.

The October 20, 1991 parliamentary election was significant, as the ANAP lost the elections to Demirel’s DYP. The DYP won 27% or the vote and ANAP came in second with 24% of the vote (Aksin 2007, 295). DYP emerged as the strongest party, and Demirel formed a coalition with Erdal Inonu’s SHP. According to Zurcher (1997), “The new government’s program bore a very liberal stamp and promised constitutional change and more academic
freedom, freedom of the press, democratization and respect for human rights” (308). In other words, the government sought to continue President Özal’s liberalization policies.

However, suddenly on April 17, 1993, President Özal suffered a massive heart attack and passed away. Despite the economic problems and scandals, Zurcher (1997) argues, “…. [T]here was a general feeling that he had a unique place in the modern history of Turkey and in many commentaries he was called the second great modernizer (after Ataturk) of the country” (309). A month later, Demirel became president and was succeeded as ANAP leader and prime minister by Tansu Ciller who continued the coalition with SHP.

Ciller, a former professor of economics and minister of state for the economy in Demirel’s last cabinet, has been described as having politics closer to Özal than Demirel “both in content (extremely pro-American with an almost blind faith in the workings of the free market) and in style (dramatic, adventurous and publicity-seeking)” (Zurcher 1997, 310). Ciller’s coalition governments were consistently under threat from parties on the left and right. The left challenged Ciller’s government to prove its social democratic credentials, while on the right, the business community and the army (Zurcher 1997, 310). Ciller’s government would consistently deal with three issues: the economy, the Kurdish question, and the relationship with the EU.

During her time in office, from 1991-1994, the economy took a downturn. As Aksin (2007) notes, “The irresponsible economic and fiscal policies of Özal governments, involving deficit spending and heavy borrowing (between 1988 and 1993 the external debt rose from $41 to 67 billion), provoked major crisis, the dollar suddenly rose from 15,000 to 38,000 liras and there was a run on the banks” (298-9). Consequently, the IMF was called in and an agreement was reached “to improve the balance of payments; to combat inflation; and to create an export-oriented free market economy” through “a drastic (and ongoing) devaluation of the Turkish Lira,
to make Turkish exports competitive in foreign markets; a large rise in interest rates, to reduce over-consumption and thus inflation; freezing wages (to increase competitiveness and lower inflation); and raising prices through the abolition or reduction of state subsidies” (Zurcher 1997, 316). The economic recovery was slow-going and its effect would not be felt until late 1995 and throughout 1996; however, none of the problems just mentioned were corrected (Zurcher 1997, 324). In fact, the effect of these policies would help Refah win both local elections in March 1994 and the general election of December 1995 (discussed below).

The Kurdish problem intensified throughout the 1990s. More specifically, the PKK continued to mount attacks forcing the Turkish army to undertake a classic counterinsurgency against the group (Zurcher 1997, 326). As mentioned earlier, the PKK fled into northern Iraq and were conducting operations across the border, resulting in continuous operations to rout out PKK guerillas. There was a “scorched earth” policy whereby “villages in the mountains were evacuated an then destroyed in order to cut off the PKK from its bases…. [with] the battle...regularly carried over the border into Iraq” (Zurcher 1997, 326-7). In addition, after the 1991 elections politicians who campaigned for Kurdish rights were kicked out of the assembly and “[m]ore and more people were persecuted under the anti-terrorism legislation. Even worse, perhaps were the ‘executions without due process’ (yargisiz infaz)—the shooting of suspects who, according to the police, had resisted arrest—and the mounting number of murders whose perpetrators remained unknown” (Zurcher 1997, 329). According to Zurcher (1997):

The war in the southeast had a traumatic effect on the whole of Turkish society. There were quite a few people in politics, in the business world and in intellectual and academic circles who recognized that a political, peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem was the only way out….But the supporters of a political solution were powerless in the face of the pressure from the security establishment, the
army top brass, the rightist majority in parliament, the chauvinist media and a public opinion which was increasingly polarized (329).

In a sense, the continued conflict with the PKK and the Kurds as an ethnic community in Turkey can best be explained by the fact that the “….Kurds’ status in Turkey’s (national-) political community always has been ambiguous” (Yegen 2009, 597). Yegen (2009) defines this ambiguity as a result of several factors: “First, legal citizenship as a formal status has never been the sole marker of Turkishness in Turkey…Secondly, Turkish citizenship itself has not been a firm category. Instead…Turkish citizenship has, from the beginning of the Republic, oscillated between an ethnic and a political definition of the (Turkish) nation” (597). Therefore, the ambiguity of the Kurds is a result of the main actors of the Turkish state—the army, bureaucracy, bourgeoisie, mainstream political parties, and mainstream media—continually shifting their image of the Kurds depending on the times (Yegen 2009).

The continuing conflict with the Kurds had a direct bearing on Turkey’s relationship with the EU. Specifically, many in Europe began questioning Turkey’s human rights record. Turkey had applied for membership in April 1987, but was only offered membership in a customs union instead of full membership. For Turkey, “This unique construction was seen…as the next step towards full membership, but in the eyes of the Europeans it was really a consolation prize, although all European politicians took care not to say so openly to the Turks” (Zurcher 1997, 331). Moreover, the trial of Kurdish parliamentarians in Turkey whose parties were banned from parliament caught the attention of the European parliament, and shone a light on Turkey’s human rights records. In October 1994, the Council of Europe started exclusion proceedings against Turkey and suspended negotiations over the customs union until March 1995 with ratification by the European parliament dependent upon further political liberalization (Zurcher 1997, 331). After constitutional changes the EU Customs Union treaty was signed, but it took lobbying from
the U.S. on behalf of the Turks that the Customs Union “….would anchor Turkey firmly in Europe and prevent the ‘fundamentalists’ from gaining power” (Zurcher 1997, 332).

Ironically, the fundamentalists would come to power in the December 1995 general elections. Ciller hoped that the signing of the Customs Union Treaty would endear her to voters, many of whom suffered from the 1994 recession which was a result of Ciller’s development policy (Mango 2006, 96). However, in March 1994 local elections, Erbakan’s Refah Party was able to win the mayoralities in 29 large cities around the country, including Ankara and Istanbul, from the SDPP, who subsequently merged with the CHP led by Deniz Baykal (Momayezi 1998, 16; Mango 2006, 95). The decline of the SDPP and even the CHP “can be explained by rather weak leadership and the fact that the SDPP seemed to be properly championing neither the welfare of the lower classes nor the principles of Kemalism” (Aksin 2007, 299). Aksin (2007) argues, “Even though Inonu had an aura, he, Karayalcin and Hikmet Cetin were on the whole rather weak political personalities. Deniz Baykal, leader of the RPP, seemed to have a strong personality, but he was out to please everybody and in the process he was turning his back on leftist policies, including Kemalism. This meant that he was pleasing almost nobody, because by enunciating rightist policies he could not hope to compete with rightist parties” (299).

While Refah’s victory was, in part, due to ineffective leadership of the DYP and SDPP, the rise in the Islamic vote was also attributed to four factors: First, the win was attributed as a protest vote against the parties in power for failing to provide employment, economic, and social benefits to the people. Second, Islamists received significant financial support from within Turkey and in Europe, including from Saudi Arabia and Libya. Third, the Islamists were effective in local voter mobilization by conducting door-to-door election campaigns. Fourth, votes were received for purely religious reasons (Aksin 2007, 300). In short, Refah’s electoral
victory would begin a six month period of internecine conflict which would catch the attention of the General Staff and culminate in Turkey’s first post-modern coup.

The December 1995 elections gave Refah 21.4 percent of the national vote and “[i]n the political horsetrading which followed, the main concern of party leaders was to block a parliamentary investigation into corruption charges leveled against them by their political rivals” (Mango 2006, 96). Erbakan negotiated with Ciller to form a coalition government, despite Ciller being an outspoken secularist. During the night of the election she stated, “‘[Y]our decision is to choose civilization over darkness’” (Momayezi 1998, 17). She was accused of allying with Erbakan to shield herself from investigations by parliament into her finances and, in fact, Erbakan’s supporters in parliament helped to defeat proposals that would have referred the issue of her finances and handling of the discretionary fund to the Supreme Court (Aksin 2007, 301; Momayezi 1998, 17).

Moreover, on foreign policy, Erbakan’s election rhetoric was perceived as radical. Political scientist Nasser Momayezi (1998) notes, “It [election rhetoric] was anti-Western, anti-NATO, and anti-Israel, and he opposed the US-led Operation Provide Comfort….He was also opposed to Turkey joining the European Economic Community” (17). Refah wanted to strengthen the ties between Turkey and the rest of the Islamic world with a foreign policy that “reflected a curious mixture of nationalism and Islamic transnationalism” (Momayezi 1998, 17). The General Staff, however, took steps once Erbakan took office to ensure that Turkish foreign policy, the military’s purview, would not be harmed. The three security portfolios—Defense, Foreign Affairs, and Interior—were given to Ciller, who became foreign minister, at the suggestion of the military (Momayezi 1998, 18). In effect, the generals and other officers had “strong suspicions about Refah’s secular as well as democratic credentials….” (Heper and
Güney 2000, 639-40). At this point, the Turkish General Staff adopted a strategy of “wait-and-see” (Heper and Güney 2000, 640).

The “wait-and-see” period occurred between July and December 1996, with the military observing the actions of Erbakan and Refah (Heper and Güney. 640). What events were causing such disquiet among the generals? The generals’ concerns, first expressed in August 1996 at a meeting of the National Security Council, concerned the threat of militant Islam toward secularism (Heper and Güney 2000, 642). To this end, a number of events influenced a report issued in January 1997 to the National Security Council by the National Intelligence Agency. First, the military was concerned that “….a number of religious orders and associations were trying to create ‘alternative state structures’….’trying to bring back to Turkey an order based on Shari’a’” (Heper and Güney 2000, 640). Second, the military was concerned with radical Turkish Islamic organizations receiving funds collected from Turkish workers abroad and channeled to Islamic holding companies to support political Islam in Turkey. Third, there were a number of students graduating from the Prayer Leader and Preacher Schools; in particular, “[a]ccording to military intelligence, even though the annual need for religious functionaries in the late 1990s was around 3000, every year more than 50,000 students graduated from these schools” (Heper and Güney 2000, 640).

Finally, the most immediate concern of the military included Refah staffing the bureaucracy with co-ideologists who would implement the following projects: 1) only those who knew Arabic were to be admitted to the Foreign Ministry, 2) diplomats were to practice their religion at foreign posts, and 3) every Turkish representative abroad was to act as a missionary for Islam (Heper and Güney 2000, 641). Also, Erbakan visited a number of militantly Islamic states, including Iran and Libya, but “….his tours of Muslim countries [did not] produce the
money to build an ‘Islamic car’, and ‘Islamic submarine’, even less an ‘Islamic aircraft-carrier’” (Mango 2006, 96). President Demirel warned Erbakan and other Refah leaders to act prudently but these warnings went unheeded.

Consequently, at the December 26, 1996 National Security Council meeting, “the commanders noted that since August of 1996, the Islamic threat had become greater by the day and reiterated their request that this matter be placed on the agenda of the [NSC]” (Heper and Güney 2000, 643). Chief of the General Staff Ismail Hakki Karadayi stated, “[B]oth secularism, ‘which is the very essence of intellectual progress, liberty of conscience, and democracy,’” and liberal democracy, ‘which is the lifestyle of free, civilized, and modern individuals,’ are the fundamental characteristics of the Turkish Republic” (Heper and Güney 2000, 643). General Karadayi and President Demirel were in close contact and Demirel tried for four weeks to dissuade Erbakan and Ciller’s government from continuing down the road it was on. According to Heper and Güney (2000), “The commanders’ response was that they were well aware of the president’s earnest endeavors concerning this matter, but Prime Minister Erbakan and Deputy Prime Minister Ciller were refraining from taking the necessary measures; worse still, they were acting against the laws enacted to safeguard secularism” (644). Therefore, the General Staff set in motion their carefully orchestrated “post-modern coup”.

1997 Coup by Memorandum

At a meeting of the National Security Council on February 28, 1997, the military demanded that “‘the forces of reaction’ should be confronted” (Mango 2006, 260). Accordingly, the General Staff “urged the members of the council to recommend to the government the necessary measures, adding that otherwise a critical threshold would be crossed, the implication being that then the military would be obliged to deal with the threat unilaterally”
Refah declared its purposes were to achieve social justice, a “just economic order”, and the promotion of Muslim values in Turkey through education; however, the General Staff, and other critics, argued that “from the beginning that it had a hidden agenda: the conversion of Turkey into a state governed by sharia (Islamic law)” (Salt 1999, 72).

According to Mango (2006), “Thus began what became known in Turkey as ‘the process of 28 February’—a campaign, concerted by the military, to eradicate political Islam from education, business and other activities” (97).

The National Security Council issued a memorandum demanding Erbakan take steps to “protect the secular nature of the state, including changing the education laws to force the closure of…prayer leader and preacher…schools” (Salt 1999, 74). Erbakan and Ciller, however, were not going to go quietly. Ciller attempted a defense of the government stating “that religion could not be used for political purposes because she and her colleagues in her party—DYP—stood guard for secularism” (Heper and Güney 2000, 645). The General Staff remarked that Ciller’s comments were only words and they (politicians) were not backing their words up with action (Heper and Güney 2000, 645).

Moreover, the West Working Group was established by the General Staff to monitor suspected fundamentalists, senior bureaucrats, and judges whom the generals believed had links to political Islam. To increase the pressure on Erbakan, the military also called in academics and journalists to meetings of the National Security Council to give them briefings on the dangers posed by “fundamentalism” and the “terrorism” of the PKK (Salt 1999, 74). As Professor Jeremy Salt (1999) recounts, “[T]he general staff warned that ‘giving freedom of movement to religious extremism and to the outlawed [PKK] in the context of democracy would be
tantamount to the state committing suicide. There cannot be any such concept of democracy” (75).

Next, the National Security Council gave the prime minister a list of 18 directives written in a “tense communiqué” which was worked out in a nine hour meeting with the five senior officers and four civilian ministers and chaired by the President (Momayezi 1998, 19-20). Momayesi (1998) notes, “Among the demands were those to cut the number of students being trained at religious academies, crack down on Muslim groups who are believed to be accumulating weapons, close unlicensed ‘Koran schools’ and end his party’s recruitment of officers cashiered from the army because of their fundamentalist sympathies” (19). Erbakan dragged his feet and was hoping to ride out the military’s criticism of his government. The military was upset at the influence Islam had pervaded Erbakan’s government and stated:

‘It has been decided that in Turkey, secularism is not only a form of government but a way of life and the guarantee of democracy and social peace. It has been decided that it is impossible to step back from our understanding of the social and legal principles which form the structural core of the state, and that out-of-date measures which are taken without regard to these principles do not coincide with our legal system.’ (Momayezi 1998, 20).

Also, due to Turkey’s efforts to join the European Union, the communiqué noted, “‘It is necessary to end all speculation which may lead to suspicions about our democracy and damage Turkey’s image and prestige abroad’” (Momayezi 1998, 20). Thus, it was not only the threat to Kemalism and the state, but international influence and recognition of one day belonging to the EU that was behind the 1997 military intervention.

In May 1997, the conflict between the military and Erbakan-Ciller government came to a head. Under pressure from the military, Erbakan stepped down as prime minister and “made a vain attempt to get the prime ministership transferred to Mrs. Ciller” (Momayezi 1998, 21).
President Demirel favored Yilmaz’s ANAP. Yilmaz, a secularist, was a close ally of the military and he formed a coalition with DSP and DYP dissidents. According to Momayezi (1998), “The generals did not want to see the Refah Party with any power, even in a government led by Ciller whom they consider[ed] corrupt and willing to deal with anyone who will protect her from prosecution” (21). Subsequently, on January 16, 1998, Turkey’s Constitutional Court dissolved the Refah Party and ruled that Erbakan was banned from politics for five years with Refah losing its 152 seats in parliament (Aksin 2007, 308; Momayezi 1998, 21). Refah reconstituted itself as the Virtue Party under Recai Kutan, but after its dissolution, Erbakan’s followers formed the Felicity Party.

Yilmaz’s government, by fall 1998, would be accused of corruption. According to Aksin (2007), “…[T]apes of telephone conversations between a mafia leader and an [ANAP]…minister found their way to the press. Their content indicated that the Deputy was trying to ‘fix’ the sale of a bank, using the services of the mafia for this purpose” (309). Consequently, when the incident was brought before the TGNA and the CHP supported a motion of inquiry, Yilmaz resigned. Ecevit and the DSP formed a minority government in the run-up to elections in April 1999. Ecevit’s DSP and Turkes’s MHP emerged as the strongest two parties. Ecevit formed a coalition with MHP and ANAP that served for two years. Mango (2006) describes these two years, as follows: “At first all went well. But success in defeating the insurgency of Kurdish separatists was matched by a growing realization that a decade of short-lived coalition governments, not to say half a century of vote-seeking policies, interrupted only by brief intervals of military rule, had left the administration in tatters” (98). Specifically, Turkey’s economy, under Ecevit, “was in free fall”; “Ecevit’s government had jacked up interest rates in response—in effect, raising the price of money in order to make it more scarce and
thereby tame inflation—but this intended cure had caused a sharp economic contraction….rendering three million Turks jobless” (Nasr 2009, 238). Consequently, an agreement was reached with the IMF to implement a stabilization program “designed to stop politicians from playing fast and loose with the economy” (Mango 2006, 100).

In May 2000, President Demirel’s seven year term was up and despite Ecevit’s efforts to persuade parliament to extend his term, the TGNA refused to do so citing public pressure for change (Mango 2006, 101). Ahmet Necdet Sezer, president of the constitutional court, was elected as the next president of Turkey after Ecevit persuaded parliament to vote for someone outside of politics and the army (Mango 2006, 101). Sezer was “[a] stickler for rules and regulations” and in a meeting of the National Security Council in February 2001 he “accused the government of covering up corruption scandals” (Mango 2006, 101). A public quarrel between Sezer and Ecevit led to economic crisis in February, because markets were already shaken by events the previous fall. The Turkish Lira was floated and lost half of its value with GNP falling by nearly 10 percent (Nasr 2009, 238). Credits were secured from the IMF under a new stabilization program. World Bank vice-president Kemal Derivs was called in by Ecevit to implement it. According to Mango (2006), “Its immediate aim was to cut back public expenditure and produce a large and continuing surplus which would serve to reduce the public debt….The program worked, and by the following year the economy had begun to recover. But confidence was not easily restored and new jobs were slow in coming” (101-2).

By the summer of 2002, Ecevit fell ill and a number of his ministers quit, led by his right-hand man Husamettin Ozkan, Ismail Cem and Kemal Dervis. Consequently, the DLP lost 63 deputies, who formed the New Turkey Party. Moreover, Nationalist Action Party leader, Devlet Bahceli, “had already broken ranks by opposing the abolition of the death penalty, cultural rights
or the Kurds and concessions in Cyprus as the price of EU membership[,] now declared that he would leave the coalition unless elections, due in April 2004, were advanced to November 2002” (Mango 2006, 102).

Ecevit gave in and elections were scheduled for November 2002. Mango (2006) notes, “In the elections held in November 2002, none of the three coalition parties—Ecevit’s Democratic Left, Bahceli’s Nationalists and Yilmaz’s Motherland Party—could win the minimum of 10 percent of the total poll, which under Turkish electoral law a party needs in order to qualify for representation in parliament” (102-3). The winner was the Justice and Development Party (AKP), which emerged on the political scene after the Virtue Party and Felicity Party were banned. The AKP, which is short for “Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi”, and means “clean party”, was led by Erdogan and “promised good and clean government and a fresh start” (Nasr 2009, 239). Due to its Islamist roots, Nasr (2009) argues, “The fear has been of a fundamentalist takeover, though from the start, the leaders of Turkey’s Islamic political revival have been a very different breed from the fundamentalists who have wreaked so much havoc around the region” (239). The next section will highlight the AKP and its relationship with the Turkish military and society.

**Justice and Development Party (AKP) & the Military, 2002-Present**

The AKP was founded in 2001 from members of Felicity who “softened their Islamic message” by touting “a pro-Western outlook, conservative but also favorable to democracy and markets” (Nasr 2009, 240). Additionally, the AKP accepted secularism and made a firm commitment to Ataturk’s legacy of modernization, especially with its continued goal of joining the EU. Because Erdogan was still banned from politics, AKP deputy leader Abdullah Gül became prime minister. The AKP built its base “not among fundamentalists, but in the
Anatolian heartland through…conservative family values rhetoric….” (Nasr 2009, 241). As Nasr (2009) notes, “Party leaders prefer to be called ‘conservative’ rather than ‘Muslim’ or ‘Islamic’ democrats. To them, the term ‘conservative’ evokes in equal measure national-patriotic values, a high regard for the family, religious piety, and a respect for Ottoman as well as local traditions” (241). Kemalists, however, were opposed to the AKP and their interpretation of secularism. The AKP, as a proponent of pluralism, wanted to move beyond Ataturk’s state-defined social values “….allowing society to open up to a range of values other than those of Kemalism—including more cultural rights for the country’s Kurdish minority” (Nasr 2009, 242). Therefore, since 2002, the AKP engaged the General Staff “in a shadow play of symbols and oblique rhetoric” allowing the AKP to test the extent the General Staff would defend Kemalism, while the General Staff aimed to avoid overt intervention into the political sphere (Jenkins 2006, 186).

Two important factors to consider as this period is discussed are the influence of the economy and continued goal of joining the EU. Between 2002 and 2007, the economy began to revive. First, Turkey “….impose[d] a tough belt-tightening package demanded by the International Monetary Fund as the price of restructuring Turkey’s massive foreign debts” (Nasr 2009, 239). Next, the AKP privatized many industries and promoted globalization to deepen economic and political ties to Europe (Nasr 2009, 239). As a result, thanks to Turkey’s “fiscal discipline and wise macroeconomic management, GDP nearly tripled, going from $230 billion to $660 billion and raising Turkey to number seven in the size rankings of European economies and number sixteen in the world. Over the same period…Foreign Direct Investment grew at a mind-boggling rate, skyrocketing from just $1 billion to $42 billion by the end of 2007” (Nasr 2009, 239).
In December 2002, the EU granted Turkey candidate status and would decide in December 2004 whether to set a date for accession negotiations (Mango 2006, 261). Since the November 2002 elections, the TGNA passed “no less than seven comprehensive legislative reform packages and a variety of major constitutional amendments under the… broad categories of judicial, human rights, economic, minority rights, and foreign policy reforms” (Cook 2007, 127). Of note, was the AKP’s amending of Articles 76 and 78 of the constitution which made it more difficult to ban a politician and political party. Consequently, Erdogan was able to return to politics and oversaw AKP electoral victories in 2004 and 2007.

Essentially, “[p]ressure from the EU for Turkey to comply with the Copenhagen criteria for civilian control of the military” instigated a number of reforms by the AKP to military institutions or mechanisms by which the military influenced politics (Cook 2007, 128). A December 2003 amendment to the Law on Public Financial Management and Control establishment oversight and control over the Defense Industry Support Fund and strengthened the civilian-controlled Under Secretariat of Defense “to identify priorities for defense expenditures” whereas in the past, the civilian leadership in the Ministry of Defense would just carry out the wishes of the General Staff (Cook 2007, 128). Next, the TGNA made changes to several government boards where the military exercised its influence; namely, military representatives were removed from the Higher Education Board and High Audio-Visual Board. According to Cook (2007), “Established after the 1980 coup, the senior command used these boards to ensure Kemalist orthodoxy by prohibiting anything other than official interpretations of Islam (reactionaryism), Kurdish nationalism (separatism), and socialism in university curricula and the media” (128). In short, the AKP was attempting to put in place civilian control of the
military and limit the military’s ability to “use nationalism” to bring the country in line with the EU’s Copenhagen Criteria.

The most significant institutional change in the civil-military relationship were the changes made to the National Security Council. First, the composition of the National Security Council was amended in October 2001 to include more civilian members. Cook (2007) argues:

Given the past patterns of relations between the military leadership and civilian politicians and the superior preparation of the officers on the MGK, there was little reason to believe that having more civilians around the table would undermine the military’s influence. In fact…‘civilianizing’ the MGK was little more than a cosmetic change, the military signaled its willingness to accede to this change a year before the amendment was adopted (128-9).

Moreover, by January 2004, the MGK’s only military officer was the Chief of the General Staff and a civilian secretary-general was appointed reporting directly to the prime minister and president. Previously the position was a military officer reporting to the Chief of the General Staff (Cook 2007, 129).

Second, the MGK’s meetings were reduced from monthly to bimonthly unless a special session is convened at the request of the prime minister or president. Finally, the duty of the MGK was redefined as “[r]eaching advisory decisions regarding the designation, determination and implementations of the state’s security policies within the prescribed frameworks, determining a method for providing the necessary coordination, and reporting these advisory decisions to the Cabinet Council” (129). Consequently, the Commission of the European Union found that the Turks had met the Copenhagen Criteria and accession talks began in 2005. Put simply, the importance of the above for Turkey’s future, can be described as: “Beyond the details of the government’s reform drive, the EU project produced something much more profound and
important for the country’s future political trajectory—a shift in the interests and constraints of its most important political actors, Islamists and officers” (Cook 2007, 130).

At this point, an important question must be asked: Why did the military not intervene again after these overt intrusions into the military domain? In part, the answer can be found through an examination of the “conflict” between progressive Pashas and the conservative Pashas on the General Staff during what has been termed “A Paradigmatic Shift for the Turkish Generals” (Aydinli 2009).

From 1998-2002, the Chief of the General Staff was Gen. Huseyin Kivrikoglu. He was an outspoken general, who as head of the General Staff, “….primarily exerted political influence through informal means, setting parameters for government policy by informing governments of its ‘concerns’ at monthly meetings of the National Security Council (NSC) and in private meetings with government officials or via the media through statements at public functions and in briefings to chosen journalists” (Jenkins 2006, 192). In other words, the General Staff used a number of informal contacts within government, as well as high-level meetings between a member of the general staff and the prime minister, to influence policy. Jenkins (2006) notes, “Although these channels were sometimes used to exert pressure on the government and to ensure that policy remained within what the [General Staff] saw as acceptable parameters, the two-way flow of information often served to alleviate—if never completely eradicate—mutual suspicions” (192).

The AKP’s November 2002 electoral victory coincided with the appointment of a relatively “circumspect” chief of staff in August 2002—Hilmi Özkök (Jenkins 2006, 193). Özkök avoided being seen as influencing the political process, because of the importance of the EU accession process to Turkey’s future. In particular, Özkök, in the first statement issued by
the General Staff, “vowed that the Turkish military would continue to ‘protect the Republic against every kind of threat, particularly fundamentalism and separatism’” (194). During Özkök’s tenure, the General Staff dealt with two policy issues of note, both foreign and domestic—the 2003 Iraq War and the headscarf. In both cases, Jenkins (2006) argues that Özkök “has pursued a more subtle strategy that tries to ensure that the [General Staff] adopts a low a political profile as possible and intervening to warn the government only if he believes that the Kemalist interpretation of secularism is in imminent danger” (193).

For example, in the build-up to the 2003 Iraq War, Turkey was asked by the U.S. if it could use its territory to transit troops to Iraq to establish a northern front. The AKP decided to put the issue to a vote in the TGNA on March 1st with the NSC scheduled to meet on February 28. According to Jenkins (2006), “The JDP appears to have calculated that the [General Staff] would use the NSC meeting to issue a public recommendation to Parliament to pass the motion and allow the government to shift the responsibility for the U.S. troop deployment onto the military. But Özkök declined to insist on any reference to the motion in the communiqué issued at the end of the meeting” (196). When the motion passed by 264-250 with 19 abstentions “[t]he result was a humiliation for the government but was greeted with elation by most of the Turkish public, and with angry dismay by Washington” (Jenkins 2006, 197). Conservative Generals in the General Staff openly complained that Özkök should have been more assertive, as they were concerned about the fallout affecting defense procurement from the U.S., Turkey’s largest supplier of weapons and military equipment (Jenkins 2006, 197).

The second issue concerned the headscarf ban, specifically that women could not wear headscarves in schools and government buildings. On April 23, 2003, the General Staff boycotted a reception held by Bülent Arinc to celebrate National Sovereignty and Children’s
Day “when it learned that it would be co-hosted by his headscarved wife” (Jenkins 2006, 197). At the NSC meeting on April 30, 2003, the General Staff “stepped up the pressure on the government, accusing it of trying to foster links with what it described as ‘fundamentalist organizations’ amongst the Turkish diaspora in Europe” by stressing that it was doing so to protect secularism (Jenkins 2006, 197). Ultimately, the government was unwilling to confront the Generals directly and Jenkins (2006) notes, “JDP leaders, such as Erdogan and Gül, adopted a compromise policy of taking their headscarved wives with them when they traveled abroad on official trips, but pointedly leaving them at home when they attended official functions inside Turkey” (198).

Nevertheless, there are still a number of generals who believed that the AKP was attempting to erode Kemalism gradually. From 2002-2004, Özkök attempted to resist the influence of the conservative generals to intervene more overtly. However, in 2007, with the AKP’S resounding victory and the election of Abdullah Gül as president, “the Kemalist establishment reacted viscerally” (Nasr 2009, 248). The Chief of the General Staff during this period was General Yasar Büyükant. Many conservatives “hoped that General Büyükant (chief of Staff, 2006-2009) could reverse the progressive momentum initiated by his predecessor… Özkök, and he was initially presented as the antibody of the “Özkökian” understanding of civil-military relations in Turkey” (Aydinli 2009, 591). In fact, the dispute over the AKP’S encroachment upon secularism drew up to one million people at an anti-government rally in Istanbul (Spiegel, 4/30/2007).

Shortly thereafter, on April 27, 2007, General Büyükant issued an “e-ultimatum” on the army’s webpage on behalf of the NSC stating: “Arguments over secularism are becoming a focus during the presidential election process and the Turkish armed forces are following the
situation with concern. It must not be forgotten that the armed forces are the determined defenders of secularism” (Aydinli 2009, 591; Spiegel, 4/30/2007). While initially many were unsure of whom within the General Staff wrote the memo; upon the end of his tenure, Büyükant stated, “I myself wrote this….It was Friday evening and I personally wrote it. The April (2007) declaration puts emphasis on the Turkish armed forces’ sensitivity toward secularism” (Reuters, 5/8/2009).

After several court challenges, the AKP government called elections in July 2007, which produced an overwhelming victory for the AKP and on August 28, 2007, Gül was elected president (Reuters, 5/8/2009). Throughout the campaign, the AKP campaigned on their success in managing the economy and wanted voters to “….focus on prosperity and sound governance rather than on worries about Islam and secularism” (Nasr 2009, 249). Subsequently, in 2008, Turkey’s Constitutional Court fined the AKP for anti-secular activities, which Büyükant said justified the military’s position (Reuters, 5/8/2009). Aydinli (2009) argues, “While the Turkish Armed Forces staunchly retained its position on the ban on headscarf in public spaces, in line with the will of the people, they agreed to work with the ‘lawfully elected President’ whose legitimacy was ‘unquestionable’” (591).

However, not all conservatives were comfortable with this position taken by Büyükant and the NSC. An ultra-nationalist group, Ergenekon, which consisted of writers, members of civil society organizations, and former military officers, was indicted for plotting a coup against the AKP government. Eighty-six people were charged in April 2010 after the arrests of retired generals, Sener Eruygur and Hursit Tolon, uncovered a cache of weapons, explosives and illegal documents in these officers’ homes (Arsu, 7/15/2008). The military has continually sought to distance itself from the Ergenekon group. According to Aydinli (2009):
When initial rumors emerged during General Özkök’s term that some of his commanders were allegedly involved in making coup preparations, the Chief of Staff announced publicly that, if asked by the courts, he would be willing to testify against any coup plotters—something he has since done in a closed session with the prosecutors (593).

Under General Büyükant’s successor, General Ilker Basbug cooperation with the justice system continued. Overall, the military leadership “is growing more consolidated within a progressive agenda, and…the conservative argument is losing its centrality....[as] the attitudes and actions of these three generals...reveal their dissociation from the conservative discourse and their proactive efforts to help remove the remaining agents of securitization which have provided a vital infrastructure for the military’s conservative figures” (Aydinli 2009, 594).

General Basbug has been Chief of the General Staff since 2009 and in his speeches he “stressed that the priority of the Turkish Armed Forces was the ‘fight against terrorism,’ a sign that the military would be prioritizing its ‘regular,’ externally oriented military mission, and nothing else” (Aydinli 2009, 593). In effect, Basburg and the military leadership, were concerned with the military’s relationship with society. Basburg stated that the military would only express its views through the NSC and reiterated that the military’s power derived from soft power rather than hard power: “‘The Turkish military is not getting its power from its weapons but from the Turkish society’s love and trust in its armed forces’” (Aydinli 2009, 593). Turkey’s civil-military relationship cannot be understood without “understanding the dynamics of the Turkish societal instincts such as its deep fears of (in)security and disorder, which are at the core of its existential bond with the army” (Aydinli 2009, 595). Consequently, Turkish military officers benefit from Turkey’s amalgam of democratic practices and quasi-democratic institutions in 3 closely connected areas:
1) These attributes of democracy conform well to the rhetoric of the Kemalist project, the centerpiece of which involved efforts ‘to raise Turkish society to the level of civilization’ (in this case, the democratic and secular West). For the officers and their civilian allies, this seeming convergence between principle and practice helps to reinforce the legitimacy of the regime.

2) The officers use Turkey’s pseudodemocratic institutions to insulate themselves from politics. For the military establishment, the second largest armed forces in NATO, it is critical that the officers are shielded from the vicissitudes of politics in order to maintain the military’s professionalism. The existence of a national parliament, competitive elections, and alternating government coalitions represents an indispensable buffer between politics and the military enclave, permitting the commanders to focus on matters related to military modernization and national defense.

3) The pseudo-democratic institutions give the military the respect and admiration of large majorities of the Turkish people. Although the officers are responsible for the political order, the presence of institutions resembling a democratic polity effectively shields them from public dissatisfaction (Cook 2007, 105).

Conclusion

The Turkish Armed Forces are the defenders of the Kemalist flame. Since Turkey’s founding in 1920, the military has intervened four times when the officers felt politicians were straying from Kemalism, specifically secularism. Despite their disdain for politicians, the military preferred to stay out of the day-to-day operations of government and wanted to be involved only as long as necessary to establish a “clean slate” and hold elections. Essentially, the military is seen as the ultimate guarantor of the nation by Turkish society.
The military’s relationship with Turkish society weighed heavily on each decision to intervene. The reverse of that decision, the withdrawal of the military, and return to electoral democracy, was influenced in later years by the West, specifically the EU accession process and the “paradigmatic divide” that has developed in the officer corps between conservative generals who were strident defenders of Kemalism and progressive generals who were more open to the ongoing transformation and modernization occurring in Turkey. Since the AKP’s electoral victory in 2002, the military has kept a watchful eye on the government fearful that its Islamist roots were harmful to the Kemalist order established by Atatürk. However, the progressive generals have grown confident in the NSC and the democratic institutions and processes in place. As the AKP’s popularity has grown, the likelihood of future military interventions in Turkey has waned; namely, because the military cannot be seen ceding the label of modernizer of the nation to the Islamists. Thus, Turkey’s civil-military relations has matured to allow for some civilian control, due to the influence of the West, but the military will continue to be an institutional check on the power of government.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

Any human being who believes that the destinies of other human beings depend wholly upon him personally is a petty man, failing to grasp the most elementary facts. Every man is doomed to perish physically. The only way to stay happy while we live is to work, not for ourselves, but for those to come.—Kemal Atatürk, March 1938 (Lewis 2002, 294).

Above all, military role expansion and military coups are politically driven processes; by the same token, the achievement of civilian supremacy over the military must be politically led. Military establishments do not seize power from successful and legitimate civilian regimes. They intervene in politics...when civilian politicians are weak and divided, and when their divisions and manifest failures of governance have generated a vacuum of authority—Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner, Civil-Military Relations and Democracy (1996, xxix).

This study of military interventions and withdrawals serves as a useful starting point for understanding the endurance of authoritarianism in the Middle East and South Asia. The Algerian, Pakistani, and Turkish militaries were the strongest institution at the birth of the nation. Throughout Algerian, Pakistani, and Turkish history, there were severe socio-economic problems and contradictions, internal conflicts, war, and international influence. These factors necessitated the militaries coming to the defense of the nation and protecting their interests from politicians. This chapter will compare and contrast the similarities and differences discussed in the preceding case studies and offer implications for theory and future research.

Comparing Military Interventions & Withdrawals

At the start, two questions drove this study: Why do militaries intervene in politics and what factors are necessary for the military to “return to the barracks”? Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey offer three of the most recent cases of military intervention and withdrawal from politics. George’s (2005) comparative case study method allows for a systematic examination of the conflict present in the relationship between the military, politicians and society in Algeria, Pakistan and Turkey. Therefore, at this point, the military intervention and withdrawal
hypotheses developed from the civil-military relations literature and tested in the case studies will be discussed below.

Algeria, a state with a strongly egalitarian, nationalist people, has been in conflict for much of its existence since the end of colonialism. At that point, the political system was defined by clan politics, as the ALN, FLN and FIS were subsumed in inter-clan rivalry.

After the war, there were two groups within the military, the "old guard", who were members of the interior AN and an "external group" of officers who were based during the war in Tunisia and Morocco. These officers came from various clans around the state and were led by Ben Bella and Boumedienne, respectively. Ben Bella became president with the support of Boumedienne, but this support was short lived. Conflict abounded between politicians within the FLN and between the military and politicians.

Ben Bella would spend three years prior to Boumedienne's coup pitting factions against one another to attempt to hold on to power. Subsequently, the military intervened in 1965, when Boumedienne felt that Ben Bella's government was interfering with the professional development and control of the army. There were only a small number of officers who took part in the decision to undertake the coup against Ben Bella. The three years prior to the coup, from 1962-65, Algeria was on the verge of civil war. Conflict was high between Ben Bella's FLN Political Bureau, Ben Khedda's provisional government (the GPRA) and the internal wilaya commanders of wilayas II, III, and IV. Boumedienne and the "externals" were able to take advantage of the situation to consolidate their power, leading to Ben Bella's resignation and the ascendancy of Boumedienne.
advantage of the bureaucratic conflict between the GPRA and the internal wilaya commanders to create a well-disciplined army. This conflict carried over into Ben Bella’s regime in an independent Algeria during, as the internal wilaya commanders of wilayas II, III, and IV resented Boumedienne’s “Army of the Exterior” for failing to assist them during the War of Independence.

Ben Bella had established a coalition of the Political Bureau, the ‘Tlemcen Group (Boumedienne, Khider and Abbas) and the Oujda clan within the ANP, each of whom had their own ambitions, that drew the ire of Algerian communists and socialists who supported Hadj and Boudiaf who were not a part of Ben Bella’s coalition. By 1965, Ben Bella had centralized power in his hands with small group of supporters, however he had no political base from which to draw support. At this point, Ben Bella’s ambition for power got the best of him as he then moved to challenge the Oujda clan in an attempt to further consolidate his power. By appointing a loyalist as chief of staff of the army, having the police report directly to him instead of through the Ministry of Interior (headed by one of Boumedienne’s close associates in the Oujda clan), and dismissing another Boumedienne ally, Bouteflika, Boumedienne and the Oujda clan overthrew Ben Bella, disbanded parliament, suspended the 1963 constitution, and placed power in a Council of the Revolution—a twenty-six member, predominantly military body that consisted of allies of Boumedienne.

Therefore, the military intervention hypotheses applicable to the 1965 coup by Boumedienne would be those concerned with military elites, bureaucratic conflict, and military elite self-interest. As described above, bureaucratic conflict was quite high among political elites, as well as between the internal and external military, and the wilaya commanders and politicians. This conflict carried over into an independent Algeria, as a result of clan politics.
The rise of Boumedienne and the Oujda clan demonstrates the presence of high amounts of military self-interest as the Oujda clan dominated decision-making in the new ANP. It was Ben Bella’s effort to replace allies of Boumedienne and the Oujda clan that resulted in the 1965 coup d’etat.

The only intervention hypothesis not bearing directly on the decision to intervene was the hypothesis stating that the presence of military corporatism would result in intervention. The 1965 coup occurred shortly after independence and the new ANP was, first and foremost, influenced by the Oujda clan and had not firmly established itself in the bureaucracy and the Algerian economy. This began after the coup once Boumedienne consolidated his hold on power by placing members of his Oujda clan in the bureaucracy to help in the political administration of the country. Boumedienne used socialism and support from the Soviet Union to win acquiescence from the population with the promotion of rapid development and the creation of a strong industrial base. This top-down modernization resulted in new industries and an increase in literacy, but by the 1980s Algeria witnessed a new generation born after the war of independence begin to come of age.

As with any youth bulge, and especially one within a Middle Eastern society, there was dissatisfaction with the one-party rule established by Boumedienne and the generals that succeeded him. In Algeria, conflict against the regime came from two ideological movements: the communists (including Berber identity movements) and Islamists, most notably the FIS. As such, from the 1970s through today, conflict between these groups and conflict directed toward the military regime have been ever present.
January 1992 Coup

After Boumedienne’s death in 1978, the Military High Command continually put forth its preferred candidate for the presidency. With Chadli in office, the military withdrew from the day-to-day running of the country and would hold elections to appeal to societal pressure. However, it is important to note, that that the military was still a major interest group influencing politics. Thus, the military withdrew after the contentious conflict between the FLN and the military once their self-interests were protected and engaged in consensus seeking with the selection of Colonel Benjedid.

A combination of violence, a deteriorating economy, and the emergence of the Islamists forced the ANP to cancel the second round of parliamentary elections in 1991 after the FIS victory. The army would then be caught in the middle of a vicious civil war. Islamists viewed the secular nature of the Chadli regime and its inability to keep its promises of economic reforms as damaging to their interests. The Chadli regime and the ANP were opposed to the Islamists having banned “political associations” based exclusively on religion, language, region, sex and race or those advocating violence. Therefore, military intervention occurred because the military was in conflict with the Islamists and their self-interest was extremely high as they were worried about the reforms that would be undertaken by the Islamists, which would be damaging to their institutional self-interest, as well as the potential for war of Berbers v. Arab or the Islamists provoking one of Algeria’s neighbors.

Although, during this period, while conflict raged across the country, a younger group of officers was coming of age and attempted to influence the direction of the country. The conflict between the “eradicators” and “conciliators” concerned how best to deal with Islamism. The
eradicators favored all-out repression of political Islam, while the conciliators sought a political solution based on compromise.

As part of the negotiations undertaken by the conciliators under General Zeroual, who became president, the High Security Council was established to allow the military to influence Algeria’s return to electoral politics. A new constitution was written which reinforced the military’s role in the political process through the High Security Council, a strong presidency, and the creation of a political party, the National Rally for Democracy, to counter the influence of the FLN and FIS. As a result, Algeria’s president has been the ANP’s man.

President Bouteflika, Algeria’s current president, has been in power since 1999 and the longevity of his reign is due in part to economic support received from the West, specifically the IMF and the United States. Algeria is a major supplier of oil and natural gas to the international community, and the instability currently present is a direct result of the Bouteflika regime siphoning profits and fuels the discontent Islamists, who are now part of AQMI, have toward the regime and contributing to the military’s need to maintain its role in government, albeit from behind the scenes.

Thus, military withdrawal occurred after the civil war when military elites saw that their self-interests would be protected by the establishment of the HCE and their own political party, the RND. This was only possible after consensus seeking occurred between the eradicators and conciliators within the ANP and a new constitution was written institutionalizing the HCE and elections along the lines that would be favorable to the military’s preferred candidate. Subsequently, the military was able to remain “withdrawn” because of having its man, Bouteflika, as president, as well as the economic support of the United States, European Union, and IMF. At this point, there was limited conflict within the military as there continues to be an
Islamist threat from AQMI, and the military reached consensus that the threat from this internal societal actor necessitated their remaining involved in the political process from behind the scenes.

**Pakistan**

In Pakistan, conflict was present from the outset. The death of Jinnah left the political elites without their leader and the forceful personality needed to help build the compromise needed between the various ethnic and sectarian groups within the new Pakistani state. The military, the state’s strongest institution, intervened after ethnic and sectarian violence was engulfing multiple provinces and the politicians were unable to quell this violence. This produced the five-step dance where the military warns “incompetent” politicians that they are encroaching on the military’s institutional and elite self-interests, a crisis occurs resulting in the intervention, followed by the military junta introducing constitutional changes to “straighten out” Pakistan. This occurred in 1958, 1969, 1977 and 1999.

Once the military is satisfied that their interests will not be encroached upon they will withdraw from politics. However, in Pakistan, political elites were in constant conflict with one another as well as the military. When the military would withdraw, politicians in the PPP and PML attempted reforms to try and improve their position vis-à-vis the military, even encroaching on policy issues perceived as vital to military institutional and elite self-interest. This occurred three times: 1971-1977, 1988-1999, and 2008-Present. Below, the intervention and withdrawal hypotheses are examined within the Pakistani case study.

**1958 Coup**

The decision to intervene in Pakistani politics in 1958 was undertaken by Ayub and 3 army generals who served in Liaquat’s cabinet with him. Ayub and the military viewed
politicians as corrupt and sought to incorporate Islam on discussions of socio-political change but wanted to limit Islamists’ role in the political process. Ayub and the military’s institutional/corporate interests were to remove corrupt politicians from harming the Pakistani state and to begin Pakistan’s rapid economic development through the imposition of martial law by altering economic, legal and constitutional institutions. Thus, all six intervention hypotheses can be applied to the 1958 coup, as military elite and corporate interests drove military decision-making.

The military remained in power from 1958-1971 due to military corporate interests and the support of the U.S. The military was concerned with the development of the economy and had to contend with continued protests from Sindhi and Bengalis who had been marginalized in the bureaucracy and military. This instilled great animosity toward Ayub and the military from Sindhi and Bengali politicians. Nevertheless, Ayub relied on aid from the U.S, as the U.S. attempted to contain communism in South Asia to the tune of $143 million as part of a U.S. military assistance program. Ayub, now overconfident, went to war with India. The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War led to high contestation between the military and politicians, specifically Bhutto’s PPP, as well as conflicts between generals and younger officers within the military. In this case military withdrawal did not occur from military to civilian government, but instead from Ayub’s military regime to Yahya’s military regime.

For Yahya, the decision to continue military rule was undertaken with a small group of generals. However, Yahya’s three years of rule would be beset with conflict between military elites and internal societal actors, specifically the Bengalis (led by Mujib) as well as among generals within the military high command. The loss of East Pakistan was a major disgrace for the Pakistani military and the junior officers in the high command; thus, Chief of the General
Staff Hassan and Air Chief Khan met with Z. Bhutto and asked him to assume the post of President and CMLA. This process was both rapid and precarious. Bhutto then began his power grab and interference into military affairs that led to the 1977 coup of General Zia ul-Haq.

1977 Coup

Zia’s coup was discussed between him, his military commanders, and the general staff. Zia appointed like-minded generals and bureaucrats into top positions and increased the economic stakes for the military. This ensured that military withdrawal would not happen. Zia argued that the survival of Pakistan was contingent on building an Islamic state, as he deeply distrusted politicians and the Islamists. Accordingly, the Islamists were co-opted to ensure Zia’s martial law regime would gain legitimacy in the eyes of the population. The extension of military rule also benefited from the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the U.S.’s increased economic assistance to Pakistan to contain communism. Thus, international involvement in domestic politics and bureaucratic conflict between military elites and internal societal actors contributed to the military’s continued involvement in Pakistani politics from 1977-1988.

In 1988, after the death of Zia, the military high command, specifically VCAS Beg met with the other members of the military high command and his corp commanders to outline the military’s withdrawal from politics. The withdrawal, however, only occurred after the military ensured its interests in the democratic process would be protected; namely, the supremacy of Islam, obedience of law and justice, support for the war in Afghanistan. The military high command worked with the PML-N and the Islamist parties and reached consensus that it was important to challenge the progress of Benzir Bhutto and the PPP.

During the “Democratic Period” of 1988-1999, Bhutto and Sharif alternated in power with the military continuing its involvement in the democratic process from behind the scenes.
Both Bhutto and Sharif chose to involve themselves in military corporate interests by appointing military chiefs of their own choosing, bypassing the military chain of command, which is a process that upsets officers when done by politicians. Moreover, events in Afghanistan and foreign policy, major military corporate interests in the 1980s and 1990s, ensured that the military would not withdraw from politics. The military supported the Taliban in Afghanistan as a counter to the Tajik, Ahmed Shah Masoud, who’s Northern Alliance had made substantial gains during the Afghan civil war of the 1990s. Also, the suspension of military sales, military training programs and economic assistance from the U.S. over Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program concerned the generals and prevented withdrawal, because the generals believed that Sharif was not doing enough to find a diplomatic solution with the US to continue weapons procurement. Throughout the 1990s, the deteriorating Pakistani economy and the continued conflict between the politicians of PML-N and PPP culminated in Musharraf’s 1999 coup.

1999 Coup

The decision to overthrow Sharif was made by a small number of Musharraf loyalists in the military high command. Musharraf was out of the country on his way back from a trip to Sri Lanka and upon reaching his deputy Lt. Gen Mohammad Aziz Khan, Lt. Gen. Mahmood Ahmed, and Maj. Gen. Shahid Aziz, the director general of military operations, the decision to oust Sharif was reached. As with prior military regimes, the military viewed politicians and the political process as corrupt. Also, with the weakness of the Pakistani economy, the military institutional self-interests and military elite-self interests were threatened; namely, the military’s view that Sharif could not govern and would threaten the military’s corporate interests of supporting the Taliban in Afghanistan and Islamists fighting in Kashmir.
Although, after 9/11, Musharraf was placed in a precarious situation of needing to ensure military corporate interests were protected, specifically ensuring the continuing flow of American economic aid. During the eight year reign of Musharraf, the military remained in power; namely because the politicians were viewed as a threat to the military’s position of power, although this was mostly because of Musharraf. In October 2002 elections, Musharraf aligned with the Islamists to prevent the PPP and PML from gaining seats. Voting was along ethnic lines and only served to increase the influence of Islamism at the local level. In effect, Musharraf ruled by decree from 2002-2007 to counter the growing influence of Islamism.

Internal societal actors, the PML and PPP, as well as the Islamists were upset at Musharraf’s usurpation of power. Moreover, as the U.S. achieved tactical military victory in Afghanistan, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda fled across the Durand Line into the Tribal Areas of Pakistan. This served to exacerbate the domestic political and security situation within Pakistan. The military had a difficult time controlling the security situation within the Tribal Areas resulting in increased confrontation between military elites and internal societal actors ensuring military withdrawal would not occur. However, ethnic unrest and ethnic tension reached a crescendo by the end of 2007, as Musharraf, who had kept his generals on a tight leash, dismissed the chief justice of the Pakistani Supreme Court. The result was protests from civil society, specifically thousands of lawyers, which spurred the PPP and PML to pressure the regime for new elections.

The election was set for January 2008 under precarious conditions and the military withdrew only after Musharraf had appointed General Kayani as Army Chief and retired from the army to run as president. Although, with the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, there appears to have been pressure from the U.S. for Musharraf to hold the elections as scheduled with
Musharraf supported by a faction of the PML. Thus, military withdrawal at this point was both rapid and precarious. Musharraf believed he stood a chance in the electoral contest, however he misjudged the level of sympathy for Bhutto and the PPP after her assassination, as well as the increased animosity toward Musharraf himself, and the PPP took advantage of this fact and won a decisive victory.

President Zardari’s tenure has been one of continued conflict. First, there has been conflict with Sharif and the PML, as well with the Islamists and Al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas. The military institutional interests at this time concerned the survival of the Pakistani state from a very serious internal opponent, the Pakistani Taliban and the jihadist groups that it still supports in its efforts against Kashmir. The assistance of the U.S. continues to flow in to the tune of $7.5 billion dollars in non-military funding and will continue to pressure Pakistan to ally with US interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan.

Ultimately, both politicians and the military sought to manage Islamism, which sprang up as a result of political and economic policies of the various military and political regimes. Each regime used Islam in its attempts to nation-build, but it must be noted, that the use of Islam was not used for the benefit of the Pakistani people; instead the military protected its interests. Consequently, the Pakistani people have suffered. The state is in a continuing battle with religious extremist groups, which at various times throughout its history, were used in ideological struggles against communism and now Salafism. Pakistan’s geostrategic position between the Middle East and South Asia make it an important frontline state and the recipient of huge sums of economic and military assistance from the United States. Thus, as the battle against Al-Qaeda and the Pakistani Taliban continues, and with the war in Afghanistan now in its
ninth year, the Pakistani military will continue to influence politics, as each of these are vital military institutional interests that threaten the security of the Pakistani state.

Turkey

Turkey, under the leadership of Atatürk, implemented a top-down modernization through an ideology known as Kemalism. Through the promotion of secularism and assimilationist nationalism, the Turkish military were the guardians of Kemalism and Atatürk’s legacy. Since the founding of the Republic, the military has intervened four times when the General Staff, and even a group of junior officers, felt the politicians were straying from Kemalism.

As part of Kemalism, Turkey moved toward a multi-party democracy with the influence of the international community, specifically the United States and NATO. The end of World War II and Marshall Plan funds helped influence İnönü to continue multi-party politics and moved the military’s focus to a conflict between the left and right on the political spectrum—socialism and Islamism. Despite a disdain for politicians, whom the military viewed as corrupt and a threat to the secular, Kemalist order, the military preferred to be removed from the day-to-day operations of government and only remained involved as long as necessary to establish a “clean slate” and hold elections. Each time, the military was conscious of how the intervention would be perceived by Turkish society. Interventions occurred in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997.

1960 Coup

For the Turkish military, historically, politicians were viewed with contempt and the political process was something to be watched over as the military was the guardian of the Kemalist flame. After winning multi-party elections in 1950, the Democrat Party, under Menderes ruled until 1960; however, the party’s rule was bereft with internal conflict between the DP and the CHP and military. Upon taking office Menderes purged the Chief of the General
Staff and the military high command. This was the first instance of Menderes involving himself into military corporate interests, specifically issues involving the chain of command. Also, after the downturn in the economy in 1954, Menderes began a series of political reforms to repress the press, judiciary and universities—groups within society that were viewed as loyal to the CHP. Consequently, bureaucratic conflict was high between politicians of the DP and CHP, between the politicians and the military, and within the military for the next six years.

The culmination of this bureaucratic conflict was the 1960 coup. The junta was led by a group of flag-rank officers who were opposed to the Democrat Party and felt that Menderes was undermining Kemalism. The junta of flag-rank officers were led by Gürsel—a general—and established the National Unity Committee (NUC) which consisted of a cabinet of five officers and thirteen civilians (later reduced to three). Prior to the coup, however, there had been disagreement among a radical group led by Alparslan Turkes and the more liberal group of flag-rank officers who were able to co-opt a select few generals who had been appointed by Gürsel. Therefore, the 1960 coup occurred because bureaucratic politics was high between internal societal actors, the DP and CHP, and contestation was also high between the military and politicians. The military was adament about maintaining its corporate interest, specifically protecting Kemalism.

Another contributing factor was military elite self-interest; namely, that the generals and junior flag-rank officers were upset at Menderes’s intrusion into the military chain-of-command when he dismissed the high command. This was a violation of the professionalism of the officer corps. Interestingly, the military’s awareness of issues of professionalism was greatly influenced eight years earlier with Turkey’s participation in the Korean War and ascension to NATO. Thus, the influence of an international actor—the U.S.—had an indirect effect on military intervention.
The NUC ruled from 1961-3. Before the military would withdraw from politics the NUC oversaw the writing of a new constitution. However, the constitution writing process re-ignited the bureaucratic conflict between the junior officers and the generals regarding the transition to democracy and the extent of NUC involvement in military corporate interests. To prevent further actions by the junior officers, the generals founded the Armed Forces Union (AFU) and repeatedly warned politicians in memoranda throughout 1961 and 1962 to not return to the style of politics pre-coup. In response, Gürsel purged these senior officers, sending them a letter saying the NUC had been dissolved, retiring them from the armed forces, and stationing them overseas in Turkish embassies and reestablished the NUC with the remaining 23 members who were both junior officers and bureaucrats. Thus, bureaucratic conflict among the generals and junior officers did not result in consensus seeking as one of the withdrawal hypotheses would suggest, but rather the confrontation led to two attempted coups by the radicals over the protracted effort to structure elections the NUC could agree upon.

In fact, after the elections not only did the NUC shut down the DP, Menderes was executed to forestall a return to his corrupt, autocratic rule. This led to increasing protests from Menderes supporters within the army, led by General Aydemir, who demanded an annulment of the election results. Aydemir led two coups against the regime, but were unsuccessful due to the efforts of senior officers in the chain of command. At this point, bureaucratic conflict was high between military officers, so to withdraw, the military formed a coalition with Inonu and the CHP. After 1963, the military stayed out of politics and entered into a period of cohabitation with politicians in a multi-party system lasting until 1971.
The multiparty politics of the 1960s brought a new set of elites to power in the Justice Party (JP) and CHP—Demirel and Ecevit, respectively. Moreover, the mid-late 1960s saw an increase in economic growth, which Demirel sought to use to his advantage, as he was a popular leader to the Turkish public, many of whom saw an increase in their average income. Accordingly, Demirel sought to reconcile with the army through the encouragement of private enterprise to rival the state sector of the economy. Demirel wanted to ensure army officers received better pay and conditions to quell any potential discontent among the officer corps.

However, Demirel’s policies contributed to increased conflict among the other internal societal actors; namely, political parties on the extreme left (Turkish Worker’s Party), the left (CHP) and extreme right (Nationalist Action Party of Türkes and the National Order Party of Erbakan). Each of the extremist parties had armed militias participating in civil unrest, bombings, robberies, and kidnappings against the other. These internal societal actors were upset that Demirel’s economic reforms had not reached their constituents—unions, agricultural workers, and Islamists—directing their protests against the military and economic ties to the West. Consequently, after the 1969 elections Demirel’s government lost its parliamentary majority, thereby allowing the extremists parties a chance to build coalitions forcing the military to intervene into the political process in March 1971.

The decision to intervene was undertaken by a group of senior, conservative generals who formed an ad hoc group known as the Enlarged Council of Commanders. These were the chiefs of the Land Forces, Navy, Air Force and Chief of General Staff. Their interests concerned the fact that Demirel had lost control of government and was unable to deal with the rising violence and political terrorism. Accordingly, the military’s corporate interest concerned the
need to restore law and order. The generals’ interest was expressed in a three-point memorandum. The memorandum was the result of bureaucratic compromise between the senior generals and a group of junior officers who were “reformists” advocating a more authoritarian government. Thus, Demirel’s government was forced to resign and a military-backed government would lead Turkey through two years of martial law.

The military would withdraw in October 1973 but not before there was bureaucratic conflict between military elites and politicians over the selection of Turkey’s next president. All but one (Bayar) of the previous presidents was a former military man. Consequently, one of the military’s institutional interests was that the office of the presidency was under their purview to represent the interests of the military in the civilian political system. The Supreme Command Council, thus, put forth their preferred candidate, Chief of the General Staff General Gürler, who resigned and was appointed to the Senate by President Sunay. Interestingly, this appointment was made after consensus was reached with each of the political party leaders—save for Demirel—who refused to attend. Demirel and Ecevit cooperated to ensure that Gürler was not elected and retired Admiral Korutürk was instead. Therefore, the events just described point to bureaucratic conflict resulting in consensus seeking between the generals and politicians which led the military to withdraw in October 1973, because the generals were unwilling to take power openly and instead made way for a series of weak, elected coalition governments from 1973-1980.

1980 Coup

The coalition governments between 1973 and 1980 were beset by conflict between politicians. These seven years witnessed the continued rise of extremist parties on the left and
right fueled by ideology and personal rivalry. Accordingly, the rising violence and economic crisis led to the military intervention of September 1980.

Under General Kenan Evren, the decision to intervene was undertaken by a five-man junta—General Evren and the Supreme Military Council. Their interest concerned political elites’ repeated failures to form a national unity government and the restoration of law and order after continued ideological, sectarian, and ethnic conflict. Also, the state was bereft with economic crisis after years of rapid economic growth and unequal social distribution in the state, which resulted in the U.S., Europe, and IMF providing stabilization and austerity measures to assist Turkish economic recovery. During the late 1970s, there was bureaucratic conflict among military elites, as the generals discussed what a post-coup regime should look like. One group, the minimalists, argued for a post-coup regime that restricted its actions to reforming the constitution and strengthening laws affecting state security before withdrawing from politics, while the maximalists argued for the army to enact far reaching social and economic reforms. Thus, intervention resulted when military self-interest was threatened by violence, economic crisis, and bureaucratic conflict among military elites.

After the September 1980 coup, Turkey remained under martial law until 1983. To ensure that military corporate and self-interests were protected, General Evren and the Chiefs of Staff of the army, navy, air force and gendermarie formed the NSC to be both an executive and legislative authority. To assist the military in running the country, a 27-member cabinet was created composed of retired officers and bureaucrats. Moreover, to counter the spread of communism, the army with support from the U.S. created a new ideology called the “Turkish-Islamic” synthesis, because under the NSC’s military rule religion and ethnics became a part of the basic curriculum in schools and would be an antidote to communism. Thus, each of the
military withdrawal hypotheses explain the military’s involvement in politics for three years and then withdrawal in 1983 after military corporate and self interests were protected with the writing of a new constitution and restructured political process creating the Third Turkish Republic.

The Third Turkish Republic lasted from 1983 until 1997. A number of important issues affected Turkish civil-military relations during this time: concessions to Islamists, ethnic conflict, economics, EC application, the Gulf War, and dissolution of the Soviet Union. Of particular note was the leadership of Öcal, who was trusted by Evren to reform the Turkish economy. Consequently, he was able to translate this success into becoming the first civilian head of state since 1960. Although, by the mid-1990s, the initial successes of the Turkish economy met up with the reality of heavy borrowing from the IMF. The recovery would be incremental, but would lead to the rise of Islamists in the 1990s, specifically the Refah Party, as a protest vote against ineffective political leadership and economic conditions. The election of Refah would lead to another confrontation between politicians and the military beginning in 1996 and culminating in the 1997 Coup by Memorandum.

1997 Coup by Memorandum

The decision to intervene was undertaken by the General Staff and the NSC—five senior officers and four civilian ministers chaired by the President. For the military, their concern was the influence militant Islam was having in society as a result of Refah’s win. More specifically, the military’s institutional interest concerned Refah staffing the bureaucracy with co-ideologists who would threaten the secular nature of the Kemalist state. Alternatively, Refah hoped to achieve social justice, a just economic order, and promote Muslim values in Turkey through education. In response the military stated that Refah had a hidden agenda to convert Turkey into
a state governed by *sharia* law. Consequently, military self-interest and corporate interests were threatened which resulted in intervention. There was, however, an absence of bureaucratic conflict, as the military was united in their views of Refah threatening secularism.

An interesting aspect of this intervention was the influence of the EU. Turkey had begun ascension talks with the EU and resorted to the communiqué with 18 directives that Erbakan would not be able to fulfill. In essence, the NSC was concerned with international recognition and did not want to be seen as abrogating democracy once again. So, in reality, the military never intervened as it had done in years past; instead, Erbakan was unable to maintain his coalition and, feeling pressure from the military, was forced to resign. Both the military and politicians were mindful of the benefit EU membership would have on Turkey.

Since the last intervention in 1997, there has been a “paradigmatic divide” between conservative generals who sought to protect Kemalism and more reform-minded generals who embraced the transformation and modernization occurring in Turkey. More importantly, the AKP’s victories in 2002 and 2007 demonstrate a unique situation; namely, that Islamist political elites’ established a compromise to work with the reformist generals, whom had installed institutions that would protect their interests. The military cannot be seen as ceding the label of modernizer to the Islamists, so for the foreseeable future, the military will continue to be an institutional check on the power of government.

**Relationships Among the Variables**

Taking the cases of Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey as a whole, this study has shown that within the Middle East and South Asia one can argue that militaries intervene in politics mainly due to domestic factors. More specifically, military elite self-interest influenced military intervention across the cases. First and foremost, military elites were concerned with military
professionalism and conflict resulted when politicians interfered in policy and organizational structure the military perceived was their purview. This confirms the applicability of the societal and internal dynamic schools of military intervention; namely the work of Finer (1976), Nordlinger (1977) and Perlmutter (1977). The military claims it is defending the “national interest” when it intervenes, when in fact, the true motive is military elite-self interest and military institutional interest. The Algerian, Pakistani, and Turkish militaries were the stronger institutions in each country, and thus, were able to take advantage of the fact that there was limited trust in political institutions.

Furthermore, across the cases, this study highlighted the bureaucratic conflict present throughout history between political elites, internal societal actors, and the military. Conflict between politicians over how to rule the state would give the military pretext to intervene in politics. Subsequently, this foray into politics would create conditions on the ground which produced the opposite outcome; namely, continued military rule and the rise of internal societal actors—communists and Islamists. These periods of military rule engendered consensus-seeking between military elites as their interests were protected and the electoral system rigged to prevent internal societal actors from participating in politics. This was done due to the use of images in the minds of military elites created by the context of the international system. More specifically, military elites, politicians, and internal societal actors’ behavior was influenced by the international environment during the time periods of military intervention and withdrawal. Although, the international environment has influenced the political environment of these states, it is not the proximate cause of intervention and withdrawal, only an intervening variable influencing the generals’ decision-making regarding whether to intervene and their perceptions of politicians, internal societal actors, and each groups’ views of the military.
Additionally, across the cases, military corporatism was not a cause of military intervention or withdrawal. Instead, corporatism in combination with international support led to the endurance of authoritarianism. The Algerian, Pakistani, and Turkish militaries have consistently received military and economic assistance from the international community, specifically the IMF, United States, and Soviet Union/Russia. This continued assistance during the Cold War or in a Post-9/11 fight against Al-Qaeda, in the case of Pakistan and Algeria has led to a dependence on military and economic assistance which furthers military corporatism, strengthening the military as an institution, as it uses money as it sees fit to the detriment of Pakistani and Algerian society.

Overcoming the endurance of authoritarianism is not an easy task, as this study has shown. The military will withdraw from politics only when military institutional self-interest and military elite self-interest are protected. Here as well, the international community played an important role. Most notably, is the case of Turkey, where military and politicians’ behavior was influenced by the possibility of joining the EU.

Implications for Theory

The study of military intervention and withdrawal carries renewed importance for the United States since 9/11, as the Bush and Obama administrations have undertaken complex nation-building endeavors in the Middle East and South Asia. Authoritarianism has endured throughout both regions despite the global spread of democracy. Thus, it is important to understand what factors explain this endurance of authoritarianism.

This study examined the role of individual, institutional and societal factors within the Middle East and South Asia to improve our understanding of the control of state institutions in the region, specifically by the military. Understanding military interventions into politics and the
factors for military withdrawal are more complicated than just examining the “level of agreement” between the military, political elites and citizenry (Schiff 2009). What was missing was a more descriptive understanding of what this “agreement” looked like, especially since the Middle East and South Asia’s history has been one of mostly conflict between the military, political elites and society. Accordingly, Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey show that bureaucratic conflict is persistent in the civil-military relationships throughout their histories. Each case study showed the influences on this conflict and how it developed over time.

Consequently, this study affirms the validity of the variables and hypotheses developed from the military intervention and withdrawal literature applied to Eastern Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. In particular, this study has sought to rectify what Welch (1992) sees as a major flaw; namely, that “….although patterns have been discerned in the regionally based analyses, they have neither coalesced into a generally accepted paradigm nor served to guide collection of data on a wider basis.” (324). Combining bureapoltics with concordance theory affords one this opportunity. Moreover, this study provides an understanding of the decision-making context to better measure “agreement” among the military, politicians, and society, because development in the Middle East and South Asia is multidimensional and to achieve a “Western” civil-military relationship involves an understanding of the complex relationships between the military, politicians and society present in these regions that underpin the endurance of authoritarianism.

Scholars such as Janowitz (1977), Nordlinger (1977), Welch (1980) and Hale (1994) have developed descriptive typologies defining the characteristics of military rule, however there has been a lack of literature on how these military regimes could move away from military rule and toward civilian rule. A civil-military relationship in the Western sense, as defined by
Huntington (1957), is still years away. It is important to remember that states in the Global North developed their civil-military relationships, in some cases, over hundreds of years. In the case of the Middle East and South Asia, the political development of Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey’s civil-military relationships are still in their infancy—at 48, 63, and 87 years, respectively.

Therefore, this study is a first cut at understanding the international and domestic factors influencing conflict between various individuals and institutions in the Middle East and South Asia that will continue to impact the future of political development in the region. More specifically, by understanding the interests of the military as an institution and the elites within it, a professional civil-military relationship can begin to be constructed. Although, as Diamond and Plattner (1996) argue:

Where the military itself has controlled the pace and character of the transition from authoritarian rule, establishing civilian supremacy is a much more formidable task. Particularly where the military has a long tradition of intervention and rule and has acquired substantial domains of power in the state and the economy…narrowing military prerogatives can be a risky business, requiring for success all of the classic instruments of effective politics: broad coalitions, persuasive communication, a clear vision of ultimate goals and a sequential strategy for achieving them, deft balancing of costs and rewards, and a shrewd sense of timing (xxix).

In a sense, there needs to be a process of bargaining, dialogue, cooperation, and consensus building that works to professionalize the military through a series of incremental steps (Diamond and Plattner 1996, xxx).

Moreover, the cases of Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey highlight the effect crises have on military intervention/withdrawal and the endurance of authoritarianism. A political, economic, or social crisis fueled conflict between politicians and the military. During these periods of
conflict, politicians turned to the military to quell violence and unrest; however, “[n]ot only must they [politicians] resist the temptation to turn to the military for support in situations of political conflict, or as an instrument of first resort to quell unruly domestic protests, but they must also repay respect with respect, granting the military the autonomy to conduct its training and operations and assign and promote its officers in accordance with professional standards and criteria, without political interference at the micro level” (Diamond and Plattner 1996, xxxiii). In effect, if given time, politicians and military officers will learn to trust one another once democratic institutions are given a chance to take root and military corporatism and professionalism respected.

**Implications for Further Research**

The possibilities for future research resulting from this study are both exciting and important for policymaking. Recent works on the endurance of authoritarianism in the Middle East focused on the democratization process, elections, and the role of political parties, and elites. One institution notably missing is the role of the military. Cook’s (2007) *Ruling But Not Governing* was a first step at examining the military’s use of elections to legitimize its rule, but as states like Turkey continue to modernize and further elections are held, continued work will be done to examine the continued presence of Islamism in politics.

Additionally, as part of the field of Security Sector Reform, examinations of leadership styles of general officers would be useful not just in the Middle East and South Asia, but in other parts of the Developing World to assist with the training of armed forces and politicians. The U.S. missions in Iraq and Afghanistan serve as a brutal reminder that, above all, nation-building is costly and time-consuming. As such, having a more nuanced understanding of what traits generals have and what images they hold of each other and politicians is important as the U.S.
and NATO remain engaged in nation-building vis-à-vis Iraq and Afghanistan. In fact, Welch (1992) argues, “Recipes for liberalization or democratization cooked up by external scholars…must be tested against the perceptual realities of disengaging officers. Such research requires major attention to perceptions of ‘politics’ and their relationship to intramilitary values and beliefs” (338). Accordingly, these values will be tested in future studies (pending additional funding) to test military elites’ and political elites’ perceptions of one another to build a framework of military intervention and withdrawal applicable to future cases, not just in the Middle East and South Asia, but throughout the world.

**Implications for Applicability**

A solid addition to the literature, this project has highlighted the factors, culled from the literature, to explain military intervention and withdrawal in the Middle East and South Asia. This study provides the foundation of a Praetorian framework; namely, the internal and external factors to look for, not just in the Middle East, but in other regions of the world to better understand military elites’ motivations, and the subsequent bureaucratic conflict, behind their desire to intervene and withdraw from politics. One notable future case could be Iran. In Iran, there exists a multiethnic, sectarian society, and growing divisions between conservatives and reformers in politics, as well as divisions within the elite Revolutionary Guard, who have seen their influence in Iranian politics grow in recent years.

In the end, understanding the process of military intervention and withdrawal is important because democratization and nation-building cannot happen unless one addresses the failure of political institutions. It is this failure that brings the military in on horseback, so to prevent this, or to hasten the return to the barracks, the strengthening of civil society, political institutions and processes is paramount. As Diamond and Plattner (1996) state in the epigraph above, militaries
intervene in politics when civilian politicians are weak and divided, and when their divisions and
manifest failures of governance have generated a vacuum of authority. Understanding how this
vacuum of authority was created in Algeria, Pakistan, and Turkey offers insight into how we
might begin to understand what factors will end the endurance of authoritarianism in the Middle
East and South Asia.
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APPENDIX

Alexander George Codebook for Conflict Between Military, Politicians & Society. Questions to be answered for each coup & years immediately preceding and following coups.

1. How many actors are involved in the decision to intervene and withdraw from politics?

2. What is the military’s view of the political process, of internal societal actors?

3. What are the military’s institutional & corporate interests? What are military elites’ interests? What are internal societal actors’ views of the military?

4. What is the level of bureaucratic politics? Is there bureaucratic confrontation or bureaucratic consensus-seeking?

5. What influence do international actors, such as the European Union, the United States or Russia, have on domestic politics?